IN RE: A.S. (Minor Child) K.S. (Mother) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Two-year-old A.S. (Child) was left without a clearly designated caregiver when her mother, K.S. (Mother), was transferred to a work release facility after violating her probation. Mother had been on probation for battering her two older children, who were determined to be children in need of services (CHINS) and later adopted after Mother agreed to the termination of her parental rights. When the Department of Child Services (DCS) attempted to verify Child's whereabouts, Mother was minimally cooperative. DCS sought court intervention, and even then, Mother provided contradictory accounts of her caretaking plans for Child.

[2] The trial court ultimately determined that Child was a CHINS, which Mother appeals. She challenges both the court's alleged failure to make written findings and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the CHINS determination. Because the trial court properly incorporated findings from the predispositional report and sufficient evidence supports the court's determination, we affirm.

Facts

[3] In November 2021, Mother was charged with two counts of domestic battery on a person under 14 years old and two counts of neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury. The charges arose from an incident during which Mother allegedly struck her then 10- and 13-year-old children with a wine bottle and attempted to break down a door behind which they hid. Because of these charges and the resulting no-contact order, these two children (Older Children) were found to be CHINS and removed from Mother's care.

[4] While the charges against Mother were pending, Child was born in February 2022. A few months later, Mother pleaded guilty to one count each of Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than 14 years old and Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. She was sentenced to two years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), all suspended to probation.

[5] One year later, Mother violated the terms of her probation and was sanctioned with home detention. Soon after, in January 2024, she was again sanctioned for non-compliance and was transferred to a work release facility. This meant Mother could no longer take care of Child. DCS thereafter investigated a report that Child was being neglected due to Mother's failure to arrange a designated caregiver for Child after Mother's commitment to the work release facility. Mother told DCS that Child was with Child's alleged father (Alleged Father). But DCS could not locate Alleged Father, even after following up with Mother, who “express[ed] her frustration with not understanding why this was important.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 35-36.

[6] Meanwhile, Mother had become non-compliant with the case plan for Older Children's CHINS cases. She failed to appear regularly for drug screens and did not complete her required counseling or family services. As a result of her extended non-compliance, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights as to Older Children. Mother later consented to their adoptions, thereby voluntarily terminating her parental rights as to Older Children.

[7] Still unable to determine Child's location after weeks of investigating, DCS moved the trial court to compel Mother to show Child, name Child's caretaker, and identify the home in which Child lived. At a March 2024 hearing on DCS's motion to compel, Mother appeared with Child and Child's maternal grandmother (Grandmother). The trial court then heard contradictory accounts of who had been taking care of Child over the past few months while Mother was in the work release facility. Mother reiterated that Child was with Alleged Father, who she claimed lived in Indianapolis. Grandmother corroborated this account. But Alleged Father—who attended the hearing remotely—denied paternity, claimed he never took care of Child, and explained that he lived out of state. Due to these discrepancies and the lack of a clear plan for Child's care going forward, the trial court ordered Child taken into DCS custody.

[8] While DCS worked on a placement for Child, Family Case Manager (FCM) Rachel Allen observed that Child appeared to be primarily non-verbal and was concerned about potential developmental delay. DCS was unable to confirm placements with either Grandmother or Mother's fiancé (Fiancé) and ultimately placed Child with a relative foster family. That family updated Child's vaccinations—which Child had not received since she was a few months old—and enrolled Child in occupational and developmental therapy.

[9] DCS petitioned to adjudicate Child as a CHINS, and the trial court conducted fact-finding hearings over the course of two days in July 2024. At the hearings, the parties revisited the conflicting accounts as to who was caring for Child from January to March 2024—the time between Mother's transfer to work release and the hearing at which Child was taken into DCS custody. Mother then offered a new explanation: that Grandmother and Fiancé had primarily cared for Child during this period, except for approximately one week, when Alleged Father cared for Child. Grandmother agreed with this account, though DCS pointed out that it did not match either Mother or Grandmother's explanations at the motion to compel hearing. Alleged Father did not appear for the fact-finding hearings.

[10] Mother also testified to the progress she had made over the past few months: she successfully completed work release in May 2024, was consistent in her visitation with Child, had been employed for the past six months, and was living in a home with Fiancé. But DCS explained that it had not received any releases of information from Mother to verify this information. DCS also emphasized that Child appeared to be developmentally delayed, and Child's foster mother testified to the improvements Child had made in occupational therapy.

[11] The trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS and ordered Mother to participate in various services, maintain stable housing and employment, and visit with Child regularly. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Though Mother's appellate brief lacks clarity, we understand her to raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether the dispositional order is contrary to law because it fails to include specific written findings required by statute; and (2) whether sufficient evidence supports the CHINS determination. We affirm.

