K.G. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.G. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of N.G. (“Child”).¹ The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with Mother and Child on November 21, 2022, after Mother was arrested for neglect of a dependent. Child was adjudicated to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and Mother was ordered to complete certain services aimed at reunification, which she failed to do. On February 2, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS's termination petition. On appeal, Mother contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Mother on December 12, 2019. Mother has had three children, including Child. By the time DCS became involved with Mother and Child in November of 2022, Mother had left her other two children to live with their father, who had allegedly abused her. Mother did not have any contact with her other two children and did not even know where they lived.

[3] On November 21, 2022, Mother was found walking down the road with Child, who “was without appropriate winter clothing at a time when the temperature was near freezing.” Ex. Vol. p. 9. Upon stopping Mother, officers from the Elwood Police Department “observed her to be in a manic state consistent with someone under the influence of an illicit substance or experiencing a mental health crisis.” Ex. Vol. pp. 9–10. “[O]ut of concern for [Child's] safety, [Mother] was detained by the police and taken to the hospital for an evaluation.” Ex. Vol. p. 10. At that point, Child was removed from Mother's care and Mother “admitted that she had used methamphetamine the night before.” Ex. Vol. p. 10.

[4] Mother was charged with Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent with Child being the victim and the trial court issued a no-contact order between Mother and Child. Child was placed with Foster Parents, where she remained at the time of the evidentiary hearing.

[5] At that time of her removal from Mother's care, Child was “mentally and emotionally ․ very fearful[,]” was “paranoid of every sound she heard[,]” would refuse to go in a bedroom or bathroom, was terrified of baths and diaper changes, and she “had significant [ ] physical [ ] signs of neglect and or abuse[,]” including “several pelvic wounds.” Tr. Vol. II p. 49. Child also had “lots of open sores, rashes, there were [ ] some abscesses[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 49. Child additionally had “significant bruising [ ] on the lower part of her back and her pelvic area and on her upper thighs and legs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 50. Child “was very scared of men[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 50. She “had significant dental decay [ ] and pain in her mouth. That has since been treated with surgery.” Tr. Vol. II p. 50.

[6] Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS, after which Mother was ordered to complete certain services. Specifically, Mother was ordered to contact the DCS family case manager (“FCM”) every week and to notify the FCM of any new criminal charges and any changes in household, employment, or contact information. Mother was also ordered, among other things, to maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal source of income; assist in the formulation and implementation of a plan to protect Child from abuse or neglect; obey the law; refrain from using any illegal drugs; complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all recommendations; submit to random drug screens; follow all terms of probation; and complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations.

[7] Mother was incarcerated in July of 2023, during which time FCM Olivia Estrada met with Mother in jail. Mother did not notify FCM Estrada when she was released to probation. Between their July meeting and January of 2024, Mother failed to maintain contact with FCM Estrada. In the meantime, in August of 2023, Mother pled guilty to Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, and the trial court sentenced her to a one-year suspended sentence and placed her on probation for 337 days. The previously-issued no-contact order was incorporated as a condition of Mother's probation.

[8] Mother failed to maintain stable housing or employment. In January of 2024, Mother moved to Kokomo with her then-boyfriend, who was leasing the home. Mother was not listed on the lease and, at the time of her move, was unemployed. Mother also failed to complete any of the court-ordered assessments.

[9] On February 2, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 29, 2024. During the evidentiary hearing, DCS presented evidence outlining Mother's failure to complete the court-ordered services or to make progress towards reunification with Child. FCM Estrada testified that she believed that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests and that the plan for Child's care was for Child to be adopted by her foster family. Likewise, Guardian ad Litem Marissa King-Ramirez (“GAL King-Ramirez”) testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. On September 6, 2024, the juvenile court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision

[10] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[11] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[12] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[13] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights to the Child. DCS was required to prove the following:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree․ (iii) The child has been removed from the parent ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services․

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).² Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove subsections (B) and (C).

I. Subsection (B)

[14] It is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find that one of the conditions listed therein has been met. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines that one of the factors has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court's determination, it is not necessary for DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, the other factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882.

[15] When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[16] Child was removed from Mother's care on November 21, 2022, for lack of a sober caregiver. At the time, Mother tested “positive for both amphetamine and methamphetamine.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. With respect to Mother's documented substance-abuse issues, the juvenile court found that “Mother was enrolled in Cordant random screens in support of her sobriety until February 27, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Mother “missed 120 testing calls and 24 random tests while she was screening for DCS through Cordant.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Mother “has not screened for” DCS since February 27, 2024. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. The juvenile court further found that “[w]hile Mother reports [that] she began to address her substance[-]use disorder by engaging in a substance[-]abuse evaluation, she presents no independent documentary or other evidence of the same. Her self-serving testimony is given little weight.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8.

