IN RE: D.M.A. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.J. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's determination that D.M.A., M.B., and E.J. (“Children”) were children in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the mother of D.M.A., born in December 2015, M.B., born in November 2017, and E.J., born in January 2024.¹ On November 21, 2018, the Jasper Circuit Court entered an order finding that D.M.A. was a CHINS under cause number 37C01-1810-JC-236 (“Cause No. 236”). Specifically, the court found that D.M.A. was discovered outside without shoes at 11:46 p.m. on October 16, 2018, when the temperature was approximately thirty-one degrees and officers were unable to obtain a response from the residence, entered the residence, and found Mother asleep on the couch. It also found that officers discovered that Mother was intoxicated and that there was a history of verbal altercations between Mother and her boyfriend, C.B. Based upon the foregoing, the court further determined M.B. to be a CHINS under cause number 37C01-1810-JC-235 (“Cause No. 235”). In 2018 and 2019, the court entered orders terminating wardships of the children in Cause Nos. 236 and 235.

[3] On January 4, 2024, the Newton Circuit Court entered an order under cause number 56C01-2309-JC-1018 (“Cause No. 1018”) finding M.B. to be a CHINS and that Mother admitted that: the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) was called to the home for alleged domestic violence, on September 6, 2023; there were pending charges as a result of the incident; and that M.B. was a CHINS. The court entered a similar order with respect to D.M.A. under cause number 56C01-2309-JC-1016 (“Cause No. 1016”). On May 10, 2024, the court entered orders terminating the wardships of M.B. in Cause No. 1018 and D.M.A. in Cause No. 1016.

[4] On August 13, 2024, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS. DCS asserted that it received a report on August 10, 2024, alleging that Mother was seen grabbing M.B.’s arm and leaving marks while Mother and M.B. shopped and, upon investigation, DCS observed a mark on M.B.’s arm consistent with the report as well as a significant bruise to the left side of M.B.’s face. It alleged that Mother admitted to grabbing M.B.’s arm because M.B. ran through the store, hitting M.B. on the back of the head, being unable to control M.B., using excessive force “to get [M.B.] to behave,” and using aggressive discipline on her Children because they misbehave and do not listen. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 55. It alleged that M.B. reported Mother hits her, the bruise on her face was caused by Mother hitting her, and she was afraid of Mother. DCS also alleged that the conditions of the home were inadequate, Mother admitted to running out of baby formula for E.J., Mother could not buy any because she had no money and refuses “to get WIC,” and Mother had a significant history with DCS. Id. at 56.

[5] On October 24, 2024, the court held a factfinding hearing. DCS presented the testimony of Family Case Manager Brittney Renee Nelson (“FCM Nelson”), Family Case Manager Karen Smith (“FCM Smith”), and Family Case Manager Vanessa Arroyo (“FCM Arroyo”). After DCS rested, Mother testified in part that she attempted to spank M.B. on her butt, M.B. ducked, she thought she hit M.B. in the back of the head, and she had no idea that she struck her on the side of the face.

[6] After the presentation of the evidence, the court stated:

So listening to this case, you know, you pick up on all kinds of different things and different things start to develop. And then there's sometimes phrases that jump out that kind of summarize. And one of the things I picked up on the closing here is you stated she's doing the best that she could. And on that day, the question is, was that good enough?

And we can take snapshots both ways in this case. I can take some snapshots the DCS gave me and say, wow, this is bad. I can take snapshots that Mom gave me, but that's pretty good. But we don't just get to live on those snapshots. We've got to look at the whole picture. And the whole totality of [the] situation leads me to a finding that DCS has proven their case today and that these children are children in need of services.

Transcript Volume II at 98.

[7] On November 8, 2024, the court entered orders finding that the Children were CHINS. With respect to the order relating to E.J., the court found:

a. On or about August 10, 2024, DCS received a report on the family alleging [E.J.’s] sibling, [M.B.], was a victim of physical abuse. The report states that Mother was seen grabbing [M.B.’s] left arm and leaving marks while Mother and [M.B.] shopped at Dollar General.

b. Upon investigation, DCS observed a mark on [M.B.’s] arm consistent with the report. DCS also observed a significant bruise to the left side of [M.B.’s] face.

c. Mother grabbed [M.B.’s] arm because [M.B.] ran through the store. Mother also hit [M.B.] in the face, which caused a significant bruise to the left side of her face. Mother stated she is unable to control [M.B.] and admitted to using excessive force to get [M.B.] to behave. Mother admitted she uses aggressive discipline on her children because they misbehave and do not listen.

d. [M.B.] reported that Mother hits her and that [she] is scared of Mother. [M.B.] reported the bruise on her face was caused by Mother hitting her.

e. The conditions of the home were inadequate. The kitchen was very cluttered. Dirty dishes were piled in the kitchen sink and counter tops and dirty laundry was piled throughout the home. The family dog was being kept in the bathroom and was urinating on the floor and the children were forced to walk through it when using the restroom.

f. Mother admitted she ran out of baby formula for [E.J.] and could not buy any because she had no money. Mother receives food stamps but refuses to get WIC.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 79-80.

