E.A., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In a combined admission agreement (“the admission agreement”), E.A. admitted to committing numerous delinquent acts. As part of its dispositional decree, the juvenile court ordered formal probation, and between January 25, 2024 and June 18, 2024, the State filed six petitions for modification of the dispositional decree alleging fifteen separate violations of the terms of E.A.’s probation. After a denial hearing on the amended petition to modify the dispositional decree, the juvenile court entered true findings as to five of the allegations contained in the State's amended petition for modification of the dispositional decree.

[2] On October 9, 2024, the juvenile court found that E.A. had exhausted all rehabilitative options and ordered him committed to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). On appeal, E.A. contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting his probation officer's testimony regarding his drug-screen results and GPS locations and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he had violated the terms of his probation. Because we disagree with each of E.A.’s contentions, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 30, 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that then-fifteen-year-old E.A. had committed acts amounting to dangerous possession of a firearm and what would be resisting law enforcement by fleeing and unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle, if committed by an adult. On December 20, 2023, E.A. admitted to being delinquent for committing what, if committed by an adult, would be one act of Level 6 felony auto theft, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in the admission agreement. E.A. also admitted to what would otherwise be a criminal act, Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss additional allegations of delinquent conduct.

[4] The juvenile court took the admission agreement under advisement, ordered a pre-dispositional report to be prepared by the probation department, and set the matter for a dispositional hearing. The juvenile court also ordered that E.A. remain detained until a GPS monitoring bracelet became available, but if a monitoring bracelet was not available by 3:00 p.m. the next day, E.A. was to be released to supervised release with day reporting.

[5] At the January 9, 2024 dispositional hearing, the juvenile court accepted the admission agreement, entering a true finding as to the auto theft, dangerous possession of a firearm, and resisting law enforcement. The juvenile court ordered formal probation; imposed standard conditions of probation; continued GPS monitoring, random drug testing, and home-based casework; and continued day reporting until E.A. provided verification of school enrollment to the probation department. The juvenile court also set an administrative review of the GPS monitoring for February 6, 2024.

[6] Between January 25, 2024 and June 18, 2024, the State filed six petitions for modification of the dispositional decree alleging fifteen separate violations of the terms of E.A.’s probation. The State alleged that E.A. had committed the following probation violations: (1) multiple failures to abide by the rules of electronic monitoring/GPS, (2) multiple failures to report to day reporting, (3) violating the condition which forbids “possess[ion] or be[ing] around anyone in possession of a gun, rifle, shotgun or other dangerous weapon, including ammunition and look-a-like weapons[,]” (4) testing positive for or being in possession of illegal drugs on multiple occasions, and (5) multiple suspensions from day reporting. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 129–30.

[7] On August 22, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing on the amended petition to modify the dispositional decree. At the hearing, E.A.’s probation officer, Celso Fuentes, testified that he regularly received updates from the Community Adjustment Unit of probation (“CA”) regarding information concerning E.A.’s GPS monitor. Fuentes explained that alerts are sent from a monitoring agency to CA when a juvenile's GPS unit is outside of the radio signal of the home. When Fuentes received information from CA concerning a GPS discrepancy or alert for one of his assigned youths, he testified that his practice was to call the parent and/or the juvenile. Fuentes testified that, every time he had received an alert from E.A.’s GPS, he had called E.A. or his mother.

[8] Fuentes testified that “if the alert is valid, I note it as non-compliance alert and I would document that information in my system and after three I would definitely have to let the Court know about the situation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 90. Fuentes testified that if the alert was “major” he would notify the court. Tr. Vol. II p. 90. Fuentes testified that he had received between twenty and twenty-two GPS alerts for E.A. Fuentes had spoken with E.A. about compliance with electronic monitoring each time an alert had been sent.

[9] After explaining the GPS monitoring notification and verification process, Fuentes testified that E.A. had failed to abide by the rules of electronic monitoring on the following occasions: (1) on January 16, 2024, E.A. had gone to a “smoke tobacco shop” in Broad Ripple; (2) on January 20, 2024, E.A. had been “at a gas station and then Arby's, also at a Kroger at front of his home” and “admitted to being on that area looking for employment[;]” (3) on January 22, 2024, E.A.’s monitoring device had alerted that he had “left his radios” and the GPS unit was unable to reach E.A.; (4) on April 5, 2024, E.A. had left his home and his mother “did not know where he went[,]” but E.A. later disclosed that he had left to visit a girlfriend; and (5) on April 15, 2024, E.A. had gone to a funeral despite being advised by Fuentes that he was not permitted to attend. Tr. Vol. II p. 91–92.

