Karl J. Stevens, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Karl J. Stevens appeals following his conviction of Level 5 felony domestic battery.¹ He presents two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as:

1. Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct:

1.1. during closing argument; or

1.2. by eliciting course of investigation testimony; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Stevens and A.L. began dating in early 2021, and by August 2022, A.L. was nine months pregnant with Stevens's child. Around 1:00 a.m. on August 16, 2022, A.L. and Stevens were asleep in A.L.’s apartment in Elkhart, Indiana, when Stevens received two text messages from an ex-girlfriend. The text message notification woke A.L., and she became upset when she saw that the messages were from one of Stevens's ex-girlfriends. A.L. “started throwing things at him, making a scene, and then he kept getting up trying to turn off the light, lay back down, just trying to ignore [A.L.] and then [A.L.] just didn't stop so he got up to leave, like leave the apartment[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 183.) A.L. blocked the apartment door, and Stevens pushed her aside and exited the apartment. A.L. followed Stevens out of the apartment and down the stairs to the apartment building's entrance.

[3] Amari Bonds was in the apartment complex's parking lot at the time, and she heard A.L. scream. Bonds entered the apartment building, and she saw Stevens and A.L. in the stairwell. Stevens was “[h]olding [A.L.’s] hands.” (Id. at 140.) Bonds then saw Stevens hit A.L. in the face, and Bonds intervened by getting between Stevens and A.L. to separate them. Stevens called Bonds a “bitch,” and Bonds hit Stevens. (Id. at 144.) Stevens then hit Bonds, and Stevens and Bonds started scuffling. At some point, Stevens showed Bonds that he had a gun, and the two stopped fighting. Stevens drove away in his car. Bonds called 911.

[4] Officer Scott Haig of the Elkhart Police Department responded to the 911 dispatch and encountered Bonds standing along State Street near the apartment complex. Bonds was crying and upset, and she explained that she could not hear out of her right ear because Stevens had hit her. Officer Brandon Stevens of the Elkhart Police Department also responded to the 911 dispatch. He encountered A.L. sitting inside her car in the complex's parking lot. She was crying and had “red watery eyes.” (Id. at 107.) Officer Stevens also noticed a red mark on her cheek below her left eye and red marks near her neck. He also observed small abrasions on both of her elbows. A.L. was visibly pregnant, and Officer Stevens's body camera captured pictures of her injuries.

[5] On April 20, 2023, the State charged Stevens with Level 5 felony domestic battery.² While Stevens was incarcerated awaiting trial, he and A.L. spoke frequently. A.L. met with the deputy prosecutors trying Stevens's case on March 6, 2024, and she discussed that meeting afterward in a series of phone calls with Stevens. She told Stevens, “[t]hey hear all your conversations, bro. You're fucked․ They already know everything. They hear all the phone calls.” (State's Ex. 101A (Stevens Call 3.6.24 at 3:16 pm) at 2:05-2:21.) A.L. explained the deputy prosecutors “know that you're trying to get me to lie․ They're not dumb. They already got all their evidence.” (Id. at 2:23-2:30.) She stated she “tried to tell them the story,” but the deputy prosecutors accused her of lying. (Id. at 2:38-2:50.) Stevens told A.L. to “go to court and say what happened,” (id. at 3:33-3:38), and A.L. replied, “they know it's a lie.” (Id. at 3:38-3:40.) Stevens told A.L. to go to court and “tell the truth,” (id. at 4:35), so that he could “get up outta here.” (Id. at 4:36.) A.L. explained, “I can't do that․ They already know it's a lie ․ That little meeting was a test.” (Id. at 4:37-4:45.) She stated, “I'm not lying period, bro. I'm not going to jail for perjury.” (Id. at 5:07-5:10.) Stevens responded, “this bitch better get me home.” (Id. at 5:10-5:13.) Stevens told A.L. that the deputy prosecutors did not know what happened because they did not witness the incident. He stated the “truth” was that he never hit A.L. or Bonds. (State's Ex. 101A (Stevens Call 3.6.24 at 3:27 pm) at 3:25-3:37.) He told A.L. that the State could not charge her with perjury because she was “hyper” and “upset” the night of the incident. (Id. at 4:44-4:48.) He also started asking A.L. questions he believed the State intended to ask her until A.L. told him to stop.

