Patricia Crawford, Appellant-Plaintiff v. George Mimms, Regat Seyoum, Rae Realty Management Company, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Patricia Crawford appeals, pro se, the judgment in favor of George Mimms, Regat Seyoum, and Rae Realty Management Company (collectively, “Landlord”) on her claims arising from a dispute over a commercial lease agreement. She purports to raise three issues on appeal; however, because she has failed to develop cogent arguments or provide adequate citations to authority and the record, she has waived her claims.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Crawford entered into a commercial lease agreement with Landlord to rent premises at which she intended to open and operate a café. “Commencing between Feb[ruary] 1st to April 15, 2023[,]” Crawford agreed to pay rent and “operational costs.” App. v. II at 75. The agreement contained “R[en]tal Commencement Prerequisites” that were to be completed by April 15, 2023, or else Crawford would “forfeit[ ] th[e] contract, any impro[v]ements, and any cash payment made.” Id. at 76. One of the prerequisites was an “Investment of $5,000 in cash or in permanent construction upgrade on the unit approved by owner.” Id. The $5,000 was to be applied to the first and last months of rent, a security deposit, and operational costs.

[4] The agreement stated that Crawford “acknowledge[d] that the Premises have been inspected” and that “the Premises have been cleaned (as agreed) and items, fixtures, appli[an]ces, and appurtenances are in complete working order (as agreed).” Id. at 78. The agreement contained a provision entitled “Tenant Alterations[,]” which gave Crawford “the right to make alterations and i[n]stallations at [her] own expense from time to time during the Lease term, ․provided [she] has the prior written consent of the Landlord, which is not to be unreasonably with[h]eld.” Id. at 80.

[5] Crawford “t[ook] possession of the unit” on the leased premises on January 27, 2023. Tr. at 140. Crawford did not pay rent during her occupancy of the leased premises, and she performed work on the space to improve it, “possibly us[ing] some of her own funds.” Appealed Order at 2. Landlord “eventually gave [Crawford] $5,000, [it] claim[s] under duress, and additionally directly paid subcontractors who worked on [Crawford's] behalf.” Id. The parties “entered into a loan agreement wherein [Crawford] borrowed and was to repay [Landlord] $11,874.00 by March 28, 2023.” Id.¹ Landlord subsequently regained possession of the premises “due to non-payment of rent and loans and other disagreements.” Id.

[6] On September 5, 2023, Crawford, pro se, filed a lawsuit against Landlord for breach of contract, fraud and deceit, nonpayment of services, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The court held a bench trial on September 16, 2024, and issued an order with findings on October 28. The trial court noted that “the evidence presented by both Parties was unclear at best[,]” and that it “considered the demeanor of the parties and witnesses in making” its judgment. Appealed Order at 2. The court determined that Crawford had failed to prove any of her claims and ordered that she “take nothing by way of [her] allegation[s].” Id. at 3-6. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Crawford appeals the judgment in favor of Landlord.

When reviewing judgments with findings of fact and conclusions of law, Indiana's appellate courts shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.

Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 501 (Ind. 2011) (quotation marks and case citations omitted). Moreover, because Crawford failed to carry her burden of proving her claims, she appeals from a negative judgment. As such, she must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the trial court. See, e.g., B&S of Fort Wayne, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 159 N.E.3d 67, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[8] Crawford brings this appeal pro se.

It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Twin Lakes Reg'l Sewer Dist. v. Teumer, 992 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. These consequences include waiver for failure to adhere to the prescribed form of the appellate brief as set out in Indiana Appellate Rule 46. See, e.g., Anthony v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Grp., 846 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).²

[9] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) requires that the appellant's brief contain a statement of facts that is a narrative summary of the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment and is “devoid of argument.” Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that each contention in an appellant's brief be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal.” When an appellant provides no cogent argument for a contention, that contention is waived. See, e.g., Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting the presentation of the appellant's contentions must contain a clear showing of how the issues and contentions relate to the particular facts of the case under review, and we will not review undeveloped arguments). Similarly, when an appellant provides no citation to legal authority supporting his contentions, those contentions are waived. E.g., Shields v. Town of Perrysville, 136 N.E.3d 309, 312 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, under our Appellate Rules, “[i]t is not sufficient for the argument section that an appellant simply recites facts and makes conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support.” Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); see also Lane Alan Schrader Tr. v. Gilbert, 974 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting Rule 46(A)(8) “prevents the court from becoming an advocate when it is forced to search the entire record for evidence in support of [a party's] broad statements”).

[10] While we prefer to decide issues on the merits, Crawford's noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46(A) is so substantial that it impedes our consideration of the issues. Crawford's statement of facts is mostly argument (without legal authority citations), contains few citations to the record, and contains citations to alleged documents that are not in the record. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 10 (referring to “affidavit 3 Marcus Perry,” without citation to the record, which in any case appears not to contain any such document). Crawford repeatedly cites “EFC#__” without explanation regarding what this term is or to what it refers. Id.

[11] Crawford's “Summary of Argument” section is not a “succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the arguments made in the body of the brief,” as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(7). Rather, that section contains an entirely new argument that is addressed nowhere else in the brief, appears not to have been raised below, is not supported by citation to the record or legal authority, and appears to be based solely upon the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct, which may only be enforced through “disciplinary agencies.” Ind. Judicial Conduct Preamble § [3].

[12] Crawford's “Argument” section of her brief provides no citations to any legal authority regarding any of her alleged issues on appeal; her only legal citations relate to the standard of review. Although the subheadings in this section appear to relate to each of the three issues she purports to raise on appeal, none of those subsections contain cogent argument supported by relevant citations to legal authority or the record. Her subsection A appropriately contains the standard of review; however, the following subsections—to the extent they are comprehensible at all—are entirely without supporting legal reasoning or citations to authorities. For example, her subsection C provides, in full: “C. The trial court erred in finding This evidence was merely disregarded without explanation.” Appellant's Br. at 20.

[13] In short, Crawford's appellate briefs,³ to the extent they are comprehensible at all, consist merely of bald assertions of error without cogent supporting legal reasoning or citations to legal authorities or the record. Therefore, she has waived her appeal.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Neither of the parties on appeal nor the trial court in its order has pointed to evidence related to the $11,874 loan from Landlord to Crawford. Apparently, Landlord filed a counterclaim against Crawford, but there is no evidence related to that claim in the appellate record. In any case, the trial court denied the counterclaim, and Landlord does not appeal that decision.

2.   Crawford makes it a point in her reply brief that she is proceeding pro se; however, it is well-established that appellants who choose to proceed pro se are “afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” J.A. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1164 (Ind. 2014).

3.   Crawford's reply brief suffers from similar deficiencies; that is, she provides no cogent argument supported by legal authority or citations to the record.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Brown and Weissmann concur. Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.