IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Z.M.D.C. (Minor Child) and B.C. (Mother) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Z.M.D.C. (“Child”) was born in October 2021 and is the biological child of B.C. (“Mother”).¹ The day after Child was born, an allegation was made that Child was a victim of neglect due to Mother's drug abuse. Mother admitted to the allegations, and Child was adjudicated as a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). For the following two and a half years, Mother continually failed to address her substance abuse issues, and ultimately had her parental rights terminated. Mother now appeals that termination and presents multiple issues for our review, which we restate as the following single issue ² : Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On October 11, 2021, Child was born to Mother in Jennings County, Indiana. The following day, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) investigated a report that Child had been exposed to methamphetamine and alcohol in utero. On October 13, DCS removed Child from Mother's care after she tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC; Mother also admitted to using alcohol and methamphetamine while pregnant with Child. On October 14, Child was placed with Hannah and Thomas Poore (“Foster Parents”) where Child remained throughout the pendency of these proceedings. That same day, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS, and, on October 27, Mother and DCS signed an agreed stipulation where Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS based on her substance abuse. The disposition order required Mother to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations therein, submit to random drug screens, refrain from using illegal substances, and notify the family case manager (“FCM”) of any arrests within five days. The following month, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Child.

[4] Within the first month of Child's life, Child was diagnosed with Cerebral Palsy. Throughout the first three years of Child's life, Foster Mother took Child to more than 300 doctors’ appointments to ensure Child had the proper care and development.

[5] In the first year of Child's life, Mother was inconsistent with her visits and, at one point, went several months without seeing Child. During this time, Mother repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine and THC. In October 2022, Mother moved from Jennings County to live with her second cousin, Mary Howard, three hours away in Kentucky. Also in October 2022, Mother was placed on probation for criminal convictions in both Decatur and Jennings Counties in Indiana for operating while intoxicated (Mother's “blood alcohol level was .144”) and disorderly conduct (Mother “got drunk and broke the front door and window of her Father's home”) respectively. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 15. In February 2023, DCS filed a motion for Child to be placed in Kentucky with Howard, but the trial court denied the motion and ordered Child to stay with Foster Parents.

[6] Mother appears to have successfully stopped using methamphetamine in late 2022, but she continued to test positive for THC all through 2023 and through mid-2024. While Mother was under substance abuse monitoring in both the CHINS cause and her two probation causes, she revealed more information about her struggles with substance abuse with her probation officers than she revealed to DCS. Mother chose to reveal less information to DCS because she “did not trust DCS.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 20.

[7] On April 18, 2024, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights over Child. The following month, the parties met in the CHINS cause and reached an agreed order stating in part that Mother “will maintain 100% sobriety moving forward from all mind-altering substances (including most notably: THC, methamphetamine, and alcohol).” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 19. Mother failed to abide by this agreement. On July 7, Mother was arrested for and later pled guilty to public intoxication and assault. That same month, Mother discovered she was pregnant but nevertheless continued to consume alcohol.

[8] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition on July 11 and October 11. Between the two hearing dates, Mother completed a 29-day substance abuse program, and, at the later hearing, Mother claimed she had been sober for 35 days. Also at the October 11 hearing, the GAL and the FCM both recommended termination of Mother's parental rights. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights over Child. Mother now appeals. Additional facts will follow.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights to Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[9] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[10] To terminate Mother's parental rights under Indiana Code section 31-25-2-4(d)(2), DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, among other things, that (a) Mother has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in Child being placed outside her home,³ and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3), (d)(2); id. at § 31-37-14-2.

