IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.S. (Minor Child) and T.S. (Mother) and A.M. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.M. (“Father”) and T.S. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights over L.S. (“Child”). We affirm.

Issues

[1] Parents raise two issues for our review:

1. Whether certain findings of fact are supported by the evidence.

2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it terminated their parental rights.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother gave birth to Child on May 18, 2020. Mother and Father were not married and did not live together, and Father had not established paternity. On May 21, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to Mother's unstable housing and involvement with another CHINS case and Father's admission that he was unable to care for Child and the previous termination of his parental rights over another child. DCS removed Child and placed him in foster care.

[3] At a hearing, Father admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition. Mother initially denied the allegations, but, at a later pretrial conference, Mother also admitted to them. The court adjudicated Child a CHINS. Thereafter, on July 9, DCS submitted to the court a DNA test that revealed that Father is Child's biological father. Then, following a dispositional hearing, the court ordered Mother and Father to, among other things, notify DCS of any changes in household; enroll in programs that are recommended by DCS; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal source of income; complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; and “[a]ctively participate in, cooperate with, and successfully complete all recommendations as a result of any domestic violence assessment(s)/programs.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 127.¹

[4] Mother continued to struggle to maintain housing, and the court placed Child with Father on May 21, 2021, with Mother to have scheduled visitation. Soon thereafter, DCS discovered that Father was allowing Mother to see Child outside of the visitation, so DCS filed a motion for a change of placement. Following a hearing, the court denied DCS’ motion but advised Parents that Mother was restricted to seeing Child only during scheduled visits.

[5] On June 22, 2022, DCS secured a place for Mother at Lotus House, a women's shelter. However, Mother was “dismissed” from Lotus House “within thirty days” because of “[i]nappropriate sexual comments to other females at the home and stealing other females’ items.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 161. After her dismissal, Mother told DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Laura Renfrow and Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) that she “found a ․ guy [who] was living in Indy and she wanted to go there[.]” Id. Both FCM Renfrow and the CASA asked Mother to stay in Floyd County in order to continue “visits with [Child].” Id. at 162. Despite those requests, Mother went to Indianapolis. While there, Mother was “involved in” domestic violence, so she returned to Floyd County and moved in with Father. Id.

[6] Father, who requires a wheelchair, has caregivers who reside in his home. One day, Mother and one of Father's caregivers got into a “physical fight” while Child was in the home. Id. at 163. Following this altercation, DCS learned that Mother was living with Father. At a detention hearing on November 21, the court again ordered that Mother was not to be around Child outside of normal visitation times. The court advised FCM Renfrow to conduct a home check the next day. FCM Renfrow conducted the home check and discovered that Mother was still living in the house. FCM Renfrow advised Father that there could be consequences to allowing Mother to be in his home, but Father responded: “I'll take my chances.” Id. at 165. FCM Renfrow then got permission from the court to remove Child. When she removed Child, Father was “in his bedroom playing a video game,” and he “[d]idn't seem to be too concerned.” Id.

[7] Following Child's removal, Parents agreed that a guardianship should be established and that Denise Nicholson, an ex-girlfriend of Father's, should become Child's guardian. At some point, FCM Renfrow left DCS, and FCM Spencer Day took over the case. In early April 2024, Nicholson contacted both FCM Day and the CASA and informed them that “she had been threatened and harassed by both [P]arents and did not feel safe herself[.]” Id. at 200. Nicholson then informed FCM Day and the CASA that her original plan “was to take the guardianship on paper and give [Child] back immediately to his parents.” Id.

[8] While Parents had originally been compliant with services, their compliance dwindled, and they made “minimal progress” toward the case plan and goals. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 173. Parents “cycle[d] between periods of compliance and hostility,” which made it “difficult to remedy the reasons for DCS involvement.” Id. In addition, Mother and Father filed numerous protective orders against one another. As a result, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights over Child. After DCS filed its petition, Parents again filed protective orders against each other. In Father's latest protective order, he alleged that Mother “had a gun and she had threated to kill [Father] and [Father] feared for [his] life.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 76.

[9] The trial court scheduled a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition for September 11, 2024. Three weeks prior to the hearing, one of Father's case workers visited Father and saw that Mother was in his home. Then, the day prior to the hearing, Father dismissed his latest protective order against Mother.

