MOORE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Dion Moore and his companions attacked and captured Curtis Shelby, who was attempting to sell Moore's previously-stolen car. One of Moore's companions fatally shot Shelby as he tried to flee.

[2] Moore appeals his convictions of aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder and Level 2 felony aiding, inducing or causing robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. He argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aiding in felony murder. Concluding that the trial court did not commit instructional error and that the State presented sufficient evidence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the night of June 4, 2022, Moore's car, a blue Buick Riviera, was stolen. On June 5, Moore learned his car had been advertised for sale on Facebook. The ad, which included a photo of the Buick, was posted by Danielle Ramsey's account. Ramsey is Curtis Shelby's mother.

[4] That afternoon, Moore sent a message to Ramsey's account to ask if the car was still available. When no one responded, Moore said, “Aight [sic] bitch when I find out [where you are] that's yo [sic] ass[.]” Tr. Ex. Vol. p. 92. A few minutes later, he added, “Ima [sic] drag yo [sic] ass up n [sic] down the street[.]” Id. Moore then called her an “[u]gly bum ass bitch[.]” Id.

[5] Later that afternoon, Moore posted on Facebook about the ad, asking his Facebook friends to inform him if they knew Ramsey. One of Moore's contacts, identified only as “Vic,” messaged Moore to say that an unidentified man knew “the chick that posted the whip.” Tr. Ex. Vol., pp. 107-08. A “whip” is a slang term for a car. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 127. Vic added, “We might as well rob him[.]” Tr. Ex. Vol., p. 108. Moore responded, “On me” and “I will fr lbs.” Id. “Fr” means “for real” and “lbs” means “laughing but serious.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 129.

[6] On June 6, Moore asked Jerry Cudjoe for help. Cudjoe used an app called Text Now to create an account, and Moore used the account to contact the seller of the Buick, pretending to be an interested buyer. They arranged to meet that night at a gas station to discuss the sale.

[7] Moore and Cudjoe contacted Moore's cousin, Treyveon Moore (“Treyveon”), a “close friend” of Moore's known as Rahim, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 200, and Keith Lowe, who was dating Treyveon's mother. The group agreed to meet at the gas station to retrieve the car.

[8] That night, the men arrived at the gas station in several cars. Cudjoe brought a handgun. The blue Buick was not present. Moore, Cudjoe, and Rahim parked in a lot behind the gas station, while Treyveon and Lowe parked at the gas station in Lowe's car. Shelby approached Lowe to ask whether he was there to buy a car. Lowe said he was, and when Shelby said the car was nearby, he told Shelby to go get it. Lowe called Moore to describe Shelby's clothing, and Treyveon walked over to the lot where Moore, Cudjoe, and Rahim were parked. Cudjoe gave Treyveon his handgun.

[9] Shelby walked near the group's location in the lot, and they confronted him. He fell to the ground, and Moore and others repeatedly kicked his face, shoulders, and back. Cudjoe saw Rahim holding a handgun. Treyveon went through Shelby's pockets and found car keys, which he gave to Moore. By this time, Lowe had driven his car over to the lot.

[10] Shelby told his attackers where the Buick was parked, and Moore's group escorted him there. Treyveon and Cudjoe walked with Shelby, while Moore, Lowe, and Rahim followed in their vehicles. Treyveon was still armed with Cudjoe's handgun. To Cudjoe, Shelby appeared to be frightened and was looking around for an escape route.

[11] The group arrived at the intersection of 33rd Street and Marshall Avenue, which was a residential neighborhood several blocks from the gas station. One person was working in his garage when the group passed his house, and he watched as the group came to a stop down the street.

[12] The Buick was parked near the intersection. Moore, Lowe, and Rahim got out of their cars, and Moore walked over to the Buick. Shelby began to run away, and one of the men said, “Shoot him.” Id. at 154. Treyveon saw Rahim draw a handgun.

[13] The man watching from his garage saw a person in the group shoot at another person. After the gunshots, Moore drove off in the Buick, and the other men left in various vehicles. A security camera at the entrance to the apartment complex where Moore lived showed that his Buick entered the complex soon after the shooting, along with Lowe's and Cudjoe's cars.

