Artemio Cruz, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Francisco Cruz Trujillo, Deceased, Appellant-Plaintiff v. City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, City of Beech Grove, and Beech Grove Police Department, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Artemio Cruz, as Personal Representative of the Estate (“the Estate”) of Francisco Cruz Trujillo (“Cruz Trujillo”) appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Beech Grove (“Beech Grove”) on the Estate's wrongful death claim, where the Estate failed to provide Beech Grove timely notice under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). The Estate argues summary judgment was improper, advancing three theories they contend would allow a tort claim against Beech Grove to proceed despite the Estate's untimely notice: (1) substantial compliance with the ITCA; (2) equitable estoppel; and (3) public policy concerns. Finding none of these theories applicable, we affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Beech Grove.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 9:30 p.m. on August 27, 2021, Cruz Trujillo was driving a vehicle in the metropolitan area of Indianapolis, which includes Beech Grove. An officer from the Beech Grove Police Department (“BGPD”) conducted a traffic stop of Cruz Trujillo on East Thompson Road, with assistance from two officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”). Because Cruz Trujillo lacked a driver's license, his vehicle was impounded. An associated incident report prepared by BGPD indicated that Cruz Trujillo “got a ride before [the] officers cleared the stop.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 110–11. After the vehicle was impounded, Cruz Trujillo apparently began walking along the road. About one hour later, IMPD officers responded to a fatal traffic accident on East Thompson Road, not far from the earlier traffic stop. They encountered Cruz Trujillo, who had been struck and killed by a vehicle. There is no indication that BGPD officers responded to the fatal vehicle accident.

[3] On September 14, 2021, the Estate sent IMPD a letter requesting a “Release of Information” regarding Cruz Trujillo's death. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. The letter specifically stated: “We understand that on [August 27, 2021], [ ] Cruz Trujillo had two separate encounters with IMPD officers in the area of East Thompson Road in Indianapolis, Indiana.” Id. (emphasis removed). The Estate sought “the entire investigative files, including any and all reports, statements, videos (including body cam footage), photographs, toxicology reports, etc. that [IMPD] ha[d] in its possession” regarding “both (1) the first encounter between [ ] Cruz Trujillo and IMPD officers, which resulted in his vehicle being impounded, and (2) the accident that occurred a short time later involving [ ] Cruz Trujillo[.]” Id. At that time, the Estate was unaware that BGPD had been involved in the traffic stop that preceded Cruz Trujillo's death.

[4] The next day, the Estate received a case report from IMPD regarding the fatal traffic accident (“the Accident Report”) but did not receive information about the traffic stop. At that point, the Estate failed to inquire as to why it had not been provided information about the traffic stop involving Cruz Trujillo, nor did it take any further action to obtain information about the traffic stop.

[5] On October 1, 2021, the Estate gave an ITCA notice to the City of Indianapolis, IMPD Chief Randal Taylor, Indianapolis Mayor Joe Hogsett, the Indiana Attorney General, and the Indiana Political Subdivision Risk Management Commission. In the ITCA notice, the Estate asked to be contacted if “some other agency or department should also be notified[.]” Id. at 103. On October 7, 2021, personnel from the City of Indianapolis electronically accessed and printed two documents—the Accident Report and a case report concerning the traffic stop (“the Stop Report”). The Stop Report contained an IMPD case number but listed BGPD as the “Incident Jurisdiction.” Id. at 110–11. The Stop Report included a narrative indicating that an officer from BGPD—not IMPD—conducted the stop and prepared the Stop Report. The Stop Report listed two IMPD officers as “Officers Involved” in the traffic stop. Id. at 111. On November 29, 2021, IMPD personnel provided the Estate with photos of the fatal vehicle accident but did not provide the Stop Report to the Estate.

[6] The 180-day notice period under the ITCA expired on February 23, 2022, by which point the Estate had not (1) received or obtained the Stop Report or (2) provided ITCA notice to the Beech Grove Defendants. On February 25, 2022, the Estate filed a wrongful death action against the City of Indianapolis and the driver who struck Cruz Trujillo. On March 4, 2022—approximately one week after the statutory notice period expired—an attorney from the Indianapolis Office of Corporation Counsel sent an email to counsel for the Estate. Attached to the email were “incident reports and information,” including the Stop Report, which the attorney provided “for ․ convenience.” Id. at 116. In the email, the attorney alerted the Estate to BGPD's involvement, writing: “I wanted to let you know that it was [BGPD] who pulled over your client, and impounded his vehicle[,] ․ [n]ot the City of Indianapolis[/]IMPD[,] although a few IMPD officers were on the scene.” Id. The attorney added: “[T]he [Stop Report] not[ed] that [Cruz Trujillo] was picked up from the scene by someone before officers even left. Thus, his ride was apparently short lived.” Id. The attorney stated that Beech Grove was “a separate municipal corporation” and that Indianapolis “ha[d] no control over ․ Beech Grove or its police department,” with “no duty to defend or indemnify the acts or omissions of their agents or employees.” Id. at 116. The attorney ultimately sought to get the City of Indianapolis and IMPD (collectively, “the Indianapolis Defendants”) “dismissed from the[ ] case as soon as possible.” Id.

