Mary Denise Walters, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial at which she represented herself, Mary Denise Walters was convicted of Level 5 felony stalking. Walters raises one issue on appeal: Did the trial court clearly err in allowing her to proceed pro se? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Walters married Robert Walters in August 2001. Their relationship grew strained, and in June 2021, Walters sought and was granted a protective order against Robert. Soon after, Walters filed for divorce. In part because of an incident where Walters showed up at the house where Robert was staying and in part because Walters sent voicemails and texts that raised Robert's anxiety to the point he thought he was having a heart attack, Robert also sought and was granted a protective order against Walters in September.

[3] After being personally served with the protective order on September 30, Walters continued to leave voicemail messages and send texts to Robert's phone. The voicemails left Robert anxious and concerned for his safety because he had “no clue what she's talking about” and “[i]t's irrational.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 221. She also sent a fax to “a whole litany of people” in which she accused Robert of being involved in a high-profile unsolved criminal case and committing or directing other people to commit harmful acts toward her, her pets, and other people. Id. at 174. She emailed a similar document directly to Robert. Robert described it as “full of really awful information” and “a horrible document to be broadcast” that implicated not only him but people he associated with. Id. at 227. Based on the content of Walters’ communications, Robert suffered emotional harm and feared Walters’ conduct might escalate to harming him physically.

[4] Over the course of several months in 2022, the State filed three separate cases against Walters for her communications to Robert: in the first two, she was charged with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and in the third, she was charged with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and Class B misdemeanor harassment. With those three cases still pending, the State charged Walters in June 2023 with Level 5 felony stalking and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. At the combined initial hearing for all four cases,¹ the trial court appointed counsel for Walters. Although represented, Walters sent several lengthy, rambling letters and purported motions to the trial court.

[5] Counsel filed a motion for a competency evaluation and notice of “possible defenses of incompetence or mental disease or defect.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 33. The trial court granted the motion and appointed two doctors to evaluate Walters’ competency. Shortly after, counsel informed the court his efforts to arrange evaluations by those two doctors were unsuccessful. The trial court issued an order appointing two different doctors to evaluate Walters’ “sanity at the time the offenses were allegedly committed,” her “competency to stand trial for each alleged offense,” and her “competency to represent [herself] at trial as [she] insists[.]” Id. at 61. Meanwhile, Walters sent a letter to the trial court “recus[ing]” her counsel and “retain[ing] the right” to represent herself. Id. at 59.

[6] Dr. Joanna Will submitted her written competency evaluation to the court on December 22, 2023. Dr. Will said Walters “exhibits paranoid and persecutory beliefs” and she “strongly suspect[s] that [Walters] has an unspecified psychotic disorder or delusional disorder.” Id. at 80. Even so, Dr. Will believed Walters was competent to stand trial. Dr. Will observed Walters’ desire to represent herself stemmed from her disagreement with counsel about his request for a competency evaluation and her refusal to pursue an insanity defense. Although recognizing self-representation might not be in Walters’ best interest and a “lengthy and complex trial would likely present additional untested psychological stress,” Dr. Will stated Walters’ psychiatric symptoms “did not appear to impair her presentation of a coherent defense strategy.” Id. at 81. Dr. Will submitted an addendum to this report with her opinion of Walters’ mental state at the time of the alleged offenses, stating Walters “may have lacked appreciation for the wrongfulness of her conduct, but there is insufficient evidence to substantiate a conclusion that she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.” Id. at 90.

[7] At a pretrial conference after Dr. Will's initial evaluation was filed, Walters again expressed her desire to represent herself:

[Defense counsel]: I have explained to her the options that she can have me represent her or she can have private counsel or she can go pro se and make that request to the Court.

The Court: Ok just so we are super clear once you do this you can always ask for an attorney till we actually start the trial and then when we do that, that ships [sic] sailed. I'm not continuing anything, so ․ [y]ou do not want [defense counsel] to represent you at this time?

[Walters]: No I do not.

The Court: On any of these cases?

[Walters]: No I do not.

