Diran Brooks, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Diran Brooks appeals the trial court's order that he spend 1,006 days in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) before returning to the Continuum of Sanctions (“COS”) Program ¹ in which Brooks had been serving his sentence. Brooks raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found Brooks committed Level 6 felony invasion of privacy 2 because the State failed to present sufficient evidence thereof; and

2. Whether we should remand for the trial court to reconsider the sanction imposed because that finding of violation was erroneous.

Because the State's evidence was sufficient to support finding Brooks committed invasion of privacy, we need address only the first argument to affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 3, 2021, following an incident with his girlfriend, V.J., the State charged Brooks with Level 5 felony criminal confinement,³ Level 6 felony battery,⁴ and Level 6 felony strangulation.⁵ On May 20, 2021, the State amended the charges to also include one count of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy,⁶ based on an allegation that Brooks violated two protective orders ⁷ by being in the presence of V.J. On February 22, 2022, Brooks entered a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty as charged and the State agreed Brooks would serve the first three years of any sentence through the COS Program, with the remainder to be served on probation.

[3] On May 31, 2022, the trial court sentenced Brooks to five years for Level 5 felony criminal confinement, two years for Level 6 felony battery, two years for Level 6 felony strangulation, and one year for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The court ordered the sentences be served concurrently, with three years executed in the COS program and two years suspended to probation. On the “Probation Order/Specific Conditions of Sentence,” the trial court entered a no-contact order that prohibited Brooks from having contact with V.J. (App. Vol. II at 76) (original formatting omitted).

[4] On November 28, 2022, Madison County Work Release filed a notice of COS termination that alleged Brooks violated his “medication procedure[,]” was “under the influence within the facility[,]” failed to attend the Batterer's Intervention Program, failed to follow the assigned schedule, violated a protective order, and owed the work release facility $1,167.62. (Id. at 84.) On December 20, 2022, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the notice of COS termination. Brooks admitted all the allegations except for failure to follow the assigned schedule, and the State agreed to withdraw that allegation. The trial court determined Brooks violated the terms of his COS placement and ordered Brooks to serve twenty-seven days at the Madison County Detention Center before returning to the COS Program.

[5] On March 24, 2023, Madison County Work Release filed another notice of COS Program termination that alleged Brooks violated his COS Program placement by “not reporting to the Community Justice Center to complete his sentence.” (Id. at 95.) On April 6, 2023, the probation department filed a notice of violation that alleged Brooks “[f]ailed to successfully complete the executed portion of his sentence” based on the Madison County Work Release's notice that he had not reported to the Community Justice Center to complete his sentence for the instant case. (Id. at 96.) Authorities could not locate Brooks, so the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. The trial court instead issued a warrant for Brooks's arrest.

[6] On July 22, 2024, Deputy Blake Callahan of the Madison County Sheriff's Department received a notice from the Sheriff's Department “camera system” that “reads license places” that a vehicle belonging to V.J., whose license was suspended, was traveling “northbound on Madison Avenue from Hazlett Street” in Madison County. (Tr. Vol. II at 20-1.) At that time, Deputy Callahan also became aware that there was an active no-contact order prohibiting Brooks from contacting V.J. Deputy Callahan located V.J.’s vehicle shortly thereafter and initiated a traffic stop because he suspected V.J. was driving the vehicle with a suspended license.

