Tyron Excell Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tyron Smith pleaded guilty to aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony. The trial court sentenced Smith to the maximum sentence of sixteen years. Smith appeals and claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We disagree and affirm.

Issue

[2] Smith presents one issue, which we restate as whether Smith's sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

Facts

[3] Smith and the victim in this case, L.M., had previously been in a romantic relationship and had children together. On February 24, 2024, Smith spent the night at L.M.’s home but was told to sleep on the couch. Three children, ages ten, six, and three, were also at the home at the time. Sometime in the night, Smith got off the couch, went into L.M.’s bedroom uninvited, and got on top of her. Smith forced L.M. to “go through her phone.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 79. As L.M. went through her phone, Smith became angry and struck L.M. in the face with his forearm. This fractured L.M.’s nose and caused bleeding, bruising, and swelling. After striking L.M., Smith forced L.M. to perform oral sex on him and ignored her pleas to stop. Once Smith fell asleep, L.M. was able to text the police for help.

[4] On February 27, 2024, the State charged Smith with three counts of rape, Level 3 felonies;¹ one count of domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony; one count of domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony; and one count of criminal confinement, a Level 6 felony. On October 25, 2024, Smith entered into a plea agreement with the State, in which Smith agreed to plead guilty to an amended count of aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. This plea agreement was accompanied by a stipulation of facts. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and, on November 26, 2024, sentenced Smith to the maximum term of sixteen years of incarceration. Smith now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Smith claims that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate. We recently summarized our review of such claims as follows:

The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. Our Supreme Court has implemented this authority through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows this Court to revise a sentence when it is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our review of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not an act of second guessing the trial court's sentence; rather, [o]ur posture on appeal is [ ] deferential to the trial court. We exercise our authority under Appellate Rule 7(B) only in exceptional cases, and its exercise boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate.

The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to leaven the outliers. The point is not to achieve a perceived correct sentence. Whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case․

Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 989-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citations and internal quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[6] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is holistic. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). That is, “[w]e assess a sentence in light of the whole picture before us.” Id. “Allowing a strong showing on one prong to outweigh a weak showing on the other promotes the ideal of ‘similar sentences’ for ‘perpetrators committing the same acts who have the same backgrounds.’ ” Id. (quoting Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ind. 2003)). Thus, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).

[7] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). Here, Smith pleaded guilty to a Level 3 felony. The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is three to sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). Thus, Smith received the maximum sentence of sixteen years.

[8] Our Supreme Court has held that maximum sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002)). But this is not a “guideline to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined. Despite the nature of any particular offense and offender, it will always be possible to identify or hypothesize a significantly more despicable scenario.” Buchanan, 767 N.E.2d at 973. Accordingly, “[a]lthough maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate for the worst offenders, we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant the maximum punishment,” and “such class encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and offenders.” Id.

A. Nature of the Offense

[9] We first consider the nature of the offense.² This requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1182 (Ind. 2020). We should defer to the trial court's sentencing decision unless the defendant presents compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offense in a positive light, “such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990. We perceive no such evidence here.

[10] L.M. allowed Smith to spend the night and sleep on her couch. Smith returned this hospitality with a brutal attack and sexual assault. He got on top of L.M., struck her face with his forearm, and forced her to perform oral sex. Smith did all of this while three young children were present in the home. L.M. suffered from serious injuries as a result of the attack, including a broken nose. Smith stipulated that these injuries resulted in a substantial risk of death to L.M. There is nothing about Smith's offense that portrays it in a positive light.

B. Character of the Offender

[11] We now turn to our analysis of the character of the offender, which involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character can vary based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). Still, “[e]ven a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We should defer to the trial court's sentencing decision unless the defendant presents compelling evidence portraying his character in a positive light, “such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990.

[12] Smith's extensive criminal history reflects poorly on his character. According to the pre-sentence investigation report, Smith has eight prior misdemeanor convictions. Three of these misdemeanor convictions were for criminal trespass, and one was for domestic battery against the victim in this case.³ Smith also has a Level 6 felony conviction for criminal trespass, and one felony conviction for theft. Multiple other charges have been dismissed. Smith was given the grace of probation several times in the past. This resulted in multiple petitions to revoke his probation, and he was discharged from probation unsuccessfully at least three times.

[13] The pre-sentence investigation report further reveals that Smith started to use illicit drugs as a teenager and has continued to do so as an adult. He started using marijuana at age fifteen; codeine at sixteen; Xanax at seventeen; synthetic marijuana at eighteen; LSD at twenty-one; and cocaine and methamphetamine at twenty-seven. Smith admitted that he was under the influence of cocaine and alcohol at the time of the instant offense. Smith claimed to be addicted to alcohol, cocaine, and methamphetamine, but he had never sought treatment. This long history of untreated substance abuse reflects poorly on Smith's character. See Vega v. State, 119 N.E.3d 193, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding that a long history of substance abuse reflected poorly on defendant's character).

[14] Smith claims that, since his incarceration, he has sought to improve himself by various means, including taking classes and addressing his substance abuse issues through treatment.⁴ But Smith did not attempt to alter his behavior until after his arrest in the current case. See Marley v. State, 17 N.E.3d 335, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that defendant's substance abuse problem did not weigh in favor of a lesser sentence because defendant did not seek treatment until after his arrest), trans. denied.

[15] Smith also notes that he expressed remorse and pleaded guilty, thereby sparing the victim the stress of a trial. But the trial court was in the best position to judge the sincerity of Smith's remorse, Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002), and it did not find Smith's remorse to be mitigating. Smith also received a significant benefit by pleading guilty—the State dismissed two Level 3 felony counts, one Level 5 felony count, and two Level 6 felony counts. See Caraway v. State, 977 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that defendant's guilty plea did not reflect positively on his character because his decision to plead guilty was likely pragmatic given the weight of the evidence against him and the benefit he received from the State's dismissal of one of the charges). In short, we see no “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” that persuade us that Smith's sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate. Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990.

Conclusion

[16] Given the brutal nature of Smith's offense and his poor character, we cannot say that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate. We, therefore, affirm the trial court.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The probable cause affidavit stated that Smith also forced L.M. to engage in sexual intercourse and forced her to use cocaine. These facts were not included in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties.

2.   The State argues that we should consider facts that were alleged in the probable cause affidavit but not included in the parties’ stipulation of facts. In Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013), our Supreme Court held that “it is not necessary for a trial court to turn a blind eye to the facts of the incident that brought the defendant before them” if a plea agreement does not limit judicial consideration to a specific set of facts. Although the language of Smith's plea agreement does not limit judicial consideration to a specific set of facts, it was accompanied by a stipulation of facts. Because the facts contained in the stipulation are sufficient to support Smith's sentence, we limit our consideration to these stipulated facts.

3.   Smith's remaining misdemeanor convictions were for obstruction of traffic, operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license, and driving with a suspended license. Smith's misdemeanor convictions also include theft, a Class D felony, but judgment was entered as a Class A misdemeanor.

4.   The only support for these claims was the statement of Smith's counsel during the sentencing hearing. Although we presume counsel's claims were accurate, statements of counsel are not evidence. Fouts v. State, 207 N.E.3d 1257, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), aff'd on reh'g, trans. denied.

Tavitas, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Brown concur. Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.