MORGAN v. DERRICK (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] David T. Morgan (“Father”) appeals the denial of his motion to set aside an August 2023 judgment enforcing a Massachusetts child support order (“the Support Order”) requiring him to pay child support for his daughter (“Child”) with Dawn E. Derrick (“Mother”) until Child attains the age of twenty-three. Father also challenges the denial of his petition to modify the Support Order to relieve him of any obligation to contribute toward Child's college expenses due to Child's alleged repudiation of the parent-child relationship. Because we conclude that Father has not identified grounds to set aside the judgment and, based on the limited record provided, has failed to demonstrate he is presently ordered to contribute toward Child's college expenses, we affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2005, Father and Mother had a daughter together. When Child was approximately three years old, a Massachusetts court issued an order obligating Father to pay child support. The Support Order was not provided to this court on appeal. There has nevertheless been no dispute that, consistent with Massachusetts law, the Support Order required Father to pay some form of child support until Child attained the age of twenty-three.

[3] In February 2009, the Support Order was registered in the State of Indiana. On May 12, 2023—by which point Father, Mother, and Child were all residents of Indiana—Mother petitioned the Clinton Circuit Court for an order modifying the Support Order. Mother asked the trial court “to include a post-secondary educational needs order,” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 17, and requested that the modified order “allocat[e] the cost of [Child's] post-secondary education” among Father, Mother, and Child, id. at 16. The trial court scheduled a hearing on Mother's petition for August 1, 2023. Father did not attend the hearing. In light of Father's absence, there was no evidence presented at the hearing, and the trial court indicated it would “show [that] child support continues at this point, does not terminate at either age 19 or [the] start of college[,] but continues pursuant to the [Support Order].” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 5. Later in the day, the trial court issued a written order. In the order, the trial court did not modify the Support Order as Mother had requested, but instead maintained the status quo. That is, the trial court noted that the Support Order “require[d] child support until age 23,” and it ordered that “child support paid by [Father] shall continue as previously ordered [in the Support Order] and shall not terminate upon the child turning 19 and/or starting college[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 20.

[4] On November 20, 2023, Father filed his “Motion to Relieve Father of Post-Secondary Educational Support due to Repudiation of Parent-Child Relationship and Motion to Set Aside Order from August 1, 2023, Hearing.” See id. at 24–26. Therein, Father sought to set aside the trial court's August 2023 order due to deficient service of process in that he allegedly had not been served with Mother's underlying petition until “the day before the hearing.” Id. at 24. Father also alleged he should not be required to contribute to Child's college expenses because he “has had no relationship with [Child] since birth” and “when [Child] became older she made no attempt to reach out to [him] and establish any relationship independent of Mother.” Id. at 25. Father filed a supporting memorandum focusing on the repudiation issue.

[5] The trial court held a hearing on August 1, 2024. At the hearing, Father sought “to establish that ․ there would be a repudiation ․ as it relates to an obligation by Father to pay [Child's] educational expenses.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 8. Father asserted that “secondarily,” he was “asking the [c]ourt to follow the Indiana statue regarding the termination of a child support obligation upon the age of 19.” Id. Father was the sole testifying witness. At one point, Father claimed he did not intend to be absent for the hearing on Mother's 2023 petition to modify the Support Order. Father testified that he “d[id] not recall receiving any kind of summons.” Id. at 15. When Father was asked whether he received Mother's petition at his mailing address, Father replied: “By U.S. Mail? I'm not the one who checks the mail, so I can't say if I got it or not, honestly.” Id. at 20. Later, Father said there were “five people at [his] house, so anybody could get the mail.” Id. at 21. As to Child's alleged repudiation of the parent-child relationship, Father testified that he had not met Child, who by that point was over the age of eighteen. Father testified that he had no contact with Child before she turned eighteen, and Child had not tried to contact him after she turned eighteen. Father asserted that, based on a complete lack of parent-child relationship, “the relationship should be repudiated” such that he should not be obligated to contribute toward Child's college-related expenses. Id. at 18.

[6] On August 1, 2024, the trial court issued a written order in which it (1) denied Father's motion to set aside the August 2023 order and (2) denied Father's request to be relieved of any obligation to contribute toward Child's college expenses due to Child's alleged repudiation of the parent-child relationship with Father. The trial court noted that it was Father's burden to prove repudiation and, because Father had not established a relationship with Child at any point in her life, Father was unable to prove that Child “repudiated [a] relationship by not seeking him out while she was a minor” or “repudiated [a] relationship after she was 18 years old when there never was a relationship.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 44. Leaving the Support Order in place, the trial court ordered “the parties ․ to mediate the issues of child support and/or college expenses.” Id. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] We begin by noting that Mother has not filed an appellee's brief. Under the circumstances, we may reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, which means error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008). This standard recognizes that we need not “undertake to develop an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Id.

