ANGELES v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Delfino Angeles appeals his child-molesting convictions, arguing the trial court erred in excluding some evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] D.P. was born in October 2009. In the summer of 2022, D.P., then twelve, moved in with her aunt Debra, Debra's husband Angeles, her grandma Debbie, and Debra and Angeles's six children (all of whom were younger than D.P.). D.P. lived there until late November, when she moved in with her mother. In December, D.P. told her mother that Angeles had molested her in November. DCS was contacted, and D.P. underwent a forensic interview, during which she disclosed sexual abuse by Angeles.

[3] The State charged Angeles with two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting (one for “other sexual conduct” and the other for sexual intercourse) and three counts of Level 4 felony child molesting (touching or fondling). A jury trial was held in September 2024. D.P., then fourteen, testified that Angeles molested her three times in November 2022, when she was thirteen, and described each incident.

[4] Angeles took the stand, denying that he molested D.P. He testified that he didn't live at the house in 2022 because he lived with his adult daughter. He acknowledged, however, that he spent time at the house and that “sometimes” he was the only adult in the house when D.P. was there. Tr. Vol. III pp. 27, 33. After Angeles's testimony, the jury submitted questions for him, and the trial court asked Angeles the following question:

THE COURT: Why were you not living in the home with your wife and children?

A. Because before everything went down, I brought a daughter that I had in Washington with another woman, and my wife had problems with her and, I mean, she has problems that were serious enough that she went to jail for destroying things inside the house. May I continue?

THE COURT: Yes.

A. When she got released from jail, when she got released from jail, they put on a protective order that she could not come to the house. And a little bit later, her mother came to the house, well, because my wife, she was not working, but she was somewhere outside the house. So, then my mother-in-law came. And they took the house where she used to live. They took the house from her. So, as they would be able to have a house, then I had to leave the house with my daughter because, like I said, she had a protective order. And that's how she came to the house with her mother and ․ [D.P.]. And that's why I couldn't live there because she had the protective order. She had the protective order, so I couldn't live there, so then I left.

Id. at 27 (emphases added). The court asked the parties if they had any followup questions based on the jury's question, and defense counsel said she wanted to ask Angeles if Debra had “a domestic violence case in which [he was] the victim[.]” Id. at 30. The State responded that Debra's domestic-violence case was not relevant “to anything we're doing here,” and the trial court agreed. Id. Defense counsel also agreed that it wasn't relevant but said she feared the jury was “going to think that [Angeles] had the protective order” and “domestic violence conviction,” not Debra. Id. at 31. Noting that they were “getting into an area that's really unrelated” and didn't have “any impact on the real issues,” the court did not allow defense counsel to ask the follow-up question. Id.

[5] The jury found Angeles guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of thirty years, with twenty years in prison, five years on home detention, and five years of probation.

[6] Angeles now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Angeles contends the trial court erred in not allowing his attorney to ask him a follow-up question about whom the protective order he referenced in his testimony was designed to protect—him or Debra. We review the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied.

[8] Angeles argues that because his answer to the jury's question was “confusing,” “the jury could have mistakenly believed there was a protective order against [him] when in fact the protective order was issued to protect [him] from his wife.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. He claims that the follow-up question was needed so that the jury didn't “incorrectly conclude [he] abused D.P. in conformity with past actions—actions that did not happen.” Id. at 12-13.

[9] The State responds that the trial court did not err in not allowing the follow-up question because Angeles's testimony was “not confusing” and “left the jury with only one logical conclusion,” that is, that “the protective order was issued against his wife and not against him.” Appellee's Br. p. 10. Even assuming Angeles's testimony is not clear as to who the “she” was (his wife or adult daughter), it is clear that Angeles did not have a protective order issued against him. Angeles testified that “when she got released from jail, they put on a protective order that she could not come to the house.” Because it was clear that the protective order was not issued against Angeles, there was no confusion and thus no follow-up question was needed. Cf. F.W.C. v. State, 821 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the defendant's answer to the jury's question created a “false impression,” thereby allowing the State “to rebut [his] misleading response by admitting evidence of his prior misconduct”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing the follow-up question.

[10] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.