[6] The trial court held Stevens's jury trial from March 12 to March 14, 2024. When testifying at trial, A.L. initially indicated that she did not see Stevens in the courtroom before identifying him as the defendant. She denied that Stevens had hit her during the incident, but she acknowledged that he had grabbed her arms and neck to “guide [her] away.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 234.) A.L. claimed she lied when talking with Officer Stevens because she “was trying to get [Stevens] in a little trouble.” (Id. at 213.) A.L. explained her own father had been incarcerated for most of her childhood and she wanted Stevens “home with his son.” (Id. at 215-16.) A.L. professed that she still loved Stevens, and she acknowledged speaking with him about her anticipated testimony and her meeting with the prosecutors before trial. Following A.L.’s testimony, the State called Elkhart County Sheriff's Office Investigator Barry Snyder and introduced recordings of the March 6, 2024, jail phone calls between Stevens and A.L.

[7] During the State's closing argument, the State commented on A.L.’s testimony that Stevens never slapped her during the incident despite what she told Officer Stevens at the scene. The State talked about A.L.’s loyalty to Stevens:

She would do anything to help him. Even if it's a bold face lie. Even if she doesn't realize all of the other stuff has already been admitted to. That's why she said in that call they know it's a lie. It's over. They know. But she's still so much under the thumb of his control that she came in here and did what – yeah, we met with her and we said just like everybody that comes in here you're going to swear an oath to tell the truth and if and when you don't there could be consequences. That's how it goes. That's how courtrooms work. We expect that people are going to come in here and tell the truth. And even after acknowledging to us that it was a lie and to him that it was a lie –

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 37-38.) Stevens then objected and argued the State's comment implied A.L. told the deputy prosecutors in a meeting with them that she intended to lie at trial. The trial court agreed: “I think it's not so far off base that one couldn't reach that conclusion. That being said, I think it's dangerous ground we're treading on.” (Id. at 39.) Stevens moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied, but the trial court did give a limiting instruction and ordered the sentence preceding Stevens's objection stricken:

So there was an objection made to a comment made by [the State] and we will agree and you'll be instructed in just a few moments that arguments of counsel are not evidence. However, just want to clarify or at least admonish the State of Indiana that the State of Indiana or certainly any party for that matter may not get into any discussions in which it's possible that that attorney may have been a witness. However, in talking with the attorneys up at the bench, it is the Court's understanding that the last comment made by [the State] was not necessarily where he wanted to put before you information that specifically came from the meeting with [A.L.], rather he was wanting you to make an inference based upon what you heard from the jail recordings that were introduced through witness Barry Snyder. However, I think the safest thing to do and I agree with [Stevens] that that comment should be struck regarding any conversation that [the deputy prosecutor] and/or his colleagues may have had with [A.L.] in their office and you are not to consider that argument.

(Id. at 44-45.) The State then finished its closing argument. After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict finding Stevens guilty.

[8] The trial court held Stevens's sentencing hearing on April 22, 2024. The trial court found Stevens's criminal history, which consisted of six felony convictions and three misdemeanor convictions, to be an aggravating factor. The trial court also found the facts that Stevens had twice previously violated the terms of community supervision and that Stevens had five additional criminal cases pending against him at the time of sentencing to be aggravating factors. The trial court further noted as an aggravating factor that Stevens violated the law by battering Bonds and by displaying a handgun even though the State did not charge him for those crimes. The trial court found Stevens's expression of remorse at the sentencing hearing to be a mitigating factor, but the trial court expressly declined to enter as a mitigating factor that A.L. initiated the argument's physicality. The trial court explained:

The Court is denying entering a mitigating factor for the victim initiating the confrontation. I recognize that's what the victim testified to, it's also this Court's observation that the victim minimized the behavior, in fact, I recall being somewhat shocked, as was I think the State of Indiana, when the victim initially was scanning the courtroom to try to find the defendant when she was asked to identify the defendant and there were no other people in the courtroom, it was the Court's observation that there was definitely fear on the victim's behalf in testifying. So her saying that she initiated it carries little weight with the Court so that's the reason that I'm denying the mitigator but I think it's fair that you ask for it and I appreciate that you asked for clarification on the denial of the mitigator.