The Court: Ok, [defense counsel] is released, thank you for your assistance.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Before the hearing concluded, Walters’ now-former counsel reminded the court the second doctor appointed to evaluate Walters had not yet responded. The trial court asked Walters, “[Y]ou don't want it correct?” and she responded, “mmm mmm.” Id. at 25.² The trial court then said, “[B]ased on what I'm seeing it's just a waste of money. Ok alright. The order to [the second doctor] will be [rescinded] and [we'll] get that out by separate order.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 25; see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 84 (order stating “[t]he order for any further evaluation is stricken, and the second evaluation is unneeded”). The trial court concluded the hearing but then went back on record to advise Walters of her right to counsel and the perils of self-representation. Walters said she had a technical degree in sound engineering and “some college as well.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. As an adult, she had been diagnosed and treated for ADHD. Walters continued to express her desire to represent herself. The trial court granted her request to proceed pro se but advised her she could change her mind before trial began.

[8] Walters appeared pro se in court three times before her jury trial. The first hearing concerned discovery she had requested. The second was a pretrial conference at which the trial court asked Walters, “[S]till don't want a lawyer?” and she replied, “That's a no.” Id. at 50. And the third was a final pretrial conference four days before trial to discuss how the trial would be conducted. Again, the trial court asked Walters if she wanted an attorney and again, she said no.

[9] At her jury trial, Walters participated in voir dire, made an opening statement and closing argument, cross-examined the State's witnesses, interposed objections, introduced exhibits, and testified on her own behalf. During her narrative testimony, Walters testified to “[s]ome background” and “what my truth is[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 24. She started off by describing the course of her relationship with Robert, and then veered into a lengthy recitation of “bad stuff that [Robert] and this person next door and couple other friends of theirs did” to make her look like she was crazy. Id. at 29.

[10] The jury found Walters guilty of all charges. Walters then asked for her previous counsel to be reappointed for the sentencing hearing. The trial court granted the request.

[11] In sentencing Walters, the trial court stated:

Here's where we're really at in this case. I know the old saw is that you don't look behind the jury verdict but Ms. Walters conducted her own defense and to some extent it may have been to her own detriment. The court is of the opinion that we should really be here sentencing on a guilty but mentally ill [verdict]. In debriefing the jury I asked the jury whether or not they would have voted for that and I had instantly raised thirteen hands in the room. Mam you have some mental health issues. You don't think you do but you do.

Id. at 100. The trial court found aggravators and mitigators, including as a mitigator that Walters’ mental health issues led to the commission of the crime. The court merged all counts into the Level 5 felony stalking conviction and sentenced Walters to 1,460 days in the Department of Correction, with 330 days executed and the remainder suspended to probation.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding Walters competent to proceed pro se.

[12] Walters argues the trial court should not have allowed her to represent herself despite the fact she repeatedly and clearly expressed her desire to exercise her constitutional right to do so because “it is clear from the record that [she] suffered from mental illness to the point that she was not competent to represent herself.” Appellant's Br. at 15.³

[13] The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel before she may be tried, convicted, and punished. Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 617 (Ind. 2011) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975)). Implicit in the right to counsel is the right to self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court described the fundamental nature of the right to self-representation:

It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.

Id. at 834 (internal quotation omitted).

[14] “That said, the right of self-representation, like most constitutional rights, is not absolute.” Sturdivant v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1219, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “[A] trial court may deny a defendant's request to act pro se when the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial but suffers from severe mental illness to the point where he is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.” Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 2009) (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008)). The trial court's determination of competence to act pro se is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. “Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1040 (Ind. 2013).

[15] A competency determination to proceed pro se involves “a fact-sensitive evaluation of the defendant's capabilities that the trial court is best-situated to make.” Edwards, 902 N.E.2d at 824. “[I]f a defendant is so impaired that a coherent presentation of a defense is unlikely, fairness demands that the court insist upon representation.” Id. at 829. In Edwards, the trial court found the defendant was incompetent to represent himself even though he was competent to stand trial based on a record that showed:

Edwards was evaluated by several mental health professionals from 1999 through 2004 and was diagnosed at various points in time with schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type, disorganized type schizophrenia, a delusional disorder, and a personality disorder. Edwards's psychiatric evaluations reveal that he experienced hallucinations and delusions, and that he manifested disorganized thought processes and impaired verbal communication. Several psychiatric reports concluded that Edwards was not competent to stand trial in the first instance, let alone represent himself. And as the trial court pointed out, Edwards produced a litany of disorganized and incoherent motions that support the physicians’ observations as well as the conclusion that Edwards was not competent to conduct trial proceedings on his own.

