IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.M. and Z.C. (Minor Children) and J.M. (Mother) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to two of her sons, C.M. and Z.C. (collectively, “Children”) on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). She presents two consolidated and restated issues:

1. Did the trial court deny her due process by holding the fact-finding hearing in her absence after mailing her the statutorily required ten-day notice?

2. Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and J.C. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the parents of C.M. (born in October 2015) and Z.C. (born in October 2020).¹ Parents also have several other children, both from prior relationships and with each other.² In 2018, DCS became involved with the family—then consisting of Parents, C.M., and five other children—and filed petitions alleging C.M. and the others were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to “failure to have a safe and stable home living environment” and concerns about illegal substance use by Mother. Tr. Vol. 2 at 42. Mother admitted C.M. was a CHINS because she needed assistance maintaining a home free of illegal substance use, and Father waived his right to a fact-finding hearing. The trial court adjudicated C.M. a CHINS on August 29, 2018, and ordered Mother to engage in a home-based case management program; participate in individual therapy and follow all recommendations; and submit to random drug and alcohol screens with the understanding any drug screen not timely completed would be deemed a positive result. See Exhibit Vol. 1 at 83. The children all remained in the home on a temporary in-home trial visit.

[4] By June 2019, DCS removed C.M. from Parents’ home due to Parents’ noncooperation with services, Mother's positive drug screens, and concerns about C.M.’s safety and the home's condition. In September 2020, the trial court changed C.M.’s permanency plan to adoption.

[5] In October of that year, Mother gave birth to Z.C., and in December, DCS filed a petition alleging he was a CHINS because of Mother's illegal substance use and the fact Parents had not remedied the reasons for removal in the pending CHINS cases involving Z.C.’s siblings. DCS removed Z.C. from Parents’ care. The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition on March 22, March 29, and April 26, 2023.³ It adjudicated Z.C. a CHINS in July because Mother had five open CHINS cases, had not completed any services ordered by the trial court in those cases, refused to engage in voluntary services offered in Z.C.’s case (including drug screens and regular visitation), and could not provide Z.C. with basic care and a home free of illegal substance use. See id. at 197. The trial court ordered Mother to execute written authorizations for service providers to release information necessary to allow the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) to monitor compliance with the court's order; engage in a home-based therapy program; complete a substance use assessment and follow all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens two times per week (again with the understanding any incomplete or untimely screen would be deemed positive for illicit drug use); and complete therapeutic visits. See id. at 217–18.

[6] DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to C.M. in April 2023 and to Z.C. in February 2024. The trial court held a combined fact-finding hearing on June 25, 2024. DCS mailed Mother notice of the fact-finding hearing on June 13, 2024, and the FCM followed up with an email to her the same day. See Exhibit Vol. 2 at 18. Mother did not appear. At the outset of the hearing, Mother's counsel requested a continuance, stating, “I have not been able to communicate with my client and I'm afraid that will impair my ability to adequately defend my client.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. Counsel for DCS objected, arguing Parents had adequate notice of the hearing and DCS was ready to proceed. The trial court denied Mother's motion to continue.

[7] Kelly Orr, therapist for then three-year-old Z.C. since December 2023, testified Z.C. talked about Mother during their sessions, and Z.C. “would always say, ‘she screams, she screams, I don't like it.’ And he'd put his hands over his ears.” Id. at 14. Orr described Z.C. as being “still so afraid of his mom.” Id. at 16. Orr believed it was in Z.C.’s best interest for the trial court to terminate Mother's parental rights because “he does not have a healthy bond with either parent, his primary attachments are at the home where he is placed[,]” and she thought “it would be psychologically traumatizing and very developmentally disabling for him” to be returned to Mother's care. Id. at 14, 15. Orr also saw C.M. for a period and believed C.M. was a safety risk for younger children because of some of his behaviors.

[8] Sarah Kropczynski, therapist for then eight-year-old C.M., had been working with C.M since January 2024. She testified C.M. “display[s] an unhealthy bond with his parents” and “has an emotional detachment from” them. Id. at 27–28. She believed it was in C.M.’s best interest for the trial court to terminate Mother's parental rights; additionally, termination would benefit C.M. by providing him stability because “he wouldn't have to worry about if there were going to be visits that were missed [or] if he was going to go home to a place where there is no structure.” Id. at 34–35. She also thought it would “improve his chances of being adopted later if the rights are terminated for the parents.” Id. at 29.