[11] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which are not challenged on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought. Mother challenges the trial court's conclusions that (a) she has failed to remedy the circumstances that led to Child's removal and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's bests interests. We address each claim in turn.

a. Failure to Remedy Circumstances

[12] Mother challenges the court's conclusion that she has failed to remedy the circumstances that led to Child's removal. Child was removed and deemed a CHINS due to Mother's substance abuse issues at the time of Child's birth. Mother claims that the evidence fails to support some of trial court's findings concerning her inability to stay sober, the need for a sober caregiver for Child, and the effect that her substance abuse has on her ability to be a parent. Instead of pointing to a lack of evidence to support these findings, Mother asks us to focus on evidence that purportedly shows she has made some progress in her substance abuse issues and has properly investigated Child's medical needs. For example, Mother challenges the following findings:

84. Mother found out she was pregnant on or about July 27, 2024. Mother admitted to drinking alcohol on two additional occasions after learning of her pregnancy.

85. Mother has continued to drink alcohol after learning she was pregnant, which causes significant concern for her judgment as a parent.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 21. On appeal, Mother does not refute that she knowingly consumed alcohol while pregnant; rather, she claims that her subsequent enrollment in a sobriety program showed her judgment is not compromised. However, these arguments are merely requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45.

[13] Likewise, Mother does not challenge the following findings related to her substance abuse and care for Child:

13. It is clear that, from the very beginning of the case, Mother has struggled significantly with three particular substances: methamphetamine, alcohol, and THC.

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17. In pertinent part, the Dispositional Order ordered Mother to complete a substance assessment and follow all recommendations; submit to random drug screens; not use any illegal substances; notify FCM of any arrests within five (5) days; and sign releases.

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21. Child's specific medical issues include, most prominently, a diagnosis of Cerebral Palsy. Child has also experienced dystonia, feeding difficulties, developmental delays, an abnormal hemangioma on her foot with a toe growing abnormally, and chronic ear infections.

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27. Dr. Glos testified that Child, like any child, needs a caregiver that is sober and clearheaded. Dr. Glos would have significant concerns if Child's caregiver was drunk or high. This court agrees.

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57. It is important to note that in the months between Mother testing positive for THC and admitting habitual use to her probation officer and the filing of the revocation (approximately a five-month period), Mother was not remotely honest or candid with DCS about her THC use. Mother did test positive for THC on several DCS drug screens but stated that it must have been from a CBD oil product she had used, and she had since gotten rid of that product. Mother was not forthcoming with the team or with the Court about her habitual THC cartridge use or about absconding from probation. Since Mother was similarly dishonest about her habitual alcohol use, DCS was not screening her for alcohol much of this time and her precise level of alcohol use during this time period is not known.

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62. In February of 2024, Mother completed an intake to begin seeing David Kingsbury for individual counseling. In her intake, Mother admitted to drinking every single day, typically 3-4 drinks per day. Mother had not been remotely transparent with DCS or this Court about her significant level of alcohol use, and DCS only found out after receiving the paperwork from Mother's therapist.

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66. Probation Officer Richmond had a Zoom meeting with Mother on February 26, 2024. At this meeting, Mother stated she had quit drinking on February 8, 2024 and then went through detox. However, after quitting drinking, Mother had “drank some shots” on at least five separate occasions between February 8th and February 26th (a two-and-a-half-week period). This level of alcohol consumption is quite concerning to the Court, especially because, again, Mother was not honest or candid with DCS or the Court that she was using substances to this level.

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71. On May 29, 2024, parties to the CHINS case met for a court-ordered facilitation to discuss several issues in the case. Parties talked over the issues and reached an agreement that became a court order (DCS Exhibit 8). One section of this order read: “The parties agree and acknowledge that [Mother] will maintain 100% sobriety moving forward from all mind-altering substances (including most notably: THC, methamphetamine, and alcohol).”

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75. On July 7, 2024, Mother was arrested in Adair County, Kentucky for Alcohol Intoxication in a Public Place, Assault (4th Degree Dating Violence), and Resisting Arrest (DCS Exhibit 7). When she was arrested, Mother advised the police officer that “she had consumed a large amount of alcohol and had been running along the roadway screaming because she was upset with her boyfriend” and that she had struck and scratched said boyfriend when she became angry during an argument. Mother pled guilty to the Public Intoxication and Assault charges․

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80. Mother has demonstrated a clear pattern in this case not only of continuing to abuse substances, but also continuing to hide this information from DCS and the rest of Mother's Child and Family team. Even at this final TPR hearing, Mother denies that she has been dishonest. She did, however, state that she did not trust DCS, so she did not share information about how much she was drinking.

