Gregory Lee Matthews, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Gregory Lee Matthews pled guilty to Level 5 felony operating a vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (ACE) of .15 or more, and Class B misdemeanor false informing. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate executed sentence of four years in the Department of Corrections (DOC). Matthews appeals his sentence, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by identifying an improper aggravating circumstance and by imposing an inappropriate sentence. We affirm, finding no sentencing error and rejecting Matthews's request for sentence revision.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] After swerving out of his lane of traffic and failing to signal his turn, police pulled Matthews over. The police tried to identify him, but Matthews gave them an incorrect date of birth. Smelling alcohol on his breath and finding three open alcoholic beverage containers in his car, the police gave him field sobriety tests, which he failed. The certified breath test indicated he had an alcohol concentration of 0.191 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

[3] The State charged Matthews with four counts related to this incident. In April 2024, Matthews pled guilty to three of the four counts: Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life;¹ Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more;² and Class B misdemeanor false informing.³ In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State agreed to dismiss the fourth count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a Class A misdemeanor. The plea agreement left sentencing to the trial court's discretion. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court identified as aggravating factors: “the seriousness of the total circumstances of the crime; criminal history; on probation for two cases at the time of committing the instant offense [ ]; this is the fourth serious driving offense ․; previous unsuccessful termination of probation; [and] prior attempts at rehabilitation have failed.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 10-11. The trial court considered the mitigating factors of: “ple[ading] guilty, [m]edical issues; substance abuse issues ․; family support; mental health issues including PTSD ․, and he has done well on Community Corrections.” Id. at 11. Finding the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the trial court sentenced Matthews to concurrent, executed sentences of four years for operating a vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, one year for operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more, and 180 days for false informing. Matthews appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Matthews appeals his four-year sentence, arguing that the trial court used an improper aggravator to enhance his sentence and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We conclude that neither argument warrants relief.

1. Challenged Aggravator

[5] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A sentencing court abuses its discretion, among other ways, by entering a sentencing statement that: 1) includes reasons for the sentence unsupported by the record; 2) omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or 3) is based on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

[6] Matthews claims the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the improper aggravator of “the seriousness of the total circumstances of the crime[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 10. To support his argument, Matthews contends that the trial court used the offense of operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more as an aggravator in and of itself to enhance the other two offenses and points to the trial court's statement:

[W]hen we talk about the seriousness of the offense, we have to take a look at the totality of the circumstances and all what existed at the time he committed the offense. So, it wasn't just operating ․ after license was forfeited for life. It was the operating while intoxicated as well. And then the false informing. So, if we look [sic] at all together, he shouldn't have been on the road in the first place. You're not supposed to be out on the road intoxicated which [ ], you were over .15. So, when your attorney argues that this crime didn't necessarily threaten the harm of individuals or the community I disagree because he's out on the road intoxicated[.]

Transcript at 57.

[7] We are unpersuaded by Matthews's argument since the trial court did not find the offense of operating with an ACE of .15 or more to be an aggravating factor in its own right. Rather, it found that the three offenses to which he pled guilty, considered collectively, were significantly more serious than any one of his charges taken individually. When Matthews was pulled over, his license had been forfeited for life, he was on probation for a prior conviction of driving with a lifetime suspension, he operated his vehicle while intoxicated, and he provided the police with false information. See Mefford v. State, 983 N.E.2d 232, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“ ‘It is a well-established principle that the fact of multiple crimes or victims constitutes a valid aggravating circumstance that a trial court may consider in imposing consecutive or enhanced sentences.’ ” (quoting O'Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 952 (Ind. 2001))), trans. denied; see also Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“A trial court may find the nature and particularized circumstances surrounding the offense to be an aggravating factor.”), trans. denied.

[8] We are confident the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not considered the challenged aggravator. The trial court found five other aggravators—Matthews's criminal history; the fact that he was on probation for two cases at the time of committing the instant offense; that this was his fourth serious driving offense; that he had previously been terminated unsuccessfully from probation; and that he had not availed himself of rehabilitative treatment. Any one of these aggravators would permit an enhanced sentence, and Matthews does not challenge any of them. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (“[W]hen a defendant challenges some, but not all, of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, we will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.”). We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in identifying the aggravator Matthews challenges.