I. The Dispositional Order Is Not Contrary to Law

[13] In CHINS cases, Indiana Code § 31-34-19-10 requires juvenile courts to accompany dispositional orders with written findings concerning a child's needs, the need for parental participation, efforts to reunify the family, services offered, and reasons for the disposition. Mother contends the trial court's dispositional order is contrary to law because it does not include these required findings.

[14] Mother, however, fails to recognize that the same statute also explicitly allows courts to “incorporate a finding or conclusion from a predispositional report as a written finding or conclusion upon the record in the court's dispositional decree.” Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10(b). Here, the trial court did exactly this, as the dispositional order states:

Based on the information presented in the Predispositional Report(s) and provided at the hearing, the Court makes the following dispositional orders: ․

Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 8. This statement indicates that the court reviewed the predispositional report and based its order on information contained therein. See Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 557-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (noting that findings from predispositional report were incorporated in dispositional order based on similar language in order).

[15] The predispositional report detailed Mother's history with DCS, Child's needs, efforts made to reunify the family, and specific recommendations for services. This information provides sufficient explanation for the services required by the trial court's dispositional order, enabling us to effectively review it. See Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 1999) (holding that findings of fact are sufficient when they “enable this Court to dispose of the issues upon appeal”); Jones v. Gruca, 150 N.E.3d 632, 640-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that the principal purpose of findings of fact is to ensure the record captures the court's reasons for its decision to allow for informed appellate review).

[16] Mother also appears to argue that the trial court erred by failing to make explicit findings “when there has been a request for them under [Indiana] Trial Rule 52.” Appellant's Br., p. 11. She cites Carmichael v. Siegel, 670 N.E.2d 890 (Ind. 1996), for the proposition that “a trial judge is not free to ignore a timely, written request for special findings.” Id. at 891. But Mother points to no instance in which she ever made such written request. Therefore, Carmichael does not apply.

[17] Because the trial court's dispositional order expressly incorporated findings from the predispositional report, as permitted by statute, the order is not contrary to law.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports the CHINS Determination

[18] Mother next argues that the CHINS determination is not supported by sufficient evidence. We review a CHINS determination accompanied by findings of fact under a two-tiered standard of review: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). In conducting our review, we consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Id. at 577-78. We will reverse a CHINS determination only for clear error, which occurs when the record facts do not support the findings or when the wrong legal standard is applied. Id. at 578.

[19] Mother contends that insufficient evidence supported six of the trial court's factual findings and the conclusion that Child is a CHINS. We find no reversible error.

A. Factual Findings

[20] Mother challenges some, but not all, of the trial court's finding of facts. We accept the remaining unchallenged findings as true. See M.M. v. A.C., 160 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We “defer substantially” to the trial court's factual findings and set them aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 554. “Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Id.

[21] Mother first disputes the finding that she was “unable to articulate a firm plan” for Child's care and housing during Mother's time in work release (Finding 8). Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 28. Mother claims she proposed a plan—that Child would stay with Grandmother—but that DCS rejected it because Grandmother was temporarily living in a hotel while her house was under construction. However, FCM Allen testified that this plan was rejected because Grandmother could not be reached to complete the required placement paperwork, not because of the nature of Grandmother's housing. Mother's argument thus acts as an invitation to reweigh evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78.

[22] Moreover, the fact that three different explanations of Child's caretaking plan were presented—that Alleged Father was Child's caretaker, that Alleged Father never had Child, and that both Grandmother and Fiancé cared for Child with the exception of Alleged Father taking Child for one week—demonstrates the lack of clarity in any discussed plan.

[23] Mother next challenges the finding that Child was behind on vaccinations and medical care (Finding 15). She claims that she stopped vaccinating Child only because of an adverse reaction to an earlier vaccine. However, this is merely an attempt to explain the otherwise undisputed fact that at the time of her removal, two-year-old Child had not been vaccinated since she was a few months old. Therefore, the record supports this finding of fact.

[24] Mother also disagrees with the finding that Child was developmentally delayed (Finding 16). She emphasizes that DCS offered no expert testimony on Child's development and that an assessment of Child performed as part of DCS's case plan resulted in no diagnosis. However, DCS presented the testimony of FCM Allen who observed Child when she was first taken into DCS custody. FCM Allen explained that, although Child appeared calm and played with toys, she “didn't really have any words” and was not “responding in a way that would demonstrate a normal two-year-old mentality.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 27. Additionally, Child's foster mother testified that Child had improved her communication and play skills through occupational and developmental therapy. Because the record contains both direct and indirect support for this finding, and because we do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility on appeal, we cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous. See Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 554.

[25] Mother next disputes the related findings that Child showed improved communication skills while in foster care (Finding 17) and that Mother “acknowledge[d] in her own testimony” that Child had improved (Finding 18). Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 28. Mother testified that she recognized Child's improvement but believed Child had been steadily developing before removal and only temporarily regressed due to the stress of being placed in foster care. Essentially, Mother agrees that Child had improved but merely attempts to offer an alternate explanation for the progress. The record contains testimony from Child's foster mother explaining that Child had improved her communication skills since being placed in her care and in therapy. Thus, we find Findings 17 and 18 are supported by the record.

