Bryant Snyder, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Ericka Cosby, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bryant Snyder (Father) appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for modification of custody and parenting time with respect to his minor son, G.S. Father challenges several of the trial court's findings as clearly erroneous and contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to demonstrate that modification was in G.S.’s best interests. Father further contends that the trial court erred in refusing to modify his child support obligation because it improperly imputed income to him and failed to include Ericka Cosby's (Mother) one-time employment sign-on bonus and income from her part-time, sporadic employment in her gross income amount. Father also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Mother the annual tax exemption for G.S. and not providing him with credit for some of G.S.’s expenses.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother (collectively, the Parties) are the parents of G.S., born on June 21, 2016. The Parties never married, and the trial court approved an initial custody agreement on December 3, 2018. Thereafter, on August 28, 2020, the Parties entered into an agreement that provided for a “2-2-3” parenting time schedule with G.S. Appellee's Appendix Vol. II at 2-3.

[4] The Parties then —without court involvement—verbally agreed to follow a week on/week off schedule from January 2023 until April 2023. Mother, however, subsequently notified Father that she no longer desired to follow that arrangement and instead wanted a “5-2-2-5” schedule. Transcript Vol. II at 77, 222.

[5] In response, Father filed a motion to Modify Parenting Time on March 17, 2023, seeking to maintain joint custody of G.S., with a “week on/week off schedule” of equal parenting time. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 50-51. Father alleged that he was concerned “about Mother's stability,” claimed that G.S. was “thriving on the “week on/week off schedule,” and did not believe that adopting a 5-2-2-5 schedule “is in [G.S.’s] best interest.” Id. at 51. In the alternative, Father sought primary physical custody of G.S. Thereafter, on February 5, 2024, Father filed a “Verified Motion to Modify Child Support,” requesting that the “parties implement the [Indiana Child Support Guidelines] (the Guidelines) as amended ․ with respect to payment of future uninsured medical ․ and counseling expenses,” and that “weekly support be modified in accordance with the ․ Guidelines.” Id. at 111-12.

[6] At various hearings ¹ on Father's motions, the evidence established that Mother was twenty-two years old when G.S. was born in 2016 and graduated from nursing school in December that year. Mother became certified in adult and pediatric cardiac life support and wound care, and she is currently working on obtaining sexual assault certifications for pediatrics and adults.

[7] Mother works full-time in the burn unit at St. Vincent Hospital (St. Vincent) and occasionally works as needed at Hancock Regional Hospital (Hancock) when G.S. is in school. Mother is the primary charge nurse at St. Vincent, so her manager arranges the other employees’ work schedules around hers. Thus, Mother's work schedule is consistent. Mother's work at Hancock does not conflict with her time with G.S., and she is able to take him to school and pick him up at dismissal. And if Mother is required to pick up G.S. early, Hancock is only ten minutes away from the school.

[8] In October 2020, Mother moved from Greenfield—where G.S. attends school—to Ingalls, which is approximately twenty minutes north of Greenfield, and purchased a home there. After Father filed his petition for modification, Mother moved to a larger house in Pendleton with nearly two acres of land. Mother has been in a relationship with Dakota Neal, whom she has known for over twelve years, since September 2022, and they have resided together since January 2023. Neal was in the National Guard for eight years, subsequently attended the Law Enforcement Academy in 2023, and currently works in law enforcement. Neal has equal parenting time with his three-year old's mother and they follow a 3-2-2 parenting time schedule.

[9] When residing with Mother, G.S. gets himself up in the morning and gets ready for school. G.S. sometimes does homework during the ride home after school, and he is not permitted to play, use the computer, or watch television until he has finished his homework. G.S. also performs chores at home, including cleaning his room and caring for the family dog.

[10] Father married Kaylee Snyder (Stepmother) in October 2018. Stepmother has a thirteen-year-old son (Stepson) who lives with her and Father. Stepmother's parenting time schedule with Stepson is a week on/week off with a “midweek flip.” Transcript Vol. III at 61-62. Stepmother's income is the only source of income in the household, and she pays all of Father's expenses, including his legal fees. Father earned $1,058 per week at 4 Wheel Parts before leaving that job in 2020 to be a stay-at-home dad. Father and Stepmother's joint bank account exceeded $35,000 from March 17, 2023 through April 18, 2023, and deposits to that account totaled more than $91,000 from October 19, 2023, through November 16, 2023.

[11] While G.S. has exhibited behavioral problems at school since kindergarten, his current teacher, Elaine Landis, describes G.S. as a bright, intelligent young man. G.S. has no attendance issues, and he turns in his homework on time. G.S.’s behaviors have improved since the beginning of the 2023 school year, and his best stretch of behavior occurred early through mid-January. G.S., however, had a behavioral setback in February 2024, when he received an out-of-school suspension. Mother was out of town during that time, and G.S. went nine days without seeing her. G.S. did not complete his schoolwork that week, and he received “Fs” on his assignments. Transcript Vol. II at 169.