2. Appropriateness

[9] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, our principal role is “to attempt to leaven the outliers,” not to achieve a perceived “correct” sentence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Accordingly, we give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision. Id. The trial court's judgment should prevail unless it is “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character[.]” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 112 (Ind. 2015).

[10] In assessing the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the statutory range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. Matthews was convicted of a Level 5 felony, a Class A misdemeanor, and a Class B misdemeanor. A Level 5 felony has a sentencing range of between one and six years with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). A Class A misdemeanor carries a possible sentence of not more than one year, and a Class B misdemeanor has a possible sentence of not more than 180 days. I.C. §§ 35-50-3-2; -3. The trial court sentenced Matthews to four years on the Level 5 felony and to the maximum sentences for his two misdemeanor convictions. With all sentences ordered to run concurrently, Matthews received a slightly aggravated executed sentence of four years.

[11] As to the nature of the offenses, Matthews repeats his claim that the trial court should not be permitted to use that he was operating while intoxicated and gave false information to aggravate his operating a vehicle with a lifetime license forfeiture conviction. Although we have already rejected this claim, we reiterate that this was Matthews's fourth serious driving conviction and he was on probation for the same offense at the time he illegally drove his car. By driving his car while significantly over the legal limit and with a permanently revoked license, Matthews posed a serious threat to public safety and was prohibited from driving—intoxicated or otherwise.

[12] Looking at Matthews's character, “[e]ven a minor criminal history” reflects poorly on a defendant. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Matthews's criminal history is far from minor. According to the presentence investigation report, his criminal history consists of eighteen prior convictions spanning from 1999 to 2019. During these years, Matthews accumulated thirteen petitions to revoke probation or his suspended sentence, nine of which were found to be true and two of which were pending at the time of sentencing. He was also on probation in two separate causes while committing the instant offenses.

[13] Describing Matthews's criminal history as “awful[,]” the trial court told Matthews that “when you continually repeat a mistake, it becomes a choice[,]” and elaborated that Matthews “made a choice to violate the driving laws of this state four different times. His record includes habitual traffic violator in 2004; habitual traffic violator in 2005; driving for the same darn offense we're here today for license forfeited for life in 2017. This is the fourth time. So, nothing seems to get through to him.” Tr. at 57, 58.

[14] In an attempt to shift the focus away from his extensive criminal history, Matthews instead emphasizes his medical problems, his difficult upbringing, and undiagnosed mental health issues to portray his character in a more compassionate light in support of his request for a downward revision of his sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. He specifically points to his long-term marriage, diagnosis of heart disease and two recent surgeries for deep vein thrombosis, untreated PTSD and alcohol use disorder, and abusive childhood.

[15] While we are sympathetic to these medical and familial considerations, Matthews was fully aware of his lifetime license forfeiture and still chose to drive while drinking, as evidenced by the open containers found in his car. Despite his current health concerns, Matthews has made this choice not just once or twice but four separate times. And by reoffending, he showed an unwillingness to reform.

[16] To the extent that Matthews appears to argue that the trial court placed too much emphasis on his criminal record and too little emphasis on the impact of incarceration on his family and health, we remind him that such considerations are unavailable for appellate review. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse [of discretion].”).

[17] Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court could impose any sentence it “deem[ed] appropriate after hearing any evidence or argument of counsel.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 62. The trial court reviewed the evidence presented and sentenced Matthews to four years executed at the DOC. If Matthews had wanted to serve his sentence on community corrections, it was a term that could have been included in his plea agreement. It was not. Considering the nature of the offenses and Matthews's character, and giving due consideration to the trial court's sentencing decision, we cannot conclude that Matthews's sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[18] Finding the trial court's sentencing statement was not an abuse of discretion and that Matthews's four-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of his offenses and his character, we affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 9-30-5-1(b).

3.   I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1).

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur. Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.