RIDDICK v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Elvante Riddick appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery. He presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

1) Was Riddick entitled to discharge pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C)?

2) Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the conviction?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In the fall of 2022, Riddick and Crystal Callahan, his girlfriend, were living together with their three-year-old daughter in Riddick's rented, one-bedroom home in Muncie, Indiana. Around 7:00 a.m. on October 10, 2022, Riddick angrily awakened Callahan, who was sleeping on the couch, and accused her of cheating on him based on messages that he saw on her phone. Riddick called Callahan names and told her that she needed to get out of his house.

[4] When Callahan got up to use the bathroom, Riddick followed her into the bedroom where their child was asleep on the bed. Riddick “got in [Callahan's] face” and screamed at her. Transcript at 8. She stepped inside the bathroom and tried to close the door, but he stopped the door. When Callahan told him that she needed privacy, he got in her face again, told her to get out, and then pushed her, causing her to fall against a windowsill and then to the ground. This caused a “big bruise” to form on her back. Id. at 9. Callahan sat on the floor crying before calling 911. Their daughter awoke during the altercation.

[5] Muncie Police Officer Matthew Hollans responded to the scene and observed an injury to Callahan's back, which Callahan reported had occurred from Riddick pushing her. Riddick initially told Officer Hollans that the mark on Callahan's back was from a bite, but he subsequently admitted to Officer Hollans that he had shoved her.

[6] Riddick was arrested that morning for domestic battery and then released on bond the next day and placed on pretrial probation. Thereafter, on November 18, 2022, the State charged him with two counts: Level 6 Felony domestic battery and Level 6 Felony neglect of a dependent.

[7] The trial court scheduled a jury trial for July 12, 2023. At a pretrial conference on June 29, 2023, Riddick waived his right to a jury trial and “submitted a proposed order waiving a jury trial and asking that a bench trial date be established.” Appendix at 10. The trial court granted the request and scheduled the bench trial for October 24, 2023.

[8] On October 19, 2023, the State filed a motion to continue the bench trial due to the unavailability of an essential witness, noting that Officer Hollans was going to be out of the state that day. The State asked for the trial to be “continued to a future date” and noted that Riddick was objecting to a continuance. Id. at 51. On October 23, the trial court granted the State's motion and reset the bench trial for February 7, 2024. Riddick did not file an objection to the trial date chosen by the trial court.

[9] On January 24, 2024, Riddick moved to dismiss the charges against him, claiming that the State had failed to bring him to trial within one year. The State responded by arguing that the delay between July 12 and October 24, 2023, when the jury trial was reset to a bench trial, was attributable to Riddick. The trial court agreed with the State, and on January 25, 2024, denied the motion to dismiss.

[10] Riddick filed a motion to reconsider on February 2, 2024. Citing Havvard v. State, Riddick argued that the time between his waiver of the jury trial and the rescheduled bench trial was not attributable to him. 703 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that delay was not attributable to the defendant's last-minute waiver of jury trial because the trial court could have tried him on the scheduled date – though by bench rather than jury – and the record was silent as to the reason for the delay). In its response to the motion to reconsider, the State asserted that Riddick had requested a future date for the bench trial when waiving the jury trial and that Riddick's counsel represented at the pretrial hearing that an October bench trial would work best for his calendar.

[11] On February 6, 2024, the trial court issued an order denying Riddick's motion to reconsider. This time the court provided a different rationale for finding that Riddick was not entitled to discharge: Riddick failed to object in a timely manner when the court reset the trial for a date outside the bounds of Crim. R. 4(C). That is, had Riddick objected to the trial date, the trial court could have reset the trial within the proper time, but Riddick did not alert the court to this matter until more than two months after the deadline had passed.

[12] The bench trial was held on February 7, 2024. At the beginning, defense counsel made a record regarding the timing of the motion to dismiss. Defense counsel did not dispute that there was a delay in objecting to the new trial date, but he claimed that his inattention to the deadline was due to his belief, based on representations by the State, that the charges were going to be dismissed because of an uncooperative witness. Counsel explained, “the defense was waiting for a dismissal of the case which just sort of never came” and then the timing issue was discovered when he began preparing for trial. Transcript at 4; see also Appendix at 74 (“Defendant's Counsel advised the Court that he was shocked the matter was proceeding to Court and upon last minute trial preparation discovered the State missed the Criminal Rule 4 Deadline and filed his Motion to Dismiss immediately.”).¹ The trial court reaffirmed its ruling.

[13] Callahan, Officer Hollans, and another responding officer testified for the State. Photographs taken at the scene, as well as the body camera footage from both officers, were also admitted into evidence. Riddick then testified on his own behalf and claimed, directly contrary to Callahan's testimony, that she had thrown objects at him and attempted to open a drawer that contained his gun. Riddick claimed that he only pushed her to get her away from the drawer. She then went into the bathroom and, according to Riddick, “stumbled” when he pushed the door open. Id. at 40.

[14] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement, allowing the parties to submit written closing arguments. On May 20, 2024, the trial court issued its order finding Riddick guilty of domestic battery and not guilty of neglect of a dependent. Following a sentencing hearing on July 22, 2024, the trial court sentenced Riddick to twelve months in jail, all suspended to probation. Riddick now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

1. Motion for Discharge

[15] Riddick contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge under Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C). “We generally review a trial court's ruling on such a motion for an abuse of discretion.” Crabb v. State, 242 N.E.3d 539, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). But when the relevant facts are undisputed and the issue is a question of law, we evaluate a Crim. R. 4 motion for discharge de novo. Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 600 (Ind. 2020).