[12] Landis testified that both parents are “incredibly involved” with G.S. and “the communication is unbelievably good.” Id. at 170. Mother has agreed to everything Landis has suggested about assisting G.S. in school. For instance, Mother occasionally eats lunch with G.S. at school, attends field trips, and helps at class parties. Landis has observed that G.S. and Mother are close and believed that “if [G.S.] were to be taken away from [Mother] ․ that would be extremely traumatic and would affect [G.S.] for the rest of his life.” Id. at 176.

[13] Justin Huff, the school therapist, began counseling G.S. in October 2023. Huff observed that G.S. is bonded with both parents. He has no concerns about either parent's household and believes that he can help develop consistency with the households. Huff observed that G.S.’s behavior was not “bad up until ․ mid-February [2024] or so” when Mother was out of town. Id. at 188-89. Huff believed that it would be a struggle if G.S. lost time with either parent and a substantial change in the parenting schedules would be detrimental to G.S.

[14] At some point, the Parties agreed to obtain a neuropsychological evaluation for G.S. Kathryn Morris, a mental health nurse practitioner with Indiana University Health, first visited with G.S. in November 2023. G.S. was diagnosed with anxiety and oppositional defiant disorder. Morris believed that a child could have anxiety related to transitions between households if Mother and Father have different parenting styles.

[15] Morris prescribed Sertraline for G.S.’s anxiety, and during a follow-up visit in December, the Parties reported that G.S.’s behavior had improved at school and at home. Morris opined that G.S.’s judgment had improved, and his mood was happy. Morris noted in a January 2024 evaluation that the Parties acknowledged G.S.’s improved behavior.

[16] In March 2024, G.S. was diagnosed with ADHD, for which Morris prescribed a non-stimulant medication. Morris had no concerns regarding G.S.’s mental health at either household and believed that a major parenting schedule change would be a difficult struggle for a child G.S.’s age.

[17] The trial court appointed Justin Clouser as G.S.’s Guardian ad Litem (GAL). Clouser's January 2024 report acknowledged that G.S.’s counselor and teacher expressed concerns about reducing G.S.’s time with Mother. G.S. told Clouser that he did not want the current parenting time schedule to change.

[18] When calculating Father's income for child support purposes, the trial court began with a potential income of $1,058 and imputed an additional $526.51 per week that constituted 25% of Stepmother's income. That amount represented the estimated value of the in-kind benefits that Father received, including paid-for living expenses, maintenance for a dirt bike and several motor vehicles, a $65,000 camper, and an overseas vacation. Stepmother admitted that she pays 100% of Father's living expenses.

[19] Following the final hearing on Father's motions on June 10, 2024, the trial court issued 175 findings of fact, denying Father's request for modification of custody/parenting time and recalculation of child support. The trial court ordered the Parties to share joint legal custody of G.S. and concluded that neither party was to pay child support to the other. The trial court further determined that the Parties were to share physical custody of G.S. pursuant to the 5-2-2-5 schedule that they had followed since May 2023, that Mother was entitled to claim G.S. as a tax exemption each year, and that Father would not receive any credit for G.S.’s expenses.

[20] Father now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Custody and Parenting Time Modification

[21] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that he failed to show that there was a substantial change in circumstances and that modification of custody/parenting time was in G.S.’s best interests. Father claims that the findings set forth below are clearly erroneous because the evidence did not support them. Thus, Father maintains that the trial court should have adopted his proposed parenting time schedule.

[22] Where, as here, the trial court enters findings sua sponte, the trial court's specific findings control only with respect to the issues they cover, and a general judgment standard applies to issues outside the court's findings. Collyear-Bell v. Bell, 105 N.E.3d 176, 183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). We review the issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016).

[23] We will not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. G.G.B.W. v. S.W., 80 N.E.3d 264, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when there is no support for them in the record, either directly or by inference. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when the findings fail to support the judgment. Id. This court grants latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters, and we will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Ind. 2012); Miller v. Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[24] Father first challenges Finding 19 that provides:

19. Father could not articulate what has changed since his Petition filed April 5, 2023 or his Answers to Interrogatories signed by Father and tendered to counsel on May 8, 2023 which warrant changing physical custody even if Mother can accommodate the weekly schedule.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 29.

