PATTERSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Spencer Patterson fled from an arresting officer, shot and killed the officer's K-9 partner, then hid from the officer. When the officer discovered Patterson, he saw Patterson point a gun at him and heard the gun fire before he returned fire at Patterson. A jury found Patterson guilty of Level 5 felony attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony striking a law enforcement animal, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Patterson appeals, arguing that his attempted battery conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. He also argues, and the State agrees, that his resisting convictions violate double jeopardy. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 1:40 p.m. on July 13, 2023, Gary Police Department Officer Shanesha Joseph received an alert to be on the lookout for a black Ford Focus associated with Spencer Patterson, who had an active warrant. Having seen a car matching the description two days earlier in an alleyway in the 1000 block of East 35th Place, and knowing Sergeant Angel Lozano was nearby, she asked him to check out that area.

[3] On 35th Place, Sergeant Lozano saw a black Ford Focus parked on the side of the road and Patterson standing by its trunk.¹ Sergeant Lozano pulled behind the car and ordered Patterson to place his hands on the squad car. He completed a “quick pat-down” search “for any weapons” but felt none. Transcript Vol. 3 at 103. After retrieving Patterson's wallet and confirming his identity, Sergeant Lozano attempted to place Patterson in handcuffs, but Patterson “pushed off the vehicle and attempted to flee.” Id. at 104. Patterson managed to get free and started running away.

[4] Sergeant Lozano radioed that Patterson was running and commanded his K-9 partner, Falco, to pursue Patterson. After Falco followed Patterson over a fence and into a backyard, Sergeant Lozano heard gunshots. With his gun drawn, Sergeant Lozano entered the overgrown backyard and found Falco lying in the middle of the yard barely breathing. Falco, shot five times, died soon after.

[5] Sergeant Lozano then “heard some movement” around the side of the house. Id. at 114. Rounding the corner of the house with his gun drawn, Sergeant Lozano saw Patterson about six feet away from him lying on the ground “holding a black firearm pointed at [him].” Id. at 116-17. Sergeant Lozano then heard “approximately two shots fired[.]” Id. at 117. He returned six shots as he backed up to put the house between him and Patterson. Patterson yelled that he had been shot and gave up, at which point Sergeant Lozano saw Patterson “with his hands out” and a firearm on the ground next to him. Id. at 119. Patterson was handcuffed and his weapon was secured.

[6] Several law enforcement officers investigated the scene. Having rained recently, the ground was still “soft.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 77. The officers divided the backyard into grids and thoroughly searched for shell casings and damage caused by bullets. The search produced ten shell casings, six of which matched Sergeant Lozano's gun, and four that matched Patterson's gun. The casings from Patterson's gun were found near where Falco was killed.

[7] The State charged Patterson with Count I: Attempted Murder, as a Level 1 felony; Count II: Attempted Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon, as a Level 5 felony;² Count III: Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Level 6 felony;³ Count IV: Striking a Law Enforcement Animal, as a Level 6 felony; and Count V: Resisting Law Enforcement, as a class A misdemeanor.⁴

[8] At Patterson's jury trial, Sergeant Lozano testified that he would not have shot at Patterson had he put his hands up or laid down his weapon. He also testified that he did not see Patterson's shots because he was “not going to look at ․ someone shooting at [him].” Tr. Vol. 3 at 117. An investigating detective testified that shell casings are “not always” recovered after a shot is fired and that it was “possible” some shell casings were not located given the condition of the backyard. Id. at 5. Patterson was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of both resisting offenses, attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon, and striking a law enforcement animal. Patterson argued that resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor was a lesser-included offense of the Level 6 felony resisting offense, but the trial court entered judgment of conviction on all counts for which he was found guilty. Patterson was sentenced to eight and one-half years in the Department of Correction.⁵

Discussion and Decision

1. Attempted Battery

[9] Patterson argues that his conviction for attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon was not supported by sufficient evidence.

[10] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is well settled. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). Sufficiency claims “trigger a deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1090 (Jan. 7, 2019)). When conducting this review, “we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. We affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005).

[11] To prove that Patterson committed Level 5 attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon, the State had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Patterson knowingly or intentionally attempted to touch Sergeant Lozano in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, and that Patterson committed the offense with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(2). “A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a).

[12] Patterson's sole argument on appeal is that there was a “complete lack of evidence presented that Patterson fired his weapon at [Sergeant] Lozano.” Appellant's Br. at 11. Specifically, Patterson argues that Sergeant Lozano did not see him fire any shots, that no shell casings were found in the area where he shot at Sergeant Lozano, and there was no bullet damage behind Sergeant Lozano.⁶

[13] But it was the jury's role to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022). We focus on the evidence that supports the verdict, and there is plenty. After seeing his dying K-9 partner Patterson admittedly shot just seconds prior, Sergeant Lozano testified that he rounded the corner of the house to investigate the noise created by Patterson's movement and saw Patterson “on the ground holding a black firearm pointed at [him].” Tr. Vol. 3 at 116-17. At that point, Sergeant Lozano had his firearm pointed towards Patterson and “heard approximately two shots fired and then [he] returned fire.” Id. at 117.

[14] Patterson does not question the credibility of Sergeant Lozano's testimony. Given Sergeant Lozano's testimony, and the evidence suggesting the soft, overgrown condition of the backyard may have prevented officers from recovering additional shell casings, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Patterson fired his gun intending to strike the officer. By this point, Patterson had already fatally shot Falco and had pointed his gun at Sergeant Lozano. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Patterson guilty of Level 5 felony attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon. See Mendoza, 869 N.E.2d 546, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding a deputy's testimony that the Mendoza pointed a gun at the officers and fired twice was sufficient to support Mendoza's conviction for attempted aggravated battery), trans. denied; McNeil v. State, 936 N.E.2d 358, 360-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding testimony was sufficient to establish that McNeil or his companions were the source of the victim's gunshot wound despite no medical, forensic, or ballistic evidence establishing the source of the wound). Patterson's argument is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stahl v. State, 219 N.E.3d 157, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

2. Double Jeopardy

[15] Patterson contends—and the State agrees—that his convictions for both Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement with a handgun and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement violates double jeopardy. See Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 248-50 (Ind. 2020). The statutes at issue do not allow for multiple punishments, the misdemeanor offense is a lesser-included offense of the felony offense, and Patterson's “actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’ ” Id. at 249 (quoting Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied). Thus, entering judgment of conviction on both counts violated double jeopardy and was erroneous. We reverse, in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate Patterson's conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

Conclusion

[16] We affirm Patterson's conviction for Level 5 attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon. Because Patterson's resisting law enforcement convictions violate double jeopardy, we reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate Patterson's conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

[17] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sergeant Lozano ran the name “Spencer Patterson” through his computer system and saw a picture of Patterson that appeared consistent with the individual standing by the vehicle as Sergeant Lozano approached.

2.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(2).

3.   I.C. §§ 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (c)(1)(B)(i).

4.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).

5.   While Counts II, III, and IV were sentenced consecutively to each other, Count V was ordered to be served concurrently with the other Counts.

6.   Patterson argues that also relevant is an unexplained possible gunshot picked up by Sergeant Lozano's radio over a minute after the shooting. However, Sergeant Lozano testified that the only people shooting guns were him and Patterson, none of the responding officers provided conflicting testimony, and the lead detective believed the noise was “[n]ot necessarily” related to the case. Tr. Vol. 4 at 128. Patterson's suggestion that this belated gunshot “nullifies any presumption the gunfire came from Patterson” is simply a request us to reweigh the evidence. Appellant's Br. at 12-13.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.