[10] During the fact-finding hearing, Father's home-based case worker Sandra Witherspoon testified that Father needed to work on “parenting skills” but that he “struggles with understanding why[.]” Id. at 83. Specifically, Witherspoon testified that Father struggled to understand “how to appropriately respond to ․ a temper tantrum or an outburst by” Child. Id. She also testified that the goals she had set for Father “have not been met,” that he is “focused on his own agenda,” and that is he “focused on other things other than [Child].” Id. at 83, 84, 86. In addition, she testified that Father allowed three-year-old Child to play the video game Grand Theft Auto, which was not “appropriate” for Child, and that Father did not “see a problem with” allowing Child to play that game. Id. at 92.

[11] Erin Bumpous, Child's therapist, also testified at the hearing. She testified that Child had previously had “a lot of aggressive hitting behaviors” but that she had “seen a lot of improvement” since his placement with his current foster family. Id. at 107-08. In addition, she testified that Father would allow Child to play video games that included “some guns” and “shooting,” and that Child had “more aggressive behaviors” after visits with Father. Id. at 118-19. She further testified that she did not “feel comfortable” conducting therapy sessions with Child in Father's house because of “observed safety issues,” such as “violence toward [Father] from other people” and “some domestic violence issues with” Mother. Id. at 119-20. And she testified that the “threats against” Father caused her to “be concerned for [Child's] safety.” Id. at 120. Bumpous also served as Mother's therapist in 2021, and she testified that, while there was period of time that Mother was “doing very well,” Mother “struggle[d]” toward the end of Bumpous’ time as her therapist. Id. at 109. She also testified that Mother's services “were incomplete” at the time she ended her involvement. Id. at 114.

[12] Shawn Craig testified that she had been Mother's home-based case worker until approximately two or three weeks prior to the hearing and that the services had ended because things had become “combative” between her and Mother. Id. at 127. She also testified that there were times when it felt like Mother was “finally moving in a direction” but that “it would all just kind of blow up.” Id. at 128. She also testified that Mother was temporarily “better” when she was away from Father. Id. at 131. And Craig testified that, at the time her services ended, Mother did not have employment or housing and that she did not “complete any domestic violence services[.]” Id. at 136. Craig continued that Mother would make progress in certain areas but that Father would “harass[ ] her while she was away from him.” Id. at 137. Craig additionally testified that she had concerns about Mother's ability to parent Child because of the “chaos” in her life due to “external factors,” which included Father, and that she is not “in a place right now where she can care for Child.” Id. at 141. She further testified that she had concerns about Father's ability to care for Child because Child “is made to feel like [Father's] helpmate” and that Father is “coaching” Child to “say things that are untrue[.]” Id. And she testified that Parents’ relationship had a “harmful effect” on Child because Child “can't thrive in that kind of chaos.” Id. at 142.

[13] FCM Renfrow testified that Mother had a history of “being dependent on guys,” including Father, and that one of her goals was to work on being “independent[.]” Id. at 159. But she testified that Father was not “in support of that” and that Father “was harassing [Mother] or keeping tabs on her.” Id. at 160. She then testified that there was a lot of “ongoing chaos” in Parents’ relationship, which had a “negative impact” on Child because it was “unstable” for him. Id. at 166. In particular, Renfrow testified that sometimes Child would be “fine” but sometimes he would be “screaming and just really upset” or throw a tantrum that was not a “normal” tantrum for a child of that age. Id. at 167.

[14] FCM Renfrow also testified that Father “would always bring [Mother] back” even when multiple people and the court had told him not to. Id. She additionally testified that Father “made threats” against service providers and that Father “had made a threat to overdose” and “attempt to commit suicide,” which caused Renfrow to be “concern[ed] for [Child's] safety.” Id. at 171, 174. Renfrow then testified that the relationship between Parents was “toxic,” that Father “wanted” Mother in the home, and that Father “always put [Mother] first.” Id. at 194.

[15] Similarly, FCM Day testified that Parents had “promising moments” in their services but then had “backslides” such that it was “very, very difficult to get consistent case progression with either parent[.]” Id. at 199. FCM Day also testified that there was a “simple lack of compliance with Court orders” and that Father would “continue to violate safety plans” and “would never fully separate from” Mother. Id. at 203. FCM Day testified that there were “repeated aggressive verbal altercations” between Parents, that Father had accused Mother “of physical violence against his person,” and that Parents have not “engaged in sufficient services in the last three months[.]” Id. at 210-11.