[7] On March 23, 2022, the Estate sent a tort claim notice to the Beech Grove Defendants, which was styled as an amended notice. On June 7, 2023, the Estate filed an amended complaint that named the Indianapolis Defendants and the Beech Grove Defendants.¹ The Estate alleged the defendants were liable in tort because they negligently “le[ft] [Cruz Trujillo] on the side of the road with no transportation, which ultimately resulted in his death.” Id. at 175. The Estate later amended the complaint to add a federal section 1983 claim that resulted in removal of the case to federal court. In January 2024, the Estate amended the complaint to name only (1) Indianapolis, (2) Beech Grove, and (3) the BGPD officer who conducted the traffic stop. See Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 2–13. On May 16, 2024, the federal court resolved the Estate's section 1983 claim in favor of the defendants and relinquished jurisdiction over the remaining tort claim. See Appellant's App, Vol. II p. 167. The federal court then remanded the case to the Marion Superior Court, where Indianapolis and Beech Grove were the only remaining defendants.

[8] On July 8, 2024, Beech Grove filed a motion to dismiss due to untimely notice under the ITCA. The Estate designated evidence in response to the motion and Beech Grove designated evidence in reply, such that the trial court ultimately regarded Beech Grove's motion as a motion for summary judgment. The Estate opposed summary judgment, presenting three theories for allowing their claim: (1) the Estate substantially complied with the ITCA; (2) Beech Grove should be estopped from asserting untimely notice; and (3) it was ultimately contrary to public policy to dismiss the tort claim under the circumstances.

[9] The Estate's designated evidence included evidence of communications between BGPD and IMPD. Specifically, the designated evidence indicated that BGPD Captain Scott Ferrer (“Captain Ferrer”) contacted IMPD Detective Eric Snow (“Detective Snow”) “to inquire about whether there was body camera footage from the IMPD officers who responded to the traffic stop.” Id. at 147. This communication occurred “shortly after” Captain Ferrer learned that the BGPD officer's camera was not turned on during the stop. There was also an affidavit indicating that, shortly after Cruz Trujillo's death, BGPD Deputy Chief of Administration Robert Mercuri (“Deputy Chief Mercuri”) contacted Detective Snow about the traffic stop. See id. at 157–58. Deputy Chief Mercuri said he contacted Detective Snow to “determine whether [the BGPD officer] properly handled the stop” and “followed department policies and procedures,” or “whether training, counseling, or discipline was warranted.” Id. at 158. The designated evidence indicated that, on January 11, 2022—still within the 180-day notice period—Detective Snow e-mailed Deputy Chief Mercuri the toxicology results for Cruz Trujillo, writing: “The Coroner sent me the results of the [p]edestrian, [i.e., Cruz Trujillo,] so I thought I better forward [them to] you.” Id. at 123. Deputy Chief Mercuri said that, when he received the e-mail, he “was unaware that [the Estate] had served [Indianapolis] with a tort claim notice.” Id. at 158. Deputy Chief Mercuri said he “had no communications with IMPD or any Indianapolis employee, officer, or official concerning a tort claim notice served on Indianapolis” and that he “did not know of any tort claim notice concerning the ․ traffic stop and fatality” involving Cruz Trujillo “until Beech Grove was served with a tort claim notice in March 2022.” Id.

