OWENS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Nasir Owens set up a drug buy with Austin Seiman, at which Owens and his friend Demetrius Walker murdered Seiman before dumping his body in a river and setting fire to the vehicle used to transport the body. The State charged Owens with murder, arson, and use of a firearm during commission of a felony under the theory of accomplice liability. A jury convicted Owens on all counts. Owens now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 26, 2023, at approximately 9:53 p.m., Seiman's girlfriend, Heley Brown, arrived at Seiman's residence. After discovering Seiman was not home, Brown checked Seiman's Facebook account from her phone. Seiman used the pseudonym Alvin Camara for the Facebook account he used for selling drugs. Brown viewed Facebook messages between Alvin Camara (Seiman) and CBW Flint (Owens)¹ where they arranged to meet in an alleyway near Seiman's home for Seiman to sell $300 worth of drugs to Owens. When arranging the meeting, Owens sent Seiman a photo of the blue-gray car he was in.

[4] At approximately 10:00 p.m. that night, Victor Lopez observed a meeting in the alleyway by his home and saw a black man hitting a white man before dragging him to a back yard. Lopez then saw a car arrive and the driver, a black man, exit the car to approach the other two before retrieving something from the car. Shortly thereafter, Lopez heard several gunshots before he witnessed two black men get in the car and leave. Lopez witnessed the two men return in the same vehicle approximately twenty minutes later and cover the body in a black bag before placing it in the backseat of the car.

[5] At 12:35 a.m. on September 27, law enforcement officers responded to reports of a vehicle fire. The vehicle was a blue-gray Hyundai Sonata matching the general description of the car seen by Lopez. A wallet was found near the burning Sonata, and officers connected the Speedway card inside of the wallet to Seiman. The back portion of the Sonata was heavily damaged, likely due to the use of ignitable liquids dumped on that part of the car. The Sonata belonged to Walker's mother, Bunita Boyd. Walker was the last known person to drive Boyd's car, and Owens was alone in the car with Walker on the night of September 26 when they left Boyd's home without saying where they were going. Owens and Walker returned to Boyd's home in Owens's mother's car, a Chevy Traverse, although they had left in the Sonata.

[6] At 12:54 a.m., Boyd called 911 to report her Sonata stolen after Walker woke her up to tell her it had been stolen. Surveillance footage shows the Sonata stopping at Owens's mother's house, the occupants exiting the Sonata and getting into the Chevy Traverse and leaving before returning a short while later. After returning, both vehicles proceeded to the scene of the vehicle fire. After the Sonata caught fire, the Chevy Traverse drove off. Later, when Walker talked to law enforcement about the vehicle being stolen, he gave multiple stories related to where and when the car was stolen.

[7] Returning to the scene of the murder, when law enforcement officers arrived in the alleyway in response to reports of gunshots, they found spots of blood in the alley and a bloodied white t-shirt. The blood was tested for DNA and matched Seiman's, whose shirtless body was discovered on September 28 by a kayaker near the convergence of the St. Mary and Maumee Rivers near the Tecumseh Road bridge. Seiman's body was riddled with gunshot wounds. Doctor Lyndsey Emery performed an autopsy and determined the cause of Seiman's death to be multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Emery also opined that Seiman's death occurred before Seiman was put into the river.

[8] Using historical cell site analysis, law enforcement officers found that Owens's phone was used to make three calls between 10:09 and 10:59 p.m. on September 26. The 10:09 p.m. call was made near the shooting location, and the 10:29 and 10:59 calls were made near the body-recovery site. Owens's phone went off network at approximately 11:00 p.m. on September 26.

[9] The State charged Owens with murder ² and arson as a Level 6 felony ³ ; it also alleged Owens had used a firearm in the commission of a felony ⁴ . A jury found Owens, guilty as charged and found he had used a firearm in the commission of Seiman's murder. The trial court sentenced Owens to 77 years of incarceration. Owens now appeals.⁵

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Owen's Convictions

[10] Owens argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his murder conviction. Our standard of review for such a claim is:

well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). Owens claims the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his convictions for (a) murder and (b) use of a firearm in the commission of the crime.

a. Murder

[11] In order to convict Owens of murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Owens knowingly or intentionally killed Seiman.⁶ See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). Notably, “it is well-settled that ‘circumstantial evidence alone’ can sustain a murder conviction.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244–45 (quoting Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016)). “Though presence at the scene alone is not sufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant's presence combined with other circumstantial evidence is.” Id. at 1245(citing Pratt v. State, 744 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ind. 2001)).

[12] Owens claims the State failed to prove intent, namely, that he “knowingly or intentionally kill[ed] Sieman, while acting in concert with Walker.” Appellant's Br. at 13. “A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense ․” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. “Indiana makes no distinction between the responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citing Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (Ind. 1999)). “We consider four factors to determine whether a defendant acted as an accomplice: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of crime.” Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012) (citing Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ind. 2001)).

[13] The evidence most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom put Walker and Owens together in the Sonata. Owens arranged to meet Seiman in the alleyway near Lopez's home to buy drugs and sent a picture of the Sonata to Seiman so Seiman could find Owens. Tr. Vol. II at 196–97. These circumstances establish the first two factors in favor of accomplice liability.

[14] In the alleyway, one of the two men from the Sonata beat Seiman and dragged him to the back yard while the other retrieved a gun from the car and shot him nine times. Tr. Vol. II at 201–03; Tr. Vol. III at 110. Owen's argument that he was uninvolved in the “spontaneous and spur of the moment act by Walker,” Appellant's Br. at 15, is unpersuasive given his dragging Seiman toward his death and the following lengths to which he went in attempting to cover up the murder. The evidence shows that (1) Owens and Walker used the Sonata to move the body from the scene of the murder and dump it in a river; (2) Owens and Walker set fire to the Sonata in an attempt to destroy evidence; and (3) Owens drove his mother's Traverse to the scene of the arson on the night of the murder so he and Walker had a getaway car in which to leave the scene of the arson. This level of planning and cooperation before, during, and after the murder cuts in favor of accomplice liability. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Owen's conviction for murder under the theory of accomplice liability.

b. Firearm Enhancement

[15] Owens argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his sentencing enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of a felony. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11 allows an additional fixed term of imprisonment when the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that a person knowingly used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Owen's argument for relief is based on his erroneous belief that, for the enhancement to stand, Owens must have personally used the firearm. It is irrelevant whether Owens personally pulled the trigger. See Parker v. State, 754 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“The fact that Parker was not the actual shooter is irrelevant under this statute.”). As discussed above, an accomplice is equally responsible for the actions of the principal. Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1191. Because there is sufficient evidence to support Owen's murder conviction under the theory of accomplice liability for the shooting murder of Seiman, it follows that there is sufficient evidence to support the sentencing enhancement for using a firearm during the commission of that offense for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Owen's firearm enhancement.

Conclusion

[16] The State provided sufficient evidence to convict Owens of murder and in support of the firearm sentencing enhancement. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At trial, witness Heley Brown referred to the account as CBW Flint; however, the Facebook account, at State's Exhibit 92, shows Owens's actual account name as CBW LUH Flint.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

3.   Id. § 35-43-1-1(d).

4.   Id. § 35-50-2-11.

5.   On appeal, Owens does not challenge his arson conviction.

6.   Owens does not contend on appeal that he was not at the scene of the crime. Owens was convicted of Arson, and he is not appealing that conviction, which is paramount to an admission that he was present at least at one significant point in the evening—where evidence of Seiman's murder was wiped from the car and then set ablaze.

Felix, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.