Orlando A. Sanders, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] While Orlando Sanders was attempting to leave the scene of a shots fired call, he was spotted by a responding officer who observed a handgun in his waistband. Sanders then tried to leave the scene in a vehicle but was unsuccessful, and when he exited that vehicle, his handgun fell to the ground. Sanders was charged with and convicted of carrying a handgun without a license. Sanders now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for carrying a handgun without a license.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 8, 2021, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) officers responded to a report of shots fired at 2800 North Chester Avenue in Indianapolis. The suspect was described as “a black male wearing an orange ball cap” and “was currently walking north bound on Chester.” Tr. Vol. III at 107. After arriving on scene, IMPD Officer Justin Hyde saw a man matching that description running away, so Officer Hyde pursued him. Officer Hyde lost sight of the man but continued searching; meanwhile, he learned the suspect was Sanders and confirmed that the man he saw matched Sanders's Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles photo.

[4] When Officer Jade Pierson-Henderson arrived on scene, she saw Sanders “emerging from a yard” nearby, Tr. Vol. III at 123, with “what appeared to be a handgun[ s]ticking out of his waistband,” id. at 124. Officer Pierson-Henderson ordered Sanders “to stop and put his hands in the air,” but he ignored her and continued walking down the street. Id. at 125. A vehicle then pulled up to Sanders, and he got in the back seat. The vehicle travelled only a short distance before it was stopped by other officers. Sanders got out of the vehicle, and as he did so, Officer Pierson-Henderson “saw a handgun fall from” Sanders and land “beside the car in the street,” id. at 127.

[5] Sanders “started walking aggressively towards” Officer Hyde, Tr. Vol. III at 110. Officer Hyde ordered Sanders “to stop moving, put his hands in the air,” but Sanders “continuously dropped his right hand to his waistband.” Id. Officer Hyde “heard [Sanders] say, I set my gun on the floor.” Id.; see also id. at 111, 127. Sanders then walked to a nearby yard and continued refusing to obey Officer Hyde's commands, including refusing to keep his hands in the air, so Officer Hyde tased him. Officer Hyde handcuffed Sanders and searched him for a firearm. Officer Pierson-Henderson secured the gun she saw fall from Sanders, and when she told Officer Hyde that Sanders had dropped his firearm as he got out of the vehicle, Sanders stated, “[Y]eah, I kicked that sh[*]t, what you saying.” Id. at 111; see also id. at 128.

[6] The State charged Sanders with criminal recklessness as a Level 6 felony ¹ and carrying a handgun without a license as a Level 5 felony ² . The criminal recklessness charge was dismissed before trial. Sanders was convicted of carrying a handgun without a license as a Level 5 felony, and the trial court sentenced him to four years of incarceration plus one year of community corrections. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Sanders's Conviction for Carrying a Handgun Without a License

[7] Sanders argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for carrying a handgun without a license as a Level 5 felony. Our Supreme Court has explained our standard of review for such a claim as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025).

[8] In order to convict Sanders of carrying a handgun without a license as a Level 5 felony under Indiana Code section 35-47-2-1(e)(2)(B), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanders (1) carried a handgun (2) in a vehicle or on or about his body (3) without being licensed to carry that handgun and (4) he had been convicted of a felony within 15 years before the date of the present offense. Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(a), (e)(2)(B) (effective July 1, 2017, to June 30, 2022). Sanders argues only that the State failed to prove he possessed a handgun.

[9] There are two types of possession: (1) actual and (2) constructive. Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 732–33 (Ind. 2015). The parties agree that constructive possession is not at issue in this case, so we analyze only whether Sanders actually possessed a handgun. “A person actually possesses contraband if he has direct physical control over it.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011) (citing Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835 (Ind. 1999)). Importantly, a conviction for a possessory offense “does not depend on the accused being caught red-handed in the act by the police.” McCoy v. State, 153 N.E.3d 363, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Smith v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1266, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). That is, the evidence does not need to “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient so long as an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 147).

[10] The evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom show that Sanders had a handgun in his waistband as he left the scene of the shots fired call and that he dropped that handgun when he got out of the vehicle. This evidence is sufficient to show that Sanders had actual possession of a handgun. Sanders's arguments to the contrary are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). For example, Sanders contends “there was an absence of reliable evidence that supports his actual possession of the firearm,” Appellant's Br. at 12, in part because the handgun Officer Pierson-Henderson recovered was not tested for DNA or fingerprints and because Officer Pierson-Henderson testified that “she saw what appeared to be the butt of a handgun,” id. (emphasis in original) (citing Tr. Vol. III at 124–25). Again, a conviction for a possessory offense “does not depend on the accused being caught red-handed in the act by the police.” McCoy, 153 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Smith, 113 N.E.3d at 1269). Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Sanders's conviction for carrying a handgun without a license as a Level 5 felony.³ We therefore affirm that conviction.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(a), (b)(1)(A).

2.   I.C. § 35-47-2-1(a), (e)(2)(B) (effective July 1, 2017, to June 30, 2022).

3.   To the extent Sanders alleges there were “evidentiary issues in this case,” Appellant's Br. at 12, he does not raise any specific evidentiary claims for our review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(4), (A)(8)(a), (A)(8)(d). For example, Sanders takes umbrage with the State's allegedly “haphazard evidence presentation,” Appellant's Br. at 14—namely, the alleged lack of clarity in the record regarding what portions of the admitted body camera footage were published to the jury—but he does not identify this as a separate issue, see App. R. 46(A)(4); he does not present cogent reasoning in support of this claim, see id. 46(A)(8)(a); and he concedes that he “did not object to the admission” of the body camera footage and did not “object to the way the exhibits were presented,” Appellant's Br. at 14; see Bradley v. State, 248 N.E.3d 563, 573 (Ind. 2024) (citing Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018)) (“For a party to preserve a claim for review, we generally require that party to object to the trial court's ruling and to state the reasons for that objection.”); Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Ind. 2017) (citing Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678–79 (Ind. 2013)) (“[W]e will not review claims, even for fundamental error, when appellants expressly declare at trial that they have no objection.”). We therefore decline to address this evidentiary claim and any others that Sanders failed to adequately raise in this appeal. See Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ”).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.