(Id. at 78-79.) The trial court sentenced Stevens to a term of six years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct

1.1. Closing Argument

[9] Stevens asserts the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument when it discussed the impact Stevens's control over A.L. likely had on her trial testimony. Specifically, Stevens takes issue with the State's comment:

That's why she said in that call they know it's a lie. It's over. They know. But she's still so much under the thumb of his control that she came in here and did what – yeah, we met with her and we said just like everybody that comes in here you're going to swear an oath to tell the truth and if and when you don't there could be consequences. That's how it goes. That's how courtrooms work. We expect that people are going to come in here and tell the truth. And even after acknowledging to us that it was a lie and to him that it was a lie –

(Id. at 37-38.) Stevens argues the comment “was severely prejudicial in that it appeared the [deputy prosecutor] was making himself a witness, or testifying to events not in evidence that he had personal knowledge of that would impact how the jury should view evidence.” (Appellant's Br. at 6.)

[10] When reviewing a properly preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “we determine (1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ind. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘Whether a prosecutor's argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied) (emphasis in Ryan).

[11] During closing argument, an attorney “must not imply a superior personal knowledge, or otherwise suggest to the jury that he has additional, undisclosed evidence of either guilt or innocence, which may induce the jury to decide the case on reliance on matters outside the evidence.” Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1125-26 (Ind. 1988). The argument must be confined “to comments based upon the evidence presented in the record.” Malloch v. State, 980 N.E.2d 887, 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The deputy prosecutor's comment that “even after acknowledging to us that it was a lie[,]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 38), implied the deputy prosecutor had personal knowledge that A.L. confessed the story she relayed on the stand was not fully accurate. Such a confession was not in evidence, and therefore, the deputy prosecutor's comment was inappropriate.

[12] However, the State does not commit misconduct during closing argument when it advances “logical or reasonable conclusions from the prosecutor's analysis of the evidence.” Saylor v. State, 55 N.E.3d 354, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Based on the telephone conversations between A.L. and Stevens that were played for the jury, one could logically conclude A.L. was not testifying truthfully at trial when she said Stevens did not hit her and only grabbed her neck to “guide her away.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 234.) In the phone calls, A.L. referenced her meeting with the deputy prosecutors and indicated that they knew Stevens was pressuring her to lie on the stand. In those calls, Stevens tried to convince A.L. the State could not charge her with perjury if she testified according to his wishes and proposed reasons A.L. could give for why she initially reported Stevens battered her. Thus, while the deputy prosecutor should not have referenced what A.L. allegedly told him, the deputy prosecutor's primary argument that the jury should consider Stevens's manipulation of A.L. when evaluating her testimony was entirely appropriate. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ind. 2006) (holding deputy prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct when he argued defendant's testimony was not truthful because it was inconsistent with the defendant's own prior statements, the testimony of other witnesses, and the physical evidence).

[13] Moreover, after Stevens objected, the trial court struck the State's comment, instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel were not evidence, and told the attorneys to “not get into any discussions in which it's possible that that attorney may have been a witness.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 44-45.) We presume that when the trial court admonishes the jury to disregard a statement made during trial, the jury follows that admonishment and the excluded statement plays no role in the jury's deliberation. Higgason v. State, 210 N.E.3d 868, 882-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. For that reason, we rarely find reversible error “if the trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a statement made during the proceedings.” Id. at 882. Given the trial court's timely and accurate admonishment to not consider the arguments of counsel to be evidence, the State's mention of its meeting with A.L. did not place Stevens in a position of grave peril. Therefore, we reject Stevens's argument that his conviction should be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. See, e.g., Fouts v. State, 207 N.E.3d 1257, 1267-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding prosecutor's comment during closing argument was not an unfair characterization of the evidence and, even if it constituted misconduct, it did not place the defendant in a position of grave peril), aff'd on reh'g, 210 N.E.3d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

