Camran Perry, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Camran Perry appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, of two counts of murder, each a felony,¹ and one count of carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor.² We affirm.

Issues

[2] Perry raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence a photograph of Perry with a gun and excluded from evidence unredacted records from a victim's cell phone.

2. Whether he has waived his Sixth Amendment claim that he was denied the right to present a defense.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 1, 2021, Blake Coffman and Andrew Jones traveled to Indianapolis from their home near Lafayette. Coffman contacted Perry through Instagram to ask if Perry wanted to buy marijuana. Perry agreed to meet and directed Coffman to 8850 Westfield Boulevard, an address in an apartment complex that is a short distance from Perry's own apartment. Coffman and Jones parked their vehicle facing the apartment at 8848 Westfield Boulevard. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Coffman messaged Perry that they had arrived and that their vehicle's light was on.

[4] A short time later, Monica Cook heard a loud noise, like a collision, outside near her apartment in the Westfield Boulevard complex. She looked out her window and saw a man wearing a hoodie standing to the rear of the driver's side of a car. The man was walking back and forth as though he was confused and then ran away into the woods by the apartment complex. Cook then saw another man, later identified as Jones, open the car's driver's side door, stumble out of the car, and fall to the ground. Cook heard Jones howling as he did this. At 6:40 p.m., Jones used his cell phone to call 9-1-1. On the call, Jones was moaning, and his speech was indistinct. A bystander took Jones’ phone and told the dispatcher that he had heard three gunshots and then found two men who had been shot.

[5] Police responded and administered first aid to Jones, who had collapsed on the pavement outside the car with a chest wound. A responding officer opened the car's passenger door to help the second man, later identified as Coffman. Coffman had been shot through the head, and he was unresponsive. The weapon used to shoot Jones and Coffman, a .38 Special caliber revolver, was found lying on the car's back seat, behind the driver's seat. Police found a small baggie of what appeared to be marijuana on the pavement by the car. Jones and Coffman were transported to a hospital, where they died from their wounds.

[6] Police recovered Jones’ and Coffman's phones at the scene and later extracted data from the phones that disclosed the communications prior to the shootings. According to records police obtained from Facebook and Instagram, those communications were made with social media and mobile phone accounts and were made to Perry. Police learned that Perry had “deleted and deactivated” his Instagram account approximately two hours after Coffman and Jones had been shot. Tr. v. 3 at 88.

[7] Police located Perry and brought him in for questioning on January 10, 2022. After Perry waived his Miranda rights, he was interviewed by Detective David Miller. Perry initially denied knowing Coffman or Jones, then later admitted that it was possible he knew them and perhaps had communicated with them through a group of friends, a job, a school, or GED classes. Perry mentioned that he had not used Instagram for a month or two months, since the previous October or November. When Miller confronted Perry with the fact that Instagram records showed that he had communicated with Coffman, Perry admitted that he wanted to buy a couple of grams of marijuana from Coffman, as he had done in the past. Perry stated that he had never entered the car but had paid for and received the marijuana through the car window. After the detective stated that Perry's DNA was found in the car, that there had been Ring doorbell cameras recording near the site of the shooting, and that the police had discovered the social media messages between Perry and Coffman, Perry admitted that he had gotten into the back seat of the car to buy the marijuana.

[8] Perry stated to the detective that Jones and Coffman “didn't want [Perry] there, ․ [l]ike, on [E]arth.” Ex. v. 2 at 205. He said that Jones and Coffman were “talking crazy to [him],” and he was “talking crazy back to them.” Id. Perry stated that Jones then “pulled his weapon out,” and Perry “grabbed it before [Jones was] able to shoot.” Id. at 206. Perry stated that the gun “looked like a revolver.” Id. He said he “kn[e]w what guns looks like,” and he “knew [the gun] was a revolver.” Id. at 211. Perry stated that he and Jones “tussle[d]” “for a little bit,” and then Perry shot Jones and Coffman in self-defense. Id. at 206-07. Perry believed that Jones had “pull[ed] a gun on” him because he had had “an altercation” with Jones in the past. Id. Perry admitted that he did not have a “gun license.” Id. at 206. He stated that he then ran into the woods because he was scared that he would be arrested on gun charges and that he would have “to prove that it ․ was self-defense.” Id.

