WEGNER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jeremy Wegner (“Wegner”) appeals the aggregate seven-year sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 gram of alcohol but less than 0.15 gram of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of his breath ¹ and adjudicated him to be an habitual vehicular substance offender (“HVSO”).² He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Wegner.

Facts

[3] Following an October 2022 traffic stop, an Elkhart Police Department officer noticed that forty-five-year-old Wegner's eyes were bloodshot and watery and that his speech was slurred. When Wegner stepped out of his car, the officer detected the odor of alcohol emanating from Wegner's breath and noticed that Wegner's balance was unsteady. Based on the officer's observations and Wegner's poor performance on field sobriety tests, the officer believed that Wegner was intoxicated. The officer read Wegner the implied consent law, and Wegner agreed to submit to a chemical breath test at the police department. The result of that test showed that Wegner had an alcohol concentration equivalent to .143 gram of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of his breath. Further, a review of Wegner's driving record revealed that he had three prior unrelated convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

[4] In April 2023, the State charged Wegner with Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 gram of alcohol but less than 0.15 gram of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of his breath. In addition, the State alleged that Wegner was an HVSO.

[5] Following a June 2024 bench trial, the trial court found that Wegner was guilty of both offenses. The trial court further determined that Wegner was an HVSO.

[6] During the July 2024 sentencing hearing, the trial court stated as follows:

You absolutely believe that you can operate a vehicle in violation of the law – Indiana law – with impunity, so long as you're not engaged in a commercial venture, because that's what you stated to the court. What that means for the court is that if I put you on probation, there's no assurance that you will not operate a vehicle while intoxicated again – you've already been convicted of it four (4) prior times. If I put you in community corrections, there's no assurance from the court's perspective that you won't operate a vehicle while intoxicated – you've done it four (4) previous times, and you have the flawed opinion that you're allowed to do it, so long as you're not engaged in a commercial venture.

When I look at your criminal record, it does date back to 1993, with your juvenile history, that is. When you were fifteen (15) years old, your first referral was for theft, and you're forty-six (46) years of age today․ As a juvenile, you were adjudicated a delinquent in 1994 for possession of stolen property, burglary, and auto theft. As an adult, in 1995, you were convicted of burglary as a Class C felony. You were placed on probation in 1995 and then in 1996, you were found in violation of your probation and your probation was revoked. In 1994, you were convicted in Goshen City Court of either leaving the scene of an accident or never receiving a license, both of which are misdemeanors[ ] ․ involving driving. Then there was a violation hearing in 1995, and you admitted to the violation of your probation. Then in 1995 in Cass County, Michigan, you were convicted of stolen property over $100.00 as a felony; in 1996, you were convicted of false informing as a misdemeanor; in 1996, you were convicted of burglary, and there was a violation of probation, and you were found in violation of your probation in 1999. You were convicted of a different burglary in 1999, and there was a violation of probation filed. You admitted to violating probation in 2005, the court continued you on probation and then there was another violation in 2006, to which you admitted guilty. You were convicted of escape in 2001, and it also shows that you were found to be in that case, a habitual offender.

You were convicted of operating with a BAC of .08 or more, which is the exact same thing you're convicted of in this case, in 2006, and I'm going to refer to that as OWI number one (1). You were convicted of public intoxication separately in 2006. You were convicted of operating while intoxicated, prior, as a felony in 2009, and you were placed on probation. You admitted to violating probation and you were sanctioned and ordered to serve the remainder of your sentence at the Department of Correction. That's what I'm going to refer to as OWI number two (2). You were then convicted of operating while intoxicated, prior, as a felony in 2009, and I'm going to call that OWI number three (3). You were placed on probation, you were found in violation of probation, you admitted to violating your probation in 2013. You were convicted of operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator as a felony in 2013. You were convicted of operating while intoxicated and being a habitual traffic violator in 2013, and I'm going to refer to that case as OWI number four (4). You were convicted of driving while suspended in Cook County, Georgia, and then finally, you were convicted of operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life in 2017.

