IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.B. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.B. (“Father”) appeals following the termination of his parental rights to L.B. (“Child”). Father argues the juvenile court's findings do not support its conclusions that: (1) the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be remedied or the continuation of the Father-Child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being; and (2) termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to C.B. (“Mother”)¹ on September 11, 2021. Child was born with congenital limb disorder. Because of this disorder, Child has “an incongruent number of ribs on each side of her rib cage[,]” has scoliosis, and requires a g-tube for nutrition. (App. Vol. II at 16.) Child lived with Mother and saw Father sporadically.

[3] On September 15, 2022, DCS filed a petition that alleged Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) based on a report that Mother was not taking Child to doctor's appointments. On October 5, 2022, DCS removed Child from Mother's care because Mother's housing had become unstable and Mother tested positive for illegal substances. DCS placed Child with Child's maternal grandmother, where she has remained. Child was not placed with Father because he could not be located.

[4] Sometime thereafter, DCS located Father, who was in jail because he had violated his pre-trial release on charges related to an alleged domestic battery against Mother. As part of that charge, the criminal court entered a no-contact order protecting Mother and her three older children, who witnessed the incident. On December 5, 2022, DCS served Father with the petition alleging Child was a CHINS. On January 4, 2023, Father admitted Child was a CHINS, and the juvenile court entered a dispositional order that required Father to contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release from custody and to establish paternity of Child.

[5] On January 31, 2023, Father was released from jail after he admitted he committed Level 5 felony domestic battery ² (“2023 Conviction”) against Mother and the criminal court suspended his 1041-day sentence to probation. The criminal court again issued a no contact order prohibiting Father from contacting Mother and her three older children. Father did not contact DCS upon his release, did not visit Child, and did not attend hearings in the CHINS matter during 2023. On January 11, 2024, Father was arrested and jailed for violating his probation for the 2023 Conviction. He was released shortly thereafter.

[6] On February 8, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. In April 2024, Father visited with Child in a laundromat while supervised by maternal grandmother. This visit was not a DCS authorized visit. During the visit, Child told maternal grandmother that she “didn't want to go with [Father.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 36.) Child also cried and said, “I don't like him[.]” (Id.) On May 8, 2024, Father was again put in jail for probation violations in the 2023 Conviction proceedings. He was released shortly thereafter.

[7] On July 23, 2024, the juvenile court ordered Father to undergo DNA testing because he questioned Child's paternity. Father did not attend court-ordered mediation in August 2024 despite the fact he was not incarcerated, but his counsel did. The parties were unable to reach an agreement during mediation. In September 2024, Mother signed a consent to allow maternal grandmother to adopt Child. In September 2024, DNA testing confirmed Father's paternity of Child.

[8] On October 8, 2024, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. Father participated from jail, where he was housed because he again had violated the terms of his probation for the 2023 Conviction. Father believed he would be released in November 2024, though upon release he could not take immediate custody of Child because he needed to “pick up on bills and make [his residence] more homely for [Child.]” (Id. at 70.) He asked the juvenile court to “give [him] some time to get out, get [himself] into a bigger and better environment that [he] can provide for [Child.]” (Id.) During the hearing, DCS presented evidence of Father's various periods of incarceration; his lack of contact with DCS when he was not incarcerated; and his failure to complete services and visit with Child during the pendency of the CHINS and termination proceedings. Maternal grandmother testified regarding Child's medical needs and her efforts to address them, which had resulted in improvements such as a diminished need for use of a g-tube for nutrition, physical supports to treat Child's scoliosis, and the procurement of aids to help Child walk after the amputation of one of her legs. The family case manager, guardian ad litem, and Mother all testified that they believed termination of Father's parental right to Child was in Child's best interests. On November 25, 2024, the trial court issued its order terminating Father's parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision

[9] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. The termination of parental rights is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities[.]” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[10] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As found by the trial court herein, the statute requires DCS to prove:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that termination is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[11] When reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights,

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.

