Johnthan Quarles, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Johnthan Quarles was convicted of Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, for which he received a sentence of nineteen years – seventeen executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and two on Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC). Quarles presents the following restated issues on appeal:

1. Did the admission into evidence of two demonstrative exhibits amount to fundamental error?

2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the conviction?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when sentencing Quarles?

4. Did the trial court improperly order Quarles to pay restitution?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Around early 2019, Aaron Jones began running a business, dubbed the High Culture, out of the basement of his Indianapolis home. Jones sold clothing, shoes, hats, and collectibles. He was working “all the time” to grow his business, and he promoted it by word of mouth and online. Transcript Vol. 2 at 110. Jones also sold marijuana out of his basement.

[4] Jones's customers used a side door to the home, where they could head directly down to the basement rather than through the main floor, where he lived with his girlfriend, Marcia Steinmeyer, and her young son. Because of his living circumstances, he was careful about allowing customers into his basement to shop. That is, strangers had to be accompanied and vouched for by someone Jones trusted.

[5] Quarles had been friends with Jones since grade school, and the two worked together at FedEx in 2017. Quarles had visited Jones's home more than one hundred times since 2017. Around early 2019, Quarles and Jones had a falling out that lasted several months. They reconciled by the fall of 2019, and Quarles began coming to the house again, though they “weren't as close” as before and the visits were not as often. Id. at 135. Quarles also bought marijuana from Jones, which Quarles then sold to others.

[6] At 3:36 p.m. on November 21, 2019, Nathan Hummel, Jones's close friend, came to Jones's home to pick up some shoes he was buying. Hummel immediately noticed something was wrong, as the gate was left open in the wrong direction and the side door was open. Jones did not respond when Hummel yelled from the open door. Hummel then entered the home with his father-in-law, James Wallace, who had been waiting in the car. Hummel went into the main area of the house and found Steinmeyer's three-year-old son in a bedroom, as Wallace went to the basement and found Jones dead. Hummel immediately called 911.

[7] Jones had been shot nine times, including in his head, face, chest, neck, right palm, and abdomen. The subsequent investigation determined that all the shots came from the same .40 caliber firearm, which was never recovered. There were signs of a struggle. The evidence also suggested that Jones was initially shot near the merchandise display section of his basement and then several more times in another area, where he died slumped against a wall behind a bar. Jones had $597 cash in his pocket.

[8] About a week or two before his death, Jones had installed a Ring Doorbell camera at his side entrance, as well as his front door. When activated by motion, the camera would record video for thirty seconds. For a period of time thereafter, while the video footage was being uploaded for storage, the camera would be unable to record additional motion. This reset period could take about thirty seconds.

[9] Based on the Ring Doorbell recordings from the day of the shooting, Quarles was identified as a suspect. The first relevant recording showed Jones arriving home with Steinmeyer's son at 1:45 p.m. Jones had a red and white Jordan backpack with him, which he had received from his parents. This backpack had sentimental value to him, and Steinmeyer testified that he would not even let her use it. Hummel described Jones as “always” having “his Jordan bag on him where he would keep his business essentials[.]” Id. at 108.

[10] At 2:16 p.m. an unidentified man arrived and was let in the side door by Jones. This man left at 2:38 p.m. carrying a small brown box.

[11] Thereafter, at 3:07 p.m., Quarles was recorded walking up the driveway followed by another man, later identified as Gabriel West, whom Jones did not know but was expecting to come with Quarles. Jones greeted the men from the side door. After entering the fenced area, West closed the gate and appeared to try not to touch it with his hands. He also used his elbow to hold the side door open as he entered. Quarles carried two bottles of Mountain Dew and a cell phone as he arrived, and Jones had two unopened beers.

[12] The next thirty-second recording began about three minutes later. It shows Quarles exiting the fenced area through the gate, carrying two backpacks, one of which was the red and white Jordan backpack. Quarles walked quickly down the driveway out of view of the camera and then returned, about ten seconds later, without the backpacks. Quarles was followed closely by another man, who was carrying a large empty duffel bag. The video ends as Quarles walks toward the gate. Right before this, what is believed to be two gunshots can be heard on the recording.

[13] There are no additional recordings until Hummel's arrival twenty-six minutes later. That is, the Ring Doorbell cameras did not record West, Quarles, or the third man, who was never identified, leaving the property. This might be due to the system's reset period.

[14] Detectives were unable to locate Quarles until February 27, 2020,¹ when he was found at his mother's Indianapolis residence and taken into custody. Quarles gave a statement that day and, when shown a picture of West, did not identify him as anyone he knew. He gave another statement on July 28, 2021, and this time he identified West.