[8] On November 21, 2024, the court held a dispositional hearing. On November 25, 2024, the court entered dispositional orders requiring Mother to maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing, obey the law, complete a parenting assessment and all recommendations, refrain from committing any acts of domestic violence, and participate in home-based casework services.

Discussion

[9] Mother references Finding (e) in the trial court's order and asserts that “[i]t is hard to say that the plain language of said finding even establishes that the home was inadequate.” Appellant's Brief at 14. She contends that Finding (e) was devoid of any evidence of insect or rodent infestation or foul odors. She argues that locking the dog in the bathroom “was an abnormal maneuver that [she] implemented to prevent the puppy from escaping the home while strangers were coming in and out.” Id. at 16. With respect to Finding (f), Mother contends that the evidence revealed that she contacted her father at some point for assistance to purchase formula, and she received assistance from him “to buy two weeks’ worth of formula, which would more than bridge the gap until [she] received her food stamps.” Id. at 18. She argues that the Children were never without food.

[10] Mother also argues that the corporal punishment administered to M.B. was consistent with a parent's right to engage in reasonable or moderate force to control behavior. She asserts that the finding that she “hit [M.B.] in the face, which caused a significant bruise to the left side of her face,” mischaracterizes what occurred. Id. at 21. She also argues that she never stated that she was unable to control M.B. or uses excessive force. She argues that grabbing a child's arm to corral an unruly child at a store is “hardly an act that seriously endangers the physical or mental health of a child.” Id. at 22.

[11] In reviewing a trial court's determination that a child is in need of services, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence which supports the court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286-1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. We apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. Id. at 1287. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.

[12] Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-2 provides in part that a child is a CHINS if the child's physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child's parent and the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.² The statute does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when the child is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010). “The resolution of a juvenile proceeding focuses on the best interests of the child, rather than guilt or innocence as in a criminal proceeding.” Id. Ind. Code § 31-34-1-15 provides: “This chapter does not do any of the following: (1) Limit the right of a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child to use reasonable corporal punishment when disciplining the child ․”

[13] To the extent Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[14] As for Mother's argument that the corporal punishment she administered to M.B. was consistent with her right to engage in reasonable or moderate force to control behavior, she cites Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008). In that case, which arose in the criminal context, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his or her child as he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education. 888 N.E.2d at 182. The Court identified factors that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of punishment including: “the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child”; “the nature of his offense and his apparent motive”; “whether the force or confinement is reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command”; and “whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.” Id. (quoting Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts, § 150 (1965)). It observed that “[a] punishment which would not be too severe for a boy of twelve may be obviously excessive if imposed upon a child of four or five.” Id. at 183 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. c). The Court concluded that the parent's five to seven swats on an eleven-year-old's buttocks with a belt or an extension card “for what many parents might reasonably consider a serious offense” of taking other's property and lying about it was not unreasonable. Id.

[15] The record reveals that FCM Nelson testified that she responded to Mother's home on August 10, 2024, and observed that M.B. had “red marks on her hand that appeared to look similar to a hand.” Transcript Volume II at 19. She indicated that M.B. expressed fear of Mother. When asked if Mother admitted to striking M.B. in any other way other than grabbing her arm at the store, FCM Nelson answered, “She said that [M.B.] tried to run away from her again. And she was holding [E.J.] and she couldn't reach her butt, so she had hit her in the back of the head when they got home.” Id. at 23. DCS's counsel asked her what Mother said about her ability to deal with the Children, and FCM Nelson said:

She expressed concern of the [Children's] behavior. She had stated that she had to use more aggressive force because the [Children] weren't gentle children. They were having a lot of behaviors, and she needed a hundred percent of her focus on the baby, [E.J.], due to him just starting to crawl and become more mobile.

