IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.M. (Minor Child); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.M. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to M.M. (“Child”). Father argues that the trial court's termination of his parental rights is clearly erroneous. We, however, conclude that the evidence supports the trial court's order. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Father raises one issue, which we restate as whether the termination of Father's parental rights is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] Child was born in October 2023 to Father and R.L. (“Mother”).¹ The Department of Child Services received a report that Mother and Father (“Parents”) admitted to using methamphetamine shortly before Child's birth. Child's umbilical cord blood tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. DCS then removed Child from Parents’ care.

[4] DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) on October 31, 2023. In December 2023, the trial court found that Child was a CHINS, and a dispositional order was entered in January 2024. The trial court ordered Father, in part, to: obey the law; secure suitable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; abstain from the use of illegal controlled substances; submit to random drug screens; attend visitations with Child; and participate in and complete fatherhood engagement services.

[5] Father went to inpatient drug treatment in November 2023, but the clinical team felt Father would be “better suited for ․ individual out-patient treatment” due to his “trouble comprehending some of their curriculum.” Tr. Vol. II p. 75. Father has a traumatic brain injury from an accident, and he is unable to read or write. Although Father was supposed to attend group therapy meetings twice a week, Father attended only one group meeting in January 2024. Father was engaged in drug treatment services in December 2023 and January 2024, but after February 2024, Father failed to participate. Father's last visit with Child was January 28, 2024.

[6] Father tested positive for methamphetamine on February 12, 2024, February 29, 2024, and April 3, 2024. In early April 2024, Father expressed suicidal ideations, and he was incarcerated on April 9. Father participated in the fatherhood engagement program while he was incarcerated, but Father struggled to “comprehend the severity” of the situation. Id. at 30. Video visits took place between Father and Child while Father was incarcerated. Father was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and, on August 26, 2024, he was sentenced to two and one-half years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). Father is expected to be released on February 22, 2026.

[7] Child is developmentally delayed, participates in occupational therapy, and is on a waitlist for physical therapy. She has been referred to a neurologist for potential seizures, a growth specialist for muscle weakness, and a gastroenterologist.

[8] In September 2024, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights. As to Father, DCS alleged in part:

i. That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied;

ii. That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health or life of the child[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12, 37. After a hearing, the trial court granted DCS's petition to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights and entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[10] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.² Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[11] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for [the] care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c).³ Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).

[12] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8. Father challenges the trial court's findings concerning the remedy of conditions that resulted in Child's removal and Child's best interests.⁴

I. Reasonable Probability of Remedying Conditions

[13] Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[14] Child was removed from Parents’ care due to Parents’ use of methamphetamine and Child's exposure to methamphetamine before her birth. Father initially participated in services, but his participation quickly dropped off.⁵ By February 2024, Father was testing positive for methamphetamine, and he was incarcerated in April 2024. Father is not expected to be released until February 2026.

[15] Father, who was fifty-three years old when Child was removed from his care, has an extensive criminal history and has been incarcerated frequently. In June 2002, he was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twelve years in the DOC. In March 2016 and November 2016, he was convicted of misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and in July 2017, he was convicted of resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony. In November 2019, he was convicted of counterfeiting, a Level 6 felony. In October 2020, he was again convicted of misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. In October 2022, he was convicted of misdemeanor operating while intoxicated. He was found to have violated his probation in both October 2020 and April 2023. And most recently, he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony, for which he is still incarcerated.

[16] Father contends that he recently achieved sobriety while incarcerated and challenges the trial court's finding that Father has not addressed his substance abuse issues. Father never completed the drug treatment program offered to him during the CHINS proceedings, he was testing positive for methamphetamine shortly before his incarceration, and he presented no evidence to confirm his recent sobriety other than his own testimony. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court's finding regarding Father's sobriety is clearly erroneous.

[17] The trial court found “no reason to believe the lack of engagement or Father's incarceration will not continue in the future.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 180. Given Father's extensive criminal history, lengthy history of substance abuse, and failure to complete drug treatment, the trial court was rightly concerned with Father's ability to provide stability and meet Child's needs. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding that the conditions resulting in Child's removal will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

II. Best Interests of Child

[18] Next, Father challenges the trial court's finding that termination of his parental rights was in Child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[19] Father argues that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous because he has overcome his drug addiction, has a bond with Child, and participated in services. Father is incarcerated until at least February 2026. Father has not physically visited with Child since January 2024, but he has participated in video visits during his incarceration. Father admitted during the fact-finding hearing that: (1) he would need at least six months of additional time after his release to obtain stability; (2) Child, who has health issues, would be three years old then; and (3) it would not be in Child's best interests to be removed from her placement at that time. See Tr. Vol. II p. 90. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests is clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[20] The trial court's termination of Father's parental rights is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother's parental rights were also terminated by the trial court, and Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

3.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in September 2024, under the new version of the statute.

4.   Father also argues that DCS failed to prove there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child. DCS was required to prove the existence of only one of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d). See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1). The trial court here found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child.

5.   Father challenges the trial court's finding that Father “fail[ed] to participate in services.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 179. Father only sporadically participated in services before his incarceration. Father began participating in services consistently only once he was incarcerated. We cannot say the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.