[15] In the meantime, on March 3, 2020, the State charged Quarles with felony murder and Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. Quarles – alongside West – was tried by jury in September 2021. He testified in his own defense, which we summarize in part as follows. Quarles claimed that he had spoken to Jones multiple times that day to plan a visit to purchase marijuana. During a video chat between Quarles and Jones, West joined in and arranged to come with Quarles to look at shoes. Quarles then drove West and another man, whom Quarles claimed to have never met before, to Jones's home, after stopping to pick up Mountain Dew and a pack of Swishers as Jones had requested. According to Quarles, once he and West were in the basement, Jones, who had a gun out on the bar stand, directed West toward his shoe inventory while Quarles gave Jones $550 for a quarter pound of marijuana, and Jones fronted Quarles a second quarter pound. Quarles claimed that Jones had the marijuana preloaded in two separate backpacks that Jones was lending to him. After taking the backpacks to his car, Quarles testified that he was returning to the basement for his Mountain Dew and though he knew the third man was following him, Quarles claimed to be unaware of the big duffel bag he was carrying. Quarles said he heard what sounded like a gunshot and then saw, from the top of the stairs, West and Jones fighting and West with a gun. Without going down, Quarles heard more gunshots and then ran to the car and waited, while the third man ran down to the basement. Shortly thereafter, West and the other man jumped in the car and Quarles drove off. Quarles claimed that he felt threatened by the men and dropped them off at a location as demanded. They took the backpacks as they left. Quarles acknowledged meeting up with West later that night and then moving out of his girlfriend's apartment and not returning to work.

[16] Ultimately, the jury found Quarles not guilty of felony murder but guilty of robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. West, on the other hand, was found guilty of murder (both intentional murder and felony murder) and robbery.

[17] Quarles's conviction was overturned on direct appeal based on the improper admission of evidence. Quarles v. State, 201 N.E.3d 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (mem.), trans. denied. Finding that the robbery conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, this court remanded for a new trial on that count.

[18] The second jury trial on the robbery count was held on May 20-21, 2024. This time Quarles did not testify, but an audio recording of the testimony from the first trial was admitted into evidence through the State. Detective Leslie VanBuskirk testified that Quarles's story had “evolved” over time and that there were “a large number of inconsistencies amongst all his statements[.]” Transcript Vol. 2 at 230, 239. These inconsistencies included details regarding who put the marijuana in the backpacks, when Quarles first saw the gun produced, and when he first saw West with the gun.² During his first statement, Quarles also did not mention the video chat involving West. Instead, Quarles simply reported to Detective VanBuskirk that he had asked the two men if they “wanted to ride with him” because “they seemed trustworthy to him[.]” Id. at 240. The State also presented evidence that Quarles's fingerprint was found inside of a shoe box located on the ground at the bottom of the basement stairs near two toppled-over bottles of Mountain Dew. Further, the evidence showed that from the top of the stairs, Quarles would not have been able to see the areas of the basement where Jones was shot.

[19] This second jury found Quarles guilty of Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. On June 21, 2024, the trial court sentenced Quarles to nineteen years, with seventeen served in the DOC followed by two years on MCCC.

[20] Quarles now appeals his conviction and sentence. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

1. Quarles waived his argument that the admission of certain demonstrative exhibits constituted fundamental error.

[21] Based on her training and experience, Detective VanBuskirk testified that a quarter pound (or four ounces) is not a particularly large amount of marijuana. The State then offered into evidence two exhibits that Detective VanBuskirk agreed would “help [her] be able to show and explain to the jury what we're talking about when we say a QP of a green leafy substance[.]” Transcript Vol. 2 at 227. Exhibit 95 was a Ziplock bag of grass clippings weighing four ounces and Exhibit 96 was a five-ounce, store-bought jar of dill weed. When defense counsel expressly indicated “[n]o objection” to the exhibits, the trial court admitted them into evidence for demonstrative purposes only. Id.

[22] Recognizing that he did not object to the demonstrative exhibits below, Quarles now argues that their admission amounted to fundamental error. The fundamental error exception to the waiver rule is “extremely narrow” and “available only in egregious circumstances.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). It applies where “the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. Further, “we will not review claims, even for fundamental error, when appellants expressly declare at trial that they have no objection.” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Ind. 2017) (citing Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 678-79).

[23] As Quarles expressly stated that he had no objection to the admission of these exhibits, we will not review his claim of fundamental error. See id.

2. Sufficient evidence supports Quarles's conviction for robbery.

[24] Quarles argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review in this regard is well-settled:

When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022). “When there are conflicts in the evidence, the jury must resolve them.” Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022). Thus, on appeal, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the conviction and will affirm “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1138 (quoting Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016)).

Sorgdrager v. State, 208 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In sum, the evidence does not need to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from the evidence to support the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).

[25] To convict Quarles of robbery as charged, the State was required to prove that he knowingly took a backpack and/or marijuana from Jones by using or threatening the use of force and that the offense resulted in serious bodily injury to Jones. See Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a)(1); Appendix Vol. III at 69.

