Gabriel Scott Galvez Roblero, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Gabriel Scott Galvez Roblero appeals following his conviction of murder.¹ He raises two issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence Roblero had physically abused the victim in the past; and

2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing testimony related to why the police did not perform DNA testing on two beer bottles found at the scene.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Roblero and his wife, Karen Hernandez, lived in a house on Mimosa Lane in Indianapolis. Eva Espinosa, Hernandez's mother, agreed to babysit Hernandez's two children on January 29, 2021, so that Hernandez and Roblero could celebrate their first wedding anniversary. Hernandez took her children to Espinosa's house at approximately 9:30 pm and returned home.

[3] Early the next morning, Roblero called his ex-wife, Annesa ² Galvez, and told her that he had killed Hernandez. He also told Galvez that he was fleeing the area and intended to kill himself. Galvez called 911 and reported this information. Officer Garret Catt of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) responded to the dispatch and went to Roblero's house to conduct a welfare check. He knocked on the front door but did not receive an answer. Officer Catt and the other officers at the scene then “began looking in through windows and around the exterior of the home and attempting to see into the interior of the home to see if there was anybody inside.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 217.) Through the back door, Officer Catt saw a female later identified as Hernandez lying face down on the floor. The officers forced entry into the house and called for paramedics. When the paramedics arrived, they pronounced Hernandez dead. An autopsy later revealed that Hernandez died as the result of eleven gunshot wounds, which damaged her lungs and heart. Roblero's DNA was found under Hernandez's fingernails.

[4] IMPD Detective Gary Toms arrived at Roblero's house and inspected the scene. He found an empty gun box and a receipt showing Roblero had purchased a handgun and bullets. The police also recovered several spent bullet casings. They “started an emergency ping on Mr. Roblero's phone” and discovered his phone traveling near the Missouri-Arkansas border. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 160.) They then issued an alert to law enforcement agencies in the area to be on the lookout for Roblero's vehicle. An Arkansas state trooper identified Roblero's pickup truck traveling in Randolph County, Arkansas, and initiated a traffic stop. The trooper arrested Roblero and impounded his vehicle. A handgun and bullets were found in the center console of Roblero's vehicle. The serial number of the handgun found in Roblero's vehicle matched the serial number on the receipt found at Roblero's house. A forensic firearms examiner determined the handgun found in Roblero's vehicle fired the bullet casings found at the scene of Hernandez's murder. The bullets found in Roblero's vehicle were also the same brand and caliber as the bullets used in Hernandez's murder. Roblero's blood was found on the grip and slide of the handgun. In addition, DNA testing of various blood stains found throughout the Mimosa Lane house matched Roblero.

[5] On January 31, 2021, the State charged Roblero with murder. The State also alleged Roblero was eligible for an enhanced sentence because he used a firearm in the commission of the offense.³ On August 18, 2022, the State filed notice of its intent to offer evidence of Roblero's prior bad acts pursuant to Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b). The motion asserted:

Specifically, the State intends to introduce evidence that the Defendant and the victim, Karen Hernandez, were in a volatile, abusive relationship, including witnesses [sic] the Defendant physically abusing the victim prior to the night of the charged murder, as well as the IMPD responding to a domestic disturbance call at the Defendant and the victim's residence approximately one month prior on or about December 16, 2020.

Such information is permissible to show intent and motive to kill.

(App. Vol. 2 at 126.)

[6] On December 19, 2022, Roblero moved to exclude Galvez's testimony because she had failed to appear for three scheduled depositions. Roblero asked the trial court to exclude her testimony and any testimony about her statements or alleged knowledge. The trial court granted Roblero's motion to exclude Galvez's testimony.

[7] On September 1, 2023, Roblero filed a motion asking the trial court to suppress all evidence the police obtained after Galvez's 911 call because Galvez was an excluded witness. The trial court held a suppression hearing on September 11, 2023. At the hearing, the trial court indicated that it did not anticipate “allowing the 911 call to be played, nor the substance of what the person said other than—the State then basically saying that in response to a 911 call, the police went to a particular address and start from there.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 87-88.) The trial court denied Roblero's motion to suppress the evidence the police found following the 911 call.