In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 125 (Ind. 2016). Father does not challenge any of the trial court's findings, and “[w]e accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

1. Remedy of Conditions Under Which Child was Removed

[12] Father argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed would not be remedied. When considering whether the conditions under which a child is removed from a parent's care would be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-3 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the reasons for the child's removal and then we determine whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. Id. at 643. As we recently stated in In re A.L.:

It is well-established that “[a] trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” In judging fitness, a trial court may properly consider, among other things, a parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment. The trial court may also consider a parent's failure to respond to services. “[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” A trial court “need not wait until the child[ ] [is] irreversibly influenced by [its] deficient lifestyle such that [its] physical, mental and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.”

223 N.E.3d at 1138-9 (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original).

[13] To support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Father's care would not be remedied, the juvenile court noted Father's conviction of Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to Mother while she was pregnant and additionally found:

18. Four separate violations of probation were filed against Father and his Probation was ultimately revoked on January 4, 2024.

19. Father was found to have violated probation in 14 instances, and one allegation was withdrawn. The violations included failing to submit to drug screens, failing to refrain from [using] illegal drugs or any controlled substance without a valid prescription, failing to report to Probation as directed, failing to pay fines, costs and restitution as directed, and two other ways which were redacted from the record.

20. On January 4, 2024, [Father] was sentenced to Community Corrections Home Detention.

21. Four separate Violations of Community Corrections were filed against Father.

22. A hearing was held on May 20, 2024. Father admitted to 2 of 32 violations and was ordered returned to Community Corrections but this time placed on work release.

23. Two separate violations of Community Corrections Work Release were file[d] against [Father] ultimately resulting in a no bond hold pending his violation hearing, for which he is currently being held.

24. A Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) Petition was filed regarding [Child] and under Cause Number 49D22-2209-JC-007055 on September 15, 2022, following allegations that Mother was not meeting [Child's] medical needs. The allegations were that Father's whereabouts were unknown, that he had failed to demonstrate willingness or ability to parent [Child], and that he was unable to protect [Child] when she was in Mother's care.

25. At the Initial Hearing on 9/16/2022, [Child] was ordered to remain in-home with Mother with Family Preservation services in place. Mother was ordered to ensure that [Child] attended all medical appointments. Father was ordered to have no parenting time until he appeared in Court.

26. A Detention Hearing was held on 10/5/2022 and [Child] was removed and placed with [maternal] grandmother. This was due to Mother's housing instability and positive drug screens. Father's whereabouts continued to be unknown.

27. [Child] continues to reside with [maternal grandmother], [maternal grandmother's husband], and her 3 older siblings.

(App. Vol. II at 15-16.) The trial court then outlined the process by which Father was served notice of the CHINS petition and that he admitted Child was a CHINS. The trial court further found, regarding the trial court's dispositional order and Father's compliance therewith that “[o]n January 4, 2023, the CHINS Court proceeded to disposition as to Father. He was ordered to contact DCS within 72 hours of his release and to establish paternity.” (Id. at 17.) The trial court then gave a timeline of Father's periods of time in and out of incarceration:

49. Father was released from the Marion County Jail on January 31, 2023.

50. Father was arrested and incarcerated in the Marion County Jail on January 11, 2024.

51. Father was not incarcerated for 11 of the 12 months of 2023.

52. Father was incarcerated in the Marion County Jail from January 11, 2024 to January 22, 2024.

53. Father was not incarcerated for the three months between January 22, 2024 to May 8, 2024.

54. Father was incarcerated in the Marion County Jail from May 8, [2024] to May 21, 2024.

55. Father was not incarcerated in the Marion County for the one month between May 21, 2024 and June 28, 2024.

56. Father was incarcerated from June 28, 2024 to August 5, 2024.

57. Father was not incarcerated for one month between August 5, 2024 to September 15, 2024.

58. Father is currently incarcerated in the Marion County Jail and has been since September 15, 2024.

59. Father had three separate periods of incarceration in the Marion County Jail in 2017.

60. Father had one period of incarceration in the Marion County Jail in 2019.

61. Father had two separate periods of incarceration in 2020.

62. Father had one period of incarceration in 2021.

63. Father has a habitual pattern of conduct which results in incarceration.

(Id.) Finally, the trial court made findings about Father's participation in the CHINS action:

64. Despite knowing that [Child] was the subject of a CHINS Proceeding and despite being out of jail for 5 months while FCM Turay was assigned, Father did not contact FCM Turay within 72 hours of his release from jail, or at any other time.