[9] At trial, the State offered into evidence State's Exhibit 114, which is a photograph of Perry with a revolver sticking out of his waistband. The photograph was posted to social media eleven days before the shooting, and the State noted that it was not the same revolver that was used in the shooting. However, the State contended the photograph was relevant to show that Perry was familiar with revolvers. Perry objected and asserted that the photograph was highly prejudicial and unnecessary because Perry had “said in his statement [to police that] he's familiar with revolvers.” Tr. v. 2 at 54. The trial court admitted the photograph over Perry's objection but instructed the jury that it was admitted “for the purpose that Mr. Perry, the defendant in this case, had knowledge and familiarity with a revolver. You are not allowed to use it for any other purpose, okay?” Id. at 221. The court also admitted State's Exhibit 145, which contained redacted records from Jones’ cellular phone, and denied Perry's request to admit into evidence the unredacted records from Jones’ cell phone.

[10] The jury found Perry guilty as charged, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction. The court sentenced Perry to consecutive fifty-five-year terms for the murders and one year for the misdemeanor carrying offense, to be served consecutively to the first count of murder. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Evidentiary Rulings

Standard of Review

[11] We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 176 (Ind. 2017); see also, e.g., Wallace v. State, 79 N.E.3d 992, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“The weighing of the probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court.”). Thus, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. See Wallace, 79 N.E.3d at 997; see also Wilcoxson v. State, 132 N.E.3d 27, 31-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting trial courts are given wide latitude in weighing the probative value of evidence against the prejudice caused by its admission), trans. denied. And we may affirm a trial court's judgment on any theory supported by the evidence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted).

Photograph of Perry with Revolver

[12] Perry first maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting State's Exhibit 114, the photograph of Perry with a revolver that is not the revolver used in the shootings of Jones and Coffman. Perry contends that the photograph is inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 404 because it is evidence of a prior bad act not admissible for any purpose other than to show his propensity to commit murder. He also asserts that the photograph's probative value is substantially outweighed by its danger of causing unfair prejudice to him, and it is therefore inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403.

[13] Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a material fact more or less probable. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Evid. R. 402. However, pursuant to Rule of Evidence 403:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

[14] Rule of Evidence 404(b) further provides, in relevant part:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

The restriction of Rule 404(b) “prevents the jury from indulging in the ‘forbidden inference’ that a criminal defendant's prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (quotation and citation omitted).

[15] The trial court found that the photograph was relevant to Perry's familiarity with revolvers and knowledge of how to use them. Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to prove or disprove a consequential fact, and this liberal standard for relevancy “sets a low bar.” Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173,177 (Ind. 2017). Perry's prior possession of a revolver tends to show he is familiar with how to use them, and his familiarity with a revolver is a consequential fact related to whether or not he shot the victims with a revolver. The photograph passes the low bar for relevancy.

[16] In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the photograph was admissible under Evidence Rule 404. As the State points out, merely possessing a firearm is not, alone, a “bad act” to which the rule applies. See Ind. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 32 (“The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.”); see also, e.g., Williams, 690 N.E.2d at 175 (noting “[i]t is by no means clear that weapons possession, evidence of gun sales, and the like, are necessarily prior ‘bad acts’ for 404(b) purposes.”). Perry asserts that the photograph became a “bad act” when considered alongside his admission to the police that he did not possess a firearm license. However, even possession of a firearm without a license is not necessarily illegal and/or a “bad act.” See I.C. § 35-47-2-1(b) (listing the circumstances under which a person legally may carry a handgun without a license). Evidence Rule 404 is inapplicable to the photograph in Exhibit 114.