[25] Father claims this finding is clearly erroneous because Mother changed jobs over a four-year period, moved to three different residences since 2020, and now resides 45 minutes away from G.S.’s school. Notwithstanding Father's claim, this finding is in regard to what has changed since his petition was filed on April 5, 2023 and his answers to interrogatories on May 8, 2023—not what has changed over four years. That said, no evidence was presented that Mother changed jobs or has moved since May 8, 2023. Moreover, while Father testified that there was a lack of structure and routine in Mother's house since the petition was filed, he admitted to not having any direct knowledge of the routines and structure at Mother's residence. For these reasons, we reject Father's claim that this finding was clearly erroneous.

[26] Father also challenges Findings 41 and 44:

41. Mother has changed jobs voluntarily since the last custody order. She did so to improve her income and work situation, including her schedule.

44. Despite working full time, Mother has aligned her work schedule to be with [G.S.] for all of her parenting time, aside from one hour on alternate Wednesdays in the morning before he goes to school.

Id. at 31-32.

[27] Father contends that these findings are not supported by the evidence because Mother's income “has remained stagnant,” and her work schedule has not improved, thus creating “instability in [G.S.’s] life.” Appellant's Brief at 15. Despite these claims, Mother testified that each job change increased her income. The evidence further established that Mother's supervisor at St. Vincent permits her to maintain a consistent work schedule, and she only works longer shifts when she is not caring for G.S. Mother also testified that she has more flexibility with having days off when working a twelve-hour shift because she can attend school functions and take G.S. to doctors’ appointments. Mother's testimony supports the trial court's findings, and we reject Father's claim that these findings are clearly erroneous.

[28] Father next challenges Findings 58, 59, and 63:

58. Father alleges that Mother makes excuses for [G.S.’s] behavior by attributing them to his diagnoses.

59. However, Father testified in court that [G.S.’s] behavioral problems are all attributed to Mother's household and Mother's parenting time, which is equally making excuses.

63. Father and Stepmother both allege [that G.S.’s] bad behaviors are a result of Mother, although they cannot articulate how or why this is the case.

Id. at 33.

[29] Father testified that he attributes G.S.’s misbehavior to “lack of structure and routine,” and he blamed Mother for not doing things that were best for G.S. Transcript Vol. II at 139. Other than that comment, Father did not testify to any specific actions or failures by Mother that may have rendered her household unsuitable and not in G.S.’s best interest. Hence, these findings are not clearly erroneous.

[30] Father next claims that Finding 73 was clearly erroneous:

73. When faced with the evidence of [G.S.’s] behavioral and academic issues [the week of February 21 through March 1], Father and Stepmother both inexplicably testified this was still [G.S.’s] best week.

Id. at 35.

[31] The evidence supported this finding, in that there were negative behavioral marks on G.S.’s report from February 21 until March 1, 2024. It was established that G.S. received a suspension from school and more “Fs” that week than the entire calendar year up to that point, notwithstanding Father and Stepmother ‘s testimony to the contrary.

[32] Father next challenges Finding 80:

80. [Father] did not articulate any specific ways in which changing the parenting time provided either more consistency or more stability.

Id. at 35.

[33] Father points to the testimony of the GAL, G.S.’s teacher, and the mental health counselor, who all indicated that G.S. required more consistency in his life. Notwithstanding Father's claim, his proposed schedule would demonstrate less consistency in the days that G.S. would be with each parent. Moreover, the evidence established that Mother has a consistent schedule where she is not required to work during her parenting time, and Father failed to direct the trial court to any evidence showing that G.S. is not receiving a consistent routine in Mother's household. Thus, Finding 80 is not clearly erroneous.

[34] Father next argues that Finding 90 was clearly erroneous:

90. [G.S.] was mad at Mother due to consequences she imposed for his bad behavior and when [G.S.] began to cry on the phone, Father told [G.S.] he would come pick him up, at which point Mother ended the call.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 36.

[35] Father points to his own testimony that he “did not tell [G.S.] that” he would pick him up, but Mother unequivocally testified that “[Father] said that he was going to come get him․” Transcript Vol. II at 153-54; Transcript Vol. III at 89. It is apparent that the trial court chose to credit Mother's testimony and not Father's. In light of this conflicting testimony, Father's request that we set aside this finding amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See D.C., 977 N.E.2d at 954.

[36] Father next challenges Finding 94:

94. During his suspension from school, [G.S.] was unable to use electronics, watch TV or have any play dates.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 37.

[37] Father claims that this finding was erroneous because “Mother testified that [G.S.] did go on his Ipad and [G.S.] was able to watch television.” Appellant's Brief at 19 (citing Transcript Vol. III at 81, 137). Mother testified that she did not have G.S.’s iPad because the school did not send it home with him. Thus, she was not able to log into the school's education application. Mother explained that she permitted G.S. to use her computer only to complete his homework, and further testified that she may have been watching the news on television the day G.S. was suspended. Neither use suggests that G.S. watched television or used the computer for entertainment purposes, as the trial court's finding implies. Thus, this finding was not clearly erroneous.