1.2. Course of Investigation Testimony

[14] Second, Stevens contends it was prosecutorial misconduct for the State to question Officer Stevens about whether his investigation allowed him to identify a suspect because “[a]ll the information he used to arrive at Stevens as a suspect that night was hearsay.” (Appellant's Br. at 14.) During the State's direct examination of Officer Stevens, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Okay. But ultimately did you receive information from [A.L.] regarding an altercation that she was involved in?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And did she provide information as to how she may have encountered some of these injuries that she had?

A. She did, yes.

Q. Okay. Based on your interaction with [A.L.] and also Corporal Haig's interaction with the woman on State Street, did you feel that you had a good idea for [sic] what happened here?

A. Yes.

* * * * *

Q. All right. Were you able to determine a possible suspect?

A. Yes.

Q. And who was that?

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 113-15.) Stevens then raised an objection that Officer Stevens's answer “can only be based on hearsay.” (Id. at 115.) The trial court overruled the objection, and the State asked:

Q. All right. Let me back up, you said you were able to determine a possible suspect so who was that?

A. Karl Stevens.

(Id. at 116.)

[15] Stevens asserts that the State used this questioning to put inadmissible hearsay evidence in front of the jury. The State counters that “Stevens failed to preserve this claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to request an admonishment or mistrial.” (Appellee's Br. at 11-12.) In support of the State's argument, the State relies upon our Indiana Supreme Court's statement in Ryan that “[t]o preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the alleged misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial.” 9 N.E.3d at 667. However, our Indiana Supreme Court recently abrogated that rule. In Konkle, the Court held “moving forward, where a defendant timely objects to alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and the trial court overrules the objection, nothing further is required to preserve the issue for appeal.” 253 N.E.3d at 1082 (emphasis in original). The Court then went on to analyze the merits of Konkle's prosecutorial misconduct claim even though Konkle had not requested a mistrial after his objection was overruled. Id. Likewise, we analyze the merits of Stevens's prosecutorial misconduct claim related to the State's questioning of Officer Stevens.

[16] A prosecutor's placement of “inadmissible evidence before the jury for the deliberate purpose of prejudicing the jury against the defendant and his defense” may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Shaffer v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. “Hearsay” is a statement “not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing” and “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evid. R. 801(c). “Evidence including hearsay is generally inadmissible, subject to a handful of specific and limited exceptions.” McMillen v. State, 169 N.E.3d 437, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[17] However, “[o]ut-of-court statements made to law enforcement are non-hearsay if introduced primarily to explain why the investigation proceeded as it did.” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 565 (Ind. 2014). “[C]ourse-of-investigation testimony is excluded from hearsay only for a limited purpose: to ‘bridge gaps in the trial testimony that would otherwise substantially confuse or mislead the jury.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1046 (7th Cir. 2011)). To ensure proffered course-of-investigation evidence is presented for the purpose of explaining subsequent police action and not for the truth of its content, we apply a three-part test. Id. at 566. First, we determine whether the testimony describes an out-of-court statement asserting a fact capable of being true or false; second, we look to the evidentiary purpose of the proffered testimony; and third, we confirm that the evidentiary purpose is relevant to an issue in the case and that the danger of unfair prejudice does not outweigh the evidence's probative value. Id. at 566-67.

