IN RE: the ADOPTION OF A.M.F.; (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] L.J. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order granting J.H. (“foster father”) and M.H.’s (“foster mother”) (collectively, “foster parents”) petition to adopt Father's seven-year-old daughter, A.F., (“A.F”).¹ Father specifically argues that the trial court erred in finding that: (1) his consent to the adoption was not required; and (2) adoption was in A.F.’s best interests. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred in granting foster parents’ petition to adopt A.F.

Facts

[3] Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”) are the parents of A.F., who was born in December 2016. In February 2019, the State charged Father with Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman, Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery (“the 2019 charges”). The victims of the offenses were not Mother or A.F.

[4] In July 2020, both Mother and Father passed out from drug use while A.F. was in their care. That same month, DCS filed a petition alleging that A.F. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and placed A.F. with foster parents. The trial court adjudicated A.F. to be a CHINS and issued a dispositional order requiring Parents to participate in services.

[5] Eight months later, in March 2021, the trial court approved a reunification plan in the CHINS proceedings, and DCS returned A.F. to Parents’ care on a trial basis. Two months later, in May 2021, a jury convicted Father of the 2019 charges, and the trial court sentenced Father to a five-year aggregate sentence, with two years executed in the county jail and three years suspended to probation. DCS removed A.F. from Parents because of Father's incarceration and Mother's drug use and placed A.F. with foster parents.

[6] In July 2022, foster parents filed a petition to adopt A.F. One month later, in August 2022, Father filed a motion to contest the adoption. Father was released from incarceration in October 2022 and began participating in some of the services that the trial court had ordered in the CHINS dispositional order. Specifically, Father attended supervised visits with A.F. and participated in individual counseling.

[7] In June 2023, the State charged Father with Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Seven months later, in January 2024, Father pleaded guilty to the Level 6 felony, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. Pursuant to the terms of a written plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Father to one year and six months in the county jail and suspended the sentence to probation. Also, in January 2024, the State charged Father with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.

[8] In April 2024, the trial court held a hearing on foster parents’ petition to adopt A.F. and Father's motion to contest the adoption. At the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of Father's criminal cases and heard testimony regarding the facts set forth above.

[9] Also, at the hearing, the guardian ad litem in the CHINS case (“the GAL”) testified that A.F. was “thriving” with foster parents. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14). The GAL further opined that adoption was in A.F.’s best interests because she had spent more than half of her life with foster parents and needed stability.

[10] The DCS family case manager in the CHINS case (“the FCM”) also testified that adoption was in A.F.’s best interests because foster parents had provided her with a very stable life and that she was “thriving” in their care. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27). The FCM also testified that she had concerns about Father's criminal history, substance abuse issues, and anger issues. According to the FCM, Father could “be quite explosive at times[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27). Based on these concerns, the FCM testified that she could not recommend that A.F. live in Father's home.

[11] Also, at the hearing, Father testified that he had previously been addicted to heroin and was taking suboxone. He also testified that he was on home detention for violating probation in one of his criminal cases and that he lived with his current wife. According to Father, he had last lived with A.F. in 2021 and had not been alone with seven-year-old A.F. in nearly three years.

[12] Further, according to Father, he had stable employment and was able to pay his bills, including $260 per week in child support for his four other children, and save $1,000 per month. He also testified that he had purchased a $29,000 car, had been approved for a mortgage, and was expecting a $250,000 inheritance from his grandmother's estate when he turned thirty-five years old that year.

[13] Father also testified that he had never been court-ordered to pay child support for A.F. According to Father, he had asked a DCS case manager if he could provide cash, and she had told him that he could not. Father further testified that during visits with A.F. in 2022, he had provided her with at least $200 worth of gifts, including coloring books, colored pencils, sticker books, teddy bears, Easter baskets, candy, shoes, boots, and a winter coat. Father also testified that during visits with A.F. in 2023, he had provided her with at least $300 worth of gifts, including clothing and “all of the same stuff[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 68). In addition, Father testified that during visits with A.F. in 2024, he had provided her with at least $75 of gifts, including food. When asked why he believed that adoption was not in A.F.’s best interests, Father testified that “there's a connection with the biological parent that honestly I don't think [foster parents] could ever have[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 92).