[9] Abigail Stasic, the FCM assigned to the case in September 2023, testified DCS permitted Mother to take in-home drug screens through DCS’ provider, Cordant. FCM Stasic had not received drug screens through Cordant or any other source since January 2022. According to FCM Stasic, Mother claimed she received substance use treatment through a program called Clean Slate, but Mother had not authorized a records release or provided documentation to verify her participation in the program, despite a court order to do so. When asked what Mother had done to rectify the reasons for Children's removal, FCM Stasic responded: “Other than sporadic visits, nothing.” Id. at 50. At the time of the hearing, Mother's most recent visit with Children was on March 3, 2024, and since FCM Stasic took on the case, at least two visitation service providers discharged Mother due to lack of communication and involvement. FCM Stasic testified termination would be in Children's best interest because “Mother [has] failed to remedy the reasons why DCS got involved over six years ago” and six years “is a very long time” to “not have had any permanency.” Id. at 60.

[10] FCM Stasic testified DCS’ plan for Z.C. was adoption with his current foster family. As to C.M.’s placement, FCM Stasic stated C.M.’s current foster home had not committed to adopting him, although had not ruled it out; if they did not adopt him, they were willing to care for him until DCS could find an adoptive home. Still, she thought termination was in C.M.’s best interest because C.M. “needs safety, stability, and routine” and it was “clear [Parents] cannot provide that for their children.” Id. at 63. She also stated there were programs available to help find C.M. an adoptive home after termination.

[11] Chris Mundy, Children's guardian ad litem (“GAL”), thought termination was in Z.C.’s best interest. But he did not believe Mother's rights to C.M. should be terminated until DCS found a suitable pre-adoptive home for him. According to GAL Mundy, C.M.’s current placement did not intend to adopt him, and he thought C.M. was “going to struggle once he finds out that the current home is not actually a permanent situation[.]” Id. at 99. Still, GAL Mundy agreed Mother had not rectified the reasons Children had been removed from the home and believed reunification with Mother was not in C.M.’s best interest.

[12] On August 2, 2024, the trial court entered orders terminating Parents’ parental rights to Children. In pertinent part, the trial court found:

d․ Mother has exercised little to no parenting time with the children in over two years demonstrating that she is not willing or able to provide for the children's long or short-term needs.

e․ Parents have failed to engage in any of the court-ordered services to work toward reunification with the children. Parents will not allow DCS or the GAL to see their home to ensure it is safe for the children. There is no evidence that parents are sober or stable caregivers.

* * *

d. Mother and father have not visited consistently with the children. There have been large gaps of time between visits which have cause emotional distress to the children. Parents have failed to demonstrate they can provide stability for their children. Parents have failed to demonstrate that they are sober caregivers for their children. Returning [Children] to [Parents] would be traumatic for them both.

e․ The children need permanency and stability. [Z.C] has that permanency and stability with his foster family. [C.M.] needs the stability of not having to be subjected to the emotional harm caused by parents[’] unstable and infrequent contact, and the fear of potentially being returned to parents he has not lived with for five years.

* * *

b. Here, these children have already waited over six years in [C.M.]’s case and over three and a half years in [Z.C.]’s case, for parents to remedy the reasons for removal. In all that time mother and father failed to make any progress toward reunification.

* * *

f. Neither mother nor father have demonstrated an ability or willingness to parent their children. Mother did not address her substance abuse issues which caused the opening of the CHINS cases. Mother has been ordered multiple times to engage in therapy and home-based case work. Mother was ordered to provide a release of information to DCS for treatment she claimed she was obtaining at Clean Slate. Mother has never provided a release of information or any records of treatment to DCS. Mother was ordered to submit to random drug screens. Mother has never satisfactorily completed any service. Mother has not provided DCS with a random drug screen since January of 2022.

* * *

h. Parents’ contact with DCS has been historically sporadic. Parents routinely fail to appear at court hearings despite notice. Both parents were found to be unfit to parent two other children by a court of competent jurisdiction. This indicates a lack of intention and ability to parent [Children]. Neither parent has provided any indication that they have stable and appropriate housing, employment[,] or can otherwise provide for the children.

* * *

j. Both the GAL and the FCM believe termination of the parent-child relationship between parents and [Z.C.] to be in the child's best interest․

k. The FCM and [C.M.]’s therapist believe termination of the parent-child relationship between parents and [C.M.] to be in the child's best interest.