I. Motion to Set Aside

[8] On appeal, Father attempts to collaterally challenge the trial court's August 2023 determination that “child support continues” and “does not terminate at either age 19 or [the] start of college,” but instead “continues pursuant to the [Support Order].” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 5. Father claims that the age-related language in the Support Order should be construed as boilerplate language requiring him to pay child support for the maximum time allowed under state law. Father asserts that Massachusetts law allows for an order of child support until a child attains the age of twenty-three whereas, as a default, Indiana law instead contemplates child support until a child attains the age of nineteen.

[9] Father's argument is not properly before us. To set aside a judgment, a litigant generally must file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion identifying a proper basis to do so. Below, Father claimed improper service of Mother's petition leading to the August 2023 order enforcing the Support Order. However, on appeal, Father has abandoned this contention and has not otherwise explained why, at this juncture, it is procedurally proper to set aside the August 2023 order. Instead, Father proceeds to collaterally attack the August 2023 order and argues the Support Order should terminate upon Child's nineteenth birthday. Because Father has not identified a proper basis to set aside the judgment, we affirm the denial of Father's motion to set aside the judgment and decline his invitation to review the merits of the August 2023 order.

II. Repudiation

[10] Father claims the trial court erred in declining to modify the Support Order such that, due to alleged repudiation of the parent-child relationship, Father would be relieved of the obligation to contribute toward college expenses. We note, however, that the record and argument presented on appeal fail to establish that Father was presently obligated to contribute toward Child's college expenses. The Support Order was not provided. And the trial court's 2023 order indicated only that the Support Order required “child support” until Child reached the age of twenty-three, with there being no indication from the record that the Support Order explicitly outlined an education-related support obligation. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 5. This is notable in that, when Mother petitioned the trial court in 2023, Mother specifically asked the trial court “to modify the ․ [S]upport [O]rder registered herein to include a post-secondary educational needs order[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 16. Mother claimed the trial court “should enter an [o]rder modifying the ․ [S]upport [O]rder which would include a post-secondary educational needs order and allocat[e] the cost of [Child’]s post-secondary education” among Father, Mother, and Child. Id. But the trial court did not explicitly grant this request for educational support. See id. at 20. Rather, the trial court maintained the status quo, specifying that “child support paid by [Father] shall continue as previously ordered and shall not terminate upon ․ [C]hild turning 19 and/or starting college,” with the court noting that the Support Order “require[d] child support until age 23.” Id. Furthermore, the court denied Father's petition to modify the Support Order, such that Father's support obligation—whatever it was—remained unchanged.

[11] To the extent Father asserts that, as a matter of Massachusetts law, the Support Order required him to contribute toward Child's college expenses, Father has failed to support this assertion. Father refers only to Massachusetts General Law chapter 208, section 28, which he claims “governs the length of a parent's obligation to pay child support.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. The cited statute appears to apply only when there was “a judgment for divorce.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 28 (within a chapter titled “Divorce”). Moreover, the cited statute was last amended in 2019, but the Support Order was issued in 2008, and the cited statute does not purport to have comprehensive, retroactive effect. In any case, the statute does not appear to mandate payment of educational expenses. Rather, it authorizes a Massachusetts court to “make appropriate orders of maintenance, support[,] and education[.]” Id. Further, the statute requires the court to “apply the child support guidelines” in “determining the amount of the child support obligation or in approving the agreement of the parties[.]” Id. Yet, on appeal, Father does not cite or rely on any guidelines.

[12] We need not reach the merits of Father's claim of repudiation. Based on the limited record, argument, and authority presented, Father has not established that he is presently obligated to contribute to Child's college expenses, as opposed to providing more general baseline support in early adulthood. Thus, Father has not established the trial court erred in denying his request to modify the Support Order to eliminate a requirement to pay college-related expenses.¹

Conclusion

[13] Father has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying Father's motion to set aside the 2023 judgment or petition to modify the Support Order.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although we do not address the merits, we note Father refers to Indiana Code section 31-18.5-6-13, part of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as providing jurisdiction to modify the Support Order because Father, Mother, and Child reside in Indiana. This statute also provides that “[a]n Indiana tribunal exercising jurisdiction under this section shall apply ․ procedural and substantive Indiana law to the proceeding for enforcement or modification.” Ind. Code § 31-18.5-6-13(b). To the extent that Father's modification claim involved interpretation of the Support Order, we note that related provisions of federal law (within the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act) at one point provide that, “[i]n interpreting a child support order including the duration of current payments and other obligations of support, a court shall apply the law of the State of the court that issued the order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(2). The appellate briefing before us does not address federal law or other provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Cf., e.g., I.C. § 31-18.5-6-11(c), (d) (providing that, in certain scenarios, “[a]n Indiana tribunal may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation of support” and, “[i]n a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support”).

Foley, Judge.

Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.