[26] Quarles's sufficiency argument centers on whether there was a taking from Jones. He claims that the evidence showed that he paid $550 for the marijuana and that Jones loaned him the backpacks to transport the two quarter-pound quantities of marijuana. In this regard, he points to his own testimony from the first trial and the $597 found in Jones's pocket at the scene.

[27] The State's theory was that Quarles, along with West, robbed Jones of marijuana, backpacks, and likely other items and that the robbery went sideways when West shot Jones as Quarles was returning with the third individual, who was carrying a large empty tote bag. The Ring Doorbell videos show West suspiciously avoiding touching the gate and door upon arrival and then Quarles leaving minutes later carrying two backpacks out of the house. One of the backpacks – the red and white Jordan backpack – had sentimental value to Jones, such that he did not even let his girlfriend use it. Further, one could reasonably infer that two backpacks were not needed in order to carry two quarter-pound quantities of marijuana, which Detective VanBuskirk described as not large amounts.³

[28] Quarles acknowledged that Jones was particular about who he let into his house, that Quarles had never brought a stranger to Jones's house, and that Quarles himself did not even know the identity of the third man. Yet immediately after placing the backpacks in his car, Quarles returned to the house followed by this man, who was carrying a large bag. As they made their way up the driveway, Quarles heard what he believed to be a gunshot (in fact, two gunshots could be heard on the video) and continued walking toward the house, seemingly unfazed. After seeing West with a gun and hearing more shots once inside, Quarles, by his own account, then went to the car and waited until West and the third man returned to the car. They then sped away.

[29] Quarles argues that the State relied solely on “uncertain and speculative evidence” and “stacked inferences” to rebut his claims that he paid for the marijuana and was borrowing the backpacks. Appellant's Brief at 17; Appellant's Reply Brief at 6. He notes that Hummel and Steinmeyer were not present and therefore could not testify as to whether Jones loaned the bags to Quarles. And he claims that one would have to speculate regarding whether the two amounts of marijuana could have fit in a single backpack.

[30] We reject Quarles's invitation to reweigh the evidence. He presented these same arguments to the jury, and the jury rejected them. As our Supreme Court has explained, “a jury may be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, by looking at ‘a web of facts in which no single strand may be dispositive.’ ” Young, 198 N.E.3d at 1176 (quoting Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. 1998)). The web of facts here sufficiently establishes a taking.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of aggravating sentencing factors.

[31] Quarles next claims that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in its consideration of certain aggravating circumstances.

“[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). When imposing a sentence for a felony offense, a trial court must enter a sentencing statement explaining the reasons it imposed a particular sentence. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter this statement, by overlooking reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or by considering reasons that are not supported by the record or are improper.

Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d 712, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[32] In sentencing Quarles, the trial court found as aggravating that the harm suffered by Jones was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the offense, that a child was present in the home during the offense, that Quarles committed a new offense while incarcerated awaiting trial, and that he violated the trust of a friend. In mitigation, the court found that Quarles did not have a criminal history before committing the robbery and that his imprisonment will cause undue hardship to his dependents.

[33] Quarles contends that the record does not support the trial court's finding of the greater harm or trust of a friend aggravators. We will address each in turn.

[34] Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) provides that a court may consider as an aggravating circumstance that injury suffered by the victim of the offense was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense. For the robbery conviction in this case, the State was required to prove that the offense resulted in serious bodily injury to Jones. Serious bodily injury is an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, unconsciousness, extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-292. Here, Jones was brutally shot nine times and died during a robbery that Quarles committed with West. While Quarles did not pull the trigger or intend for Jones to be killed, the jury clearly found that he acted in concert with West in robbing Jones and that the robbery resulted in Jones being shot multiple times. In other words, it matters not that Quarles was acquitted of murder; the serious bodily injury caused during the robbery still resulted in Jones's death. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the greater harm suffered by Jones.

[35] Regarding the position of trust aggravator, Quarles argues that his relationship with Jones was not the type of relationship that supports this aggravator. He downplays his friendship with Jones and directs us to Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1198 (Ind. 1996), where our Supreme Court found that the defendant was not in a position of trust with the murder victim, her neighbor. The Court explained:

Being in a “position of trust” with the victim has certainly been considered a valid aggravating circumstance by Indiana courts in the past. A review of those cases, however, indicates that the relationship between the perpetrator and victim has usually been closer and more involved than that between Edgecomb and Motylewski. For example, in Wesby v. State, 535 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 1989), the defendant was convicted of robbing and murdering a woman who had known the defendant since childhood, as she had formerly been the girlfriend of the defendant's father․.

