LEATHERS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Shawntrell Leathers guilty of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement for fleeing from a police officer in a vehicle. He appeals, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 3:00 a.m. on August 21, 2023, the 911 dispatcher received a call that four men were “getting ready to fight” outside the Ponytails Lounge, a strip club in Evansville, Indiana, and that one of the men had a gun. Transcript Vol. 2 at 133. The caller advised that the man with the gun got into a black Cadillac Escalade. 911 informed the officer that the suspect was leaving in the Escalade.

[3] Officer Robert Morrow was dispatched to the area. On his way to Ponytails, Officer Morrow activated the lights on his cruiser.¹ State's Exhibit 4 at 00:30. When he got closer, Officer Morrow saw a black Escalade ahead of him—driven by Leathers—turn from the parking lot of the strip club onto Columbia Street. When Officer Morrow was about fifty to seventy-five yards behind Leathers, the officer activated his “siren [ ] to get [Leathers’] attention.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 142; see also State's Ex. 4 at 1:02. Leathers turned onto Highway 41 “normal[ly]” but accelerated “way faster” when Officer Morrow pulled onto the highway behind him. Tr. Vol. 2 at 138; see also State's Exh. 4 at 1:02-1:15. In total, Officer Morrow stayed behind Leathers with his lights engaged for upwards of thirty seconds before he abandoned his pursuit in line with department policy. See State's Ex. 4 at 0:55-1:30.

[4] Later, officers found Leathers by a black Escalade parked outside of his house. Leathers had facial injuries and told the arresting officers he had been “jumped” and beat up by some guys at the club. Tr. Vol. 2 at 227. Leathers claimed he did not “remember” or “see” an officer attempt to pull him over. Id. at 227. He said he was “just trying to get home and get some clothes[.]” Id. at 159.

[5] The State charged Leathers with Count I: Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, as a Level 4 felony;² Count II: Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Level 6 felony;³ and Count III: Driving While Suspended, as a Class A misdemeanor,⁴ which was ultimately dismissed. The jury found Leathers not guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon but guilty of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. The trial court sentenced Leathers to 786 days executed in the Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is well settled. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). Sufficiency claims “trigger a deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1090 (Jan. 7, 2019)). When conducting this review, “we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. We affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005).

[7] To convict Leathers of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Leathers used a vehicle to knowingly or intentionally flee from Officer Morrow after the officer had, by visible or audible means, including by siren or emergency lights, identified himself and ordered Leathers to stop. See I.C. §§ 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (c)(1)(A). A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if his “conscious objective” is to engage in that conduct, and “knowingly” if he is “aware of a high probability” that he is engaging in that conduct. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a)-(b). In the context of the resisting law enforcement statute, it is “ultimately for the jury to decide whether there's evidence of knowing or intentional fleeing[.]” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 563 (Ind. 2019). However, “flight” can mean a “knowing attempt to escape law enforcement when the defendant is aware that a law enforcement officer has ordered him to stop or remain in place once there.” Wellman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

[8] Leathers argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally fled from law enforcement. He claims there was “no evidence that [he] fled[,]” and the jury could not reasonably infer “(1) that Leathers actually saw Officer Morrow, and (2) that he knew that the lights and siren were meant for him.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 7; Appellant's Br. at 12.

[9] At the time Leathers pulled out of the Ponytails parking lot, he had just been involved in a fight. Thus, he should have been keenly aware that an approaching police car with active lights was responding to investigate those involved, including Leathers. Leathers claims he did not see the officer or was attempting to get out of his way, but we are not persuaded. Officer Morrow activated his siren directly behind Leathers and before Leathers turned onto the highway. If he did see the officer and wanted to pull over, he could have done so on the shoulder of the road. Instead, Leathers accelerated “way faster” when the officer turned onto the highway behind him with his lights and sirens activated. Tr. Vol. 2 at 138. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Leathers recognized and ignored Officer Morrow's orders to stop and knowingly continued to flee from the officer. In reaching this conclusion, the jury weighed the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Conclusion

[10] The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Leathers of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In their fact statements, both parties adopt Officer Morrow's testimony that he hit his lights “immediately” after seeing the Escalade. Tr. Vol. 2 at 137. However, on cross-examination, Officer Morrow clarified that he turned his lights on “as soon as [he] turned off Evans [Avenue]” because he was headed to a priority scene where someone had a gun. Id. at 141. The dash camera footage confirms this and shows that Officer Morrow activated his lights well before he could have seen the Escalade. See State's Ex. 4 at 00:30-1:00.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

3.   I.C. §§ 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (c)(1)(A).

4.   I.C. § 9-24-19-2.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.