[14] Meanwhile, Graylin Watson was at his home near the intersection of 33rd Street and Marshall Avenue when he heard a noise outside. He looked out of a window and saw a man running by, “clenched over.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 46. Watson went outside and found the man on the ground in his yard, covered in blood. He flagged down a passing police officer, who requested backup. Another officer arrived and determined the man was dead. The police identified him as Shelby. An autopsy revealed Shelby had been shot in the left side of his chest, piercing his heart. Shelby also had blunt force injuries on his body, including his head and neck.

[15] On June 8, 2022, an officer found the blue Buick in a rural area, parked near a soccer field. It was later taken into police custody and released to Moore. During questioning by police on July 13, 2022, Moore denied that he had found the car on the night of the murder, and he denied being in the area of the shooting.

[16] During an October 3, 2023 police interrogation, Moore could not explain why the security camera recorded his Buick entering his apartment complex after the shooting. Moore initially denied gathering with Cudjoe or Lowe that night, but he later admitted that he and Cudjoe had been at the gas station, looking for the Buick. He claimed that he did not see the car, and he and Cudjoe left.

[17] In a final police interview on January 9, 2024, Moore presented a different version of events. He conceded that he, Rahim, Treyveon, Lowe, and Cudjoe went to the gas station and confronted Shelby. Moore also acknowledged that some of his companions knocked Shelby to the ground and kicked him. He then said the group escorted Shelby to the Buick's location, where Rahim shot Shelby while Moore was walking to his car.

[18] The State charged Moore with: Count I, aiding, inducing, or causing murder, a felony; Count II, aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder, a felony; Count III, Level 2 felony aiding, inducing, or causing robbery resulting in serious bodily injury; and other charges not relevant to this appeal. The jury determined Moore was not guilty on Count I, but was guilty on Counts II and III. The trial court imposed a sentence, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Jury Instruction – Aiding, Inducing, or Causing an Offense

[19] Moore argues the trial court's jury instruction on aiding, inducing, or causing an offense, also known as accomplice liability, was incorrect and misled the jury. Instructing the jury is within the discretion of the trial court. Green v. State, 937 N.E.2d 923, 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We reverse only for an abuse of discretion, which occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Birk v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1090, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “When evaluating jury instructions on appeal, we look to whether the tendered instructions correctly state the law, whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the instruction, and whether the substance of the proffered instruction is covered by other instructions.” Mathews v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1172, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “We do not reverse the trial court unless the instructions as a whole misstate the law or mislead the jury.” Randall v. State, 115 N.E.3d 526, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[20] The trial court's final jury instruction on accomplice liability was as follows:

I.C. 35-41-2-4. Aiding, [i]nducing, or causing an offense.

A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person:

l. Has not been prosecuted for the offense.

2. Has not been convicted of the offense; or

3. Has been acquitted of the offense.

A further, although non-statutory, explanation of ‘aiding, inducing, or causing’ is as follows:

The acts of one person are attributable to all who are knowingly or intentionally acting together during the commission of a crime. Accordingly, although the state need not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant personally, and acting by himself, committed all of the elements of the crime or crimes with which he is charged, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly or intentionally engaged is [sic] some affirmative conduct aiding, inducing, or causing another person to commit the charged crime or crimes, and that the defendant and another person or persons knowing [sic] or intentionally acting together committed all of the elements of the crime or crimes with which the defendant is charged. To be found guilty, a person does not have to personally participate in the crime, nor does he have to be present when the crime was committed. Merely being present at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to prove that a person aided, induced, or caused the crime. Failure to oppose the commission of the crime is also insufficient to prove aiding, inducing, or causing another to commit the crime. However, presence at the scene of the crime and failure to oppose the crime's commission are factors, which may be considered in determining whether there was aiding, inducing, or causing another to commit the crime.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 190-91.¹

[21] The trial court must instruct jurors on all matters of law that are necessary for their information in reaching their verdict. Peterson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). On the subject of aiding an offense, the jury must be instructed that accomplice liability requires proof that the defendant engaged in voluntary conduct in concert with an accomplice. Green, 937 N.E.2d at 929. Here, the trial court's instruction accurately states the key elements of accomplice liability, including proof of voluntary conduct in concert with others. See id. at 930 (instruction on aiding an offense, read as a whole, correctly instructed jury on applicable law).