[38] Father next argues that Finding 98 was erroneous:

98. [Neal] testified Mother has improved her discipline with [G.S.] and they do not have many behavior issues with [G.S.] at home.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 37.

[39] Neal testified that G.S.’s behavior has improved, while acknowledging that “[G.S.] can be difficult. I think he has good days and bad days, and his behavior can flip on a dime.” Transcript Vol. III at 44. On the other hand, Neal testified that he has observed Mother's improved parenting skills, and that “when [G.S. is told] to do something ․ he does it.” Id. at 53. This finding is not clearly erroneous.

[40] Father next challenges Findings 102-04:

102. Mother testified that Father and Stepmother make unilateral decisions regarding [G.S.’s] medical decisions and extracurricular activities without [consulting] her or respecting her legal custody rights.

103. Mother testified that, after she explicitly stated she didn't want [G.S.] enrolled in therapy with the school until his recent testing results were released, pointing out she has a legal say in his treatment, Father and Stepmother proceeded to schedule the therapy behind her back, complete the intake process wherein they shared information about themselves and Mother, and began sessions with the counsellor at their house without knowledge or consent from Mother.

104. Mother testified she did not learn of this until the counselor introduced herself to Ericka at a school event.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 38.

[41] Father maintains that these findings are clearly erroneous because the evidence established that Mother was informed about the change in therapists prior to the school event, that he and Mother were both on the same email chain with the coordinator for G.S.’s therapy, and that he and Stepmother took proper steps to schedule a time to set up an intake for G.S.

[42] While Father correctly points out that Mother was included in emails regarding G.S.’s therapist, he neglects to point out that Mother adamantly opposed the initiation of a new counselor in those email communications. Father and Stepmother nonetheless enrolled and scheduled G.S. for counselling sessions without Mother's consent or knowledge. Additionally, Father did not present any evidence establishing when he advised Mother about the commencement of the counseling sessions or when he provided her with dates or times. Rather, it was established that despite Mother's directive not to enroll G.S., Father and Stepmother proceeded to do so, and Mother was not aware of the new counselor until she introduced herself at G.S.’s school event. Father's contention amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we decline to do. See D.C., 977 N.E.2d at 954. Hence, the above findings are not clearly erroneous.

[43] Father next claims that Finding 106 is clearly erroneous:

106. Mother has concerns ․ because Father recently told a provider [that G.S.] was taking a blood thinner rather than correctly reporting his anxiety medication.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 39.

[44] Father challenges this finding because he testified at the hearing that he mistakenly listed his medication, i.e., lisinopril, to the provider rather than G.S.’s anxiety medicine. Father points out that he then corrected himself. Notwithstanding Father's contention, the evidence established that he mistakenly told a physician prior to the hearing that G.S. was taking lisinopril. This finding was not clearly erroneous.

[45] Father next challenges Findings 111, 112, and 113:

111. [G.S.’s] behavior has improved since last school year [sic].

112. Mother believes the change to a 5-2-2-5 [schedule] in May of 2023 contributed to his improvement and testified that medication regimen has continued to help [G.S.], especially the most recent increase in dosage.

113. From the time of that increase until the end of the school year, [G.S.’s] behavior changes were increasingly positive and have trended in the positive direction since medications began in March 2023.

Id. at 39.

[46] Father argues that these findings are clearly erroneous because G.S.’s behavioral reports demonstrated that his behavior has been inconsistent and has not improved since May 2023. Notwithstanding Father's contention, the nurse practitioner noted that the Parties reported improvements in G.S.’s behavior during an assessment on January 22, 2024. Mother also believed that medications have helped G.S. curb his disruptive behavior at school. Further, Mother testified that the “5-2-2-5” custody arrangement involving fewer transitions between the households has helped G.S. because it is more routine and easier for him. In short, these findings are supported by the evidence, and Father has, once again, impermissibly requested that we reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility.

[47] Father next challenges Finding 116:

116. Mother introduced evidence of challenges to the parenting time schedule resulting from Father's and [Stepmother's] desires such as: birthday scheduling (Exhibit V), different dropoff scheduling (Exhibit HH), Boy Scouts scheduling (Exhibit JJ), and drop-off coordination (Exhibit 4).

Id. at 40.

[48] Father argues that this finding is erroneous because the referenced exhibits were not admitted at the final hearing and, therefore, the characterization of the conversation was not supported by the evidence. Even though the exhibits were not admitted, the facts and circumstances regarding them were addressed through witness testimony. See Transcript Vol. III at 35-40, 66-69. As a result, Father has failed to show that the evidence did not support this finding. Thus, it is not clearly erroneous.