[7] In fact, Brooks was driving the vehicle, and V.J. was in the passenger seat. Deputy Callahan discovered Brooks had an active warrant out for his arrest because he had not reported to the Community Justice Center to complete his sentence. When Deputy Callahan told Brooks and V.J. that there was a no-contact order against Brooks involving V.J., they both indicated they thought it had been dismissed. Deputy Callahan asked Brooks if he had “gone to court and had [the no-contact order] dismissed by a judge” and Brooks told Deputy Callahan “they had not had a hearing on it.” (Id. at 24.) Deputy Callahan then ran Brooks's name through the BMV database and discovered Brooks should not have been driving the vehicle because he was a “[h]abitual traffic violator for life” since 2006. (Id.) Deputy Callahan also noted there was an “active [driving] suspension for delinquent child support” dating back to 2018. (Id.) Deputy Callahan confirmed the no-contact order from the instant case was still active. Deputy Callahan detained Brooks, who remained in jail until the fact-finding hearing on the notice of violation. Based on these additional events, Madison County Work Release filed an amended notice of COS termination that alleged that, in addition to not reporting for the remainder of his sentence, Brooks committed two new criminal offenses – driving while a “[h]abitual traffic violator – lifetime” and Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. (App. Vol. II at 100.)

[8] The trial court held an initial hearing on the matter on August 1, 2024. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter on August 20, 2024. After hearing testimony and receiving evidence, the trial court found Brooks violated his COS Program by not reporting to the Community Justice Center to serve the remainder of his sentence as ordered, by driving while a habitual traffic violator, and by committing Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. The trial court ordered Brooks to serve “1006 days in the Indiana Department of Correction and 12 months on the Continuum of Sanctions program through the Community Justice Center.” (Id. at 14.) The trial court gave Brooks credit for twenty-nine actual days served and ten days of good time credit.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Brooks argues the trial court abused its discretion when it found he violated the terms of his COS Program because the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove he committed Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. “The standard of review for revocation of a community corrections placement is the same standard as for a probation revocation.” Bennett v. State, 119 N.E.3d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2019). We review whether a violation occurred for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion is when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[10] As we explained in Hammann v. State, regarding challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a probation revocation decision:

“ ‘A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014)); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). “ ‘When the sufficiency of evidence is at issue, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment - without regard to weight or credibility - and will affirm if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation.’ ” Brown, 162 N.E.3d at 1182 (quoting Murdock, 10 N.E.3d at 1267).

210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Brooks argues the State did not present sufficient evidence that he committed Level 6 felony invasion of privacy because neither he nor V.J. knew the no contact order was still in effect.

[11] A person commits Level 6 felony invasion of privacy if, while having a prior unrelated conviction of invasion of privacy, he knowingly or intentionally violates “a no contact order issued as a condition of probation” or “an order issued under IC 35-38-1-30” as part of an executed sentence. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(6) & (a)(12). Brooks signed the “Probation Order/Specific Conditions of Sentence,” which indicated Brooks was not to have contact with V.J. (App. Vol. II at 76) (formatting in original omitted). While Brooks told Deputy Callahan that he did not know the no-contact order was still in place,⁸ he admitted to Deputy Callahan that there had not been a hearing to dismiss it. Nor had Brooks finished serving the sentence for which the no-contact order was a condition. Brooks's argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Brown, 162 N.E.3d at 1182 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when determined Brooks violated the no-contact order that was a condition of his sentence and, thereby, committed invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 999 N.E.2d 914, 917-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (evidence supports finding knowing violation of protective order when police officer told defendant about protective order and defendant nevertheless entered protected person's house), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[12] Brooks has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion because the State presented sufficient evidence that he committed Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. Accordingly, we affirm.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The COS Program is similar to work release and is administered at the Madison County Community Justice Center.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(6).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(1).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e).

5.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c).

6.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a).

7.   These orders were entered as part of two prior criminal cases against Brooks, but the record before us does not reveal the details of those cases.

8.   Brooks notes V.J. also told Deputy Calahan that she did not know the no-contact order was still in effect. However, when determining whether someone violated a protective order, we are concerned with the knowledge and behavior of the defendant, not the protected person. See Smith v. State, 999 N.E.2d 914, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Moreover, when determining whether Smith committed the offense of invasion of privacy, we do not consider whether [the protected person] knowingly ignored the protective order but, rather, whether Smith knowingly violated the order.”), trans. denied.

May, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur. Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.