BARRINGTON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Richard Otto Barrington appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 4 felony,¹ and his admission to being a habitual offender.² We affirm.

Issues

[2] Barrington raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Between November 20 and December 6, 2023, Barrington engaged in five transactions during which he sold controlled substances to an undercover officer. Barrington represented that the substances were methamphetamine or heroin, but they contained fentanyl. On one occasion on December 6, Barrington agreed to sell the officer methamphetamine and heroin. Barrington provided the officer with a plastic bag that contained methamphetamine and several folded paper packets that contained fentanyl.

[4] Based on those transactions and a subsequent search of Barrington, the State charged him with thirteen offenses and alleged that he was a habitual offender. Thereafter, Barrington and the State entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Barrington agreed to plead guilty to one count of dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 4 felony, based on the December 6, 2023, offense. He also agreed to admit to being a habitual offender. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining twelve charges and that the sentencing enhancement for the habitual offender charge would not exceed ten years.

[5] The trial court accepted the guilty plea, entered judgment of conviction on the Level 4 felony, and adjudicated Barrington to be a habitual offender. During a subsequent sentencing hearing, the court identified as aggravating Barrington's criminal history, “not including ․ the ones that are ․ used to enhance the habitual[,]” and a recent violation of probation. Tr. at 59. The court then identified as mitigating the fact that Barrington had pleaded guilty, that his incarceration would be a hardship on his children, and his “history of mental health illness[.]” Id. The court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Barrington to seven years on the Level 4 felony conviction, enhanced by ten years for the habitual offender adjudication, for an aggregate term of seventeen years. The court then ordered fifteen years to be executed in the Department of Correction, with two years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[6] Barrington first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.³ Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[7] The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two years to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. And, while Barrington could have faced an additional fixed term of between eight years and twenty years for his adjudication as a habitual offender, see I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(1), the terms of his plea agreement capped the additional fixed term for the habitual offender adjudication at ten years. Following the sentencing hearing, the court identified as aggravators Barrington's criminal history and recent probation violation, and it identified as mitigators that he pleaded guilty, that his incarceration would be a hardship on his dependents, and that he had issues with mental health. The court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Barrington to an aggregate term of seventeen years, with fifteen years executed at the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation.

[8] On appeal, Barrington contends that the court abused its discretion when it did not identify his history of substance abuse as a mitigating factor. The finding of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 248-49 (Ind. 2000). An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Id. at 249. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Id.

[9] Barrington claims that the court abused its discretion when it declined to identify his “substantial long-term substance abuse” as a mitigator because it “explains most of [his] juvenile and adult criminal history[,] which consists of multiple offenses related to the use and abuse of controlled substances.” Appellant's Br. at 15. However, Barrington has not demonstrated that his proffered mitigator is significant. Again, his only argument is that his substance abuse is the cause of his criminal behavior. And he does not suggest how that purported mitigator would add weight not already accounted for by the court's assessment that his acceptance of responsibility and mental health issues entitled him to mitigating weight. Further, regarding Barrington's drug use, the court stated that Barrington was “rationalizing” his behavior, “minimizing what's going on,” and “not owning it at all.” Tr. at 58. In addition, the court noted that Barrington's actions were helping people “obtain substances that will lead to further addiction or kill them with an overdose.” Id. at 59. In other words, the court rejected the idea that Barrington's offenses were simply to feed his own addiction and were, instead, actions that furthered dangerous drug use by others in the community. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not identify his history of substance abuse as a mitigating factor.

Issue Two: Appropriateness of Sentence

[10] Barrington next contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has previously explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[11] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[12] As discussed above, Barrington faced a total possible sentence of twenty-two years under the terms of the plea agreement. And, following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Barrington to an aggregate sentence of seventeen years, with fifteen years executed and two years suspended to probation.

[13] On appeal, Barrington contends that his sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offense because the “amount of the drugs delivered” was “very small” and because he “cooperated with the police by providing information about where he obtained the controlled substances.” Appellant's Br. at 12. And, while he acknowledges his criminal history, Barrington maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because he expressed remorse, he has two children for whom his incarceration would be a hardship, he has a “substantial long-term substance abuse” problem that began when he was only ten years old, he suffers from mental illnesses, he was “an effective store manager at Subway,” and he had obtained a GED. Id. at 15, 17.

[14] However, Barrington has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offense, Barrington misrepresented what he was selling and sold methamphetamine and fentanyl. Thus, while the amount of drugs was small, Barrington has not presented compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offense in a positive light. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[15] As for his character, Barrington has a criminal history that includes several adjudications as a juvenile delinquent as well as numerous misdemeanor and felony offenses as an adult. In addition, Barrington has had his placement on probation revoked on three occasions, and he was on probation at the time of the instant offense. And Barrington continues to use illegal substances, which reflects poorly on his character. We cannot say that Barrington's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his character.

Conclusion

[16] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to identify Barrington's history of substance abuse as a mitigating factor. And his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or his character. We therefore affirm his sentence.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(c)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8(b).

3.   Barrington purports to only raise the issue of whether his sentence is inappropriate. But within that argument, he additionally asserts that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. While he does not make a separate argument on this issue, his argument is nonetheless sufficient for us to address it.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.