[49] Father next challenges Finding 119:

119. The concerns raised by the GAL appear to have pre-dated the Parties’ last custody arrangement as do the majority of the concerns raised by Father and Stepmother.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 40.

[50] Father claims that this finding is clearly erroneous in light of the GAL's testimony that he based his recommendation solely on changes that occurred since the Parties’ last custody arrangement. Father points out that the GAL noted that Mother has moved twice in the last three years and farther away from Father and G.S.’s school. The GAL reported that Mother's career changes have led to conflicts in schedules with drop-off and pick up issues. The GAL also indicated in the supplemental report that Mother lacks structure and organization and is more of a nurturer.

[51] Notwithstanding Father's contentions, the GAL's initial report analyzed concerns including “Mother's erratic work schedule,” and “[her] multiple relocations over the last several years.” See Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 67-82. Those issues have not been a concern since the most recent court order in August 2020. Therefore, the GAL's concerns referenced and relied upon events and circumstances that pre-dated the August 2020 order. Father's challenge to this finding fails.

[52] Father next claims that Findings 120 and 121 are clearly erroneous:

120. The GAL testified Father provided a box of documents detailing every purported indiscretion of Mother's which [he has] documented over the years.

121. [Father] acknowledged they were focused on litigation and tracking Mother rather than co-parenting.

Id. at 40.

[53] Father attacks these findings, claiming that the GAL did not testify to the above. To the contrary, the GAL testified that Father “provided a box of binders that included text messages that were three, four, five years old ․ [and reviewed] them briefly․ ” Transcript Vol. II at 36. Much of the communication focused on Mother's transgressions, including those dating back to 2016, the year that G.S. was born. Father has failed to show that these findings are clearly erroneous.

[54] Father next challenges Finding 125:

125. The GAL reviewed the factors which the court should consider in making a custody change and determined there were no changes which favor either parent and the only changes noted about Mother were to the positive: a long-term relationship with a “sibling” in each home and a more consistent and suitable work schedule.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 40.

[55] Father asserts that this finding is clearly erroneous because the GAL is not properly in a position to evaluate factors that would justify a custody change and maintains that this determination rests solely with the trial court. Father also claims that the evidence at the hearing mischaracterized the GAL's ultimate determination that a custody modification was in G.S.’s best interest.

[56] Notwithstanding Father's contentions, Finding 125 does not conclude that the trial court simply followed the GAL's recommendation about a proposed custody change. Rather, the finding merely represented an accurate statement of the evidence that the GAL presented. Thus, Father's challenge fails.

[57] Father next challenges Finding 139:

139. Although Father asserts [Mother] is less of a disciplinarian, Father also admits to making [G.S.] do planks[2] as punishment at the age of 4.

Id. at 42. Father claims that this finding is clearly erroneous because it relies on evidence that occurred prior to the last custody proceeding that is barred under Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21.³ Father maintains that because the last court order was in August 2020, and this incident occurred in 2019, the trial court was barred from considering earlier events.

[58] Mother points out that G.S. was born on June 21, 2016. Thus, G.S. turned four years old on June 21, 2020. The last custody and parenting time order was issued two months later, on August 28, 2020. There is no evidence that Father's punishment only occurred between June 21, 2020, when G.S. turned four, and August 28, 2020, when the last order was issued. Thus, it was proper for the court to consider this evidence because G.S. was four years old during the ten months following the latest court order as to custody and parenting time prior to his fifth birthday. It was therefore likely that the discipline occurred during a period of time that the trial court could properly consider. In short, Father has failed to show that this finding was clearly erroneous.

[59] Father next challenges Findings 143 and 148:

143. To change [the present schedule] goes against all of the recommendations that [G.S.] needs consistency.

148. There is no evidence that [Father's] proposed schedule will benefit [G.S.] or meet his need for more consistency or less transition.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 42-43.

[60] Father claims that these findings are clearly erroneous because G.S.’s mental health counselor advised the GAL that a more stable schedule was required and that the current schedule still created conflict between the Parties. Father further points out that G.S.’s mental health nurse indicated that the parenting styles are different in each home and G.S. may have anxiety because of the transitions between the households. Father maintains that his proposed schedule would provide G.S. more time with him, and he is “more consistent and stable” than Mother. Appellant's Brief at 24.

[61] Contrary to Father's claims, his proposed schedule demonstrates less consistency regarding the days that G.S. would spend with each parent. More specifically, during week one, G.S. would be with Father on Monday, but in week two, he would be with Mother on Monday. G.S.’s visits with Mother would be three days long, seven days away, one day with Mother, three days away. There is simply no consistency in that pattern because G.S. would be required to change households for one overnight on alternating Mondays. There are the same number of transitions between the proposed schedule and the current 5-2-2-5 arrangement. Therefore, G.S. would not benefit from a reduction in transitions.