[14] Foster father, a former teacher and a stay-at-home dad, testified that A.F. thrived in a structured environment, loved attending school, and participated in soccer and basketball. According to foster father, he and A.F. had a typical father-daughter relationship, which included him getting her ready for school, making her lunch, helping her with her homework, and guiding her through her relationships with friends. Foster father further testified that A.F. had a normal sibling relationship with foster parents’ two-year-old son. According to foster father, he and A.F. had a bond, and he loved A.F. as much as he loved his son.

[15] Foster mother, a naturopathic doctor in a primary care practice, testified that A.F. was a “very happy joyful little girl.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 116). Foster mother further testified that A.F. would be participating on a swimming team and playing baseball during the summer. According to foster mother, A.F. was foster father's “little girl ․ [chuckles] we call her his shadow ․ wherever he goes she goes[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 115). Foster mother also testified that foster family loved A.F. very much.

[16] Following the hearing, in July 2024, the trial court issued a detailed order finding that Father's consent to the adoption was not required because he had knowingly failed to provide for A.F.’s care and support when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree. The trial court's order specifically provides, in relevant part, as follows:

18. The Court finds that [Father] has never paid any support for [A.F.] Since [A.F.]’s removal[,] he has provided $200-$300 worth of clothing, food, and gifts for [A.F.] during his supervised visitation. For the year 2024, [Father] provided maybe $75.00 wor[th] of food for [A.F.] at the time of the trial.

19. At the time of the adoption trial, [Father] had nearly $20,000.00 in his bank account[ ]. In addition, he owned a vehicle he purchased for $29,000 and had applied for a loan to own a home. Further, since his release in October 2022, [Father] is able to save $1,000.00 every month from his income after paying $260.00 per week in child support for other children. [Father] also contends he will soon receive an inheritance from his grandmother's estate in the amount of one-quarter million dollars.

* * * * *

37. ․ the inconsistent and occasional provision of clothing, a gift, and other various items in the yearly amount of $200-$300 are merely token efforts that are not sufficient to preserve the requirement for Father's consent to this adoption[ ] ․ especially in light of someone quite eager to boast of his income, savings and anticipated inheritance of a quarter million dollars.

(App. Vol. 2 at 15, 18). The trial court also found that adoption was in A.F.’s best interests and granted foster parents’ petition to adopt A.F. The trial court issued a decree of adoption in August 2024.

[17] Father now appeals.

Decision

[18] Father argues that the trial court erred in granting foster parents’ petition to adopt A.F. He specifically contends that the trial court erred in finding that: (1) his consent to the adoption was not required; and (2) adoption was in A.F.’s best interests. We address each of his contentions in turn.

[19] At the outset, we note that when reviewing the trial court's ruling in an adoption proceeding, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption. M.M. v. A.C., 160 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We generally give considerable deference to the trial court's decision in family law matters because the trial court is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of a parent and the parent's relationships with his children. Id.

[20] We will not disturb the trial court's decision unless the evidence leads to one conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite conclusion. Id. The trial court's findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. Id. We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Rather, we will examine only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id.

[21] Generally, a trial court may grant an adoption petition only if both the mother and father of the child consent. IND. CODE § 31-19-9-1. However, INDIANA CODE § 31-19-9-8 provides that consent to an adoption is not required from:

(2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent:

(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so; or

(B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.

I.C. § 31-19-9-8.

[22] In sum, a parent who meets society's expectations by maintaining a connection with his child and by financially supporting his child cannot have his legal relationship with that child severed without his consent. Matter of Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 276 (Ind. 2021). However, when a parent fails to maintain a meaningful relationship with or fails to financially support his child, he loses his right as a natural parent to withhold his consent to adoption. Id. Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that what constitutes failure is a fact-sensitive inquiry. Id.

