Aaron Harris, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Aaron Harris was charged with dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony,¹ but ultimately pleaded guilty to reckless homicide and dealing in a narcotic drug, both Level 5 felonies.² The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve years, with eight years executed in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). On appeal, Harris argues that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We conclude that Harris has failed to establish either that the trial court abused its discretion or that his sentence is inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The following facts are based on the testimony and exhibits presented at Harris's sentencing hearing. In September 2022, Harris was a maintenance director at an apartment complex and was “good friends” with leasing agent Stephanie Sachs. Tr. Vol. 2 at 97. Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on September 4, Sachs texted Harris to ask if he had ten or twenty bars of Xanax to sell. Sachs informed Harris that she had “someone with r money asking for a ton of s**t[.] You may have some of it[.]” Ex. Vol. at 6-7.³ Harris responded via text, and then the two apparently communicated via FaceTime. They arranged for Harris to meet Sachs at a gas station on the east side of Indianapolis, where he would give her six oxycodone tablets (also known as “Rox” or “Roxies”) and two grams of cocaine, which she would then deliver to a third party in Carmel, who would pay for the drugs electronically.

[3] At 7:42 p.m., Sachs texted Harris to inform him that the buyer was getting “flustered” about the electronic payment arrangements and had $200 in cash. Id. at 10. Sachs asked, “Can me and [my friend] Leslie come grab this s**t, drive to Carmel, then drive back to you? I'll literally turn my location on so you can see where I am.” Id. Shortly after 8:30 p.m., Harris met Sachs in the gas station parking lot and “fronted” her the drugs, i.e., “provided the narcotics without payment at that time.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 84. Sachs left the gas station in Leslie's vehicle.

[4] At 9:40 p.m., Harris texted Sachs, “It's been over a hour what's up[.]” Ex Vol. at 15. Sachs replied that Leslie had “dropped [her] off at home so [she] didn't have to go to Carmel” and that the buyer was being extremely difficult. Id. at 16. Sachs texted, “Worst case I'll sell the rox to [another person] he'll pay over $32. I'm giving [the buyer] until 10:30.” Id. Harris replied, “That's was not the plan. You making me feel like you lied to me[.] I don't like that feeling just bring me everything I gave you[.]” Id. at 16-17. Sachs responded, “Aaron I swear you don't need to be worried about this. I got you.” Id. at 18.

[5] At 9:58 p.m., Harris texted, “This is taking to long. When s**t takes to long I end up f***ed with my money.” Id. at 18-19. Sachs replied, “I'm unloading these and will have $$$ for you before I go to bed. On my life.” Id. at 19. Harris responded, “Stephanie I don't want to lose a friendship over this money but you have bad history with me[.]” Id. at 20. Sachs texted, “Aaron you can literally shoot me if I don't give you what I owe you.” Id. Harris replied, “Nobody will be shot if we just do good business[.] What's going on now is not good business[.]” Id. at 21. Sachs responded, “Aaron I promise I'm not gonna do you dirty. On my life.” Id. at 22.

[6] After several more text exchanges, Harris asked, “Wtf is going on it's almost 11[:]30[.]” Id. at 25. Sachs replied, “Leslie's friend was a bust but [my boyfriend's] friend is gonna buy them Tomorrow!!!!!” Id. at 26. Harris responded, “[Your boyfriend] is not going to like me kicking in his door Stephanie[.]” Id. He further advised her, “This is a business love please don't take it personal[.]” Id. at 28. Shortly thereafter, Harris informed Sachs, “I'm like 7 mins away.” Id. at 30. Sachs texted, “I promise they're gonna be sold by tomorrow[.]” Id. at 31. At 12:13 a.m., Harris texted, “This is my last text I need my money or product by in the morning and that's it I have to pay people as well[.]” Id. at 35. Sachs assured Harris that the product was “safe” and that “[s]quaring up with you is absolutely top priority.” Id. at 36.