[62] On the other hand, the 5-2-2-5 schedule means that G.S. knows where he will be every Monday through Thursday with no inconsistency. And the most important and consistent aspect of G.S.’s life has been the ability to stay with both parents for an equal amount of time. Father's proposed schedule does not eliminate the inconsistencies between the Parties’ households. Indeed, that proposed schedule removes the consistency of the current 5-2-2-5 arrangement and the consistency G.S. has had with Mother.

[63] To be sure, the evidence showed that Mother has a consistent work schedule, and she does not work during her parenting time. While Father claims that G.S. needs routine and consistency, he points to no evidence suggesting that G.S. is not receiving the same when G.S. is with Mother. Father has failed to show that these findings are clearly erroneous.

[64] Finally, Father challenges Findings 150 (a) and (f):

150. The changes since the last custody order are: (a) Mother has aligned her work schedule with her parenting time so she is not required to work when she has [G.S.]; ․ (f) [G.S.]’s behaviors have improved and continued to improve as of the last court hearing on June 10th.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 43.

[65] While Father claims that these findings are not supported by the evidence, it was established that Mother coordinates her work schedule with her parenting time. As Mother is presently the primary charge nurse at St. Vincent, her supervisor arranges the other employees’ schedules around hers. As a result, Mother's work schedule is consistent, and she only works a twelve-hour shift when G.S. is not in her care. Moreover, Mother testified that she changed jobs to work at St. Vincent because:

the three 12-hour shift provided [her] with more flexibility to have days off during the week that [she] could spend with [G.S.] during the summer vacation or going to school, any school functions or going to doctors’ appointment or anything like that that [she] didn't have before with [her] Monday through Friday 7:30 to 4 job.

Transcript Vol. III at 115.

[66] We additionally note that Father has misconstrued finding 150(f). Specifically, the finding states that G.S. has improved “as of the last court hearing on June 10th” not “since the June 10th hearing.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 43 (emphasis added). At the June 10 hearing, Mother testified that up to that point, G.S.’s behavior continued to improve. We therefore reject Father's claim that these findings are clearly erroneous.

[67] In sum, Father's challenges to the trial court's findings merely represent his disagreements with those findings and/or amount to impermissible requests to weigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Every finding that Father challenges is supported by the evidence. Thus, Father's claims that the findings are clearly erroneous fail.

II. Change in Circumstances

Father next claims that the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to show a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant a modification of custody. Father contends that a custody modification was in G.S.’s best interests, inasmuch as the trial court ignored evidence of G.S.’s ongoing mental health and behavioral issues and the need for consistency.

[68] In accordance with Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21, a court may not modify a child custody order unless modification is in the child's best interests and there is a substantial change in at least one of the following factors:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

(9) A designation in a power of attorney of:

(A) the child's parent; or

(B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.

I.C. § 31-17-2-8; see also In re Marriage of B.K. and B.P., 873 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[69] To justify a modification, a change in circumstances must be so decisive in nature as to make a change in custody necessary for the welfare of the child. Poret v. Martin, 434 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. 1982). The change, if its effect upon the child is to be properly assessed, must be judged in the context of the whole environment. Id.

[70] While we review custody modifications under an abuse of discretion standard, see Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), Father had the burden of proving that a modification of custody was warranted; thus, in appealing the denial of his motion he is appealing from a negative judgment. See Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We will reverse a negative judgment only if it is contrary to law, meaning that the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different from that reached by the trial court. Id. We are obligated not to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's ruling. Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2011). To reverse a trial court's custody modification ruling, “ ‘it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by the appellant before there is a basis for reversal.’ ” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).

[71] In this case, although Father claims substantial change has occurred that would warrant a modification of custody because of Mother's alleged “lack of structure and routine,” he admitted to not having any firsthand knowledge of the circumstances in her household. Transcript Vol. II at 150. Hence, Father has failed to point to any specific structure or routine that is lacking. On the other hand, Mother and Neal presented significant testimony describing the structure and consistent routines in their household when G.S. is with them. And while Father complains generally about Mother's employment changes, Mother testified that each transition has improved her finances and the situation with G.S. She has established a consistent work schedule, and Father did not present any evidence establishing that Mother's job changes have negatively affected G.S.

[72] Further evidence established that although G.S. still has occasional behavioral issues, the Parties, counsellors, the GAL, and G.S.’s teacher acknowledged that his behaviors have improved. Since November 2023, the Parties have been working with Morris—the mental health practitioner—to address G.S.’s anxiety and oppositional defiant disorder diagnoses. Mother also believed that the medication has helped curb G.S.’s disruptive behavior at school and has helped with his ability to focus and better control his emotions.

