Taylor Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Taylor Smith's twelve-day-old infant, W.W., died from asphyxiation when Smith rolled onto W.W. in the bed they were sharing. Smith allegedly was under the influence of drugs when the incident occurred. She was also flouting a court order that barred her from being alone with W.W., who had been born with methamphetamine in his system due to Smith's drug use. Additionally, Smith ignored explicit warnings that she received from child welfare officials about the dangers of co-sleeping with her infant.

[2] The trial court denied her request to sever the drug charges from the neglect count. A jury then convicted Smith of those charges. In this appeal of her convictions, Smith challenges the sufficiency of the neglect evidence and the propriety of the court's refusal to sever. Finding the evidence sufficient to support her neglect conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, we affirm.

Facts

[3] Smith gave birth to W.W. on May 27, 2022. Both tested positive for methamphetamine, triggering an investigation by the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS). Smith told the DCS investigator that she had used methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy and had last used the drug two days before W.W.’s birth. Smith also stated that she had used drugs throughout her previous pregnancies and that her other children had been removed from her care due to her drug use. A court soon declared W.W. a child in need of services (CHINS), ordered him to live with his father and paternal grandmother, and prohibited Smith from being alone with the child.

[4] Smith violated the order repeatedly by having W.W. stay at her home after they were released from the hospital. When W.W. was ten days old, his father brought the infant to Smith's residence. Two days later, Smith took W.W. to bed with her, despite having received extensive education on safe-sleep practices and explicit warnings against co-sleeping, especially while using drugs. Medical personnel and DCS workers specifically warned Smith that co-sleeping while under the influence of drugs or alcohol elevates the risk of infant death.

[5] Smith awoke about 41/212 hours after going to sleep with W.W. and found the infant underneath her and unresponsive. W.W. was pronounced dead within an hour later, and the coroner determined the cause of death was positional or traumatic asphyxia.

[6] Smith told investigating officers that she had decided to sleep separately from W.W.’s father in the home after arguing with W.W.’s father. She admitted that she “rolled over on” W.W. State's Exh. 1 (3:20-3:30). Although Smith acknowledged to officers that she had used methamphetamine, she reported her last use was two days earlier. Both Smith and W.W.’s father tested positive for methamphetamine the morning of W.W.’s death. During police interviews that day, which occurred both at Smith's home and at the police station, Smith rarely sat still. Her body jerked erratically, and she routinely rocked back and forth. A search of Smith's home revealed, among other things, methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

[7] The State charged Smith with neglect of a dependent resulting in death (Level 1 felony), possession of methamphetamine (Level 6 felony), possession of paraphernalia (Class C misdemeanor), and other charges that were later dismissed. Before trial, Smith moved to sever the neglect charge from the drug charges, arguing that evidence of her drug use would unfairly prejudice the jury as to the neglect count.

[8] After a hearing, the trial court denied Smith's motion to sever, ruling:

The Court finds the number of charged offenses (seven) and the complexity of the evidence do not weigh in favor of severance. Further, [the drug counts] are connected to [the neglect count,] considering the investigation into the child's death led to the discovery of the alleged drugs and paraphernalia that serve as the basis for [the drug counts]. The anticipated evidence does not appear to require consideration of significant amounts of different evidence, dates, or persons. Therefore, the Court believes the jury will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently to each charged offense. See Sexton v. State, 213 N.E.3d 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

App. Vol. II, p. 72. Smith renewed her motion at the beginning of trial, conceding that “the caselaw is very clear that the Court has discretion under these circumstances on whether to sever or not.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 5. The trial court upheld its previous ruling.

[9] During the ensuing jury trial, the State presented testimony from medical personnel who had educated Smith about safe-sleep practices, DCS witnesses who worked with Smith after W.W.’s birth, emergency responders who found W.W. unresponsive, and the coroner who determined the infant's cause of death. Expert testimony established that co-sleeping while under the influence of drugs increases the risk of infant death up to tenfold. The jury found Smith guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced her to an aggregate term of 30 years.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Smith raises two issues on appeal. First, she asserts the State failed to prove her neglect of W.W. resulted in his death. Second, Smith argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to sever. We find neither claim persuasive.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor re-examine witness credibility. Jordan v. State, 244 N.E.3d 445, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We consider only the “probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the jury's verdict” and affirm unless “no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[12] The State charged Smith with Level 1 felony neglect under Indiana Code § 35-46-1-4, which provides, in pertinent parts:

(a) A person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly or intentionally:

(1) places the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent's life or health;

***

commits neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony.

(b) However, the offense is:

***

(3) a Level 1 felony if it is committed under subsection (a)(1) ․ by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age and results in the death or catastrophic injury of a dependent who is less than fourteen (14) years of age[.]

[13] Smith does not assert that the State failed to prove she neglected W.W. Instead, she claims the State did not prove that her neglect “result[ed]” in W.W.’s death. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(b)(3). She focuses on the coroner's testimony that “without knowing what I knew about this case, ․ I would definitely not be able to reach a conclusion of positional or traumatic asphyxia[;] in this case I would have had no idea what the cause of death would be, there would be none actually.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 82. The coroner noted that, in general, there are a few non-conclusive indicators of positional traumatic asphyxia, including certain types of hemorrhages that would suggest “a struggle in the person's body” to breathe, but none of those indicators were noted during W.W.’s autopsy. Id. at 81-82. Relying on this testimony, Smith contends that the coroner determined the cause of death “by default” without any physical evidence of asphyxiation. Appellant's Br., p. 15.