[10] Fuentes also testified that he had been advised by “Ms. Sam” from the day-reporting program that E.A.’s mother had failed to enroll E.A. in the day reporting program for several weeks. Tr. Vol. II pp. 92–93. E.A. objected to the testimony concerning the intake process of the day-reporting program for hearsay, which objection was overruled because the juvenile court found that Ms. Sam is reliable and often appears before the juvenile court for the day-reporting program.

[11] Fuentes testified that he regularly receives reports from Ms. Sam regarding “all of [his] youths[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 98. Fuentes testified that he had received a report from Ms. Sam indicating that E.A. had been suspended from the day reporting program in May and June of 2024 for separate incidents and expelled in June of 2024, and E.A. objected that the testimony was hearsay within hearsay. The juvenile court sustained the objection as it related to specific allegations that gave rise to the suspension but overruled the objection as it related to the allegation that E.A. had been expelled.

[12] Fuentes also testified that he had given E.A. five drug screens, in January, February, March, April, and May of 2024, and all five of these drug screens had been positive for marijuana. Fuentes testified that he had been certified to administer drug screens on the days that he had collected E.A.’s saliva samples for the drug screens. He testified that when he administers the drug screens, he explains the procedure to the youth being screened, he collects the samples and seals the drug screen, the youth signs the sample, and Fuentes ships the sample to the drug screening agency. Fuentes testified that he had followed all of the steps to administer the saliva drug screen properly, and that probation regularly relies on the test results it receives from a third-party company. E.A. did not object to this testimony.

[13] The juvenile court entered true findings as to five of the allegations contained in the amended petition for modification of the dispositional decree. On October 9, 2024, the juvenile court found that E.A. had exhausted all rehabilitative options and ordered him committed to the DOC.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[14] E.A. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting Fuentes's testimony regarding E.A.’s drug test results and GPS locations, arguing that the testimony contained inadmissible hearsay. We review the juvenile court's decision to admit or exclude evidence in a probation revocation hearing for an abuse of discretion. Robinson v. State, 955 N.E.2d 228, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We will only reverse if the juvenile court's decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. Because probation-revocation proceedings are meant to be flexible, strict rules of evidence do not apply. See Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2). Consequently, hearsay is admissible at a probation revocation hearing if the evidence is substantially trustworthy. Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 90 (Ind. 2012).

[15] E.A. contends that Fuentes's testimony regarding his positive drug screens was not substantially trustworthy. E.A. contends that the State failed to provide evidence of the type of sample collected from E.A. and that Fuentes “admitted he did not know how the lab tested for drugs, he had no way to determine the accuracy of any results, no way to determine the accuracy of any testing.” Appellant's Br. p. 11.

[16] In support of his arguments, E.A. attempts to distinguish C.S. v. State, 817 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), arguing that the State “utterly failed in presenting evidence to the Court on how E.A.’s drug screens were collected or tested.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. E.A.’s attempt to distinguish C.S. on this issue is misplaced. In C.S., C.S. had provided a urine sample to his probation officer five days after he had been placed on probation. 817 N.E.2d at 1281. C.S.’s probation officer had testified in detail about “how the sample was secured and sealed, how it was transmitted to the laboratory and how she received the results. She followed a standard process.” Id. The probation officer, however, had also testified concerning her lack of knowledge of the actual testing procedures employed. Id. We nonetheless concluded that the probation officer's testimony had provided “a substantial indicia of reliability and the evidence was properly admitted.” Id.

[17] We conclude that this case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from C.S. on this issue and reach the same result as we did in that case. Like the probation officer in C.S., Fuentes testified about his lack of knowledge of the testing procedures at the lab. Contrary to E.A.’s contention, however, Fuentes testified in detail about how he collects and sends the saliva samples for testing. Fuentes testified that it was his practice to personally administer the drug screens, he was certified to administer them, and he administered the screens correctly. Fuentes testified to how he received the positive reports and that probation regularly relied on the reports from the lab. Based on the foregoing, we believe that the evidence had a substantial indicia of reliability, and we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting Fuentes's testimony regarding E.A.’s positive drug screens.¹

[18] With regard to the GPS location evidence, E.A. contends that the State's evidence “fell below the standard of having substantial indicia of reliability” because “Fuentes offered no testimony about the accuracy of” the third-party monitoring company and the CA unit, Fuentes “did not actually monitor the GPS system[,]” and Fuentes “could not speak to the accuracy of the GPS device.” Appellant's Br. p. 12.

[19] E.A. relies on Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), to support his contention that the GPS evidence lacked substantial indicia of reliability. In Carden, we reversed the revocation of Carden's probation because the only evidence used to revoke Carden's probation had been his probation officer's testimony that “some unidentified mapping system” had shown that the address where Carden had been for one night was within two blocks of an unnamed daycare center, with no information that the daycare had even been in business when Carden had spent the night there. 873 N.E.2d at 164. We concluded that the probation officer's testimony about the mapping system had not had a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Id.

[20] Unlike in Carden, however, Fuentes testified that there was “radio on [E.A's] home where each time he stepped out of that radio, it got signal and then I have to call” to verify that E.A. was out of the radio signal without permission. Tr. Vol. II p. 90. While Fuentes had not personally monitored the GPS system, Fuentes testified that he regularly received updates from CA concerning E.A.’s GPS alerts, verified the discrepancies with E.A. and E.A.’s mother, and routinely relied on the GPS alerts reported to him before independently verifying the alerts. Fuentes testified that every time he received an alert from CA concerning GPS discrepancies or alerts, he called E.A. or his mother to verify the information. Fuentes testified that when he called E.A. on several occasions to verify an alert that E.A. had left his radios and had been at another location, E.A. admitted to leaving the home and being in another area to search for employment or visit a girlfriend. Fuentes also testified that on one occasion, E.A. had asked for permission to attend a funeral, Fuentes “advised him that he could not” and the GPS pinpointed E.A. at the funeral, “so he went to the funeral and came back home.” Tr. Vol. II p. 92. Based on the foregoing, we believe that the evidence concerning E.A.’s failure to comply with the rules of electronic monitoring was substantially trustworthy, and we cannot therefore say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting Fuentes's testimony.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[21] E.A. contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he had violated the terms of the dispositional order or of his probation. We apply the same standards with respect to the revocation of probation for minors as we do for adults. See T.W. v. State, 864 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

A probation revocation proceeding is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and, therefore, the alleged violation need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. Violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. As with other sufficiency issues, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. We look only to the evidence which supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that the probationer committed any violation, revocation of probation is appropriate.

Id. (citations omitted).

[22] E.A. contends that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that E.A. had used marijuana during his probationary period, arguing that “the State did not proffer any evidence of how long marijuana would stay detectible after ingestion in whatever test was performed.”² Appellant's Br. p. 13. E.A. again relies on C.S. for support. In C.S., the urine test which C.S. had taken only five days after he had been placed on probation had tested positive for cocaine. 817 N.E.2d at 1281. In reversing C.S.’s probation revocation, we concluded that because the sample had been taken “only five days after C.S. was placed on probation, we are left to merely speculate whether he used cocaine before or after probation was imposed” and therefore concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that C.S. had used cocaine at some time after he had been placed on probation. Id. at 1282.

[23] E.A. contends that the State proffered “no evidence as to when E.A. ingested any potential marijuana” and that it “is not even clear, based on this record, which of the five tests were positive for marijuana.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. However, unlike in C.S., E.A. tested positive for marijuana more than four months after he had been placed on probation, not five days. Fuentes testified that since E.A. had been placed on probation, “[h]e has given I believe five each – since January each month, I drug screen him, tested positive for marijuana.” Tr. Vol. II p. 96. When asked again about the results of the March drug screen, Fuentes reiterated that the results of the January, February, March, April, and May screens were “all positive.” Tr. Vol. II p. 110. This testimony is clear that all five of E.A.’s drug screens between January and May of 2024 were positive for marijuana, and the evidence supports the reasonable inference that E.A. had used marijuana while he was on probation. This violation of E.A.’s probation on its own was enough to revoke E.A.’s probation.³ See, e.g., Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (providing that a trial court may revoke the defendant's probation upon proof of a single violation), trans. denied.

[24] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that E.A. contends that the State failed to admit evidence of the result of each drug screen, we note that Fuentes testified that since E.A. had been placed on probation, “[h]e has given I believe five each – since January each month, I drug screen him, tested positive for marijuana.” Tr. Vol. II p. 96. When asked again about the results of the March drug screen, Fuentes reiterated that the results of the January 12, February 29, March 28, April 23, and May 23 screens were “all positive.” Tr. Vol. II p. 110.

2.   We note that Fuentes testified that the drug screens he conducts are saliva screens.

3.   Because proof of a single violation is enough to revoke E.A.’s probation, we need not address E.A.’s other arguments regarding sufficiency.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.