[8] The trial court held Roblero's jury trial from October 23 to October 26, 2023. Before the second day of trial, the court addressed Roblero's motion in limine seeking to prohibit “[t]estimony or evidence of excluded witness, Annesa Galvez.” (App. Vol. 3 at 2.) The State did not object to the motion in limine, but it did seek clarification from the trial court:

[State:] As far as testimony or evidence of excluded witness ․ Galvez. I understand that we cannot—that Ms. Galvez has been excluded as a witness and we cannot play the 911 call. However, can we make reference to the 911 call as far as being something that led detectives to both—to do a welfare check and as far as developing a suspect?

THE COURT: Well, having read the motion in limine, her testimony obviously doesn't exist because she's been excluded. But her existence is not excluded.

* * * * *

[State:] So may we make reference—the reason is we don't want to overstep. Also, because of the suppression hearing is that we were planning—the way we were handling it is that police responded to a 911 call, made a welfare check, and essentially leaving it at that.

THE COURT: Okay. I haven't even heard her name listed.

[State:] Okay.

THE COURT: I haven't even heard her name mentioned during summation there.

[State:] Very good, then. That answers my question.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 181-82.) The trial court also addressed the State's notice of its intent to offer Rule 404(b) evidence. The State explained it intended to produce evidence that police had been called to Roblero's house in response to a domestic disturbance call on December 16, 2020, and that Espinosa intended to testify regarding another domestic violence incident between Roblero and Hernandez that occurred during the early morning hours of December 25, 2020. Roblero argued the evidence related to both incidents was irrelevant. The trial court issued a preliminary ruling that the Rule 404(b) evidence was admissible.

[9] The State called Espinosa to testify. Roblero objected when the State began to question her about the events of December 25, 2020, but the trial court overruled Roblero's objection. Espinosa testified Hernandez called her that day, but Espinosa could not answer the telephone before it went to voicemail. Hernandez then called Espinosa's romantic partner. He answered the phone and passed it to Espinosa. Hernandez was crying, and she said “[t]hat if she was dead within the next five minutes, that was because Gabriel had killed her.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 2.) Espinosa and her partner then drove to Roblero's house. When Espinosa arrived, Hernandez looked “badly beaten.” (Id.) Her face was bloody “[a]nd her eye had been hit.” (Id. at 3.) Roblero was holding a gun and was “very angry.” (Id.) Roblero told Espinosa “that nothing had happened and [Hernandez] liked to create scenes.” (Id. at 3-4.)

[10] The State subsequently called the crime scene investigator who analyzed the murder scene, and she testified that she had not swabbed two beer bottles for DNA evidence because Detective Toms directed her not to do so. In a conference outside the presence of the jury, the State asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling regarding admission of the substance of the 911 call. The State argued the evidence “was necessary to rehabilitate our witness” because the reason Detective Toms did not ask her to take DNA samples from the beer bottles was that “they already had a suspect based on the 911 call.” (Id. at 154.) The trial court denied the State's motion to reconsider. The State then called Detective Toms to testify, and a juror submitted the question: “Why didn't you have the crime lab swab the bottles that were on the couch in the living room that smelled like alcohol?” (Id. at 172.) The parties then discussed the question during a bench conference:

[State:] Again, so this calls – again, this has been open – the door has been opened by the defense?

THE COURT: I'm [sic] was just asking the detective, why he didn't do something.

[State:] The answer is because he had a suspect already.

THE COURT: So he can answer that.

[State:] Okay. Okay.

THE COURT: If that's what his answer is, he can answer that.