[10] On August 6, 2024, the trial court held a hearing, where Beech Grove argued that any alleged wrongdoing by Indianapolis was “not imputed to Beech Grove.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Beech Grove asserted that the designated evidence indicated that “Beech Grove had no contact with the Estate during the [ITCA notice] period,” and therefore, “did not do anything ․ to warrant ․ the consequence of losing the notice defense.” Id. The trial court took the matter under advisement. On October 31, 2024, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to Beech Grove. In the written order, the court expressly rejected the Estate's three theories for allowing the claim, writing: “The undisputed evidence ․ considered in a light most favorable to [the Estate] precludes application of estoppel or substantial compliance, and there is no public policy that the [trial court] c[ould] apply to excuse the untimely notice” to Beech Grove. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 58. The trial court ultimately identified no just reason for delay and designated its order as a final judgment under Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C). The Estate now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] The Estate claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Beech Grove due to the Estate's untimely notice under the ITCA. “We review the trial court's summary judgment decision de novo.” Z.D. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 217 N.E.3d 527, 531 (Ind. 2023). A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is ‘contrary evidence showing differing accounts of the truth,’ or when ‘conflicting reasonable inferences’ may be drawn from the parties’ consistent accounts and resolution of that conflict will affect the outcome of a claim.” Z.D., 217 N.E.3d at 532 (quoting Wilkes v. Celadon Grp., Inc., 177 N.E.3d 786, 789 (Ind. 2021)). “In viewing the matter through the same lens as the trial court, we construe all designated evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party.” Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 912 (Ind. 2017). “The party appealing the trial court's summary judgment determination bears the burden of persuading us the ruling was erroneous.” Id. at 913. However, in conducting our review, we “carefully scrutinize” the trial court's determination “to ensure that a party was not improperly prevented from having its day in court.” Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 908 (Ind. 2001).

[12] This case involves the ITCA, which provides that “a [tort] claim against a political subdivision is barred unless notice is filed with ․ the governing body of that political subdivision ․ within one hundred eighty (180) days after the loss occurs.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8(a). The ITCA notice requirement serves to inform political subdivisions “with reasonable certainty about the accident and the surrounding circumstances so the political subdivision may investigate, determine its liability, and prepare a defense.” Town of Cicero v. Sethi, 189 N.E.3d 194, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting City of Columbus v. Londeree, 145 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)). Moreover, by requiring timely notice, the ITCA ensures that a political subdivision can effectively take these steps “while the facts are still ‘fresh and available.’ ” Londeree, 145 N.E.2d at 833 (quoting Mills v. Haussmann-McNally, S.C., 55 F.Supp. 3d 1128, 1134 (S.D. Ind. 2014)).

[13] There are limited exceptions to the general rule that “a claim ․ is barred unless [timely] notice is filed” with the pertinent governing body. I.C. § 34-13-3-8 (a); see Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013) (noting that the ITCA is a statute in derogation of the common law and that, “so long as its essential purpose has been satisfied, it should not function as ‘a trap for the unwary’ ” (quoting Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 255 N.E.2d 225, 229 (1970)). Those limited exceptions include where the plaintiff substantially complied with the notice requirement, when the law recognizes waiver of the requirement, and when a party is equitably estopped from asserting untimely notice as a defense against a tort claim. See Brown v. Alexander, 876 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Although these theories “may allow a claim to proceed notwithstanding defective notice, the rationale for doing so is distinct.” Id. On appeal, the Estate advances theories of substantial compliance and equitable estoppel. The Estate also argues it was against public policy to dismiss their claim against Beech Grove. We address each of the Estate's contentions in turn.

1. Substantial Compliance

[14] The Estate argues it substantially complied with the ITCA notice requirement because it provided timely notice to the Indianapolis Defendants, which “concealed or did not provide evidence that would have identified [Beech Grove,]” and there was evidence that, before the notice period expired, IMPD shared information with BGPD about the fatal vehicle accident. Appellant's Br. p. 12. The Estate directs us to Schoettmer, where our Supreme Court noted that, “so long as the purpose of the ITCA's notice requirement is satisfied, “it should not function as a trap for the unwary.” 992 N.E.2d at 706 (quoting Galbreath, 255 N.E.2d at 229). The Estate also notes that, although substantial compliance is “not a question of fact but one of law,” our Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hat constitutes substantial compliance ․ is a fact-sensitive determination.” Id. at 707 (quoting Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989)).

[15] When it comes to the ITCA, “[s]ubstantial compliance concerns the notice's content, not its timing.” Lowe v. N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 177 N.E.3d 796, 801 (Ind. 2021); see also, e.g., Collier, 544 N.E.2d at 499 (“[N]otice is sufficient if it substantially complies with the content requirements of the statute.”). Thus, as a matter of law, untimely notice does not substantially comply with the notice requirement. Murphy v. Ind. State Univ., 153 N.E.3d 311, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Indeed, as we have explained: “Where a plaintiff, within the 180-day period, ‘fails to file any notice of an intent to make a claim, actual knowledge of the occurrence on the part of the [governmental entity], even when coupled with an investigation of the occurrence, will not suffice to prove substantial compliance.” Id. (quoting Town of Knightstown v. Wainscott, 70 N.E.3d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied). To establish substantial compliance, the plaintiff must have at least tried to serve notice on the proper governing body before the notice period expired. See Lowe, 177 N.E.3d at 801.