1. Consent

[23] Father contends that the trial court erred in finding that his consent to the adoption was not required because he had failed for a period of at least one year to provide for the care and support of A.F. when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree. Indiana law imposes upon a parent the duty to support his children. Irvin v. Hood, 712 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). This duty exists apart from any court order or statute. Id. A court must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine a parent's ability to support his children. I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 277.

[24] For example, under some circumstances, a parent's non-monetary, in-kind support to his child can satisfy that common law duty. In In re Adoption of N.W., 933 N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), opinion adopted by, 941 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 2011), this Court found that although the mother lacked the ability to provide financial support to her child, her in-kind contributions to her child in the form of housing, food, clothing, and other necessities during parenting time established that she did not fail to provide support. In other words, because she was doing the best she could under the circumstances, her consent to the adoption of her child was required. Id. On the other hand, in In re Adoption of M.A.S., 815 N.E.2d 216, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), where the evidence indicated that the father clearly had sufficient resources to provide financial support to his child but mostly provided only in-kind support, we held that the father had failed to provide adequate support to his child and that his consent to the adoption was not required. Id.

[25] Here, Father's situation more closely resembles that of the father in M.A.S. because he had ample financial resources to support A.F. but did not do so. Specifically, the trial court found that Father had $20,000 in his bank account, was able to save $1,000 every month from his income after paying $260.00 per week in child support for his other children, had purchased a $29,000 car, and was expecting a $250,000 inheritance from his grandmother's estate. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to find that Father had knowingly failed to provide for the care and support of A.F. when able to do so.

[26] Father attempts to excuse his failure to support A.F. by arguing that he “inquired as to the ability of DCS to accept financial support from him and was told they could not accept payments from parents.” (Father's Br. 16). However, even assuming that Father's attempt to support A.F. was somehow thwarted, this did not impede Father's ability to provide non-monetary, in-kind support. The trial court found that Father's “inconsistent and occasional provision of clothing, a gift, and other various items in the yearly amount of $200-$300[,]” were “merely token efforts that [were] not sufficient to preserve the requirement for Father's consent to this adoption.” (App. Vol. 2 at 18). This is a reasonable finding based on the evidence, and we will not second-guess the trial court's determination. Father's argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See M.M., 160 N.E.3d at 1135. The trial court did not err in finding that Father's consent to the adoption was not required.

2. Best Interests

[27] Father also argues that the trial court erred in finding that adoption was in A.F.’s best interests. The primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child. In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Thus, even if a court determines that a parent's consent is not required for an adoption, the court must still determine whether adoption is in the child's best interests. Id.

[28] The adoption statute does not provide guidance for which factors to consider when determining the best interests of the child in an adoption proceeding, but we have noted that there are strong similarities between the adoption statute and the termination of parental rights statute in this respect. Id. In termination cases, we have held that the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence to determine the child's best interests. Id. Relevant factors include, among others, a parent's historical and current inability to provide a suitable environment for the child, recommendations of the child's case worker or guardian ad litem, and the child's need for permanence and stability. Id.

[29] Here, our review of the record reveals that at the time of the hearing, Father, who admitted that he had been addicted to heroin, was on house arrest for violating probation in one of his many criminal cases. Indeed, Father had continued his criminal misdeeds even after foster parents had filed their petition to adopt A.F. On the other hand, seven-year-old A.F. was thriving with foster parents, with whom she had lived for more than half of her life. Specifically, A.F. had a bond with foster parents and their two-year-old son, loved school, and participated in many extracurricular activities. Further, both the GAL and the FCM testified that adoption was in A.F.’s best interests. Simply stated, foster parents offered A.F. stability and permanence. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that adoption was in A.F.’s best interests.

[30] In conclusion, the trial court was in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of both Father's and foster parents’ relationships with A.F. We will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Based on the facts of this case, Father has not met his burden to overcome the presumption that the trial court's decision is correct, and we cannot say that the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. Concluding that the trial court did not err in granting foster parents’ petition to adopt A.F., we affirm the trial court's judgment. See K.H. v. M.M., 151 N.E.3d 1259, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (affirming the trial court's grant of a decree of adoption), trans. denied.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.F.’s mother (“Mother”) consented to the adoption and is not participating in this appeal.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur