Dericka Rena Stokes, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Despite Mary Moore telling Dericka Rena Stokes that she was not welcome and to stay away from Moore's house, Stokes opened the front door and went inside Moore's house while she was away. The trial court convicted Stokes of residential entry as a Class A misdemeanor and sentenced her to 365 days with 363 days suspended. Stokes appeals and claims that Moore's son had given her consent to enter the house. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 4, 2023, Moore lived with her adult son, Melvin Moore (Melvin), in Indianapolis, Indiana. She was “the only owner” of the house and the only one who had “control over [her] home or property.” Transcript at 17, 18. Melvin did not pay rent, had no lease, and there were no “documents at all relating to him living there[.]” Id. at 18. The home was equipped with an alarm system and a “doorbell camera” with motion sensor detection at the front door. Id. at 19.

[3] That morning, Moore left the house to attend a meeting. She set the alarm, locked the door—“jiggl[ing] the doorknob to make sure it was locked”—and walked onto the porch. Id. at 20. Moore saw Melvin in the yard and noticed Stokes, Melvin's girlfriend, approaching the front porch. Moore told Stokes she “didn't want her there. [She] told her not to come to [her] home again. [She] told her [she] didn't even want her walking on [her] grass. [She] told her to just stay away.” Id. at 20. Stokes, Melvin, and Moore then left in separate cars. Later that day, Moore received a call from her security company that her “house had been broken into[.]” Id. at 21. Moore's doorbell camera had captured a video of Stokes “coming through [Moore's] front door.” Id. at 27.

[4] On January 5, 2024, the State charged Stokes with Level 6 felony residential entry.¹ At the close of the bench trial, the trial court found Stokes guilty and entered judgment of conviction for Class A misdemeanor residential entry. The court sentenced Stokes to 365 days in jail, with 363 days suspended. No probation was imposed. Stokes appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Stokes argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict her of residential entry. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008). “We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[6] To prove Stokes committed residential entry, the State was required to establish that she knowingly or intentionally broke and entered the dwelling of another person. See I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5. Stokes does not contest that she knowingly or intentionally broke and entered Moore's residence; rather, Stokes asserts that she had Melvin's consent to do so. Lack of consent is not an element of the offense that the State is required to prove. Townsend v. State, 33 N.E.3d 367, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, “ ‘it is the defendant who must claim and prove the defense of consent. A defendant's belief that [s]he has permission to enter must be reasonable’ ” for a defendant to invoke the defense. Id. (quoting McKinney v. State, 653 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). Once a defendant successfully raises the defense of consent, “the State has the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Holman v. State, 816 N.E.2d 78, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[7] The evidence most favorable to the judgment reflects that Stokes was not welcome in Moore's home and was ordered by Moore “to stay away.” Tr. at 20. Ignoring her explicit instructions, Stokes returned while Moore was away and entered the residence. Melvin did not testify, and Stokes relies solely on her own testimony—which was rejected by the trial court—to prove her defense that Melvin had invited her over and had “left the door unlocked for [her].” Id. at 44. Since Moore had ordered Stokes “to stay away” from her home, Stokes could not have reasonably believed that she had permission to enter Moore's home. Tr. at 20; McKinney, 653 N.E.2d at 118. Stokes's argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do.² See Bailey, 907 N.E.2d at 1005.

Conclusion

[8] In light of the foregoing, we affirm Stokes's conviction for residential entry.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5.

2.   Stokes also asserts a mistake of fact defense pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-7. Because Stokes makes this argument for the first time on appeal, she waived the issue for our review. See Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004) (“[A] party may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that argument or issue before the trial court.”).

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur. Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.