MINNEY v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2015, Ricardo Minney was convicted for molesting his girlfriend's then-six-year-old daughter, J.P. Minney now seeks post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to use J.P.’s pretrial statement to impeach her trial testimony. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

A. Crimes, trial, and direct appeal

[2] In 2010 or 2011, Minney began a romantic relationship with J.P.’s mother, J.H. The couple moved in together shortly thereafter. J.H. worked the night shift and sometimes left J.P. under Minney's care and supervision while she was at work. In early 2014, J.P. disclosed to J.H. and her father's wife that Minney had molested her while J.H. was at work. J.P.’s father took her to the hospital. The hospital contacted the Department of Child Services (“DCS”), and J.P. underwent a forensic interview. During the fifteen-minute interview, J.P. divulged Minney had molested her. DCS reported Minney's conduct to the police. In June 2014, the State charged Minney with three counts of Class A felony child molesting (Counts 1, 2, and 3) and one count of Class C felony child molesting (Count 4).¹

[3] Before trial, Minney's counsel took a recorded statement from J.P. During the questioning, J.P. explained Minney “used to do bad things to [her],” like touch her where “[n]o one is supposed to touch[.]” Ex. Vol. 2 at 223–24. J.P. described two incidents. The first involved Minney using his hand to touch J.P. under her pants, placing his fingers on the “outside” of her “place.” Id. at 228, 223. J.P. said both she and Minney were dressed when this occurred. The next incident concerned Minney using his mouth to touch J.P. on her “front.” Id. at 237. Although J.P. said her pants were on, she could feel Minney's mouth, which she described as open, moving, and dry. When asked, J.P. could not remember if her mouth ever touched Minney's body.

[4] The case proceeded to jury trial, and the State called J.P. as a witness. While testifying, J.P. recounted Minney “put[ting] his lips on [her] private part,” “the part that little girls use to pee[.]” Id. at 3. J.P. shared her clothes were off and she felt Minney's tongue move side to side, leaving her private feeling “wet.” Id. at 5. J.P. next described a separate incident during which her “mouth was on [Minney's] private part.” Id. at 7. Minney's clothes were off, such that J.P. could see Minney's penis, which she described as “[h]ard” and “brown and cylinder shape.” Id.

[5] On cross-examination, Minney's counsel asked J.P. about some inconsistencies between her pretrial statement and trial testimony. Counsel pointed out discrepancies regarding whether J.P. was wearing clothes when Minney put his mouth on her; whether an incident occurred on a couch versus the floor; and whether Minney was standing or kneeling when the act occurred. J.P. recalled giving her pretrial statement but could not remember her specific answers. Minney's counsel did not offer a copy of J.P.’s pretrial statement as impeachment evidence.

[6] At the close of evidence, Minney moved for a directed verdict on Count 3, arguing the State presented evidence of only two potential acts of deviate sexual conduct. After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial court granted Minney's motion and dismissed Count 3. Then, during closing argument, Minney's counsel again attacked J.P.’s credibility by, among other ways, highlighting conflict between the families in J.P.’s mother's and father's homes, the lack of physical evidence corroborating J.P.’s allegations, varying levels of detail in J.P.’s disclosures, and J.P.’s potential exposure to sexual content from other family members or the internet.

[7] The jury found Minney guilty of Counts 1, 2, and 4. At sentencing, the trial court merged Count 4 into Count 1 and sentenced Minney to concurrent thirty-year terms for Counts 1 and 2, each a Class A felony. Minney appealed, claiming the trial court fundamentally erred by admitting certain evidence and his sentence warranted revision under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). A panel of this Court affirmed Minney's convictions and sentence, and our Supreme Court declined review. See Minney v. State, No. 49A02-1503-CR-172, at *6 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2015) (mem.), trans. denied.

B. Post-conviction proceedings

[8] In September 2016, Minney filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a pair of amendments, Minney informed the State he was proceeding only on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's failure to impeach J.P. with her pretrial statement.

[9] The post-conviction court held a hearing on Minney's petition during which Minney's trial counsel testified. Having recognized the inconsistencies between J.P.’s pretrial statement and trial testimony, Minney's counsel had considered admitting a copy of her statement as impeachment evidence. According to Minney's counsel, he chose not to offer the statement out of concern that doing so might have allowed the State to admit additional information about the child molesting allegations not yet in evidence. In counsel's eyes, the State had, at that point, admitted evidence of only two acts of deviate sexual conduct, although Minney had been charged with three. So, counsel opted to take a “conservative approach” to prevent these facts from being discussed and to avoid prolonging the testimony about the allegations. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11.

