Orlando Rodgers, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Orlando Rodgers appeals his convictions for Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug,¹ claiming the trial court admitted evidence obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 3:00 in the afternoon of May 8, 2019, Officer Dirk Fentz pulled over Rodgers for committing two traffic violations—following too close to the vehicle in front of him and switching lanes without signaling. A day or two earlier, Officer Fentz had conducted an unrelated traffic stop of another driver that led to the recovery of methamphetamine. The driver told police he received the methamphetamine from Rodgers, described Rodgers’ appearance, and shared Rodgers’ phone number and where Rodgers lived. Using this driver as a confidential informant, police organized a controlled buy of one ounce of methamphetamine from Rodgers to take place at a Walmart in Avon, Indiana. So when Officer Fentz stopped Rodgers on May 8 near that Walmart, it was not a mere happenstance; police had been watching for Rodgers’ vehicle to pass by.

[3] After Officer Fentz activated his emergency lights to begin the traffic stop, Rodgers kept driving for a “considerably ․ long amount of time compared to an average length of a traffic stop.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 67.² Rodgers would start to stop then go again before stopping for good. Officer Fentz thought the non-immediate stop could signal Rodgers “debating on fleeing” or attempting to “hid[e] illegal contraband whether it be narcotics or firearms[.]” Id. Once Rodgers’ vehicle stopped, Officer Fentz approached and asked Rodgers for his driver's license and registration. Rodgers supplied his license but shared he did not have a registration. Instead of a registration, Rodgers handed Officer Fentz a piece of paper with handwritten names describing who the vehicle belonged to. Rodgers tried to explain he was buying the vehicle from someone else. Officer Fentz then asked Rodgers to accompany him to his police vehicle so he could write Rodgers a warning for the traffic infractions. Rodgers complied. As the two men sat together for several minutes in Officer Fentz's police vehicle, Officer Fentz began inputting Rodgers’ information into his computer and ran a warrant check. Rodgers said he was on his way to Walmart before being stopped. Officer Fentz noticed Rodgers breathing heavily, which the officer interpreted as a sign of nervousness.

[4] Meanwhile, Officers John Maples and Eric Hollingsworth—along with Officer Hollingsworth's police K-9, Lancelot—arrived on scene. About seven minutes after Officer Fentz pulled over Rodgers, Officer Hollingsworth started to conduct an open-air sniff of Rodgers’ vehicle by walking Lancelot around its perimeter. Lancelot—who is trained to detect methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, crack cocaine, and ecstasy—signaled through a distinct set of behaviors that he smelled drugs near the driver's side of Rodgers’ vehicle. Officer Maples then walked to Officer Fentz's vehicle and asked Rodgers to step out. Rodgers did so and was patted down by Officer Maples. Officer Maples later explained he patted down Rodgers because “violence kind of goes with the drug trade” and “weapons are not anything uncommon for [police] to come across when ․ working narcotics.” Id. at 113. According to Officer Maples, police waited to conduct the pat down until after Lancelot alerted on Rodgers’ vehicle to “keep[ ] everything very calm.” Id. at 122.

[5] While frisking Rodgers for weapons, Officer Maples felt a “rock substance” in a plastic bag “tucked right inside of [Rodgers’] underwear.” Id. at 115–16. Based on his training and experience, Officer Maples suspected the bag contained narcotics. Before removing the bag, police handcuffed Rodgers. Ultimately, police recovered three bags of narcotics while searching Rodgers—two from his “crotch area” and one from his pant leg. Id. at 77. Later testing revealed the bags contained 26.4 grams of methamphetamine (about two grams short of an ounce) and 0.4 grams of heroin. With Rodgers in custody, police searched his vehicle. The vehicle search did not uncover any weapons or contraband. Throughout the entire encounter, Rodgers was cooperative and “[a]bsolutely nothing” he said raised police concern that he was armed and dangerous. Id. at 130. Rodgers made no aggressive or furtive movements and police never saw or recovered a weapon.

[6] The State charged Rodgers with Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug.³ Rodgers moved to suppress evidence recovered during the pat-down search. The trial court denied Rodgers’ motion. A jury found Rodgers guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate eight-year term in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Standard of Review

[7] Trial courts have broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and although “we assess claims relating to admitting or excluding evidence for abuse of discretion, to the extent those claims implicate constitutional issues, we review them de novo.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189 (Ind. 2021).

A. The trial court did not admit evidence obtained in violation of Rodgers’ Fourth Amendment rights.

[8] The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “basic purpose of this Amendment ․ is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018) (citation omitted). Under the Fourth Amendment, any warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, subject only to a handful of recognized exceptions. Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied. Once it is shown that police conducted a search or seizure without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to show the search fits within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. 2017).

[9] According to Rodgers, police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by frisking him without reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and dangerous.⁴ A frisk—a limited pat down of the suspect's outer clothing to search for weapons—is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if police can “point to specific and articulable facts” indicating “that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968). Generalized concerns of officer safety will not suffice. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). Still, “[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. We consider the “specific, reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his experience, can draw from the facts,” to determine whether the officer acted reasonably. Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1205. The Fourth Amendment compels this additional armed-and-dangerous inquiry because a frisk is more intrusive than a stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.

[10] “[C]ourts have often considered evidence of drug involvement as part of the totality of the circumstances contributing to an officer's reasonable belief that a subject is armed and dangerous.” Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1205 (quoting Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). So, although evidence of drug use alone may not create a reasonable fear that a suspect is armed, evidence of other criminal activity that often involves weapons—like drug dealing—can create such a fear. Id. (recognizing drug dealing is a crime for which a suspect could potentially be armed). After all, firearms are “known tools of the drug trade[.]” United States v. Thompson, 842 F.3d 1002, 1007 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is widely known that guns and drugs go hand in hand.”).

[11] Here, police believed, based on collaboration with a confidential informant, Rodgers was traveling in his car with a notable amount of methamphetamine. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972) (noting an informant's tip that a subject of investigation was carrying narcotics contributed to an officer's reasonable fear for his safety). As the investigation progressed, this suspicion grew. For example, Rodgers exhibited signs of nervousness and was slow to pull over, indicating potential debate over whether to flee or an attempt to hide weapons or contraband. Moreover, Lancelot signaled he smelled drugs in Rodgers’ vehicle. With growing suspicion Rodgers was dealing drugs, Officer Maples patted him down because in his training and experience “weapons are not anything uncommon for [police] to come across when ․ working narcotics.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 113. Under these circumstances, a reasonably prudent officer in Officer Maples’ position would be warranted in his belief that his safety or the safety of others was in danger, thereby justifying a frisk of Rodgers. See Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1205 (“[O]fficers know that it is common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotic transactions”) (quotation omitted); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983) (explaining traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police officers”).⁵

B. The trial court did not admit evidence obtained in violation of Rodgers’ Article 1, Section 11 rights.

[12] Rodgers also argues police violated his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees, in relevant part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Although the language of Section 11 is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, our courts interpret the state provision “independently and ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191. In doing so, we use the framework set forth in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). We determine the reasonableness of a law-enforcement officer's search or seizure by balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361. “When weighing these factors as part of our totality-of-the-circumstances test, we consider the full context in which the search or seizure occurs.” Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied.

1. Degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred

[13] We begin by evaluating the law-enforcement officer's “degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. To do so, we consider “the reasonableness of the officers’ assumptions, suspicions, or beliefs based on the information available to them at the time.” Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 18 (Ind. 2010). Rodgers was stopped on his way to a controlled buy, hesitated when pulling over, and exhibited nervous behavior. Moreover, Lancelot alerted to the presence of narcotics in Rodgers’ vehicle. So by the time of the frisk, police had a strong suspicion Rodgers was dealing drugs and, by extension, a reasonable concern Rodgers was potentially armed and dangerous. Taken as a whole, these circumstances contributed to the reasonableness of police concerns and suspicions that led Officer Maples to perform the pat-down.

2. Degree of intrusion

[14] Next, we consider “the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. We measure the degree of intrusion from the defendant's point of view, considering the “intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy.” Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944. A public frisk “may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. That said, an “ ‘ordinary’ pat-down of the outside of a suspect's clothing is a fairly limited intrusion for the purposes of the Indiana Constitution.” Berry v. State, 121 N.E.3d 633, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. Here, Officer Maples began at Rodgers’ waistline and patted down the outside of Rodgers’ pants. Only after Officer Maples felt what he immediately recognized as narcotics did police handcuff Rodgers and conduct a more intrusive search. Because this was an “ordinary” frisk, the degree of intrusion was minimal. See Appellant's Br. at 15 (describing the intrusion as “relatively minor”).

3. Extent of law enforcement's needs

[15] Under the final Litchfield factor, we review the extent of law enforcement's needs “to act in a general way” and “to act in the particular way and at the particular time they did.” Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946–47. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized law enforcement needs related to drug interdiction are significant. See, e.g., State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361, 373 (Ind. 2021) (“[D]istributing or possessing even small amounts of drugs threatens society.”). Rodgers does not disagree. Rather, he posits police did not have a “great need to engage in the elaborate ruse they used to draw a net around [Rodgers].” Appellant's Br. at 15. Yet in so arguing, Rodgers ignores the circumstances that contributed to the officers’ reasonable belief that Rodgers could be armed and dangerous. As previously noted, traffic stops are particularly dangerous for police. Paired with the probability of a firearm or other weapon near drug dealing, police had a strong need to ensure their safety as they conducted the traffic stop and pursued their narcotics investigation.

[16] Upon balancing each factor, we conclude the officers’ actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and therefore the search did not violate Article 1, Section 11.

Conclusion

[17] The frisk of Rodgers violated neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article 1, Section 11. The trial court therefore did not err in admitting evidence obtained from that search.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-6.1(c) (2014) (Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine), 35-48-4-6(a) (2014) (Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug).

2.   Footage from Officer Fentz's vehicle shows about forty-five seconds elapsed between Officer Fentz activating his emergency lights and Rodgers’ vehicle coming to a complete stop.

3.   Originally, the State charged Rodgers with Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine. This charge was later amended to a Level 4 felony. Moreover, the State charged Rodgers with a second charge for Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine which was dismissed before trial.

4.   Rodgers does not challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop, the duration of the stop, the use of Lancelot, or the search of his vehicle.

5.   Based on this conclusion, we need not address the State's argument that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Brown concur. Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.