Matthew T. Manning, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] When police went to Matthew Manning's home to investigate a tip that he possessed child pornography, officers obtained Manning's consent to search his laptop. But Manning then attempted to close the door on officers, prompting a small scuffle that ended with Manning being placed in handcuffs. After he was advised of his rights and uncuffed, Manning signed a written consent to search form, led officers to his laptop, and provided its password. The laptop search revealed ten images of child pornography in a folder bearing Manning's name. Additional images were later found on an iPhone also labeled as his.

[2] Manning was subsequently convicted of ten counts of Level 6 felony possession of child pornography, which he appeals. Manning contends his consent to the search was involuntary, rendering the seized evidence inadmissible, because he was handcuffed prior to his signing of the consent form. He also claims the State presented insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the images because his fiancé also had access to the laptop. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[3] In 2021, Manning and his then-fiancé lived together in a duplex with their son. While Manning was at work one day, the fiancé searched Manning's laptop because she suspected him of infidelity. She found an image of child pornography on the laptop, a device she also used occasionally for schoolwork. Shocked by her discovery, the fiancé photographed the screen with her phone to document her finding. Not long thereafter, she moved out of the residence, leaving Manning a note indicating that she “saw stuff [she] cannot unsee.” Exhs. Vol. I, p. 76.

[4] The fiancé told her co-worker about the child pornography, and that co-worker reported the information to police, requesting anonymity. Two law enforcement officers then visited Manning's residence and informed him that they were investigating a report of child pornography on his laptop. The officers asked for Manning's consent to search the device, and Manning agreed. He then turned to retrieve his laptop from inside and attempted to close the door. One of the officers stuck his foot in the door threshold and said, “I can't let you go in there by yourself.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 114. Manning then attempted to “shove” the officer out of the doorway, and a brief struggle ensued. Id.

[5] The struggle ended with Manning being temporarily handcuffed. The officer then explained to Manning why he could not go inside by himself, citing concerns about the destruction of evidence and the risk of Manning harming himself or others. The two then began to “talk a little more comfortably.” Id. at 115.¹ The officer advised Manning that “he could give [the officers] consent to search the residence or [they] could apply for a search warrant, it was his decision.” Id. Manning verbally consented to the search.

[6] The officer further explained Manning's rights, including the right to refuse the search, the right to an attorney, and his Miranda rights. Officers then removed the handcuffs, and Manning signed a written authorization to search the residence. This form again listed Manning's rights to refuse consent and consult a lawyer.

[7] Manning then led officers to his laptop and typed in its password. The officers quickly discovered an image of child pornography and stopped to obtain a search warrant for a more comprehensive examination of the laptop and other electronic devices in the home. Forensic analysis later revealed ten photographs of prepubescent females “naked, posing in provocative positions” in a user folder labeled “Matthew.” Id. at 138-39. Twenty additional similar images were found on an iPhone named “Matthew's iPhone.” Id. at 151.

[8] Manning was charged with ten counts of Level 6 felony possession of child pornography. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing the consent he gave was invalid due to the officer's allegedly coercive actions like handcuffing him. The trial court denied Manning's motion and, after a bench trial, found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 21/212 years on each count, to be served concurrently, with the sentence suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Manning appeals his convictions on two grounds. First, he claims the trial court erred by admitting evidence from the search of his residence because he did not voluntarily consent to the search. Second, he claims insufficient evidence supports his convictions because the State failed to prove he knowingly possessed the illicit images. Unpersuaded by either argument, we affirm.

I. Voluntariness of Consent to Search

[10] We typically review a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). However, we apply a different standard “when a trial court has admitted evidence alleged to have been discovered as the result of an illegal search or seizure.” Cox v. State, 160 N.E.3d 557, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)). In that situation, we generally “assume the trial court accepted the evidence presented by the State and will not reweigh that evidence, but we owe no deference as to whether that evidence established the constitutionality of a search or seizure.” Id.

[11] Here, Manning argues that his consent to the search was involuntary, rendering the warrantless search unconstitutional. “Under both [the Indiana and Federal] Constitutions, it is axiomatic that a search requires a warrant unless certain narrow exceptions apply.” State v. Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d 21, 25 (Ind. 2015). One such exception is valid consent. Id. “Consent to a search is valid when given voluntarily and knowingly, which ‘is a question of fact determined from the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Isley v. State, 202 N.E.3d 1124, 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229, 1237 (Ind. 2011)).

[12] When determining the voluntariness of consent, this Court considers the following non-exclusive factors:

• whether the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights prior to the request to search;

• the defendant's degree of education and intelligence;

• whether the defendant was advised of his right not to consent;

• whether the detainee has previous encounters with law enforcement;

• whether the officer made any express or implied claims of authority to search without consent;

• whether the officer was engaged in any illegal action prior to the request;

• whether the defendant was cooperative previously; and

• whether the officer was deceptive as to his true identity or the purpose of the search.

See Navarro v. State, 855 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The vast majority of these factors support a determination that Manning voluntarily consented to the search.

[13] From the outset, the officers were transparent—not deceptive—about the purpose of their visit. They clearly identified themselves as officers investigating a report of child pornography. Manning readily agreed to let them search his laptop. After the brief scuffle at the door, resulting in Manning being handcuffed, one officer explained to Manning why he could not go inside alone—for safety and evidentiary reasons. The two then had a calm conversation.

[14] The officer made no claims of authority to proceed with the search without Manning's consent; instead, he clearly presented Manning a choice: “he could give [the officers] consent to search the residence or [they] could apply for a search warrant, it was his decision.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 115; see generally McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 512 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that “consent is invalid if police assert that they will get a warrant regardless of consent” but “merely stating that they will seek a warrant may be permissible”).