[18] Here, Officer Stevens's testimony that he determined Stevens was the primary suspect does not relay any out-of-court statement. But, assuming arguendo that Officer Stevens's conclusion followed directly from the out-of-court statements of A.L. and Officer Haig, the testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It explained why Officer Stevens did not canvass the area in search of the perpetrator and why he gave A.L. a domestic violence referral form. The State did not rely on Officer Stevens's testimony to prove Stevens was the one who battered A.L. Bonds testified that she saw Stevens hit A.L., and A.L. testified that she and Stevens got into a physical altercation. Therefore, Officer Stevens's testimony about who he believed the suspect was following his initial investigation was admissible course-of-investigation evidence, and the State's elicitation of that evidence was not prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Bates-Smith v. State, 108 N.E.3d 399, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that, even if detective's testimony was premised on the verbal and non-verbal statements made by a confidential informant, it was not hearsay because it was offered to explain the course of the investigation and not the truth of the matters asserted).

2. Sentencing

[19] Finally, Stevens asserts the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing.³ We review a trial court's sentencing decision using a well-settled standard of review:

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. A trial court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law.

Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations omitted). Even if we determine the trial court abused its discretion in its findings of mitigators and aggravators, we will remand for resentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it considered the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Ind. 2001).

[20] Stevens argues the trial court abused its discretion by not finding as mitigating factors that A.L. testified he did not instigate the violence and that he “tried to remove himself from it.” (Appellant's Br. at 15.) “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999). The trial court does not have to give the same weight to mitigating evidence as a defendant would when determining whether a mitigator exists. Townsend v. State, 45 N.E.3d 821, 830-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Here, the trial court specifically considered whether those circumstances of the crime relayed through A.L.’s testimony were mitigating factors and concluded they were not. The trial court explained “there was definitely fear on the victim's behalf in testifying” and she “minimized” the altercation. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 78-79.) Given the trial court's observation of A.L. while testifying, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in concluding A.L.’s testimony did not support Stevens's proposed mitigators. See, e.g., Bradford v. State, 246 N.E.3d 808, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in specifically rejecting defendant's proposed mitigating circumstance), trans. denied.

[21] Stevens also asserts “the sentencing court seemed to add weight to an aggravating factor not listed on the sentencing order.” (Appellant's Br. at 15.) He contends the trial court “obviously [weighed] into the analysis the statutory aggravator of attempting to influence witness testimony[.]” (Id.) However, the trial court stated it was not considering Stevens's campaign to influence A.L. to lie at trial as an aggravating factor at sentencing, and Stevens does not provide any support for his assertion that the trial court nonetheless did, other than the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence for a Level 5 felony. See Ind. Code 35-50-2-6(b) (Level 5 felony punishable by term of imprisonment up to six years). The presence of one aggravating circumstance may support an enhanced sentence. Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Here, several aggravating factors supported the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence, including Stevens's lengthy criminal history, his past failures to abide by the terms of community supervision, uncharged criminal conduct, and additional criminal matters pending against Stevens. Thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in its consideration of aggravating factors. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering defendant's significant criminal history as an aggravating factor at sentencing and imposing maximum sentence).

Conclusion

[22] The State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct in its comments during closing argument or in its elicitation of course-of-investigation testimony from Officer Stevens. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Stevens. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(c).

2.   The State also charged Stevens with Level 6 felony strangulation, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(a), but the State dismissed that charge before trial.

3.   While Stevens invokes our authority to revise a defendant's sentence if it is inappropriate pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), his argument focuses solely on the trial court's findings related to mitigating and aggravating factors. To the extent Stevens seeks to also argue his sentence is inappropriate under Rule 7(B), he has waived that issue by failing to advance a cogent argument. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring cogent argument supported by citations). Waiver notwithstanding, the nature of Stevens's crime was egregious. Stevens not only battered A.L. when she was nine months pregnant with his child, but he also battered Bonds after she intervened and he threatened Bonds with a gun. In addition, after Stevens's arrest, he tried to convince A.L. to commit perjury. Moreover, Stevens's extensive criminal history and past failures to abide by the terms of community supervision reflect poorly on his character. Therefore, we cannot say his sentence is inappropriate given the nature of his offense and his character. See, e.g., Govan v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1165, 1177-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding defendant's sentence was not inappropriate when his conviction represented one crime in a series of crimes he committed over the course of one day, defendant had a long criminal history, and previous attempts at rehabilitation had failed), trans. denied.

May, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and DeBoer concur. Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.