Edgecomb was not in a “position of trust” with Motylewski as that term is used in [ ] previous cases. Edgecomb was merely a neighbor who occasionally borrowed things from Motylewski's and casually conversed with her when they would see each other. Being a “neighbor” may encompass a higher degree of societal relationship and philial responsibility than that of “stranger” or “acquaintance,” but such a relationship, without more, is not a “position of trust” warranting its consideration as an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, Motylewski did not “trust” Edgecomb at all. She told Edgecomb never to visit her again because of Edgecomb's earlier theft of Motylewski's money.

Id.

[36] The facts here are easily distinguishable from Edgecomb. Jones and Quarles had been friends since early childhood, and Quarles indicated that he had visited Jones's home more than one hundred times since 2017. While they had a disagreement earlier in 2019, they reconciled before the robbery. More importantly, Quarles used his friendship with Jones so that West would be welcomed into Jones's basement. As the State argued at sentencing, “the only reason Gabriel West was allowed to go into that home is because Johnthan Quarles took him there and vouched for him.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 70. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Quarles's abuse of his position of trust as Jones's friend. See Reyes v. State, 828 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming trial court's use of position of trust aggravator where victim was defendant's friend and used that relationship to gain access to the victim's home), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 848 N.E.2d 1081, 1083 (Ind. 2006).

4. The trial court did not err in ordering Quarles to pay restitution for Jones's funeral expenses.

[37] Finally, Quarles challenges the trial court's restitution order making him and West jointly and severally liable for $5000 of Jones's funeral expenses. Quarles contends that this was improper because he was acquitted of murder.

[38] “Because restitution is penal in nature, the statute governing it must be strictly construed against the State in order to avoid enlarging it by intendment or implication beyond the fair meaning of the language used.” Martin v. State, 784 N.E.2d 997, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[39] Ind. Code § 35-50-3(a) provides in relevant part:

[T]he court may ․ order the person to make restitution to the victim of the crime, the victim's estate, or the family of a victim who is deceased. The court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of:

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(5) funeral, burial, or cremation costs incurred by the family or estate of a homicide victim as a result of the crime.

Quarles argues that Jones was West's homicide victim, not his, because only West was convicted of murdering Jones.

[40] In Martin, the defendant was acquitted by a jury of murder but convicted of battery. As the battery caused the victim's death, the trial court ordered him to pay the victim's funeral expenses as restitution. On appeal, the defendant argued that this award was improper because the victim was not a “homicide victim” since the defendant was acquitted of murder. In rejecting this argument, we explained:

This Court addressed this issue in Utley v. State, 699 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.[4] In Utley, the defendant was charged with reckless homicide and leaving the scene of an accident for running over his former girlfriend with his car. The jury found the defendant guilty of leaving the scene of an accident․. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the victim's funeral expenses because a trial court can only order a defendant convicted of a homicide to pay funeral expenses. In addressing this issue, this Court first noted that Indiana Code § 35-50-5-3(a) “simply list[s] the considerations the trial court must make in fashioning a restitution order.” Id. at 729. The court refused to interpret subsection (a)(5) to limit a trial court's authority to require a defendant to pay a victim's funeral expenses to cases involving convictions for homicides. Rather, the court held that “restitution is properly ordered payable to those shown to have suffered injury, harm or loss as a direct and immediate result of the criminal acts of the defendant.” Id. However, because the jury convicted the defendant of failing to stop at the scene of an accident, and not reckless homicide, the court said that it was apparent that the victim was an accident victim and not a victim of a crime. Therefore, the court concluded that no funeral expenses were incurred by the victim's estate because of the defendant's failure to stop at the scene of the accident.

Here, however, Joshua was convicted of battery as a Class C felony for beating Walker. And Joshua does not dispute that Walker died as a result of the injuries that he caused. Because Walker's family suffered financial loss as a direct and immediate result of Joshua's criminal act, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Joshua to pay Walker's funeral expenses.

Martin, 784 N.E.2d at 1014-15 (some citations omitted) (emphases added).

[41] Likewise, in this case, Jones's death was a direct and immediate result of the robbery Quarles and West committed together. As we have explained, “the restitution statute and case law do not require that a victim's injury or loss be directly or solely ‘caused’ by a defendant; instead, they require the victim's injury or loss be a ‘result of’ the defendant's crime.” Postiglione v. State, 84 N.E.3d 659, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding restitution order that was based on injuries directly caused by a codefendant rather than the defendant), trans. denied. Quarles's argument that the restitution order was not authorized by the statute is without merit.

[42] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After the shooting, Quarles had moved out of his girlfriend's apartment and not returned to work.

2.   Detective VanBuskirk acknowledged that Quarles had consistently reported that he paid Jones $550 for a quarter pound of marijuana and then took the backpacks to his car.

3.   Pictures from the scene showed an abundance of empty shipping boxes in the basement, and there was a video of an earlier visitor leaving the home carrying such a box.

4.   Utley was abrogated on other grounds by Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173 (Ind. 2017).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Brown and Tavitas concur. Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.