IN RE: the ADOPTION OF G.S. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.T. (“Stepfather”) petitioned to adopt his stepdaughter, G.S. (“Child”), in Hamilton County. Child's father, J.S. (“Father”), moved to have the case transferred to Fulton County. The Hamilton Superior Court granted Father's motion, and Stepfather appeals. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Stepfather's two-paragraph statement of facts paints a very straightforward picture of this litigation. It has been anything but. The parties have a complicated history that involves five trial-court cause numbers in three counties (No. 32D03-2307-JP-98, No. 25C01-2308-AD-7, No. 29D02-2402-AD-179, No. 25C01-2412-AD-15, and No. 25C01-2412-JP-124), three appeals to this Court (No. 24A-AD-793, No. 25A-AD-90, and No. 25A-AD-100), and an original action in our Supreme Court (No. 24S-OR-360). To tell a more complete story, we have taken judicial notice of the filings and court orders Stepfather doesn't mention. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(C) (permitting a court to judicially notice the existence of “records of a court of this state”).

[3] Child was born in April 2021. Father signed the birth certificate and/or a paternity affidavit at the hospital, but his relationship with Child's mother eventually soured. In July 2023, Father petitioned to establish paternity, parenting time, and child support in Hendricks County. See No. 32D03-2307-JP-98. Stepfather married Child's mother later that month, and in early August, represented by a Fulton County attorney, he petitioned to adopt Child in Fulton County, where he lives with Child and her mother. See No. 25C01-2308-AD-7. The petition alleged that Father had failed to communicate significantly with Child for at least one year and that as a result his consent to the adoption was not required under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8. Stepfather also moved to have the Hendricks County paternity case consolidated into the Fulton County adoption case, which the Fulton Circuit Court granted. Father objected to the adoption, and for the next six months the cases were litigated in Fulton County.

[4] In early February 2024, however, things changed: on February 1, an attorney with an office in Hamilton County entered an appearance for Stepfather; on February 6, that attorney moved to dismiss the Fulton County adoption case without prejudice, though he didn't specify a reason; on February 7, the Fulton Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss; and on February 8, the new attorney opened a new adoption case (this case) in Hamilton County. This new petition alleged that Father had both failed to communicate with and failed to provide support for Child for at least one year, making his consent to the adoption unnecessary under Section 31-19-9-8.

[5] On February 9, the day after Stepfather filed in Hamilton County, Father filed a motion to correct error asking the Fulton Circuit Court to reinstate the Fulton County adoption case. Father argued, among other things, that significant resources had been expended in the Fulton County case, that Stepfather was engaged in delay tactics and forum shopping, and that Stepfather's motion to dismiss was procedurally improper under Indiana Trial Rule 41. While that motion was pending, Father moved the Hamilton Superior Court to transfer the Hamilton County case to Fulton County or, in the alternative, to stay the Hamilton County case until his Fulton County motion to correct error was decided. He argued that (1) Hamilton County isn't a preferred venue under Indiana Trial Rule 75, but Fulton County is, and (2) the “same action” was pending in Fulton County. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 28-31. In March, the Hamilton Superior Court stayed the Hamilton County case.

[6] In April 2024, the Fulton Circuit Court granted Father's motion to correct error and reinstated the Fulton County adoption case. Stepfather immediately appealed, see No. 24A-AD-793, but the Fulton Circuit Court and this Court denied his motions to stay the trial-court proceedings. The final hearing in the Fulton County adoption case was set for June. Before the hearing, Stepfather amended his adoption petition by adding an allegation that Father's consent is not required because he had failed to provide support for Child for at least a year. In July, the Fulton Circuit Court issued an order denying Stepfather's petition. The court concluded that Father's consent to the adoption was required because Stepfather didn't prove that Father willingly failed to communicate with or provide support for Child for at least a year. Stepfather then amended his notice of appeal to include this ruling, in addition to the court's earlier ruling reinstating the case.

[7] In September, despite having a pending appeal of the Fulton County rulings, Stepfather asked the Hamilton Superior Court to lift the stay of the Hamilton County adoption case. The court declined to do so and instead granted Father's earlier motion to transfer the case to Fulton County. In doing so, the court noted both (1) the past and ongoing litigation in Fulton County and (2) the fact that Stepfather's attorney “maintains an office in Marion County[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 33. The latter point related to preferred venue under Trial Rule 75. Trial Rule 75(A)(8) provides that preferred venue lies in, among other counties, “the county where a claim in the plaintiff's complaint may be commenced under any statute recognizing or creating a special or general remedy or proceeding[.]” And Indiana Code section 31-19-2-2(a) provides that an adoption petition can be filed in a county where the petitioner's attorney “maintains an office.” We have held that “Section 31-19-2-2 is a special venue statute to which Trial Rule 75(A)(8) applies.” In re Adoption of E.S.J., 219 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). So when the court noted that Stepfather's attorney “maintains an office in Marion County,” it was indicating that Marion County would be a preferred venue, but Hamilton County is not.

[8] Stepfather immediately sought reconsideration, noting that his attorney also maintains an office in Hamilton County. In response, the Hamilton Superior Court issued the following order:

1. The Court's December 4, 2024 order is corrected as counsel for [Stepfather] does have an office in Hamilton County, and that venue for this matter could be in Hamilton County as a result;

2. However, with the paternity issues consolidated into an adoption case type, it is questionable as to whether this Court is the most appropriate venue for this cause;

3. The Court in Fulton County is the more appropriate venue, and this Court has granted [Father's] motion for transfer; and

4. As such, the motion to reconsider is denied.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 38. Stepfather then filed a motion to correct error, which the court also denied.

[9] Stepfather now appeals. While this appeal was pending, we decided Stepfather's first appeal that challenged the Fulton County rulings. We affirmed in full, holding that the Fulton Circuit Court didn't err by reinstating the Fulton County adoption case, by finding that Father's consent was necessary, or by denying Stepfather's adoption petition. In re Adoption of G.S., 254 N.E.3d 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Stepfather has now filed a petition to transfer with our Supreme Court. Petition to Transfer, No. 24A-AD-793 (Apr. 12, 2025). As such, the Fulton County adoption case is not yet final.¹

Discussion and Decision

[10] Stepfather contends that the Hamilton Superior Court erred by transferring the Hamilton County adoption case to Fulton County. Father hasn't filed an appellee's brief. When an appellee does not respond to an appeal, we will not undertake the burden of developing an argument on their behalf. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). Rather, we will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Id. In this context, “prima facie error” means error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.

[11] Stepfather hasn't made a prima facie showing of error. Similar to his statement of facts omitting highly relevant information, Stepfather's argument doesn't address the trial court's ultimate reason for transferring the case. His argument is written as if the court's only reason for transferring the case to Fulton County was that it believed Hamilton County isn't a preferred venue under Trial Rule 75. But as detailed above, the court's transfer order also cited the past and ongoing litigation in Fulton County. And when Stepfather sought reconsideration on the preferred-venue issue, the court acknowledged that error but reaffirmed its transfer order on the basis that Fulton County is “the more appropriate venue” in light of the parties’ preexisting litigation there. On appeal, Stepfather doesn't even acknowledge this rationale for the transfer, let alone argue that it is erroneous. Just as we will not develop an argument for an appellee who doesn't file a brief, we will not develop an argument for an appellant who disregards the express rationale underlying an appealed order. Because Stepfather hasn't made a prima facie showing of error as to the trial court's ultimate reason for transferring the case to Fulton County, we affirm the transfer order.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Two weeks after Stepfather filed his brief in this appeal, he filed yet another petition to adopt Child in Hamilton County. See No. 29D02-2503-AD-339. Father has moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it is barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. A hearing on Father's motion is scheduled for June 3, 2025.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.