[16] Finally, Child's CASA testified that Child is doing “really well” in his current placement, that the concerns about domestic violence between Parents “have not been alleviated,” and that Parents have “not made much progress.” Id. at 233-34. The CASA also testified that there has been a “lack of stability” in Child's life, that Parents’ relationship is “toxic,” and that Child has “been exposed to that relationship.” Id. at 234-35.

[17] Following the hearing, the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions thereon. In particular, the court found as follows:

63. The reasons for Child's removal from Mother were never remedied, despite Mother being given every opportunity to do so. There is a reasonable probability that those reasons for removal will not be remedied. Mother has been given four years to put herself in a position where she could be a consistent, safe, and sober caregiver for Child. At this time, Mother has not addressed her issues and seem[s] uninterested in doing so.

64. Continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Child poses a threat to Child's well-being. Mother does not have a stable residence, does not have a stable income, and has not addressed her mental health issues. These persistent issues make her an inappropriate caregiver for Child.

65. Father has not remedied the reasons for Child's removal from him and [Child's] continued placement outside of his home. Father has shown time and time again that given a choice between having Child or Mother in the house, Father will always choose Mother. Father does not acknowledge any parenting issues that need to be addressed and has shown no interest in improving his parenting skills.

66. Continuation of the parent-child relationship between Father and the Child poses a threat to [Child's] well-being. Father's dishonesty, lack of accountability, and willingness to deceive to do what he please[s] make[ ] it impossible to know if Father would keep a safe and stable home for Child.

* * *

73. Child deserves to have permanency. It would not be in [Child's] best interests to give Mother and Father more time to remedy the reasons for removal. Mother and Father have been given over four years, including a trial home visit with Father that lasted over a year, to show that they can put the Child's needs ahead of their own. They have not shown that they are capable of this.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 27-28. Accordingly, the court terminated Parents’ parental rights over Child. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[18] Parents challenge the trial court's termination of their parental rights over Child. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[19] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

Issue One: Findings of Fact

[20] Parents first contend that the trial court erred when it terminated their parental rights because several of the court's findings are not supported by the evidence. Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

Finding Number 17

[21] Mother first challenges the court's finding number 17, in which the court found that, “[l]ess than a month after securing housing, Mother was discharged from the shelter for theft and making inappropriate sexual remarks to other residents.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 19. Mother does not dispute that she was dismissed from Lotus House but she “dispute[s] that misbehavior was the reason for her dismissal.” Appellants’ Br. at 31. In particular, Mother contends that the “evidence shows that the allegations of misbehavior arose (i) from a falsehood and (ii) from an environment filled with people struggling with drug addiction.” Id. at 32. However, the only evidence to support Mother's argument is her own testimony, which the court was not required to accept as true. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (stating that “factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). Further, FCM Renfrow testified that Mother had been dismissed from Lotus House less than thirty days after her arrival because of “[i]nappropriate sexual comments to other females at the home and stealing other females’ items.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 161. The evidence supports the trial court's finding regarding the reasons for Mother's dismissal from Lotus House.²

Finding Number 32

[22] Mother also challenges the court's finding number 32, in which the court found: “Since Child's removal from Father, Mother has had limited compliance and communication with DCS.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 21. But, again, Mother relies on her own testimony to assert that she had taken actions that “substantially compl[ied] with the goals of addressing the stated reason for removal: unstable housing.” Appellants’ Br. at 34. However, Craig testified that Mother did not have housing, did not have employment, and had not completed any services related to domestic violence. FCM Day testified that Mother “really hasn't made any progress to stabilize herself or be a stabilizing influence[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 204. And FCM Day testified that Parents had not “engaged in sufficient services in the last three months[.]” Id. at 211. That evidence supports the court's finding.³

Finding Number 65

[23] Parents next challenge finding number 65, which provides:

Father has not remedied the reasons for the Child's removal from him and [Child's] continued placement outside of his home. Father has shown time and time again that given a choice between having Child or Mother in the house, Father will always choose Mother. Father does not acknowledge any parenting issues that need to be addressed and has shown no interest in improving his parenting skills.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 27. Parents contend that this finding is unsupported by the evidence because Mother testified that she had acquired independent housing away from Father and Father “testified that he has taken classes and studied to improve both his parenting abilities and his relationship with Mother.” Appellants’ Br. at 36.