[73] In sum, we cannot say that the changes in Mother's life and G.S.’s behavioral issues represent circumstances “so decisive in nature” as to warrant a change in custody or parenting time necessary for G.S.’s welfare. See Poret, 434 N.E.2d at 888. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's petition for change of custody and/or parenting time.

II. Child Support Calculation and Tax Credit

[74] Father argues that his child support obligation cannot stand because the trial court improperly deviated from the Guidelines in calculating the Parties’ weekly gross income. Specifically, Father maintains that a portion of Stepmother's income was improperly imputed to him because the trial court's calculation of that amount was outside of the evidence presented, and that Mother's one-time bonus she received from St. Vincent and her income she earned at her part-time position at Hancock should have been included in her weekly gross income. Father also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award him credit for half of G.S.’s expenses and alternate the annual tax exemption with regard to G.S.

A. Imputed Income

[75] A trial court's calculation of child support is presumptively valid. Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008). Reversal of a child support order that deviates from the appropriate guideline amount is merited only where the trial court's determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015). Upon review of a modification order, only evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment are considered, and the order will only be set aside if clearly erroneous. Id.

[76] Imputation of income is permitted to discourage parents—both the payor-non-custodial parent and the recipient-custodial parent—“from avoiding significant child support obligations by becoming unemployed or taking a lower paying job.” Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The exact cost or value of living expenses received by a parent is not required in order to find imputed income. See Glass v. Oeder, 716 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ind. 1999). The Commentary to the Guidelines states that “[t]he marriage of a parent to a spouse with sufficient affluence to obviate the necessity for the parent to work may give rise to a situation where either potential income or imputed income or both should be considered in arriving at gross income.” Ind. Child Supp. G. 3(A) cmt 2(e) (emphasis added). At the same time, the Guidelines caution that the trial court must employ “a great deal of discretion” in its potential income determination. Ind. Child Supp. G. 3(A) cmt 2(c). Specifically, “discretion must be exercised on an individual case basis to determine if it is fair under the circumstances to attribute potential income to a particular nonworking or underemployed custodial parent.” Ind. Child Supp. G. 3(A) cmt. 2(d).

[77] Here, the evidence demonstrated that Father earned $1,058 per week at his prior place of employment with 4 Wheel Parts. Father left that job at the end of 2020 to be a stay-at-home dad, and it was established that Stepmother then became the sole source of the household's income. Stepmother pays all of Father's expenses, including his housing, phone, food, clothing, entertainment, and the maintenance of several vehicles. Stepmother also paid for an overseas vacation for the family, and all of Father's legal fees that totaled $26,183 as of the April 3, 2024 hearing. The Parties’ joint account bank statement showed deposits in excess of $35,000 from March 17, 2023 through April 18, 2023 and more than $91,000 in deposits from October 19, 2023 through November 16, 2023.

[78] When considering this evidence, the trial court began calculating Father's income with a potential weekly income of $1,058. Then, regarding the substantial personal expenses that Stepmother paid for Father, the trial court imputed an additional $526.51 per week of income to Father for purposes of calculating child support. That amounts to 25% of Stepmother's income that represented the trial court's estimation of the value of in-kind benefits that Father received.

[79] The extent to which Stepmother supports or contributes to Father's living expenses was clearly established and supported by the record. Based on the evidence regarding the substantial benefits Father receives as gifts from Stepmother, the amount of imputed income is fair under the circumstances, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in imputing that income to Father.

B. Excluding Mother's Bonus and Occasional Part-time Earnings From Her Second Job.

[80] Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Mother's one-time St. Vincent employment sign-on bonus and her earnings from her part-time position at Hancock from her weekly gross income. Father argues that such income should have been included because Mother “had been receiving monthly income from Hancock ․ for three years,” and “the undisputed evidence [established that she] received a $20,000 bonus from St. Vincent.” Appellant's Brief at 44.

[81] For purposes of the Guidelines, weekly gross income is defined as “actual Weekly Gross Income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or underemployed, and imputed income based upon ‘in-kind’ benefits ․” Trabucco v. Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d 544, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. In particular, the phrase “actual income” has been interpreted by this court as “existing income currently received by a parent and available for his or her immediate use.” Scoleri v. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). And under the Guidelines

[w]eekly gross income of each parent includes income from any source, except as excluded below, and includes, but is not limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, overtime, partnership distributions, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, structured settlements, capital gains, social security benefits, worker's compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, gifts, inheritance, prizes, and alimony or maintenance received.

Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A).