Id. at 827. On appeal, our Supreme Court acknowledged the evidence was “not without conflict.” Id. (noting one psychiatric evaluation found he was free of psychosis and able to think clearly, the most recent competency evaluation showed he was taking medication and receiving therapy, and several of his motions and in-court statements were lucid and demonstrated at least a basic understanding of trial practice). But “remain[ing] mindful of the standard of review,” the Court affirmed the trial court because the totality of the evidence confirmed the defendant suffered from “severe and pervasive mental illness” such that he was not competent to represent himself. Id. at 828; see also Ricketts v. State, 108 N.E.3d 416, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding no clear error in trial court's denial of defendant's request to proceed pro se where record indicated defendant was “suffering from many severe mental illnesses prior to trial and ․ his treatments were no longer effective”), trans. denied.

[16] Walters argues the record shows she exhibits the “thoughts of someone with significant mental health issues,” focusing on the more outlandish statements she made in letters to the court, in the fax and email the State introduced as exhibits at trial, and during her testimony. Appellant's Br. at 16. She compares the evidence before the trial court in her case to that in Edwards, noting she too “filed a litany of lengthy letters and motions with the court prior to trial.” Id. at 17. But Walters’ case is presented in the opposite procedural posture to Edwards: rather than reviewing a trial court's denial of a request to proceed pro se, we are reviewing the trial court's grant of her request. Walters faces an “uphill battle” to show the trial court's decision is unsupported by the facts, circumstances, and reasonable inferences before it. Sturdivant, 61 N.E.3d at 1224.

[17] Here, there is no indication in the record Walters has ever been diagnosed with or treated for a mental illness. Walters testified to being treated only for ADHD. Dr. Will “suspect[ed]” Walters had a thought disorder but nonetheless believed her competent to stand trial and competent to represent herself. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 80. Walters asserted she understood the trial court's advisements about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and repeatedly declined re-appointment of counsel, claiming she was capable and prepared to represent herself. The trial court had the opportunity to make a first-hand evaluation of Walters’ mental state based on its interactions with her, including the three times she appeared pro se at hearings before trial.⁴

[18] Undeniably, Walters made some odd—even bizarre—assertions, both before and during trial, and there are some indicators of possible mental illness. But that is not evidence of a severe mental illness rendering her incompetent to represent herself. See Sturdivant, 61 N.E.3d at 1225 (affirming decision that the defendant could represent herself where there were “some indicators of mental illness [but] they certainly were not sufficient to outweigh [the defendant's] explicit and repeated requests to waive counsel and represent herself”). The facts and circumstances in the record support the trial court's decision to allow Walters to represent herself.

Conclusion

[19] The trial court did not clearly err in granting Walters’ request to proceed pro se.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At Walters’ request, the four cases were eventually consolidated, and before trial, the State filed an amended information under the original stalking cause number that included all charges. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 24; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 82–83.

2.   Both Walters and the State describe this as an affirmative response. See Appellant's Br. at 14; Appellee's Br. at 12.

3.   Walters mentions the statutory procedure for determining competency was not followed when the trial court rescinded the order for a second competency evaluation and did not specifically find she was competent to stand trial. See id. at 17 (referencing Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1). But she does not claim she was not competent to stand trial, nor does she claim her waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, voluntary, or that the trial court failed to properly advise her of the dangers of self-representation and the benefits of counsel.

4.   That the trial court stated at sentencing it believed “we should really be here sentencing on a guilty but mentally ill [verdict]” came with the benefit of hindsight and is not, in itself, evidence of a severe mental illness. Tr. Vol. 3 at 100. Moreover, even while represented by counsel, Walters expressed her refusal to pursue an insanity defense.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Brown concur. Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.