[14] That may be the case, but Smith both misunderstands how doctors determine the cause of death and the role that a coroner's cause-of-death determination plays in this type of jury trial. The coroner's testimony revealed that the cause of death is determined from the autopsy results considered in the context of the circumstances of the death. Although positional or traumatic asphyxia often does not leave visible marks in the body, the coroner relies on the autopsy in such cases to rule out the other possible causes of death. “[W]e're looking for heart defects or infection, especially of the brain or of the lungs,” according to the coroner. Tr. Vol. II, p. 80. If, as here, such physiological explanations for the death are not found and the circumstances show the child was in an unsafe sleeping environment, the coroner testified that positional or traumatic asphyxia becomes the cause of death “by default.” Id.

[15] Just because the coroner's determination of the cause of death was subject to reasonable attack by the defense does not mean Smith prevails on this issue. The coroner's testimony was but one part of the evidence before the jury, which was tasked with determining whether W.W. died as a result of Smith's neglect. See Nicks v. State, 598 N.E.2d 520, 523-524 (Ind. 1992) (finding that failure of doctor performing autopsy to discover the victim's pregnancy was not dispositive of whether the victim was actually pregnant and, instead, was an issue to be decided by the jury).

[16] The evidence showed that Smith violated court orders by taking W.W. to her home. She then took the twelve-day-old infant to bed with her despite repeated warnings about the dangers of co-sleeping, especially while using drugs. Expert testimony confirmed that co-sleeping while using drugs increases an infant's death risk as much as tenfold. Smith admitted that she “rolled over on” W.W. while sleeping and later found W.W. unresponsive underneath her. Smith also admitted that she had used methamphetamine while caring for W.W., she tested positive for the drug the morning after W.W.’s death, and she displayed unusual behaviors common to someone under the influence of the drug later that day. Based on this evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from it, the jury could reasonably conclude that Smith neglected W.W. by co-sleeping with the infant while under the influence of methamphetamine. The jury could also reasonably conclude that Smith's neglect resulted in W.W.’s death by asphyxiation.

[17] Smith's reliance on Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), is misplaced. In Patel, this Court reversed a mother's neglect conviction after finding the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that the mother's failure to obtain medical care for her prematurely born baby proximately caused the infant's death. Id. at 1055. Smith emphasizes that, despite strong medical evidence that the baby was viable, the Patel Court found the testimony “established only a possibility” of causation, which was insufficient to meet the burden of proof. Appellant's Br., p. 16. According to Smith, the coroner's testimony in her case is even weaker than the evidence in Patel because the coroner who conducted W.W.’s autopsy determined the cause of death “by default” with no physical evidence of asphyxiation. Smith concludes that, as in Patel, the State's evidence amounted to mere “speculation about a possibility” of causation rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 17.

[18] But the causal connection in Patel was attenuated, and medical experts could not determine with certainty what caused the baby's death. Here, the evidence presents a direct causal connection. Smith engaged in conduct known to be dangerous (co-sleeping, allegedly while impaired), expert testimony established her alleged drug use increased the risk of death to W.W. tenfold, the coroner identified positional or traumatic asphyxia as the cause of death, and Smith herself admitted she “rolled over on him.” State's Exhibit 1 (3:20-3:30). Although the coroner acknowledged relying partly on circumstantial evidence, the totality of evidence provided a sufficient basis for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith's conduct caused W.W.’s death.

II. Motion to Sever

[19] Smith contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to sever the neglect charge from the drug charges. Smith alleges that she was entitled to severance under Indiana Code § 35-34-1-11(a), which provides:

[T]he court, upon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court determines that severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense considering: (1) the number of offenses charged; (2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and (3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.

We review a ruling under this provision for an abuse of discretion. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264 (Ind. 2015).

[20] Smith argues that joining the drug charges to the neglect count allowed the State to circumvent Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), which specifies that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” The evidence of her drug use unfairly prejudiced the jury's consideration of the neglect charge, according to Smith, particularly because the State repeatedly emphasized her methamphetamine use as a factor in W.W.’s death. Smith contends that the jury could not differentiate between her drug possession and the causation element of the neglect charge. A review of the record establishes otherwise.

[21] First, the charges against Smith were straightforward, posing minimal risk of jury confusion. Second, and most significantly, Smith's drug use was inextricably intertwined with the neglect charge. Her methamphetamine impairment was central to establishing both her neglect of W.W. and that W.W.’s death resulted from her neglect. Expert testimony established that co-sleeping while intoxicated increases the risk of infant death tenfold, making Smith's drug use an essential component of the State's case.

[22] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), even if Smith's drug charges had been severed and tried separately, evidence of Smith's methamphetamine use would have been admissible in the neglect trial to prove intent, knowledge of risk, and absence of accident. See id. (providing that evidence of a crime or wrong “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident”). Smith's methamphetamine use was not merely character evidence but directly relevant to an essential element of the neglect charge: her knowing placement of W.W. in a dangerous situation. The State's theory, supported by expert testimony, was that co-sleeping while impaired by methamphetamine created a significantly heightened risk of death, making the drug evidence probative rather than merely prejudicial.

[23] Finally, the trial court gave proper limiting instructions, directing the jury to consider each charge separately. We presume the jury follows the court's instructions. Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 20 (Ind. 2015), quoting Duncanson v. State, 509 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ind. 1987). The trial court reasonably concluded that the jury could distinguish the evidence relevant to each charge and apply the law intelligently to each offense. We find no abuse of discretion.

[24] As the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Smith's neglect of W.W. resulted in the infant's death, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith's motion to sever, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[25] Affirmed.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.