[82] As this court has previously observed, “[t]he commentary first notes that overtime and bonus income can be ‘irregular and nonguaranteed which causes difficulty in accurately determining the gross income of a party.’ ” Thompson v. Thompson, 696 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Ind. Child Support Guideline 3, commentary 2(b)). Also, “[t]he commentary ․ notes that while this type of income is includable in the total income, such inclusion is also very fact sensitive.” Thompson, 696 N.E.2d at 83. “The commentary indicates the underlying philosophy with respect to this type of income when it states, ‘[c]are should be taken to set support based upon dependable income, while at the same time providing children with the support to which they are entitled.’ ” Id. (quoting Ind. Child Support Guideline 3, commentary 2(b)). Thus, from the discussion in the commentary, “it is clear that the decision to exclude overtime or bonus income centers around the dependability of such income and it is also clear that if the income is dependable, it should not be excluded without proper consideration.” Marshall v. Marshall, 92 N.E.3d 1112, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The “thrust of the commentary and related cases is that the trial court's discretion in excluding overtime ․ income is grounded in a determination that the income is not dependable or would place a hardship on a parent to maintain.” Id. In addition to articulating its reasons for excluding this type of income, the trial court's reasoning must indicate that its determination was made in light of these principles. Id.

[83] In this case, Mother testified that she received a one-time sign-on bonus from St. Vincent, and that no additional bonuses would be forthcoming. She further testified that she occasionally works a second job on an as needed basis at Hancock to pay her legal fees that she has incurred because of Father's petition. It was also established that Mother works at Hancock less in the summer when G.S. is with her, and she is only required to work one shift every two months. At the time of the final hearing, Mother had worked only four hours over the course of four weeks during G.S.’s summer break.

[84] Finally, contrary to Father's contention, the trial court explained its reasoning for excluding Mother's one-time bonus and her sporadic as-needed nursing income: “Mother's previous bonus income and part-time, occasional secondary income shall not be included in her regular weekly income” ․ because Mother “is not scheduled to receive any additional bonus,” “rarely works [at Hancock] in the summer,” “requires this [secondary] income to pay the legal fees caused by Father's Motions,” and ․ her “hours are not set and the facility does not always need her to work, so the income is not guaranteed.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 31, 45-46 (emphasis added). These findings are supported by the record and support the judgment. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mother's one-time bonus from St. Vincent and the income she earns at Hancock from her gross monthly income.

C. Controlled Expenses and Annual Tax Credit

[85] Father claims that the trial court erred in not providing him with credit for half of G.S.’s controlled expenses ⁴ and not alternating the tax credit for G.S. We note, however, that Father has failed to present a cogent argument and citation to relevant authority and parts of the record in support of his claim that the trial court's refusal to award him the expense and tax credits was an abuse of discretion. Thus, Father has waived the issue for appellate review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that arguments be supported by “cogent reasoning” and be supported by “parts of the record on appeal relied on”).

[86] Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court ordered Mother to pay all of G.S.’s controlled expenses. It follows, therefore, that Father cannot expect to be awarded any of those credits. Moreover, the trial court's Child Support Obligation Worksheet (Worksheet) awarded Father a credit of $177.78 per week for his half of the overnights with G.S. It is unclear why Father maintains that he is entitled to credits for expenses he does not pay or beyond those afforded in the Worksheet.

[87] As for the annual tax credit and exemption regarding G.S., the Guidelines set forth factors for the trial court to consider that include the value of the exemption, each parent's income, and the percentage of cost of supporting the child borne by each parent. See Ind. Child Supp. G. 9. Here, the evidence showed that Father earns no taxable income. Thus, the value of the exemption to Father is zero. Moreover, Father provides no direct support for G.S., and the trial court ordered Mother to pay the controlled expenses in addition to providing for all of G.S.’s needs during her half of the parenting time. When G.S. is at Father's house, Stepmother pays the costs related to him. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the annual tax exemption to Mother under the present circumstances.

Conclusion

[88] In light of our discussion above, we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Additionally, the trial court properly determined that there was not a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of custody or parenting time and that Mother's one time sign-on bonus with St. Vincent and the income she earned from her sporadic part-time employment at Hancock were properly excluded from her gross income for purposes of calculating child support. Finally, we conclude that the trial court properly imputed income to Father and acted within its discretion in denying Father's request for credit as to G.S.’s expenses and in awarding Mother the annual tax exemption.

[89] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court conducted hearings on April 4 and 5, 2024, and June 10, 2024.

2.   A plank is generally regarded as an exercise that involves lying face down on the floor and supporting one's body weight with the forearms and toes, while maintaining a straight line from head to heels.

3.   I.C. § 31-17-2-21(c) provides that “[t]he court shall not hear evidence on a matter occurring before the last custody proceeding between the parties unless the matter relates to a change in the factors relating to the best interest of the child․”

4.   Controlled or “fixed” expenses include items like clothing, education, schoolbooks and supplies, and personal care items. See Ind. Child Supp. G. 6, Comm.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Brown and Tavitas concur. Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.