[22] Moore claims the trial court's instruction was confusing and contradictory because it told the jury that (1) a defendant's mere presence at the scene of a crime or failure to oppose a crime is insufficient to prove the offense but (2) mere presence and failure to oppose are factors to be considered.² This language tracks the Indiana Supreme Court's explanation of accomplice liability in Echols v. State, 722 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ind. 2000). Given that the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, we do not conclude the instruction was contradictory or confusing. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on accomplice liability.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Aiding Felony Murder

[23] Moore argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aiding, inducing, or causing another to commit felony murder. “For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact.” O'Connor v. State, 234 N.E.3d 242, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. “We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[24] Generally, there is no distinction between the liability of an accomplice and a principal, as one who aids another in committing a crime is just as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citations omitted), trans. denied. There does not have to be evidence the defendant participated in every element of the underlying offense to convict him as an accomplice. Id. The defendant's presence at the scene of the crime may be considered, along with the defendant's relation to the one engaged in the crime and the defendant's actions before, during and after the commission of the crime. Green, 937 N.E.2d at 927.

[25] In Moore's case, to obtain a conviction of aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Moore (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) aided, induced, or caused (4) another person (5) to commit or attempt to commit (7) robbery (8) during which Shelby was killed. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) (2018) (felony murder); I.C. 35-41-2-4 (1977) (accomplice liability); Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 20.

[26] In this case, before Moore arranged to meet Shelby at the gas station, he had threatened Ramsey with violence and had expressed a willingness to rob an acquaintance. Next, after Moore contacted Shelby and arranged a meeting, he gathered a group of friends and relatives, some armed, to confront Shelby and take the Buick. Moore never told the men that they should refrain from violence when confronting Shelby. To the contrary, Moore joined with some of the men in beating Shelby, and kicking him in the head and neck. By this point, Cudjoe had handed his handgun to Treyveon, and Rahim was openly holding a handgun.

[27] After Treyveon found the car keys in Shelby's pockets, Moore and others directed Shelby to lead them to the Buick's location. Shelby appeared frightened, but Moore never suggested letting him go or even calling 911 to let the police sort it out. When Shelby tried to run away, someone shouted to shoot him, and Rahim, Moore's close friend, apparently did so. Moore was walking to his Buick when the shooting occurred, but he did not object.

[28] Moore did not seek medical assistance for Shelby or report Rahim's act of murder. Instead, Moore fled with his companions, regrouping with them at his apartment complex. He or someone he knew ditched the Buick at a soccer field.

[29] In subsequent months, Moore then told the police a series of false stories. At first, he denied that he had been at the gas station and had recovered the Buick. He then admitted he had been at the station with Cudjoe but left without seeing Shelby or his car. Then, several months later, Moore finally conceded the group had beaten Shelby, and one of them had shot him.

[30] This evidence demonstrates that Moore knowingly or intentionally joined with others to rob Shelby of the car, and his participation in the robbery in concert with others led to Shelby's murder. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Moore's conviction of aiding in felony murder by robbery. See Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (sustaining conviction for assisting in felony murder by robbery; Dean arranged for victim to meet with her co-conspirators, resulting in victim's death at meeting), trans. denied.

[31] Moore also argues his conviction of aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder should be reversed because the jury found him not guilty of Count I, aiding, inducing, or causing murder. In Indiana, “[j]ury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). In any case, the murder charges were based on different statutory subsections, with different elements of proof. Moore has failed to demonstrate reversible error.

Conclusion

[32] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Moore violated Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(e) by failing to include in his Appellant's Brief the challenged jury instruction and his objection at trial.

2.   Moore also argues the trial court failed to use the Indiana pattern jury instruction on accomplice liability, but his proposed jury instruction on that subject is also based on language taken from cases rather than the pattern jury instruction. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 164.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.