[17] The trial court also acted within its discretion when it determined that the photograph's probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Evidence Rule 403. All relevant evidence is necessarily prejudicial in a criminal prosecution. E.g., Bowman v. State, 73 N.E.3d 731, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. In evaluating whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial and should be excluded, we look for the dangers (1) that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or (2) that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury. Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation and citation omitted).

[18] First, Perry asserts that the probative value of the photograph was low because he “admitted [his] familiarity” with firearms in his interview with police. Appellant's Br. at 12. However, in the interview, Perry said only that he “know[s] what guns look like,” and he “knew [the gun used in the shooting] was a revolver.” Ex. v. 2 at 211. Those statements do not express familiarity with a revolver, only familiarity with what a revolver looks like.

[19] Second, Perry maintains that admission of the photograph was highly prejudicial to him, and the prejudice outweighed the evidence's probative value. But we agree with the trial court that there was little, if any, prejudice to Perry from the photograph's admission. The State admitted that the gun in the photograph was not the gun used in the shootings. Moreover, following admission of the photograph into evidence, the trial court admonished the jury that the photograph was admitted “for the purpose that Mr. Perry, the defendant in this case, had knowledge and familiarity with a revolver. You are not allowed to use it for any other purpose, okay?” Tr. v. 2 at 221. “When a limiting instruction is given that certain evidence may be considered for only a particular purpose, the law will presume that the jury will follow the trial court's admonitions.” Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Hernandez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 294, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied). We presume that the jury obeyed the court's limiting instruction and did not consider the photograph for any purpose other than showing Perry's familiarity with revolvers. Therefore, there was no unfair prejudice to Perry from the admission of the photograph, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.

Cell Phone Records

[20] Perry also challenges the trial court's admission of a redacted version of Jones’ cell phone records from December 1, 2021, and its denial of his request to admit unredacted versions of those records from April through June of 2021 and November through December 1, 2021.³ The unredacted versions of the December 1 records contain the content of the messages, including a message sent at 6:38 p.m. from Jones to an unknown individual, stating, “lght ima lyk wen I'm done bussin dese plays n if u want it so I can slide back.” Ex. v. II at 246. The unredacted records from Jones’ phone from April through June and November 2021 show a gap in communications between Jones and someone identified only as “LulKam.” Tr. v. 2 at 235-36.

Unredacted December 1, 2021, Records

[21] The State objected to the admission of the unredacted records from December 1 as hearsay, which is generally not admissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 802. Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evid. R. 801(c). Perry does not dispute that the unredacted portions of the December 1 cell phone records are hearsay but contends they are admissible as exceptions to the rule against hearsay under Rules of Evidence 803(3) and 804(b)(3). He also argues they are admissible under Rule of Evidence 106.

[22] Evidence Rule 803(3) states, in relevant part:

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

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(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.

A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, design, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) ․

In criminal cases involving out-of-court statements of a victim's state of mind, the statement may be admissible “to show the intent of the victim to act in a particular way.” D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226 (Ind. 2009) (quotation and citation omitted).⁴

[23] Perry contends that Jones’ statement, “lght ima lyk wen I'm done bussin dese plays n if u want it so I can slide back” was admissible to show Jones’ intent to rob Perry, thus corroborating Perry's claim that he acted in self-defense. Ex. v. II at 246. In support of this contention, Perry asserted that he would have elicited testimony that “bussin dese plays” is slang for “illicit activity,” Tr. v. 2 at 232-33, which “could mean a drug deal but ․ could also mean a robbery,” Appellant's Br. at 17. But even assuming the phrase “bussin dese plays” means what Perry says it does, i.e., engaging in “illicit activity,” the statement does not express Jones’ intent to act in any particular way. Therefore, the statement does not fall under the hearsay exception of Rule 803(3).

[24] Evidence Rule 804(b)(3) provides, in relevant part:

(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

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(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that that [sic] a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability.