[16] Here, the Estate argues that, because it gave timely notice to the Indianapolis Defendants, it substantially complied with the requirement to give timely notice to Beech Grove. But, in Murphy, we rejected the argument that a party substantially complied with the ITCA notice requirement to give timely notice to a state university when, instead, the party gave timely notice to the Indiana Attorney General, noting that the university and the Attorney General were separate governmental entities without an agency relationship. 153 N.E.3d at 319. We distinguished our Supreme Court's Galbreath decision, where the plaintiff timely notified the city's legal department, but failed to notify the city's mayor. See id. In Galbreath, our Supreme Court determined the plaintiff substantially complied with the ITCA in light of a statute establishing that the legal department was the mayor's agent for certain purposes, among them, “to receive notice ․ of suits to be brought against the city.” 255 N.E.2d at 229.

[17] The Estate directs us to designated evidence of communications between IMPD and BGPD, which it claims demonstrated Beech Grove and Indianapolis “were working together and on notice of both liability and damages as it relate[d] to this incident[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 13. However, in Murphy, we pointed out that an entity's knowledge of an incident is not sufficient to establish substantial compliance, and that “[t]here [was] no evidence that [the university] or an agent of [the university] had any indication of [the plaintiff's] intent to file a notice of tort claim within the 180-day statutory window.” 153 N.E.3d at 320. In this case, the designated evidence indicated that the communications were for internal review purposes, and Deputy Chief Mercuri confirmed he learned the Estate intended to bring any tort claim only when the Estate belatedly notified Beech Grove.

[18] Although the designated evidence reflected communication and cooperation between the separate governmental entities, this evidence was insufficient to establish that timely notice to the Indianapolis Defendants was equivalent to giving timely notice to Beech Grove so as to satisfy the purpose of the notice requirement or otherwise amount to substantial compliance. Because the Estate made no attempt to notify Beech Grove during the statutory period to do so, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the Estate did not substantially comply with the ITCA notice requirement.

II. Equitable Estoppel

[19] Next, the Estate argues Beech Grove should be equitably estopped from claiming untimely notice. The Estate argues estoppel applied because the Indianapolis Defendants allegedly concealed Beech Grove's involvement in the traffic stop by failing to provide the Stop Report upon the Estate's request and, as a result, the Estate was prevented from giving timely notice to Beech Grove.

[20] “All forms of estoppel are ‘based on the same underlying principle: one who by deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position, attitude, or course of conduct that causes injury to such other.’ ” Londeree, 145 N.E.3d at 833. Generally, the party claiming estoppel must establish “(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.” Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 709. Critically, this doctrine requires conduct by the party against whom estoppel is asserted—here, Beech Grove. See id. Indeed, an entity “will not be estopped in the absence of clear evidence that its agents made representations upon which the party asserting estoppel relied.” Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown Cnty. Area Plan Comm'n, 819 N.E.2d 55, 67 (Ind. 2004); see also Londeree, 145 N.E.3d at 833.

[21] Equitable estoppel can be based on active or passive fraudulent concealment. Lyons v. Richmond Cmty. School Corp., 19 N.E.3d, 260–61 (Ind. 2014). Active concealment requires that the defendant have had actual knowledge of the alleged wrongful act and intentionally concealed it from the plaintiff by making some statement or taking some action calculated to prevent inquiry or to mislead, where the plaintiff relied on that defendant's statement or action. Id. Passive fraudulent concealment, meanwhile, requires “(1) a relationship between the parties such that the defendant has a duty to disclose the alleged wrongful act to the plaintiff and (2) a breach of that duty.” Id. at 261. This type of relationship generally arises only when the defendant had a special relationship with the plaintiff. D.H. ex rel. A.M.J. v. Whipple, 103 N.E.3d 1119, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. For example, a physician owes a special duty to their patient, see, e.g., Biedron v. Anonymous Physician 1, 106 N.E.3d 1079, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied, and a grandparent owes a special duty to their grandchild. See, e.g., D.H., 103 N.E.3d at 1130–31.

