JOHNSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Ricky Johnson appeals his convictions and sentence for three counts of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and being a habitual offender. Johnson argues that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting a letter he wrote. He also asserts that his sentence is inappropriate. Finding no error in the admission of the letter and that Johnson has not met his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] After Johnson sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant on three different occasions, the State charged him with three counts of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. The State also alleged that Johnson is a habitual offender.

[3] At trial, over Johnson's objection, the court admitted a letter that Johnson had written to one of the judges in the county where these charges were pending and that had been filed in this case. Johnson believed the particular judge to be in charge of a drug court program, and in the letter he admitted to selling drugs. A jury convicted Johnson of all three felonies, and he admitted to being a habitual offender. The court sentenced Johnson to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for each of his three felony convictions and enhanced the first count by twelve years for the habitual offender adjudication. Johnson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Admission of Evidence

[4] Johnson first asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the letter in which he admitted selling drugs. Specifically, Johnson contends that the court committed reversible error in admitting the letter because it should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Rules 404(b) and 403.

[5] A trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and thus we disturb its ruling only if it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or it is a misinterpretation of the law. Id. Even if the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Id. An error is harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties. Id.

[6] Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” The rule “ ‘is designed to prevent the jury from making the ‘forbidden inference’ that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.’ ” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind. 1999)). Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) provides in pertinent part, “This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

[7] To ascertain whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding the admissibility of 404(b) evidence, we must first determine whether the evidence of prior bad acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act. Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 951 (Ind Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Second, we must balance the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. Id.; see Ind. Evidence Rule 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). “A trial court's evidentiary rulings are presumptively correct, and the ‘defendant bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that the court erred in weighing [unfair] prejudice and probative value under Evid. R. 403.’ ” Rivera v. State, 132 N.E.3d 5, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. State, 681 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied.

[8] Here, prior to the start of trial, the court heard argument on the State's desire to introduce the letter at trial. From the State's perspective, the crux of the letter is Johnson's statement that he “started selling drugs to feed my habit[.]” Ex. Vol. I, p. 43, Ex. 34. Johnson objected to the letter as inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), arguing that it is “vague” and “seems to be referencing something from the past.” Tr. Vol. I, p. 61. The trial court determined it would admit the letter because it “is an explicit statement of motive,” and motive is one of the exceptions in Rule 404(b)(2). Id. At trial, the State moved to admit the letter, Johnson objected, and the court admitted the letter over his objection. See Tr. Vol. II, pp. 84-85.

[9] Turning to the first factor in our assessment of whether the 404(b) evidence was erroneously admitted, we conclude the evidence of other wrongs is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act—that matter being Johnson's motive. “Evidence of motive, though not required, is always relevant in the proof of a crime.” Cox v. State, 854 N.E.2d 1187, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Yet, if the State's claim of relevance to motive is too strained and remote to be reasonable, then evidence of the prior act is inadmissible. D.R.C. v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[10] Here, Johnson's letter appears to be evidence not of “other wrongs” but of the charged offense. The letter was written to a judge in the county where Johnson was charged with dealing methamphetamine, dated during the pendency of this case, and refers to him selling drugs. Even if we assume the letter refers to other bad acts, we conclude, as did the trial court, that it is relevant evidence of Johnson's motive that is not too remote to be reasonable.

[11] Next, we balance the probative value of the letter against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. It is of note that the inquiry is not whether the evidence is prejudicial, because all relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial in a criminal case, but rather whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial. Jackson v. State, 222 N.E.3d 390, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002)).

[12] We find that the prejudicial nature of the letter does not substantially outweigh its probative value. The letter is only prejudicial in that it is highly probative of Johnson's commission of the charged offenses and thus does not rise to the level of unfair prejudice. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Johnson's letter into evidence.

[13] Moreover, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the trial court did abuse its discretion by admitting the letter, the admission would have been harmless error. “ ‘An error in the admission of evidence is not prejudicial if the evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence in the record.’ ” Williams v. State, 782 N.E.2d 1039, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Pavey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 692, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied), trans. denied. In this case, prior to admission of the letter, the confidential informant testified to the three instances in which she purchased methamphetamine from Johnson. This evidence was in addition to video footage, photos, and text messages of the drug sales that depict Johnson's involvement. Because the letter was merely cumulative to this evidence, it was not prejudicial, and its admission was harmless.