65. [FCM] Leone Hubbard is currently the assigned FCM for [Child] and her family[.]

* * * * *

67. Despite being out of jail for a total of 11 months while FCM Hubbard was assigned to the family, and despite knowing that [Child] was the subject of a CHINS proceeding, Father has not ever reached out to FCM Hubbard regarding [Child].

* * * * *

69. Father has been aware of the CHINS proceeding for over one and a half years, since December 5, 2022. Father was aware of the CHINS matter from many different perspectives: he was served, he had an attorney, he was in contact with Mother, and he was in contact with Grandmother[.] For over one and a half years, Father chose not to communicate with DCS and he chose not to demonstrate a willingness or ability to parent [Child].

70. Father did not visit with [Child] at all through an agency or provider, as ordered.

(Id. at 18.)

[14] Father argues the juvenile court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed would not be remedied because “he demonstrated an ability and willingness to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [Child's] removal and, if given more time, the conditions would be remedied.” (Father's Br. at 12.) Father contends he completed domestic violence prevention and mental health evaluation and treatment while incarcerated. However, he did not provide evidence of those services. In addition, he notes he was scheduled to be released from incarceration a few months after the termination fact-finding hearing, but he also told the trial court that he would need some time before he had a suitable living arrangement for Child.

[15] Father ignores the trial court's findings regarding his habitual pattern of incarceration and his failure to contact DCS, participate in court ordered services, and visit with Child. Child has never been in Father's care and had only brief visits with him through the years. Child had been the subject of CHINS proceedings for over a year and a half at the time of the termination fact-finding hearing and Father was no closer to being able to care for Child than he had been when DCS removed her from Mother's care. Child needs stability and cannot languish, waiting for Father to engage in court-ordered services so that he is able to properly care for her. See Baker v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Family & Child., 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 n.4 (Ind. 2004) (limitations on trial court's ability to approve long-term foster care are designed to ensure a child does not “languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency”) (quoting In re Priser, No. 19861, 2004 WL 541124 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19, 2004)). Therefore, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed would not be remedied.³ See, e.g., In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (father's failure to visit with child and participate in services, as well as pending criminal charges, supported the trial court's conclusion that conditions under which child was removed from his care would not be remedied), reh'g denied.

2. Child's Best Interests

[16] Father also contends the termination of his parental rights to Child is not in Child's best interests because he was working on participating in services to help him obtain the ability to care for Child. When considering whether termination of a parent's rights is in a child's best interests, the trial court is “required to look at the totality of the evidence.” Z.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. When it does so, the trial court “must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved.” Id. The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed” before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, testimony from service providers may support a finding that termination is in a child's best interests. Id.

[17] In addition to its findings regarding Child's removal, Father's pattern of incarceration, and Father's lack of participation in services and visitation with Child, the trial court also outlined Child's medical needs, such as the necessity of a g-tube for nutrition, the use of physical supports to aid in the treatment of her scoliosis, and the ongoing process of treating the amputation of Child's leg, which would involve the use of a prosthetic. The trial court noted Father received training regarding Child's g-tube when she was born but had not participated in services designed to help him care for Child's medical needs since then. While in maternal grandmother's care, Child received extensive medical care to address her health issues, which were improving. Maternal grandmother wanted to adopt Child. Based thereon, we hold the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests. See, e.g., In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 800 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (trial court's findings supported its conclusion that termination of father's parental rights was in child's best interest because child's placement wanted to adopt her and father had not addressed his substance abuse issues, failed to “have a consistent presence” in child's life, and was incarcerated for the majority of the proceedings), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Conclusion

[18] The trial court's findings support its conclusions that the conditions under which Child was removed would not be remedied and that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Accordingly, we affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother consented to maternal grandmother's adoption of Child and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(c)(3).

3.   Father also argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Father-Child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requires DCS to allege one of the circumstances set forth in that section. Because we have determined the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be remedied, we need not consider Father's argument regarding another circumstance listed in Section 4(d).

May, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Bradford concur. Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.