[15] The officer then advised Manning multiple times of two key rights noted by the court in Navarro: his right to refuse consent and his Miranda rights. The consent form reiterated that Manning had the “right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search” and the “right to talk to a lawyer before giving consent to such search.” Exhs. Vol. I, p. 77. The record reflects that Manning—who completed high school, served in the military, attended some college, and maintained regular employment—had the intellectual capacity to comprehend these rights and make an informed decision. Manning consented to the search.

[16] Manning's subsequent actions further demonstrate the voluntariness of his consent. After signing the consent form, he actively cooperated by leading officers to the laptop and providing his password. This affirmative assistance goes beyond mere acquiescence to authority. See Navarro, 855 N.E.2d at 679 (noting defendant's cooperation in opening car trunk for officers as evidence of voluntary consent).

[17] Manning focuses his challenge on the fact that he was handcuffed following the brief altercation when he attempted to close the door on the officers. But this temporary restraint does not invalidate the voluntariness of his subsequent consent. See Garcia-Torres, 949 N.E.2d at 1237 (“Voluntariness is not vitiated merely because the defendant is in custody.”); Gutenstein v. State, 59 N.E.3d 984, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (finding consent to blood draw voluntary where defendant verbally consented while handcuffed in back of police car). Moreover, an officer testified that the handcuffs were applied to Manning for safety reasons after he shoved an officer—not as a punishment “due to his failure to consent,” as Manning alleges. Appellant's Reply Br., p. 11. Critically, Manning was uncuffed before he signed the consent form, reducing any coercive atmosphere.

[18] Finally, Manning “does not allege that officers were engaged in illegal activity” prior to the consent. Id. at 12. He does, however, claim that this appears to have been the first time Manning was in police custody, which weighs against voluntariness. But this is greatly outweighed by the presence of numerous other Navarro factors that demonstrate voluntariness: the verbal and written advisements of Manning's Miranda rights, right not to consent, and option to wait for officers to apply for a warrant; the removal of his handcuffs; Manning's active cooperation and intelligence; and the forthright conduct of the officers.

[19] Given the foregoing evidence and our deferential standard of review on factual determinations, see Cox, 160 N.E.3d at 560, we find that the totality of the circumstances show Manning voluntarily provided his consent. Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence discovered as a result of the search.²

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[20] Manning next claims that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. When reviewing sufficiency claims, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without reweighing evidence or judging witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). “A conviction may be supported by circumstantial evidence alone, and that evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Albrecht v. State, 185 N.E.3d 412, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[21] To convict Manning of possession of child pornography, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally possessed or accessed images depicting sexual conduct by a child under 18 years of age with the intent to view the images. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4(d). Manning contends that the State failed to prove he knowingly possessed the images. We disagree.

[22] Possession may be either actual or constructive. Albrecht, 185 N.E.3d at 422. Actual possession occurs when a defendant has “direct physical control over an item,” while constructive possession requires both the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over an item. Id. (citation omitted).

[23] “A trier of fact may infer that a defendant had the capability to maintain dominion and control over contraband from the simple fact that the defendant had a possessory interest in the premises on which an officer found the item.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). Where that possessory interest is non-exclusive, as it is here with Manning's shared residence, the defendant's intent to maintain dominion and control over contraband can also be inferred if supported by additional circumstances indicating the defendant knew of the contraband. Id. at 174-75. Manning contends that no such circumstances were demonstrated here. But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment without reweighing it, we disagree. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

[24] Manning's now ex-fiancé testified that the laptop belonged to Manning and that she used the device only “occasionally” for schoolwork by accessing the “guest profile.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 77. Manning also demonstrated his control over the laptop by providing officers with the password to his specific user account. Additionally, the images of child pornography were discovered in a user folder specifically bearing Manning's first name, creating a direct connection between Manning and the images. See Albrecht, 185 N.E.3d at 423 (noting that files containing child pornography were found on hard drive linked to a computer user account bearing defendant's first name, which supported the finding of constructive possession).

[25] Still, Manning claims this evidence is not enough because his ex-fiancé had access to the computer and “[n]o witness was able to determine when any of the images had been downloaded or viewed.” Appellant's Br., p. 14. However, Manning's ex-fiancé testified that she never downloaded child pornography on the device, and she observed that the timestamp on the child pornography file that she discovered indicated it was created while she was at work. The trial court was entitled to credit this testimony. Manning's argument ignores the substantial evidence connecting Manning personally to the images and essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

[26] Given the user folder bearing Manning's name, Manning's provision of the laptop password, and his ex-fiancé’s testimony, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Manning knowingly possessed the images.

Conclusion

[27] The totality of the circumstances surrounding Manning's provision of his consent to search—including multiple advisements of his rights and his cooperation with officers—demonstrates that his consent was voluntary. Also, sufficient evidence supported Manning's convictions for possession of child pornography. Accordingly, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Around this time, an additional officer arrived on the scene with a body-worn camera, which was activated shortly thereafter. Footage from this camera was admitted during a pre-trial hearing but not at Manning's trial. A CD that purported to contain this video exhibit was included in the appellate record, but when opened, the CD contained no files.The parties do not rely on this video footage in their arguments, as Manning references the existence of a body-worn camera only once in passing. At Manning's trial, multiple officers testified about the encounter and Manning does not dispute the events that took place—especially not the events that occurred after the activation of the camera. Instead, he challenges only the legal consequences of these events on the voluntariness of his consent. For these reasons, we find that the absence of this footage does not hinder our review.

2.   Because we find Manning voluntarily consented to the search, we reject his related argument that the warrant issued after the officers’ discovery of the first illicit image was invalid due to the alleged lack of probable cause or proper consent.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.