[22] Here, the Estate's estoppel argument fails because the Estate relies entirely on the conduct of the Indianapolis Defendants, not Beech Grove.² Indeed, the designated evidence reflected no communication whatsoever between the Estate and Beech Grove prior to the ITCA notice deadline. The Estate's information request and original tort claim notice were solely directed to the Indianapolis Defendants. In Londeree, we rejected a theory of estoppel under similar circumstances, where the plaintiff sought to estop a city from claiming untimely notice, but the plaintiff was relying on the acts of a third party. 145 N.E.3d at 833–35. In rejecting the theory, we explained that estoppel operates to deter the defendant from making representations that induce reliance, then taking a position inconsistent with the representation, and this purpose is not served by estopping a party based on the representations of a third party over whom the defendant lacked control. Id. at 836. The same reasoning applies here; estoppel due to active fraudulent concealment is not supported because the Estate is relying on evidence that a third-party failed to properly disclose information to the Estate, not that Beech Grove ever failed to do so. There was no evidence that Beech Grove knew of the Estate's requests for information from the Indianapolis Defendants, let alone in any way directed them to withhold information from the Estate. Instead, there was designated evidence that Deputy Chief Mercuri “did not know of any tort claim notice concerning the ․ traffic stop and fatality” as to the Indianapolis Defendants or otherwise “until Beech Grove was served with a tort claim notice in March 2022.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 158. Furthermore, with respect to any theory of passive concealment, the Estate has not alleged a special relationship existed.

[23] Because the Estate's estoppel theory relies on alleged acts of the Indianapolis Defendants—which are not the parties to be estopped—the Estate did not establish that Beech Grove is equitably estopped from claiming untimely notice.

III. Public Policy

[24] The Estate argues that overriding principles of public policy should excuse the Estate's failure to provide timely notice to Beech Grove. See Appellant's Br. pp. 13–14. The Estate refers to the Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”), arguing the Indianapolis Defendants had a “legal duty” under APRA to provide a complete response to the Estate's request for information about the traffic stop with Cruz Trujillo. Id. at 13. The Estate alleges the Indianapolis Defendants’ failure to comply with APRA prevented it from learning of Beech Grove's involvement within the ITCA notice period. According to the Estate, the only way to ensure timely service would be to “file tort claim notices to every police department and city in the state just to avoid concealment in cases where a police interaction happens in a neighboring jurisdiction.” Id.at 12.

[25] We find this argument unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the Estate has not identified an established public policy exception to the notice requirement based on one government entity's alleged failure to respond fully to a records request that might have identified another entity's involvement. Moreover, the established circumstances under which the notice defense can be lost—estoppel, waiver, and substantial compliance—already reflect a balancing of government interests and fairness to tort claimants. See Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 706–10. Second, although the Estate asserts that the Indianapolis Defendants were obligated to provide a complete response to their information request, APRA itself provides specific remedies to a party who does not receive requested information. Under APRA, a denial of a request occurs when an agency fails to respond to a written request for information within seven days of receipt. I.C. § 5-14-3-9(c). If a person was denied access to public records, the person may seek an opinion from the Public Access Counselor, who must provide an opinion within thirty days. See I.C. ch. 5-14-5. In the alternative, the person may sue to compel disclosure of the records, and APRA directs courts to expedite such actions. I.C. § 5-14-3-9(e), (l).

[26] Finally, it is worth noting that, even without resorting to any formal remedy available under APRA, nothing prevented the Estate from informally following up with the Indianapolis Defendants when the Estate received a partial response to its information request that omitted records of a traffic stop the Estate already knew occurred. Indeed, the Estate's initial request specifically sought information about IMPD involvement in two matters on August 27, 2021, i.e., the traffic stop and the investigation of the fatal vehicle accident. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. The record reflects that the Estate received the incomplete response to its information request on September 15, 2021, which was approximately five months before the ITCA notice deadline expired.

[27] Given these circumstances, we cannot say the Estate established that public policy compelled excusing its noncompliance with the ITCA requirement.

Conclusion

[28] Contrary to the ITCA, the Estate did not provide timely notice of a tort claim to Beech Grove. Because the doctrines of substantial compliance and equitable estoppel do not apply, and because the Estate has not otherwise established that overriding public policy considerations compel excusing noncompliance with the notice requirement, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Beech Grove.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Other previously named defendants were no longer part of the litigation.

2.   To the extent the Estate raises public policy concerns about their inability in this instance to rely on the conduct of the Indianapolis Defendants to support estoppel, we address those concerns in the next section.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.