[26] Finally, Mother challenges the finding that “Mother testified that she did not realize prior to the detention that [Child] was behind, which implies to this Court that Mother was acknowledging that she now recognizes [Child] was behind” (Finding 19). Id. Mother claims this is not a fair reading of her testimony, in which she stated:

At home [Child] was beginning to talk. Um I found it normal. Um I worked with her, but she just turned two. So, I mean I didn't see it I mean I was trying. Um I didn't see it as a problem cause she just turned two and I never realized that was an issue. I mean she was still talking. She was saying Mama. You know up, down, milk. I mean normal stuff. I didn't notice anything wrong.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 108. We agree with Mother that this finding of fact distorts her testimony. There is no other statement in the record that indicates Mother acknowledged Child was behind. In fact, later in her testimony, Mother plainly answered “no” when asked if she thinks Child is behind and reiterated that Child “was steadily learning” and her pace was “normal.” Id. at 112. Because Finding 19 is not supported by the evidence, we find it clearly erroneous.

[27] However, a single erroneous finding of fact does not necessarily constitute reversible error, particularly when the remaining findings adequately support the trial court's ultimate determination. Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Therefore, without considering Finding 19, we now determine whether the findings support the conclusion that Child was a CHINS. See In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

B. CHINS Determination

[28] DCS alleged Child to be CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1, which requires DCS to prove by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; ․ and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[29] As appellate courts have previously observed, “[t]he statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Mother claims DCS presented insufficient evidence to prove these elements. But considering the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment, we cannot say that the trial court erred in determining Child was a CHINS.

[30] DCS presented evidence that Child was endangered by Mother's continued inability to provide a clear caretaking plan for Child and her non-cooperation with DCS's efforts to determine it. When DCS reached out to Mother to ensure Child was receiving care, Mother told DCS that Child was with Alleged Father. But when DCS informed Mother that Alleged Father could not be located, Mother “express[ed] her frustration with not understanding why this was important.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 35-36. This back and forth between Mother and DCS “went on for so long that eventually [DCS] had to pursue the Motion to Compel.” Id. at 36.

[31] It was only after court intervention that Mother showed Child to DCS and further explained her caretaking plan. Still, she continued to provide ever-changing stories. Initially, Mother claimed Child was primarily in the care of Alleged Father. But at the hearing on DCS's motion to compel, Child appeared in the care of Grandmother while Alleged Father attended virtually from out of state and denied having cared for Child. Then later, at the fact-finding hearing, Mother claimed Grandmother and Fiancé had been caring for Child all along, aside from Alleged Father caring for Child for one week.

[32] This demonstrates that Mother was only willing to give DCS information about Child when compelled by the court, and even then, could not provide sufficiently clear or consistent information. Such inconsistency—persisting at the fact-finding hearing—supports both the conclusion that Child has unmet needs as to a stable home and that court coercion is necessary for Mother's compliance. See Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d at 559 (“[C]ourts should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.”).

[33] Though Mother claims that DCS never proved that Child was physically harmed as a result of this situation, the court need not “wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene.” In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, DCS presented testimony from FCM Allen and Child's foster mother that Child was behind on medical care and appeared non-verbal upon removal. Yet Mother persistently denied that Child had any developmental delay.

[34] Additionally, Mother's criminal record and CHINS history are significant. See In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1210 (Ind. 2019) (finding past acts by parents are generally relevant to CHINS findings); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-5 (allowing evidence of parent's prior acts to be admitted in CHINS proceeding to demonstrate intent, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident, or other similar purposes). Mother pleaded guilty to felony domestic battery of a child under 14 years old and felony neglect of a dependent. This battery incident resulted in the CHINS determination for Older Children and their ultimate adoption after Mother failed to comply with required services. To be sure, Mother's prior acts are not the primary basis for this CHINS proceeding, but they provide context and “give [the] trial court the full story.” In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1212.

[35] Despite this evidence, Mother claims she had made progress. She testified at the fact-finding hearing that she had successfully completed work release, obtained steady employment, secured housing, and attended therapy on her own. However, by the time of this hearing, DCS had not received the necessary releases of information to verify any of Mother's claims. Moreover, the trial court was not obligated to believe Mother's testimony. See Williams v. Cardona-Feliciano, 245 N.E.3d 626, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“[A] fact-finder is not obliged to credit testimony even when it is uncontroverted.”).

[36] Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment—looking to Mother's provision of inconsistent information about Child's caretaking plan, refusal to cooperate until compelled to do so by the court, and history with DCS—we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding Child to be a CHINS.

Conclusion

[37] We first find the trial court's dispositional order is not contrary to law because it incorporated findings from a predispositional report, which is permitted by statute. We also set aside one clearly erroneous finding of fact and conclude that the remaining findings support the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS.

[38] Affirmed.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.