Sentence

[14] Johnson next alleges that his sentence is inappropriate. Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes the Court to review and revise sentences. Appellate Rule 7(B) implements this authority, stating the Court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[15] “Sentence modification under Rule 7(B) ․ is reserved for ‘a rare and exceptional case.’ ” Wilmsen v. State, 181 N.E.3d 469, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018)). “When conducting this review, we generally defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court.” Wilmsen, 181 N.E.3d at 472. Our deference to the trial court will prevail “unless the defendant persuades us the sentence is inappropriate by producing compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense—such as showing restraint or a lack of brutality—and the defendant's character—such as showing substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of positive attributes.” Id. at 472-73. “We consider the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court and also any other factors appearing in the record.” Williams v. State, 170 N.E.3d 237, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[16] When considering the nature of the offense, we begin with the advisory sentence. Id. Johnson was convicted of three Level 2 felonies. A person found guilty of a Level 2 felony can be sentenced to a minimum term of ten years, a maximum term of thirty years, and an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5 (2014). In addition, Johnson admitted to being a habitual offender, which permits the court to enhance his sentence by a term of between six and twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (2017).

[17] The trial court sentenced Johnson to twenty-two years on each of the Level 2 felonies, all concurrent, and enhanced one count by twelve years for his adjudication as a habitual offender, resulting in an aggregate term of thirty-four years. Assuming concurrent sentences, Johnson's sentence is sixteen years less than the maximum possible sentence of fifty years.

[18] “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). There is nothing particularly remarkable about Johnson’ convictions for dealing methamphetamine.

[19] Turning to the character of the offender, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Id.

[20] Johnson claims that the circumstances of his crimes make it clear “this was not a case that deserved an enhanced sentence.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. Yet, in determining an appropriate sentence for a defendant, the trial court does not view the present offenses in a vacuum. Rather, a defendant's criminal history is a proper factor for the court to consider in crafting a sentence. See Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 668; Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2) (2019). And it is well established that even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 668 (quoting Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)). Here at sentencing, the court characterized Johnson's criminal history as “extensive,” found it to be an aggravator, and afforded it “heavy weight.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 166. Indeed, his juvenile legal history consists of seventeen arrests that resulted in six misdemeanor adjudications; four felony adjudications, two of which were crimes of violence; and one community supervision violation. See Appellant's App. Confidential Vol. 2, p. 135 (Pre-Sentence Investigation Report). As an adult, Johnson has been arrested twenty-seven times resulting in six misdemeanor convictions; thirteen felony convictions, three of which are crimes of violence and three that involve a firearm; and eleven commitments to the Department of Correction. Id. Violations of sentencing conditions have been filed in seven of Johnson's cases. Id. The court found Johnson's admission to his status as a habitual offender as a mitigator but afforded it low mitigating weight.

[21] In further assessing Johnson's character, the court described Johnson as “obstreperous” during trial, explaining that “[h]e knew he shouldn't be trying to privately communicate messages to the jury, but he did that, and then denied it after the evidence made it quite clear that's what he had done.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 167. The court additionally observed that Johnson blamed everyone but himself for his difficulties and remarked that this attitude did not bode well for his rehabilitation.

[22] In addition, while Johnson blames his legal trouble on his addiction, he does not explain how his drug use justifies a reduction in his sentence. Appellant's Br. p. 11. Moreover, he acknowledges completing substance abuse treatment in approximately 2012 while in the DOC, yet he has failed to change his behavior. See Appellant's App. Confidential Vol. 2, p. 137 (Pre-Sentence Investigation Report). While these facts do not reflect positively on his character so as to bring about a sentence reduction, as Johnson is aware, there are substance abuse treatment programs that may be available to him in prison. Thus, Johnson has produced no compelling evidence that portrays the nature of his offenses or his character in a positive light to overcome the deference we show to a trial court's sentencing determination.

Conclusion

[23] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Johnson's letter into evidence at trial and that Johnson failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate.

[24] Affirmed.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.