BALL v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kristin Ball sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant, and the State charged her with dealing in methamphetamine. While on a recorded call in jail, Ball admitted to previously selling methamphetamine. On the day of trial, Ball expressed an intent to argue the defense of entrapment, so the State advised it would use parts of the jail call that contradicted her defense. Even though defense counsel was aware of the contradictory evidence, Ball requested a continuance which was granted. Thereafter, the State filed a formal notice of intent to admit the jail call as evidence of prior bad acts or crimes. The jail call was admitted as evidence, and Ball was found guilty as charged. Ball now appeals and presents a single issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the jail call.

[2] Because we conclude that Ball has waived her claim for multiple reasons, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2021, Ball met Ashely Crawford and sold her drugs “[t]wo (2) to three (3)” times. Tr. Vol. II at 225. In December 2022, Crawford was working as a confidential informant for Detective Shane Heath of the Fort Wayne Police Department. On December 19, 2022, Detective Heath provided Crawford with money to conduct a controlled buy of methamphetamine from Ball. Crawford executed the controlled buy, purchasing an ounce of methamphetamine from Ball. The State charged Ball with dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony.

[4] On November 13, 2023, Ball placed a phone call from the Allen County Jail where she admitted to previous instances of selling methamphetamine, stating that she used to sell “a quarter pound ․ twice a week.” Ex. 5 at 1:11–1:19.¹ On January 4, 2024, the State amended its witness list to include the record keeper at the Allen County Jail.

[5] On July 9, the parties arrived for the scheduled jury trial.² However, Ball claimed she could not proceed to trial because the State was inappropriately seeking to introduce evidence of prior crimes and bad acts in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), arguing that the introduction of the November jail call was contradictory to what the State had allegedly told her in an email exchange in May.³ Also at issue was a jail call that Ball made on July 5, 2024, where she stated that she had charged Crawford double the standard amount for methamphetamine because she “did not want to f[*]ck with [Crawford],” Ex. 6 at 2:15–2:19, but then stated, “I'm not saying I didn't do it. I did it. I'm guilty. I did it,” id. at 2:49–2:57. In response, the State argued that Ball had never requested the 404(b) evidence and that it sought to offer evidence of the calls only after Ball made it clear that she intended to argue entrapment as a defense. Ball moved to continue the jury trial, and the trial court granted this request. On July 19, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence, including both jail calls.

[6] On July 26, the trial court held a hearing on the State's proposed 404(b) evidence. The trial court concluded in part that, if Ball raised a defense of entrapment, then the November call was admissible and that the July call was admissible regardless because it was not 404(b) evidence. On July 30, Ball's jury trial began. At trial, Ball presented her defense of entrapment, the State offered the November jail call into evidence, and the trial court admitted the call. Ball was found guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced her to 17 years with 2 years suspended to probation. Ball now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Ball Has Waived Her Claim for Our Review

[7] Ball claims that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[8] For multiple reasons, Ball has waived her evidentiary claim for our review. We initially note that Ball does not identify which piece of evidence the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence. Her argument references only the November 2023 jail call, which was admitted as State's Exhibit 5. Ball failed to identify in the record where this exhibit was offered and admitted into evidence in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(d). Notably, the record reveals that Ball failed to object to the admission of Exhibit 5. In fact, when the State offered the November jail call into evidence, Ball stated, “No objection.” Tr. Vol. II at 165. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a defendant's failure to object to the admissibility of evidence at trial waives the issue for our review unless fundamental error occurred. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678–79 (Ind. 2013) (citing Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. 2010)). Further, “we will not review claims, even for fundamental error, when appellants expressly declare at trial that they have no objection.” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Ind. 2017) (citing Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 678–79). “The appellant cannot on the one hand state at trial that he has no objection to the admission of evidence and thereafter in this Court claim such admission to be erroneous.” Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 679 (quoting Harrison v. State, 258 Ind. 359, 281 N.E.2d 98, 100 (1972)). Thus, Ball waived this claim for our review. See id. at 678–79.

[9] We also find it important to highlight that the argument in Ball's brief is rife with violations of our Appellate Rules. If a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)). Ball failed to provide the correct standard of review in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b). Ball asks us to review her claim for abuse of discretion, ignoring her failure to object at trial and the resulting fundamental error analysis. Also, Ball failed to provide adequate citations to the record in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

[10] We also note Ball's argument is often inconsistent and lacks the cogent reasoning required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). On appeal, Ball's argument seemingly relies on her belief that the State should have informed her earlier about the use of the jail call, claiming that State should have been aware she would argue entrapment at trial. In doing so, Ball contends that entrapment was “central to this case” from the beginning, suggesting that she was under no duty to inform the State of her entrapment defense. Appellant's Br. at 10. However, Ball later acknowledges, “[I]t is incumbent upon the defendant to affirmatively raise the defense before the State is required to offer rebuttal evidence showing the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime.” Id. at 10–11 (quoting Jackson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)). In another instance of self-contradiction, Ball focuses much of her argument on the reasonable notice requirement of Evidence Rule 404(b) but then states the following: “The question is not whether the timing of the notice of their intent to use [the] November, 2023 jail call was sufficient. Instead, the State unequivocally stated that they would not be using the call.” Id. at 10. “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Because Ball has failed to clearly state or support her argument, we conclude that she has waived these claims for our review, see Pierce, 29 N.E.3d 1267 (Ind. 2015).

[11] Waiver notwithstanding, we will quickly address the merits of Ball's claim. Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), permits evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Further, the rule provides:

On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:

(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and

(B) do so before trial--or during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b). Ball does not point us to anywhere in the record where she requested the State's 404(b) evidence; rather, she highlights only the July 9, 2024, proceeding where she argued that, at this point, the State should have already provided her notice. Even if we assume that Ball met her burden of making the request, the State provided reasonable notice of the jail call. The call occurred on November 13, 2023, and the record shows that the parties discussed the call in May 2024. When Ball asked for a continuance based on the introduction of the call, the trial court granted the request. On July 18, the State filed its notice of intent to introduce the call at trial. This notice came 12 days before the newly scheduled trial date and provided enough time to conduct a hearing on the admissibility of all the 404(b) evidence the State intended to offer. Thus, the 12-day notice was sufficient to resolve any questions of admissibility. See Hatcher v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (Ind. 2000) (“[T]he six-day notice given to Hatcher was sufficient to promote the early resolution of questions of admissibility.”) We conclude that the State did not violate Evidence Rule 404(b) by admitting the November jail call.

[12] In sum, Ball waived her claim due to her failure to object at trial as well as her violations of our appellate rules, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the November jail call. We affirm the trial court's decision.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At trial, Exhibits 5 and 6 were admitted together, and the jail record keeper mixed up the dates of the jail calls. This discrepancy is later clarified when the Exhibits were published to the jury.

2.   We note that both parties mischaracterize the proceedings related to this date. Neither party acknowledges that they appeared in court on July 9 for trial. The State refers to this appearance as a status hearing while Ball merely states that this appearance was “three weeks prior to trial.” Appellant's Br. at 8. The trial court scheduled this jury trial on April 8, and witnesses were present and prepared to testify at the proceeding.

3.   The record on appeal does not provide any copies or transcripts of these emails. Thus, we can rely only on the parties’ descriptions of the email exchange.

Felix, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.