Christopher M. Matson, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Christopher Matson appeals the post-conviction court's summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Matson presents two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition without a hearing.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 1997, in Case No. 64D04-9706-DF-844 (“DF-844”), the State charged Matson with four counts of operating while intoxicated, two as Class D felonies, one as a Class A misdemeanor, and one as a Class C misdemeanor. Matson ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of Class D felony operating while intoxicated. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Matson's plea agreement also included his guilty plea to Class D felony possession of marijuana in Case No. 64D04-9709-DF-1529 (“DF-1529”). The parties agreed that if Matson successfully completed his sentence in DF-844, which included two years suspended to probation, the trial court would dismiss his conviction in DF-1529.

[4] In March 2023, Matson filed a petition for post-conviction relief from a 2001 murder conviction and habitual offender adjudication in Case No. 64D02-0007-CF-5475 (“CF-5475”). That petition was assigned Case No. 64D02-2306-PC-5467 (“PC-5467”).¹ Matson's petition included allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In November, Matson filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction in DF-844, but he mistakenly used the “PC-5467” case number in his caption. And the court's docket in PC-5467 mistakenly labeled that petition as an amended petition for post-conviction relief. In December, Matson realized the mistake and moved the post-conviction court to assign his petition regarding DF-844 a new case number. On February 9, 2024, the post-conviction court ordered Matson to file his petition for post-conviction relief regarding DF-844 under a new case number.

[5] On February 28, under Case No. 64D04-2402-PC-2007 (“PC-2007”), Matson filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his OWI conviction in DF-844 (“initial petition”). Matson alleged that he had been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Matson argued that his plea agreement was “void and unenforceable” because it called for the trial court to withhold judgment in DF-1529 in violation of Indiana law. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 34. Matson alleged that his counsel's performance was deficient when counsel did not object to the plea agreement.

[6] Also on February 28, Matson filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief (“amended petition”) from his 2001 murder conviction. His amended petition alleged that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel did not challenge the “defective habitual offender allegation ․ prior to trial[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 15 (emphasis omitted). Matson accidentally used the same case number, PC-2007, for both his petition in this case and the amended petition in the murder case.²

[7] It is well settled that self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. All of Matson's mistakes are extremely important in light of those standards. These repeated mistakes are also extremely important as we attempt to sort out the procedural and substantive posture of which case was before the post-conviction court and is now on appeal.

[8] In its order summarily denying Matson's petition in PC-2007, the post-conviction court found that it had no “jurisdiction” to grant relief for issues related to the 2001 murder conviction. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 6. Accordingly, it dismissed those claims without prejudice. Still, the court attempted to construe Matson's allegations, which very clearly pertained only to his 2001 murder conviction,³ in the context of DF-844.⁴ And the court summarily denied, without prejudice, Matson's petition as to the OWI conviction under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f). This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Matson appeals the post-conviction court's summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied Matson's petition under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f), which provides:

If the State Public Defender has filed an appearance, the State Public Defender shall have sixty (60) days to respond to the State's answer to the petition filed pursuant to Rule PC 1(4)(a). If the pleadings conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court may deny the petition without further proceedings.

As this Court has explained,

[w]hen a court disposes of a petition under subsection f, we essentially review the lower court's decision as we would a motion for judgment on the pleadings.[] The court errs in disposing of a petition in this manner unless “the pleadings conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief.” P.-C.R. 1 § 4(f). If the petition alleges only errors of law, then the court may determine without a hearing whether the petitioner is entitled to relief on those questions. Clayton v. State, 673 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, if the facts pled raise an issue of possible merit, then the petition should not be disposed of under section 4(f). Id. at 786. “This is true even though the petitioner has only a remote chance of establishing his claim.” Id. at 785.

Allen v. State, 791 N.E.2d 748, 752-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[10] Here, Matson's amended petition, which pertains solely to his 2001 murder conviction and habitual offender adjudication in CF-5475, replaced his initial petition, which pertains solely to his guilty plea in DF-844. Thus, our review on appeal is limited to the arguments Matson made in his amended petition.

[11] However, in his brief on appeal, Matson's argument refers only to the issues he raised in his initial petition, and he ignores the fact that his amended petition replaced his initial petition. In any event, because the argument in his amended petition has no relevance to his guilty plea in DF-844, the pleadings conclusively showed that Matson was entitled to no relief, and the court was entitled to summarily deny the amended petition. See Ind. Post. Conviction Rule 1(4)(f).

[12] Matson's post-conviction claim in PC-2007 raised a single issue, namely, whether his counsel's performance was deficient because counsel did not object to the withheld judgment provision in his plea agreement. Matson argues that withheld judgments are illegal and that his plea agreement was, therefore, a nullity. In particular, Matson's plea agreement provided that, if he successfully completed his sentence in DF-844, “then cause DF[-]1529 [would be] dismissed[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 12.

[13] In Debro v. State, our Supreme Court addressed a similar plea provision and explained that

the plea agreement contemplates not a “withheld” judgment but that no judgment would ever be entered. If Debro had fulfilled the terms of his agreement, then the charge to which he pleaded guilty would have been dismissed. The agreement was thus in clear violation of I.C. [§] 35-38-1-1(a). That does not mean however that Debro is entitled to relief. A plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the State and the trial court. Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994). As we recently explained, “[D]efendants who plead guilty to achieve favorable outcomes give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights, such as challenges to convictions that would otherwise constitute double jeopardy. Striking a favorable bargain including a consecutive sentence the court might otherwise not have the ability to impose falls within this category.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004) (quotation omitted). Withheld judgments and deferred sentences fall into this category as well.[] The agreement Debro reached with the State provided him with a significant benefit: the possibility of no criminal conviction for his admitted criminal conduct.

821 N.E.2d 367, 372 (Ind. 2005).

[14] Likewise, here, Matson's plea agreement provided him with a significant benefit in that the trial court would dismiss the charge in DF-1529 if he successfully completed his sentence in DF-844. His plea agreement was not a nullity, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue, if it had properly been before us for review, would fail as a matter of law.

[15] After consideration of the extremely confused substantive and procedural posture of this appeal, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary denial of Matson's petition in Case No. 64D04-2402-PC-2007.⁵

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Rule of Evidence 201(b)(5) permits courts to take judicial notice of records of a court of this state. Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1160 (Ind. 2016). For ease of discussion, we take judicial notice of the docket in PC-5467, which is available to this Court through the Odyssey case management system.

2.   Matson's petition for post-conviction relief pertaining to his murder conviction remains pending in PC-5467.

3.   The allegations explicitly referred to Matson's trial and his habitual offender adjudication. In DF-844, Matson pleaded guilty and was not adjudicated a habitual offender.

4.   The post-conviction court's application of Matson's collateral attack on his murder conviction to Matson's OWI conviction was unnecessary, and we vacate the court's reasoning.

5.   To be clear, Matson's petition for post-conviction relief in PC-5467 is still pending, and nothing about the court's resolution of PC-2007 can be used against Matson in that case. Further, because the post-conviction court dismissed his petition in PC-2007 without prejudice, Matson is entitled to file a new petition for post-conviction relief, albeit on grounds other than those he raised in his initial petition.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges Foley and Felix concur. Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.