* * *

c. DCS's plan for the children is adoption. [Children] are thriving in their foster care placements. [Z.C.] has a preadoptive home that can provide for his needs. DCS continues to look for a preadoptive home for [C.M.], but in the meantime, he is in a safe and stable home that will keep him until a preadoptive home is identified. DCS has complied with the statute regarding providing an appropriate plan for the care of the children.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32–37.

1. The trial court did not deny Mother due process for lack of notice.

[13] Mother first argues the trial court violated her due process rights when it held the fact-finding hearing in her absence after mailing her notice of the hearing. The due process clause of the U.S. Constitution and due course of law clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. 2011). Parental rights constitute an important interest warranting deference and protection, and when the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process. Id. at 916–17. Although due process has never been defined, the phrase embodies a requirement of fundamental fairness, including the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. It is of “paramount importance” for parents of children involved with DCS to receive notice of DCS’ involvement. Id. at 918. And when a State imparts a due process right, it must give that right. Id. at 917 (quotation omitted).

[14] On appeal, Mother claims DCS only emailed Mother notice of the fact-finding hearing and therefore the trial court's termination order “is void for lack of service.” Appellant's Br. at 17. Mother cites Matter of A.B., 226 N.E.3d 791, 796–97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), in which this Court held an order terminating parental rights was void for lack of personal jurisdiction after DCS failed to serve the parent under Indiana Trial Rule 4. See id. Mother's argument here is somewhat unclear, but it appears she has conflated the requirements for the trial court to establish personal jurisdiction over her with the statutory requirement to notify her of the fact-finding hearing at least ten days before the hearing.

[15] To establish personal jurisdiction over a party to a termination of parental rights proceeding, service of process must occur under Trial Rule 4.1. See Ind. Code § 31-32-9-1(a) (1997); I.C. § 31-35-2-2 (1997) (providing Indiana Code chapter 31-32-9 applies to termination of parental rights proceedings). That rule permits service on an individual by personal service. See Ind. Trial Rule 4.1(A). The record shows the clerk served Mother the summons and notice of the initial hearing on the petition to terminate her parental rights to C.M. on May 5, 2023, and to Z.C. on February 20, 2024, both by process server. The record also contains verified return of service for each summons. This was sufficient to establish the trial court's personal jurisdiction over Mother.

[16] Once a court has personal jurisdiction over a party, any written notice of a hearing shall be given to a party in the manner provided by Trial Rule 5. I.C. § 31-32-1-4 (2007); I.C. § 31-35-2-2 (providing Indiana Code chapter 31-32-1 applies to termination of parental rights proceedings). Trial Rule 5(B) provides service must be made upon a represented party's attorney by delivery, mail, or e-service. See T.R. 5(B). Service by mail is deemed complete when the papers are deposited in the United States mail addressed to the person on whom they are being served, with postage prepaid. See T.R. 5(B)(2). Our statutes also require DCS to send the parent and their attorney notice of the termination hearing at least ten days before the hearing. I.C. § 31-35-2-6.5(b) & (c)(1)–(2) (2012).

[17] Although Mother claims on appeal DCS served her notice of the hearing only by emailing her, DCS did more than that. Mother does not challenge the following trial court finding regarding notice of the hearing:

On June 25, 2024, this court heard evid[e]nce on the [termination of parental rights] petitions filed by DCS. Neither mother nor father appeared in person at the hearing, however, both were represented by counsel. DCS served both parents with a 10-day notice of hearing. Those notices were filed with the court. DCS FCM Abigail Stasic testified that she sent both parents additional copies of the 10-day notice of hearing by email at the current email address for each parent. FCM Stasic used the same email address used by parents to communicate with her.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25–26. The record supports this finding. At the fact-finding hearing, counsel for DCS stated it “sent the ten-day notice, which we filed with the court.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. The appellate appendix contains a written notice of termination hearing dated June 13, 2024, addressed to Mother's mailing address, and stating the time, place, and reason for the hearing along with a certificate of service signed by counsel for DCS. The CCS indicates DCS filed this notice with the court on June 13. FCM Stasic testified she also emailed the notice to Mother the same day and DCS submitted a copy of the email as Exhibit 23. The record shows Mother was properly and timely served notice of the fact-finding hearing. Accordingly, Mother has not shown she was denied due process for lack of notice.

2. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

A. Standard of Review

[18] In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the trial court must enter findings of fact that support its conclusions. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(c) (2012). “We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). We must accept as true trial court findings not challenged on appeal. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

[19] Out of deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will affirm the termination of parental rights unless the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. A termination decision is clearly erroneous “when the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision.” Id. We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. And we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

B. Statutory Requirements to Terminate the Parent-Child Relationship

[20] Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children. Id. This right, however, is not absolute and may be terminated when parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. at 45–46. “The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” In re I.B., 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992)).

[21] Because parental rights are “an important interest warranting deference and protection, and a termination of that interest is a ‘unique kind of deprivation,’ ” Indiana law sets a high bar to sever the parent-child relationship. C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 916–17 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). To do so, DCS must prove the four elements of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) by clear and convincing evidence. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019);⁴ I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). Mother does not challenge the first element.⁵ But under the second, third, and fourth elements, DCS must prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b). If the trial court finds DCS has met its burden, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8.

C. Challenged Findings

[22] Mother challenges two findings related to Mother's drug use as unsupported by the evidence. In finding ten, the trial court found, “[a]s of the time of the Detention Hearing on June 19, 2019, mother's recent drug screen was positive for illegal substances.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 24. Finding eleven states: “The matter was set for a Permanency Hearing on September 23, 2020. Mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs and was now pregnant.” Id. Mother contends these findings are supported only by inadmissible hearsay contained in prior court orders and therefore should be “discarded.” Appellant's Br. at 27. Without these findings, Mother contends the trial court “has no admissible evidentiary basis for its conclusions that Mother continued to use illegal drugs during the pendency of the CHINS action.” Id.

[23] At the fact-finding hearing, DCS did not introduce any of Mother's drug screen results. But there is evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding Mother used illegal drugs and struggled with unaddressed substance use issues while she had open CHINS cases. This case began when Mother admitted she needed court intervention to maintain a home free of illegal substance use. The trial court ordered Mother to submit to drug screens two times per week. Under the court order, any missed or untimely screens would be deemed positive for illegal drug use. The trial court found “Mother was ordered to submit to random drug screens” but “Mother has never satisfactorily completed any service” and “Mother has not provided DCS with a random drug screen since January of 2022.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 35.

[24] As to finding ten, Mother did not object to the admission of the trial court's detention hearing orders entered on June 5 and 19, 2019, even though Mother objected to the admission of other orders on hearsay grounds. A party's failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial normally results in waiver and precludes appellate review. In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Mother therefore waived her hearsay argument about these prior orders. Both orders state Mother submitted to drug screens and the results were positive, which led to C.M.’s removal.⁶

[25] Later, Z.C. was adjudicated a CHINS and removed from the home due to Mother's lack of engagement with court-ordered services to address her admitted issues with substance use. The trial court at that stage ordered Mother to complete a substance use assessment, complete all recommendations arising from the assessment, and submit to drug screens twice per week. FCM Stasic testified Mother had not completed any services, would not release records to show she had engaged in the substance use treatment program she claimed to have attended, and refused drug screens despite being permitted to take them at home for her convenience. The findings Mother engaged in illegal drug use during the CHINS cases are not erroneous.

D. Reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied.

[26] Next, we turn to Mother's arguments DCS failed to meet its burden to show there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied.⁷ To make this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's placement outside the home, then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. And a trial court may consider the services the State offered to the parent and the parent's response to those services when assessing whether the conditions leading to the child's removal will not be remedied. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[27] Mother contends there is no evidence the conditions leading to Children's removal are unlikely to be remedied because DCS admitted no drug test results to prove she used illegal drugs and DCS failed to show “any nexus between Mother's alleged drug use and her parenting.” Appellant's Br. at 24.

[28] As discussed above, there was evidence of Mother's illegal substance use, including her own admission she needed assistance maintaining a drug-free home. As this Court has observed, the “inevitable conclusion is that when [a parent] abuses drugs, she endangers her children in a variety of ways.” In re D.L., 814 N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding evidence mother “had not yet abandoned her life of drug abuse, despite being given over two years to do so” supported the trial court's termination decision), trans. denied. Yet despite her admission and request for assistance, Mother did not engage in the services DCS offered to help her remedy the problem or submit to drug screens to show illegal substance use was no longer an issue. A “parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, then later claim the DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued.” A.B., 924 N.E.2d at 671. The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion Mother did not remedy the reasons for Children's removal. See id. (holding evidence of mother's drug use right after child's birth, combined with her failure to participate in drug and alcohol assessments and counseling, “makes it reasonable to reach the conclusion that her drug abuse issue was not remedied”).

E. Children's Best Interests

[29] The trial court also found termination was in Children's best interests. When deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Children's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[30] Under this prong, Mother renews her arguments about an alleged lack of evidence of drug use and nexus between drug use and parenting. As to Children's best interests, the trial court found the Children's CHINS cases had been pending for six and three years respectively; Mother had failed to make any progress in that time; there was no evidence Mother could provide a safe and stable home for Children; and returning Children to Parents’ care would be traumatic for both kids. FCM Stasic and GAL Mundy testified it was in Z.C.’s best interest to terminate the parent-child relationship. “Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. This testimony supports the trial court's determination it was in Z.C.’s best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights.

[31] As to C.M., FCM Stasic and C.M.’s therapist testified termination was in his best interest. Both also noted additional adoption opportunities and services would be available if Mother's parental rights were terminated. Mother argues DCS inappropriately “relied on testimony that Mother's parental rights in [C.M.] must be terminated so he will be free to be adopted” because being “freed for adoption” is not a valid basis for termination. Appellant's Br. at 24. Mother correctly notes a trial court may not terminate a parent's constitutional right to raise her child solely because there is a better home available for him. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1151–52 (Ind. 2015). But increased adoption prospects for C.M. are not the sole reason FCM Stasic and the therapist thought termination would be in C.M.’s best interests. The FCM testified to C.M.’s need for permanency after six years of no progress on Mother's part, and the therapist testified C.M. was emotionally detached from Parents and would benefit from ending a harmful cycle of inconsistent parental visitation. And although GAL Mundy stopped short of recommending termination for C.M. at this time because of his concerns C.M. was not in a pre-adoptive home, he did not advocate for C.M.’s reunification with Mother. In sum, the trial court's decision was not based solely on the fact C.M. may have better adoption chances if Mother's parental rights were terminated.

[32] DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence termination was in Children's best interest.

F. Satisfactory Plan

[33] Finally, Mother argues DCS failed to carry its burden to show it had a satisfactory plan for C.M. Indiana courts have traditionally held that for a plan to be satisfactory, it need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007 (quotation omitted). Mother points to GAL Mundy's concern C.M. was not in a pre-adoptive home and the fact that after six years, DCS had not identified an adoptive home. But for a plan to be satisfactory, “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” Id. As the trial court found, “DCS continues to look for a preadoptive home for [C.M.], but in the meantime, he is in a safe and stable home that will keep him until a preadoptive home is identified.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 37. This was a satisfactory plan.

Conclusion

[34] The trial court did not deny Mother due process of law by holding the fact-finding hearing in her absence after serving her notice of the hearing. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's decision to terminate the parent-child relationship between Mother and Children.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated Father's parental rights to Children, but Father is not a party to this appeal.

2.   Father had a son and Mother had three children with prior partners. Parents then had five children together: C.M., Je.M., Ju.M., Z.C., and another child. A trial court also terminated Parents’ parental rights to Je.M. and Ju.M.

3.   The Chronological Case Summary for Z.C.’s CHINS matter states Parents, by counsel, waived the statutory requirement to hold a CHINS fact-finding hearing within sixty days of the petition being filed. See Exhibit Vol. 1 at 122. After several continuances, the case eventually proceeded to a fact-finding hearing and the trial court adjudicated Z.C. a CHINS on June 29, 2022. But after an appeal and remand, the trial court set aside the CHINS adjudication on Mother's motion for relief from the judgment. See Exhibit Vol. 1 at 164–65. The trial court then held a new fact-finding hearing.

4.   The legislature amended this statute with an effective date of March 11, 2024. We use the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS filed the petitions to terminate.

5.   Under the first element, DCS must prove:(A) that one (1) of the following is true:(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child[.]I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b).

6.   The basis for finding eleven was the trial court's order entered on September 23. Although no party objected to the admission of that order, DCS offered the order only to show the court changed C.M.’s permanency plan to adoption. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 83. But even without finding eleven, there is evidence to support the trial court's findings concerning Mother's drug use.

7.   Under the second element, the trial court found there is a reasonable probability Mother will not remedy the reason for Children's placement outside her home, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), and there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii). But Subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, so the trial court need only find one of the three requirements of that element has been established. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 2010). Because we find it dispositive here, we review only whether DCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted Children's removal will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Pyle concur. Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.