* * * * *

So, I'm going to circle back for a moment. I have no assurance that if I place you anywhere but jail or prison, I have no assurance that you're not going to continue to drive while intoxicated with the incorrect belief that you can do so without repercussions. You have four (4) prior convictions for operating while intoxicated, Mr. Wegner, and your criminal record dates back to when you were fifteen (15) years old. I do believe that an executed sentence is appropriate in this case, but I don't believe that the maximum sentence is appropriate in this case.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 162-164, 166).

[7] Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment of conviction for Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 gram of alcohol but less than 0.15 gram of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath. The trial court further adjudicated Wegner to be an HVSO.

[8] The trial court sentenced Wegner to sixty (60) days for his Class C misdemeanor conviction.³ In addition, the trial court enhanced this sixty-day sentence by six (6) years and ten (10) months for Wegner's HVSO adjudication.⁴ The trial court further ordered Wegner to serve his seven (7) year aggregate sentence in the Department of Correction.

[9] Wegner now appeals his sentence.

Decision

[10] Wegner argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 490. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

[11] Wegner specifically contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because it “fail[ed] to issue a sentencing statement providing a detailed explanation of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances[.]” (Wegner's Br. 15). A sentencing statement serves two primary purposes: (1) it guards against arbitrary and capricious sentencing; and (2) it provides an adequate basis for appellate review. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489. In order for this Court to carry out its function of reviewing the trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion, we must understand the trial court's reasons for imposing the sentence. Id. at 490. “This necessarily requires a statement of facts, in some detail, which are peculiar to the particular defendant and the crime, as opposed to general impressions or conclusions.” Id. In other words, a trial court's sentencing statement “must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court's reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id.

[12] Our review of the record in this case reveals that the trial court entered a detailed sentencing statement indicating that it had considered as an aggravating factor that Wegner had an extensive multi-state adult criminal history that spanned more than twenty-five years. Specifically, the trial court noted in detail each of Wegner's multiple felony and misdemeanor convictions. The trial court also noted that Wegner had numerous probation violations.

[13] In addition, the trial court noted that Wegner believed that he could operate a motor vehicle in violation of the law so long as he was not engaged in a commercial venture. Thus, according to the trial court, if it placed Wegner on probation or community corrections, it had no assurance that Wegner would not again operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

[14] We conclude that this sentencing statement is a sufficient articulation of the trial court's reasons for imposing a seven-year aggregate sentence after convicting Wegner of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 gram of alcohol but less than 0.15 gram of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of his breath and adjudicating him to be a HVSO. Further concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Wegner, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.⁵

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   IND. CODE § 9-30-5-1(a). We note that the legislature amended this statute during the 2025 legislative session and that the amended statute is effective July 1, 2025. The amendment was minimal and does not affect this case on appeal.

2.   I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2.

3.   A person convicted of a Class C misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than sixty (60) days[.]” IND. CODE § 35-50-3-4.

4.   “The court shall sentence a person found to be a habitual vehicular substance offender to an additional fixed term of at least one (1) year but not more than eight (8) years of imprisonment[.]” I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2(d).

5.   Wegner further argues that “the trial court only focused on the aggravating factors when imposing the sentence, and there was no mitigating factors listed in the transcript of the sentencing hearing.” (Wegner's Br. 12) (grammatical error in the original). According to Wegner, “[t]his omission indicates that the trial court did not adequately consider or weigh the relevant mitigating circumstances[.]” (Wegner's Br. 12). However, because Wegner failed to raise any mitigating factors at his sentencing hearing, he has waived appellate review of this issue. See Banks v. State, 841 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that defendant waived claims regarding the trial court's failure to identify mitigating circumstances because he failed to raise them at the sentencing hearing), trans. denied.Lastly, Wegner argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it “failed to properly weigh any aggravating and mitigating factors[.]” (Wegner's Br.12). However, eighteen years ago, in Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491, our Indiana Supreme Court explained that a trial court cannot “be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ [aggravating and mitigating] factors.”

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.