[16] Crim. R. 4(C)² “places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year from the later of two dates: (1) the filing of charges or (2) the arrest.” Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 615 (Ind. 2020). The one-year period may be extended by, among other things, delays caused by the defendant. See Crabb, 242 N.E.3d at 542 ((“Criminal defendants extend the one-year period ‘by seeking or acquiescing in delay resulting in a later trial date.’ ”) (quoting Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 601)). Further, it is well established that “a defendant generally waives rights under Rule 4(C) by failing to offer a timely objection to trial dates set outside the one-year limitation, unless the setting of that date occurs after the one-year period has expired.” Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 601; see also State v. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d 700, 704 (Ind. 2018) (“A defendant waives his right to be brought to trial within the period by failing to raise a timely objection if, during the period, the trial court schedules trial beyond the limit.”); Crabb, 242 N.E.3d at 542 (same).

[17] Riddick was arrested and then later charged on November 18, 2022. Thus, even assuming that no delays were attributable to Riddick, the State had until November 18, 2023 to bring him to trial. When the trial court granted the State's motion to continue the October 24, 2023 trial, it rescheduled the trial for February 7, 2024. This put the trial outside the deadline of November 18, 2023, but Riddick did not object to this date.

[18] On appeal, Riddick claims that his objection to the State's motion to continue was sufficient to preserve the issue. He did not make this argument below. Regardless, we are not persuaded. The State's motion to continue did not request a setting beyond the Crimin. R. 4 deadline. And when the trial court granted the motion over Riddick's noted objection, there were still several weeks in which to hold a bench trial before the deadline. Once the trial court set the trial for a date beyond the deadline, it was incumbent upon Riddick to raise a timely objection in order to permit the trial court to reset the trial for a date within the proper period. See State v. Myers, 101 N.E.3d 259, 261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); see also Hoskins v. State, 83 N.E.3d 124, 128 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“[Defendant's] objection was not ‘ripe’ until the trial court set a trial date beyond the one-year period, and when that occurred, he did object.”).³

[19] Riddick's admitted failure to determine the Crim. R. 4 deadline until after it passed resulted in him not objecting to the trial setting in time and thus acquiescing to the trial date. The trial court properly found that Riddick had waived his claim to discharge under Crim. R. 4(C). See Myers, 101 N.E.3d at 261-62 (holding that defendant waived claim to discharge by not timely objecting when, twenty days before expiration of the one-year period, the trial court scheduled trial for beyond that period).

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[20] Riddick also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Our standard of review in this regard is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016) (“We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.”). Further, a battery conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim. See Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).

[21] To convict Riddick of Level 6 felony domestic battery, as charged, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally touched Callahan, a family or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner and did so in the physical presence of a child less than sixteen years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3.

[22] Riddick does not dispute that he pushed Callahan during an argument in the presence of their three-year-old daughter. He contends only that his actions were “justified pursuant to self-defense of Person and Property.” Appellant's Brief at 19. More specifically, he argues that he used reasonable force to terminate Callahan's trespass in his home and to stop her destruction of his property and apparent attempt to reach for his gun.

[23] We reject Riddick's request for us to reweigh the evidence. His argument is based almost exclusively on his own testimony in which he described Callahan throwing his possessions and attempting to obtain a gun from his dresser. Callahan, however, testified: “I didn't throw anything at him that day, at all.” Transcript at 11. She also denied that she “went into his drawer where he holds his gun[.]” Id. Further, when questioned by responding officers at the scene, Riddick provided inconsistent statements about the cause of Callahan's injury and did not report that Callahan had thrown objects at him or tried to obtain his gun. It was the trial court's prerogative, as finder of fact, to determine whom and what to believe.

[24] Moreover, while it is undisputed that Callahan did not immediately leave when Riddick demanded her to do so that morning, the trial court could reasonably determine that the force used by Riddick was unreasonable in light of the urgency of the situation and not necessary in order to protect his property rights. See Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (To establish his claim of defense of property, defendant was “required to prove that he used reasonable force to prevent or terminate a trespass or to defend his property”; “Any force employed must be reasonable in light of ‘the urgency of the situation.’ ”); see also Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d) (permitting a person to use “reasonable force ․ if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry of or attack on the person's dwelling”). And contrary to Riddick's unsupported assertion, Callahan did not become a trespasser as soon as he asked her to leave; she was entitled to a reasonable period of time to comply with his request. See Curtis v. State, 58 N.E.3d 992, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“If a person is not given a reasonable period of time to comply with a request to leave, then there is no trespass.”). In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Riddick's conviction.

[25] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This comes from a post-trial filing entitled Defendant's Summary of Closing Argument.

2.   The rule provides in part:No person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed․

3.   The cases cited by Riddick are distinguishable and do not establish that his bald objection to the motion to continue, which objection was noted only in the State's motion, sufficiently preserved his claim without an objection to the date subsequently selected by the trial court. For example, in Otte v. State, the defendant did not sit idly by and wait for the deadline to pass before complaining about it; he brought the trial court's attention to the deadline by making timely Crim. R. 4 objections to the trial date. 967 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Further, in Dilley v. State, the State filed a motion for continuance, which unlike this case was based on Crim. R. 4(D), and when the defendant objected, he expressly alerted the trial court that they were “up against the 70 day deadline” and that he was continuing to assert his right to a speedy trial. 134 N.E.3d 1046, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We acknowledge that Hoskins is a closer case with respect to one of the appellants in that consolidated appeal. But there, at a hearing on the State's motion, the defendant “clearly objected to any continuance whatsoever” and did not simply rely on an objection noted in the State's motion. Hoskins, 83 N.E.3d at 130. Further, we disagree with Hoskins to the extent that it holds that a defendant does not have an obligation to object to a trial date set outside of the Crim. R. 4 deadline.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.