[10] The post-conviction court denied Minney relief, concluding Minney's trial counsel's “strategic decisions regarding impeachment of J.P. were reasonable and made solely in the best interests of his client.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 84. In determining trial counsel's performance was not deficient, the post-conviction court recognized the other ways in which trial counsel attacked J.P.’s credibility during trial. The post-conviction court also found Minney failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficient performance, noting he obtained a directed verdict on Count 3.

Standard of review in post-conviction proceedings

[11] “Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence.” Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied; Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). “The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681. “Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.” Id. (quoting Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012)). It is the petitioner's burden to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See P.-C.R. 1(5). When, as here, a defendant appeals from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he “must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied). We will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief when the defendant fails to meet this “rigorous standard of review.” Id. (quoting DeWitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001)).

[12] When the post-conviction court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), we will reverse the findings and judgment “only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)). We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. See Bradbury v. State, 180 N.E.3d 249, 252 (Ind. 2022) (explaining the post-conviction court is the “sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses”) (citation omitted), cert. denied. And we do not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions. See Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1279.

Minney was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

[13] Minney argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to admit J.P.’s out-of-court statement as impeachment evidence. To prevail on his claim, Minney must show: (1) his counsel's performance fell short of prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

[14] To show deficient performance, Minney must prove his legal representation lacked “an objective standard of reasonableness,” which effectively deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 682 (quoting Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ind. 2007)). When assessing counsel's performance under Strickland, the post-conviction court relies on “several important guidelines.” Id. First, the post-conviction court strongly presumes “counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002), cert. denied. Next, the post-conviction court affords counsel “considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and these decisions are entitled to deferential review.” Id. at 746–47. And finally, “[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id. at 747.

[15] Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “the method of impeaching witnesses is a tactical decision and a matter of trial strategy that does not amount to ineffective assistance.” Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1151 (Ind. 2010); McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (“Few points of law are as clearly established as the principle that tactical or strategic decisions will not support a claim of ineffective assistance.”) (quotation and alteration omitted). This is true even when there are inconsistencies between a witness’ out-of-court statement and her in-court testimony. See Bivens v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1116, 1134 (Ind. 2000). In such situations, a decision to not impeach a witness with inconsistent statements normally does not amount to deficient performance because the decision is one of strategy and counsel may make reasonable judgments in strategy. See Olson v. State, 563 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. 1990).

[16] At the post-conviction hearing, Minney's trial counsel recognized inconsistencies between J.P.’s pretrial statement and trial testimony. Counsel asked J.P. about some of these inconsistencies on cross-examination. But once J.P. stated she could not recall her prior answers, Minney's counsel decided against admitting a copy of the statement for strategic reasons. Namely, Minney's counsel sought to avoid eliciting information about a different act of deviate sexual conduct that could support Minney's third charge of Class A felony child molesting. Rather than admitting the statement, counsel opted to take a “conservative approach,” and impeached J.P.’s testimony through other means. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. This was a reasonable exercise of trial counsel's professional judgment and was not deficient performance. Minney has therefore failed to show the post-conviction court clearly erred by determining Minney was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. See Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1151 (holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present all possible impeachment evidence against a key State's witness).²

Conclusion

[17] The trial court's determination that Minney failed to prove his counsel was ineffective was not clearly erroneous.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Counts 1 and 2 alleged Minney performed or submitted to deviate sexual conduct with J.P. Count 3 alleged Minney performed or submitted to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with J.P. And Count 4 alleged Minney performed or submitted to fondling or touching J.P. with the intent to arouse or satisfy his or J.P.’s sexual desires.

2.   Even if counsel's performance was deficient, our conclusion would not change. To demonstrate prejudice, Minney must show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 682. “This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As trial counsel explained during Minney's post-conviction hearing, part of his rationale for not admitting J.P.’s pretrial statement was to avoid J.P. testifying to additional acts of child molesting. By this point, counsel believed the State had not presented evidence to support Minney's third charge for Class A felony child molesting. At the close of evidence, Minney's counsel successfully moved for a directed verdict on Count 3. We cannot say the trial court's determination that Minney was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficient performance was clearly erroneous.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.