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90. Shortly before this Fact Finding Hearing, Mother completed a 29-day substance abuse treatment program at Women Finding Freedom. While this is encouraging for Mother's future sobriety, in the 1,090 days this case has been open, Mother has only been sober this time for the most recent 35 days, and 29 of those days were in a highly controlled facility. The program ended about a week before this Fact Finding. DCS has yet to receive records from the facilities detailing Mother's compliance.

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92. Mother was recommended by Women Finding Freedom to participate in IOP for aftercare and continued sobriety. Mother told FCM that she “didn't have time” for IOP. The fact that Mother has indicated she does not plan to follow the recommended aftercare from her treatment center causes significant concern that she will not be able to follow through with maintaining her newfound sobriety.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 13, 14, 17–18, 19, 20, 21–22.

[14] Even if Mother's challenged findings were not supported by the evidence, the unchallenged findings demonstrate that, while the Child was under DCS supervision, Mother consistently used mind altering substances until 35 days prior to the final fact-finding hearing. Additionally, Mother exhibited a continual inability to comply with her obligations under the CHINS dispositional order and keep the trial court informed of her substance abuse. Further, although Mother claims that she intends to work on her sobriety this time, she refused aftercare treatment from her most recent substance abuse treatment program. The trial court acted within its discretion to disregard the efforts Mother made shortly before the termination hearing and provide more weight to her history of substance abuse. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. We conclude that the findings support the trial court's conclusion that Mother failed to remedy her substance abuse issues.

[15] DCS also alleged Mother's parental rights should be terminated under subsection (d)(3) of the statute, alleging there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal or placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied by Mother. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). Essentially, (d)(3) removes the timing requirement relevant to subsection (d)(2) and takes a prospective look at the conditions that led to removal. The trial court concluded that DCS had proven these circumstances under subsection (d)(3), and Mother argues that this conclusion is clearly erroneous. For all the reasons previously discussed, we disagree with Mother's argument. Also, because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, and we have already concluded the trial court did not err in its decision under (d)(2), no additional analysis is necessary.⁴

b. Best Interests

[16] Mother also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that termination was in the best interests of Child. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “We have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re P.B, 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.)

[17] Here, both the FCM and the GAL testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Mother challenges some of the trial court's findings as they relate to the best interests determination; however, as discussed above, the unchallenged findings demonstrate that it is unlikely that Mother's substance abuse issues or lack of focus on parenting will be remedied. Additionally, Child has been in the care of Foster Parents since she was three days old, and Foster Parents have demonstrated an ability to properly care for Child's specific medical needs. Throughout the time Child has been with Foster Parents, Mother failed to engage with DCS in good faith and comply with the trial court's orders. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of Child.

Conclusion

[18] The evidence supports the trial court's findings and those findings support the trial court's judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights over Child, and we affirm the trial court's decision.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The alleged father died during the pendency of these proceedings and had limited involvement in Child's life.

2.   Mother also presents an argument alleging that the trial court should have “explor[ed] guardianship prior to terminating Mother's [parental] rights.” Appellant's Br. at 5. Mother claims this argument is “interwoven” with her other arguments and does not provide a separate heading or section for this claim. Id. This presentation of a claim violates Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(c) (“Each argument shall have an argument heading.”). This argument also lacks the cogent reasoning required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Because Mother has not adequately presented this claim, she has waived it. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

3.   The final element under (d)(2) is a timing element. DCS must show a child has been outside the parent's home for 15 of the most recent 22 months.

4.   Mother also argues that DCS failed to prove other circumstances listed under subsection (d). However, DCS did not allege these circumstances in its petition to terminate parental rights nor did the trial court make conclusions related to these other these circumstances.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.