“A statement against interest must be incriminating on its face to be admissible under this exception.” Hendricks v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1123, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted), trans. denied. Statements that are “vague and subject to interpretation” do not fall within the hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(3). Beasley v. State, 46 N.E.3d 1232, 1237 (Ind. 2016) (citing D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 232 (Ind. 2009) and Jervis v. State, 679 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ind. 1997)).

[25] The statement “lght ima lyk wen I'm done bussin dese plays n if u want it so I can slide back” is not comprehensible, much less incriminating, on its face. Ex. v. II at 246. Rather, the statement requires speculative interpretation to discern any potential meaning, incriminating or otherwise. Such a cryptic statement does not fall within the hearsay exception of Evidence Rule 804(b)(3).

[26] Finally, Perry asserts that the statement “lght ima lyk wen I'm done bussin dese plays n if u want it so I can slide back” is admissible under Evidence Rule 106, which states:

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

However, the remainder of the writing or recorded statement is still “subject to the general rules of admissibility,” such as the rule against hearsay. Strunk v. State, 44 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Because the proffered redacted portion of the statement is hearsay not subject to any exception, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it from evidence.

April through June and November 2021 Records

[27] Perry also states that he “wanted the unredacted messages admitted ․ to show that there was frequent contact between a user in Jones’ contacts identified as LulKam and Jones up until June of 2021, and then no contact between the two until it started again in November 2021.” Appellant's Br. at 16. However, that one sentence is the only mention Perry makes of the evidence of phone records showing messages between LulKam and Jones. As the State points out, Perry fails to offer any analysis at all regarding why that evidence was admissible under any rule of evidence. Therefore, he has waived review of that issue. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that each contention on appeal be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to authority).

Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense/Waiver

[28] Perry also maintains that the exclusion of the unredacted portions of Jones’ cellular phone records—specifically, Jones’ statement about “bussin dese plays”—deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Appellant's Br. at 21. However, Perry has waived that contention by failing to raise it in the trial court and failing to assert fundamental error on appeal. See, e.g., Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1239 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless fundamental error occurred.”); see also App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).

[29] Perry contends that he did raise the issue in the trial court.

Generally, to preserve a claim for review, counsel must object to the trial court's ruling and state the reasons for that objection. Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018). Moreover, an objection must be “sufficiently specific to alert the trial judge fully of the legal issue.” Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 n.13 (Ind. 2001).

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1194-95 (Ind. 2021). Perry only points to his lawyer's contention that the statement “bussin dese plays” is “highly relevant” to a “self-defense case, that there were messages that support that there were maybe actions other than drug dealing that was [sic] happening and that – perhaps that corroborates a self-defense situation.” Reply Br. at 9-10 (quoting Tr. v. 2 at 234). This vague assertion that there were “maybe” other actions that “perhaps” corroborate a self-defense claim was not sufficiently specific to alert the trial court that Perry was raising a Sixth Amendment claim that the exclusion of the evidence deprived him of a Sixth Amendment right to raise a defense. Furthermore, Perry does not direct us to any other part of the record where he raised such a claim, and it is not our role to scour the multi-volume record in an attempt to find support for him. See, e.g., Haddock v. State, 800 N.E.2d 242, 245 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“As we have often noted, we will not, on review, sift through the record to find a basis for a party's argument.”); see also App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).

Conclusion

[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings. And Perry has waived his Sixth Amendment claim by failing to raise it in the trial court or allege and show fundamental error in his appeal.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-47-2-1(a), (e) (2021).

3.   In his offer of proof, Perry provided copies of the proffered unredacted phone records from December 1, 2021, but he did not provide copies of any of the proffered unredacted phone records from the other dates.

4.   Out-of-court statements of a victim's state of mind are also admissible to explain physical injuries suffered by the victim or in response when the defendant puts the victim's state of mind in issue. D.R.C., 908 N.E.2d at 226. However, Perry does not contend that the statement at issue is admissible for either of those two reasons.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.