[7] Later that day, police were called to Sachs's home, where she was found dead. It was determined that Sachs had ingested four of the purported oxycodone pills, which actually contained fentanyl. Two days later, the two remaining pills and “just over one gram of cocaine” were found in an envelope in the home and turned over to police. Tr. Vol. 2 at 87. A forensic toxicology report indicated that Sachs's blood tested positive for numerous substances, including amphetamines, anticonvulsants, antidepressants, antipsychotics, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, opioid analgesics (including fentanyl), sedative/hypnotics, and stimulants (including a cocaine metabolite). Harris's text messages to Sachs were found on her phone.

[8] On December 1, 2022, the State charged Harris with dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony. An arrest warrant was issued and executed the next day, and Harris was released on bond. On September 13, 2024, Harris and the State entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which Harris agreed to plead guilty to reckless homicide and dealing in a narcotic drug, both Level 5 felonies, in exchange for the dismissal of the Level 1 felony count. The parties agreed that sentencing would be left to the trial court's discretion and that the sentences imposed would run consecutively.

[9] The trial court held a change of plea and sentencing hearing on November 7, 2024. Among the testifying witnesses was Sachs's father, who stated without objection, “What bothers me is [Harris] was even asked by Stephanie's boyfriend to not sell her drugs, because he was concerned she had a weak heart and could die. [Harris] didn't listen.” Id. at 73.

[10] Also testifying was Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detective Scott Wolfe, who had responded to the overdose call as a member of the Metro Drug Task Force and later arrested Harris. Detective Wolfe stated that the two pills found in the envelope were “blue pills marked with M30 imprinted on them[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 77. He testified that such pills are “supposed to be the oxycodone or Roxicodone[,]” but that when he encounters such pills “out on the street,” they typically contain “more and more fentanyl.” Id. at 77, 78. Defense counsel elicited testimony from Detective Wolfe that Sachs's autopsy report indicated that Sachs “had suicidal ideations in the past” and “reported attempts of suicide by overdose[,]” as well as “[o]pioid use disorder” and “[s]edative, hynotic, and anxiolytic use disorder[.]” Id. at 89.⁴

[11] On direct examination by defense counsel, Harris testified that he has one child with one woman and three children with a former partner who has lupus. According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), only the first child is the subject of a support order. Harris stated that he helps out his former partner by transporting the children to and from school and work, and he had also coached their sports teams. He further stated that he is involved with organizations that assist the homeless and teach new drivers about car maintenance.

[12] On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Harris admitted that Sachs “had burned [him] on a drug deal before” when he gave her some “marijuana stuff that she ran off with.” Id. at 97-98, 103. He also admitted that when Detective Wolfe arrested him, he “had a gun and a rifle in the car.” Id. at 99. Harris claimed that he did not know about Sachs's “prior history with drug use[.]” Id. at 101. He further claimed that Sachs “said that she was trying to make some money, and [he] just thought that [he] could possibly help her” by giving her the pills and the cocaine to sell. Id.⁵ Harris also claimed that he did not know that “the Roxies had fentanyl in” them and that he did not test them before he sold them. Id. at 102-03. He acknowledged that he “knew [Sachs] was taking [his] drugs [specifically, the marijuana] and using them[.]” Id. Finally, Harris stated, “I made a terrible choice. I made a big mistake. To her family and friends, I apologize. I never, never meant, never wanted to hurt [Sachs]. She was a really good friend of mine, coworker.” Id. at 104.

[13] After the parties presented closing argument, the trial court addressed Harris in pertinent part as follows:

I don't know who said it, but there's no win. The fact the Court is bothered by the fact that you kept saying, again, you have no criminal history, you have mitigators, that you have accepted responsibility.․ But what you told the [probation officer who compiled the PSI], you did minimize it a little bit and the fact that you continue to say you wanted to help [Sachs]. You didn't help her. You weren't helping her. If you wanted to help her, get her into rehab. You are her friend․

And if you didn't know she was on drugs, you should have known. And if you're going to deal drugs, you got to know what you're dealing because $240 for Roxies and cocaine is not worth having someone take fentanyl, which you didn't even know was in it supposedly[.] But if you didn't -- you weren't going to kill her, you were going to kill somebody else.

And I find that is offensive to say you were trying to help her. You have two sides. You are a good father, you work for the homeless initiative, you work for -- you do lots for the community. That is helping. Continuing to deal drugs to a user [whose] boyfriend told you don't deal her drugs because she has a bad heart and she could die and then it happened. You were on notice. You were on notice that you sold her drugs before. That apparently she ripped you off. You knew she was using drugs. And you continued to do it.

And then you only stopped, maybe, when you found out she was dead. Give me my money. Is it worth $240? I don't think so. I don't want to lose a friendship over the money, but I have a bad - - you have a bad history with me, you know.

She was in a position of trust with you. You have some history of criminal delinquent behavior by dealing her drugs in the past. I doubt that in the 90 minutes it took you to get these drugs that this was the first time you did this. She was a good friend to you, you were trying to be nice. What you did is not being nice.

Kicking in her boyfriend's door because she didn't call you back because she was probably dead, not being nice.

․.

A friend who works with you calls you and tells you they need money. You give her money, not drugs. That's a friend. The reason you got caught is because you left a trail and the police got on the phone and saw a text message asking for stuff. She wasn't asking for stuff, you gave her drugs. And it cost her her life.

I find that the actions [sic] and I find that you have accepted responsibility, but you got a benefit from that by lowering your exposure.

The Court finds that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators and I am going to sentence you on Count II [reckless homicide] to [six] years executed, four years at the [DOC]. One year on home detention with one year suspended to probation.

On Count [III] [dealing in a narcotic drug], the Court is going to sentence you to four years at the [DOC], with two years suspended and one year on probation.

So the Court is sentencing you to eight years of DOC because they are consecutive. One year on home detention with two years on probation and three years suspended.

Id. at 111-14. Harris now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[14] Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(d) provides, “A court may impose any sentence that is: (1) authorized by statute; and (2) permissible under the Constitution of the State of Indiana; regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” And Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-3 provides,

Before sentencing a person for a felony, the court must conduct a hearing to consider the facts and circumstances relevant to sentencing. The person is entitled to subpoena and call witnesses and to present information in his own behalf. The court shall make a record of the hearing, including:

(1) a transcript of the hearing;

(2) a copy of the presentence report; and

(3) if the court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances, a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes.

[15] The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that under this “statutory regime[,] Indiana trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing sentence for a felony offense.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “[T]he statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court's reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. “If the recitation includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id.

[16] “So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for abuse of discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). “One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing to enter a sentencing statement at all.” Id.

Other examples include entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.

Id. at 490-91. “Under those circumstances, remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491.

[17] “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 493. “However, ‘If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.’ ” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).

[18] Harris argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “ignor[ing], or at least fail[ing] to address[,]” eight proposed mitigating circumstances. Appellant's Br. at 11. But he merely lists those circumstances and fails to establish that they are both significant and clearly supported by the record. Accordingly, we find this argument waived. See Casco-Canales v. State, 243 N.E.3d 370, 375 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (finding similar argument waived where appellant “simply state[d]” that “the trial court overlooked proposed mitigating circumstances”). To the extent that Harris's argument could be construed as a challenge to the weight that the trial court assigned those mitigators, we observe that such a challenge is not subject to appellate review. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.

[19] Harris also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding as an aggravating circumstance that he knew or should have known that “Sachs had other drugs in her system” or that she “would take the drugs she acquired from him by deception[,]” because he “admitted to recklessly killing Sachs and nothing more.” Appellant's Br. at 13 (citing I.C. § 35-41-2-2, which outlines differences between “knowing” and “reckless” conduct). We must agree.

[20] We note, however, that a single aggravating circumstance may be used to both impose consecutive sentences and enhance a sentence. Lewis v. State, 31 N.E.3d 539, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). And via his plea agreement, Harris agreed to the imposition of consecutive sentences, which may be viewed as an acknowledgement of at least one aggravating circumstance. The trial court was obviously troubled by Harris's threat to kick down the door of Sachs's boyfriend over a $240 drug deal with his supposed “friend”. For this reason alone, we can say with confidence that the court would have imposed the same sentence even in the absence of the improper aggravator mentioned above. Consequently, we decline Harris's invitation to remand for resentencing.

Issue Two: Appropriateness of Sentence

[21] Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to independently review and revise a sentence imposed by the trial court. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. This authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our “role under Rule 7(B) is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ and we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor a sentence appropriate to the circumstances presented, and “the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222.

[22] Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). “Ultimately the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served are the issues that matter.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Harris bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court's sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d at 494.⁶

[23] “In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence ‘is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.’ ” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Harris agreed to the imposition of consecutive sentences. He received an aggregate sentence of eight years executed in the DOC and four years of less restrictive placements.

[24] Harris pleaded guilty to reckless homicide and dealing in a narcotic drug. Reckless homicide is the reckless killing of another human being. I.C. § 35-42-1-5. “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c). Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic drug is the knowing or intentional delivery of a narcotic drug. I.C. 35-48-4-1(a)(1).

[25] Here, Harris gave Sachs six pills that appeared to be oxycodone and two grams of cocaine after she expressed an interest in selling drugs to a third party. But Harris knew that Sachs had used marijuana that he had fronted her to facilitate a prior transaction, and he had also been warned by Sachs's boyfriend not to “deal her drugs because she has a bad heart and she could die[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 112. Instead of selling the drugs, Sachs consumed four of the pills and approximately one gram of cocaine and died.⁷ Moreover, when Harris was not promptly paid for the drugs, he insinuated that violence could ensue and that he was only minutes away from making good on his threat. Harris has failed to establish that the nature of his offenses justifies a sentence reduction.

[26] As for Harris's character, he had not previously been convicted of any crime ⁸ and was gainfully employed, but his own text messages to Sachs strongly suggest that dealing drugs was a side “business” with which he was intimately familiar. Ex. Vol. at 21, 28. Harris pleaded guilty to two Level 5 felonies and expressed remorse, but he benefited substantially from the dismissal of the Level 1 felony dealing charge, which carried a potential sentencing exposure between twenty and forty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4. Harris was involved with his children and various community organizations, but he gave Sachs drugs despite their past history and her boyfriend's warning, and he threatened violence when he did not get paid. Harris has failed to persuade us that his less-than-pristine character merits a reduced sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(a).

2.   I.C. §§ 35-42-1-5, 35-48-4-1(a)(1).

3.   With the exception of asterisks and bracketed text, we have reproduced the texts verbatim.

4.   The autopsy report is not in the record before us on appeal.

5.   The trial court asked Harris how much he was “trying to get out of” Sachs for the pills and the cocaine. Tr. Vol. 2 at 102. Harris replied that the pills were worth $120 and the cocaine was worth $120. The court responded, “Well, she told you somewhere in that text, somebody was trying to come up with like $200. So if you're trying to make [Sachs] money and you're charging her $240, and she's selling it for $200, you're not making her money, ․ she's losing money. Right?” Id. Harris replied, “She never tell me how much she was going to make.” Id.

6.   The State asserts, “Defendant must show that his sentence is inappropriate both in light of his character and the nature of the offense.” Appellee's Br. at 14 (citing Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). Our Supreme Court rejected this approach to Rule 7(B) in May of last year. See Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (adopting approach taken in Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016): “Reviewing courts ‘must consider’ both factors, but the defendant need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts.”).

7.   Harris complains about the trial court's skepticism of his assertion that he was unaware that the pills contained fentanyl. But given Detective Wolfe's testimony regarding the increasing prevalence of fentanyl in oxycodone pills “out on the street” and the reasonable inference that can be drawn from Harris's own text messages that he was not a novice drug dealer, Tr. Vol. 2 at 78, we find Harris's complaint unpersuasive.

8.   In 2009, Harris was charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana and driving while suspended and another count of driving while suspended in an unrelated case. All charges were dismissed.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.