Id. at 22-23. On cross-examination, FCM Nelson testified that the marks were still present on M.B. on August 11, 2024.

[16] FCM Smith testified that she observed M.B. on August 11, 2024, and that M.B. had a red mark on her arm and “petechiae and bruising along the left side of her face from above her eyebrow all the way to her cheek and then down past her left ear.” Id. at 43. She also testified that M.B., who was six years old in August 2024, told her that “when [Mother] took her back home, she hit her in the back of the head, and then she took her into the bedroom and slapped her in the face.” Id. On cross-examination, when asked if M.B. gave any reason as to why Mother was upset with her, FCM Smith answered, “Because she was trying to get away.” Id. at 48. Mother's counsel asked “[w]here was she trying to get away,” and FCM Smith answered, “That was at the house. She was trying to run away again at the house.” Id. DCS introduced and the court admitted photographs of M.B.’s injuries.

[17] With respect to the condition of the house, FCM Nelson testified that “[t]he conditions were concerning,” there were “piles of laundry throughout the house,” Mother had stated that her washing machine was broken, and “[t]here were unclear walkways.” Id. at 23. FCM Nelson stated that she “had to kind of scooch [her] way through the kitchen so that [she] could turn on the sink to check for water.” Id. She also stated that there were dishes “piled up in the sink and on the counters” and a puppy was in the bathroom with the door closed and urinating on the floor “[s]o the children, to use the bathroom, would have had to walk through the urine on the floor to reach the toilet.” Id. On cross-examination, FCM Nelson indicated that one of the Children went in the bathroom while the dog was locked inside. When asked why the condition of the home concerned her, FCM Nelson answered:

It was difficult to walk throughout the house due to the items scattered. If there was an emergency, it could be difficult to get all the kids out, especially if there was a fire. And the big concern that I had with the bathroom was that the dog was using the restroom in the bathroom and the kids had to walk through that to use the restroom.

Id. at 25. She also indicated that Mother had said that her brother was residing in the home while she was away, he had “dirtied the house,” he did not leave “one clean dish there and it was a mess,” and that she “had been home for two weeks and she was cleaning it up.” Id. DCS also introduced and the court admitted photographs of the residence.

[18] FCM Nelson stated that Mother was “low on food” and that Mother had stated that “she had ran out of formula for a period of two to three hours, and she was out of food stamps, so she contacted someone to send her money, and she did receive that money and get formula.” Id. at 23. FCM Nelson stated that there was a limited amount of food in the house which concerned her because Mother stated that she was “out of food stamps.” Id. at 25. She indicated that Mother had said that “she had ran out of formula and was asking money from a friend” and also said that “she didn't have WIC either, but that she did receive food stamps in the amount of a thousand dollars and that that was sufficient.” Id. at 25-26. When asked if she was concerned that Mother had sufficient food stamps to actually feed the family, FCM Nelson answered:

I was concerned. I suggested, while we were trying to safety plan, that we utilize Community Partners and get her set up with WIC so that she could ․ utilize the WIC for the formula, allowing more money for the family and the food stamps to purchase food instead of using the food for the formula as well.

Id. at 26. She also indicated that Mother was unwilling to enroll in the WIC program.

[19] FCM Arroyo, the ongoing case manager, testified that services were being offered to Mother. When asked if Mother had been fully compliant with services, she indicated that “[t]here are struggles,” Mother believes she does not need services, there were excessive text messages, especially in the beginning of the case, with profanity that seemed intimidating to service providers, and Mother would have inappropriate conversations with the Children and called “the Department demons and devils.” Id. at 56. She also testified that the profane text messages she received from Mother indicated that she had “trouble controlling her emotions with anger” and “it just seems a lot of instability with her mental health.” Id. at 58. When asked why she thought the Children were CHINS, she answered:

Mother ․ has not remedied the situation. She has no home. Her mental health is unstable for a lot of traumas that we know, and that's why we're here to offer her services to help. She has no income. Therefore, she cannot provide for her children. Especially with the physical abuse, we would like for her to get parent education.

Id. at 61. Considering the totality of the evidence, we conclude the trial court's judgment is not clearly erroneous.

[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   P.A. is the father of D.M.A., P.P. is the alleged father of E.J., and C.B. is the father of M.B. The fathers do not participate in this appeal.

2.   The trial court's orders relating to E.J. and D.M.A. adjudicated them CHINS as defined by Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. The trial court's order relating to M.B. adjudicated her a CHINS as defined by Ind. Code §§ 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2.

Brown, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.