[17] The juvenile court further found that Child had been removed from Mother's care after Mother was arrested and charged with Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, with that dependent being Child. A “no-contact order” had been issued in the neglect case that remained in effect on the date of the evidentiary hearing. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Although Mother had requested that the no-contact order be lifted, her request was “withdrawn when she failed to personally appear at the hearing on that motion[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Mother pled guilty to neglect of a dependent and the no-contact order was incorporated as a condition of her probation. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8.

[18] Mother “has not attended a child and family team meeting[ ]” and “has never engaged in home-based casework to advance her parenting although there remained, as of the date of the evidentiary hearing, an open referral for those services.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. The juvenile court found that

60. Since the beginning of this year, 2024, Mother has made some effort, including submitting to screens which have been clean, but has still not complied with the orders of the Court as she has not yet started home-based casework or had a psychological evaluation, despite open referrals for the same, and has not demonstrated an ability to maintain a source of income or a stable residence.

61. Mother has testified about “engaging” in individual therapy at Meridian Services since June of 2023, but the Court questions the veracity of that statement as

a. Mother admits that she engaged in no therapy through Meridian between June 2023 until January 2024; and

b. Mother has not signed a release for Meridian Health so that DCS can substantiate her otherwise self-serving claims of active involvement in treatment.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. The juvenile court further found that Mother has failed to maintain stable housing, as she had been the subject of an eviction action and, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, had reported to DCS that she was living “in Kokomo at the sufferance of her current significant other ․ in an apartment at which she does not have legal right to remain should she be asked to leave.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Mother has also failed to maintain a stable source of income, with Mother admitting that “she was not gainfully employed, and when she was employed in the last year, she had a work history averaging 1 to 3 months per job.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 8–9.

[19] The juvenile court found that Mother “had no visits with [Child] at all in either 2023 or 2024. Her last face-to-face meeting with [Child] was in 2022, immediately before Mother was charged” with neglect of a dependent. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Mother failed to attend numerous hearings during the CHINS proceedings; maintain weekly contact with FCM Estrada; notify FCM Estrada of changes in her contact information, employment, or housing; and keep all appointments with DCS and service providers. The juvenile court also found that Mother has two other children, “who are out of her care and for whom she has provided no financial support since at least July of 2023.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 9. Mother has no contact with these other children and is not even “aware of where [they] live.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 9.

[20] In concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from and continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, the juvenile court found that

29. In summary, Mother has not engaged with DCS with offered services, and she failed to respond to her case manager's overtures for the complete second half of 2023. Even now, while she is occasionally in contact with DCS, she refuses to provide FCM Estrada with even her physical address.

30. DCS has made significantly more than reasonable efforts to engage Mother in services for reunification; her lack of engagement through DCS makes clear that she is not interested in reunification with and actively parenting [Child] now or in the near future.

31. Throughout this case, it [has been DCS] who has pursued Mother attempting to engage her in reunification efforts with [Child], not the other way around.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 9. Mother does not challenge any of the juvenile court's numerous findings, which we therefore accept as true. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as true), trans. denied.

[21] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of her parental rights, Mother asserts that “the only evidence that DCS put forth in regards to the removal of [Child] was that [M]other tested positive for methamphetamines” and claims that she “has made substantial improvements on bettering herself” and is no longer testing positive for methamphetamine. Appellant's Br. pp. 9–10. She further asserts that “[t]he only barrier to reunification was the no-contact order[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. However, contrary to Mother's assertions, the evidence proves that Mother had not participated in the court-ordered services aimed at reunification or established a safe and stable home for Child. Mother's argument on appeal amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

II. Subsection (C)

[22] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, the child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[23] FCM Estrada testified that she believed that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. FCM Estrada noted Child's “significant” bonds with her foster family, which wished to adopt Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 26. GAL King-Ramirez also testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. GAL King-Ramirez noted “the amount of time that [Child] has not been um in her mother's care and the bond that she has with the foster placement[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. GAL King-Ramirez expressed a fear that Child would regress “if she were to gain contact with her mom” and indicated that Child was “currently flourishing” with her foster family providing her with a safe and stable environment. Tr. Vol. II p. 40.

[24] FCM Estrada's and GAL King-Ramirez's testimony establish that Child was thriving in the safe and stable environment provided by foster parents, who wished to adopt Child. Their testimony, coupled with the evidence establishing Mother's lack of stability and failure to make progress towards reunification, is sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). Again, Mother's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[25] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parental rights of Child's father, C.H., have also been terminated. Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Although Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 has been amended, effective March 11, 2024, the amended provisions do not apply to this case.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.