(Id. at 173.) Following the bench conference, Detective Toms testified:

The reason why I did not swab the two bottles was because the information I received is that [Roblero] killed his wife before I ever got on scene. [Roblero] lives there, so it's highly likely that his DNA is going to be in the house because he lives there. He drinks out of things. So I was not looking for any other suspect at the time. And the evidence that the officers found on scene matched with the information they had to meet [Roblero] as being the sole suspect.

(Id. at 173-74.) He later explained:

Prior to me getting there, the southeast district officers received a tip through a 911 call that Mr. Roblero may have been involved in an incident at 6854 Mimosa Lane. They went there and based on the information they got from the tip, they were able to corroborate the information in the tip.

(Id. at 249-250.) Detective Toms also testified that police had been dispatched to Roblero's residence approximately one-and-a-half months before Hernandez's death to respond to multiple “domestic disturbance calls.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 8.)

[11] The jury found Roblero guilty. Roblero waived his right to a jury trial with respect to the firearm enhancement, and the trial court found the enhancement true. The trial court sentenced Roblero to a base term of fifty-seven years imprisonment, enhanced by an additional eight years because of the firearm enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years.

Discussion and Decision

1. Rule 404(b)

[12] Roblero first argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Espinosa to testify about the December 25, 2020, incident. We generally review a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Weed v. State, 192 N.E.3d 247, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.

[13] Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, such “evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evid. R. 404(b)(2). “The purpose of the rule is to prevent the jury from making the ‘forbidden inference’ that a defendant is guilty of the charged offense on the basis of other misconduct.” Kendall v. State, 225 N.E.3d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Therefore, before admitting evidence under Rule 404(b), the trial court must: “(1) determine whether the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403.” Mise v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1079, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[14] Roblero contends the evidence of his prior bad acts against Hernandez was not relevant for proving intent because he never asserted as a defense that he acted without the requisite mens rea. In addition, he asserts “Espinosa's testimony was speculative, lacking context, and described a single incident in what was at least a year-long relationship.” (Appellant's Br. at 22.) Roblero argues, “[t]his isolated snapshot fell short of establishing frequent conflict or a pattern of hostility and thus was not relevant to a potential motive based on a hostile relationship.” (Id.)

[15] However, hostility is a common motive for committing a crime, Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997), and “evidence of motive is always relevant[.]” Carr v. State, 255 N.E.3d 519, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “Numerous cases have held that where a relationship between parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant's prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may be admitted to show the relationship between the parties and motive for committing the crime.” Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The 404(b) evidence Roblero challenges illustrated that conflict was a part of his relationship with Hernandez. Espinosa's testimony that Hernandez said on December 25, 2020, that if she died in the next five minutes, it was because Roblero killed her, showed that the relationship between Roblero and Hernandez was violent and hostile. Moreover, Espinosa's testimony that Hernandez's face was bruised and bloody and that Roblero was holding a gun further demonstrated the relationship's tumultuousness. Espinosa described one prior incident of domestic violence, but Detective Toms also testified that the police had responded to domestic disturbance calls at the Roblero residence earlier in December 2020. Thus, we disagree with Roblero's characterization of Espinosa's testimony as presenting an “isolated snapshot,” (Appellant's Br. at 22), of their relationship. Rather, it described one episode in a pattern of hostility and conflict. Such evidence was relevant for showing why Roblero would kill Hernandez. See, e.g., Whitham v. State, 49 N.E.3d 162, 167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding evidence defendant attacked his grandmother on two prior occasions was relevant for showing defendant's hostility toward his grandmother and his motive for assaulting her), trans. denied.

[16] Roblero also contends the evidence's probative value was minimal and the danger of unfair prejudice was high. We disagree. “[A]ll relevant evidence is ‘inherently prejudicial’ in a criminal prosecution, so the inquiry boils down to a balance of probative value against the likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the jury.” Richmond v. State, 685 N.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ind. 1997). “Unfair prejudice ․ looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Ingram v. State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the incidents highlighted the level of conflict between Hernandez and Roblero and occurred close in time to Hernandez's murder. Thus, the probative value of the evidence was great because an abusive relationship explains why one spouse might hurt another. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding evidence of prior instances of domestic violence was highly relevant to establishing defendant's motive and disproving his claim of self-defense), trans. denied. Admission of the evidence for that purpose was legitimate and did not encourage conviction on an improper basis. See, e.g., Ind. State Police v. Estate of Damore, 194 N.E.3d 1147, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding evidence that deceased was driving recklessly in minutes before accident was highly relevant to the issue of negligence and was not intended to persuade jury by illegitimate means or suggest decision on an improper basis), trans. denied. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence of prior incidents of hostility in the relationship between Roblero and Hernandez. See, e.g., Iqbal, 805 N.E.2d at 409 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of prior incident of domestic violence between defendant and victim).

2. 911 Call

[17] Roblero next argues the trial court should not have allowed Detective Toms to testify regarding the information IMPD learned through Galvez's 911 call. Specifically, Roblero takes issue with Detective Toms's testimony that “the information I received is that [Roblero] killed his wife ․ And the evidence that the officers found on the scene matched with information they had to meet [Roblero] as being the sole suspect.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 173-74.) He argues this testimony ran afoul of several Rules of Evidence because it “contained inadmissible hearsay,” was “vouching testimony, and the probative value of the testimony was vastly outweighed by its likely prejudicial impact.” (Appellant's Br. at 27.)

[18] Roblero acknowledges he did not object to this testimony at trial, and the failure of a party to object before the trial court generally results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Harris v. State, 245 N.E.3d 184, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). However, Roblero asserts Detective Toms's testimony resulted in fundamental error. “The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement applies only ‘when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’ ” Fouts v. State, 207 N.E.3d 1257, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010), reh'g denied), aff'd on reh'g, 210 N.E.3d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. “The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and reaches only those errors that are so blatant the trial judge should have taken action sua sponte.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[19] “[H]armless error cannot be considered fundamental.” Smith v. State, 190 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A) outlines the standard for reversible error. Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 570 (2024). It states:

No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.

App. R. 66(A). “Under this test, the party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. This requires “a review of what was presented to the trier of fact compared to what should have been presented.” Id. We evaluate “the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Id.

[20] Aside from the challenged testimony, the evidence against Roblero was substantial. Hernandez dropped off her children at Espinosa's house hours before she died because she intended to spend the night alone with Roblero to celebrate their first wedding anniversary. Hernandez was later found dead in the house with cuts and bruises on her face and eleven gunshot wounds. Roblero's blood was found throughout the house, and his DNA was found in a DNA sample taken from underneath Hernandez's fingernails, which suggests Hernandez tried to defend herself from Roblero.

[21] Moreover, “[f]light shows consciousness of guilt.” Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Roblero was captured in Arkansas. He had the murder weapon with him at the time of his capture, and his blood was on the murder weapon. A receipt found at the Mimosa Lane house indicated Roblero purchased that weapon and the ammunition used in the murder. Given the overwhelming evidence of Roblero's guilt, we cannot say the testimony likely had much of an impact on the jury's ultimate decision to convict Roblero, and because Detective Toms's testimony constituted harmless error, its admission was not fundamental error. See, e.g., Smith, 190 N.E.3d at 466 (holding that even if the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Smith's cell phone location data, “it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Smith's guilt, and harmless error cannot be considered fundamental”).

Conclusion

[22] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence Roblero had abused Hernandez in the months before her death because such evidence was highly relevant to demonstrating Roblero's motive and was not unfairly prejudicial. In addition, Detective Toms's discussion of what law enforcement learned through Galvez's 911 call in his response to a question about why IMPD did not test two beer bottles found in the Mimosa Lane house was not fundamental error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

2.   The record contains various spellings of Galvez's first name. For the sake of consistency, we spell her first name “Annesa” throughout this opinion.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11.

May, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and DeBoer concur. Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.