[24] But Witherspoon testified that Father “struggles with understanding why he needs to work on his parenting skills” and that Father was “focused on other things other than” Child. Tr. Vol. 2 at 83, 86. In addition, FCM Renfrow testified that Father “would always bring [Mother] back.” Id. at 167. And FCM Day testified that Father “would never fully separate from [Mother]” and that he “would never cut her off.” Id. at 203. That evidence supports the court's finding.

[25] The trial court's findings are supported by the evidence. Parents’ contentions to the contrary are simply requests that we reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we cannot do.

Issue Two: Termination of Parental Rights

[26] Parents next contend that the court clearly erred when it terminated their parental rights as to Child. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. As the Indiana General Assembly has provided:

(c) A petition ․ must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition ․ must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child․

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 (2024). If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[27] On appeal, Parents challenge the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside their home will not be remedied and that the termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests.⁴ We address each argument in turn.

Remedy

[28] Parents first challenge the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from their care or the reasons for the continued placement outside their home will not be remedied. To make that determination, the trial court should judge Parents’ fitness to care for the Child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. See E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child[ren].” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Id.

[29] Here, Parents contend that the court erred when it determined that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied because “the condition that led” to Child's removal from Mother's care was unstable housing but that Mother “has changed during the time from August 2022 to September 2024, and her change constitutes clear and convincing evidence that she is capable of remedying the reason for the CHINS case—unstable housing.” Appellants’ Br. at 30, 32. And Parents allege that “Father succeeded in providing suitable and stable housing for the Child from when his paternity was established until Mother engaged in a physical argument with a caregiver[.]” Id. at 33.

[30] However, we first note that the evidence does not show that Mother has obtained stable housing. Rather, as discussed above, Craig testified that Mother had not obtained independent housing. In any event, Parents’ argument focuses only on the reasons for Child's initial removal from their care, but they disregard the reasons for Child's continued placement outside their home.

[31] While DCS removed Child from Mother's care because of her unstable housing, they kept Child away from Parents because of their tumultuous relationship with one another. Parents’ relationship was toxic and chaotic, and it had a “negative impact” on Child. Tr. Vol. 2 at 166. In particular, Parents had “repeated aggressive verbal altercations[.]” Id. at 210. Further, Parents filed multiple protective orders against each other based on allegations of violence, and Mother made reports that Father had harassed her. And even though a court order and multiple service providers instructed Father that Mother was not to be around Child outside of visiting hours, Father continued to allow Mother to live in his home. Indeed, after Mother returned from Indianapolis, Father violated a court order when he allowed Mother to move into his home. Notwithstanding the problems with their relationship, Father told FCM Day as recently as the morning of the fact-finding hearing that “he would never fully separate from” Mother. Id. at 203. And neither parent fully complied with any service, including a program to help with domestic violence.

[32] Stated differently, despite a negative impact on Child, Parents continued to live together, engage in arguments, file protective orders, and violate safety plans. The evidence supports the court's findings, and the findings support the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reason for Child's continued placement outside Parents’ home will not be remedied. The trial court did not clearly err when it concluded as such.

Best Interests

[33] Parents next challenge the court's conclusion that termination of their parental rights is in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 221.

[34] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the FCM and CASA to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[35] On appeal, Parents contend that the court erred when it determined that the termination of their parental rights was in Child's best interests because “multiple witnesses testified that the Child never suffered an injury, was fed, clothed, and sheltered while in the custody of Father.” Appellants’ Br. at 42. And they allege that, “given proper services, the trial court heard testimony that Mother could properly care for the Child.” Id.

[36] But, as the court's findings demonstrate, Parents have not shown that they are capable of providing Child with a stable home. Parents had several years to participate in services and show that they can adequately provide for the care and safety of Child. But despite that time and involvement in services, neither Parent made significant progress toward meeting Child's needs, and they showed an unwillingness to make any changes for the sake of Child. Indeed, Mother has not found stable housing or employment, and Father continues to allow Mother to reside with him even though they have a toxic relationship that is harmful to Child.

[37] Child needs permanency. At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been removed from Mother's care for approximately four years and from Father's care for nearly two. And, while Child was initially in Father's care after Father established his paternity, Child was removed because Father violated a court order and safety plans and allowed Mother to live in his home. Both FCM Renfrow and Child's CASA testified that termination of Parents’ parental rights and adoption was in Child's best interests. Further, Child's current placement and service providers testified that Child has improved since being placed at that home, and his current placement has expressed a desire to adopt Child. The evidence that the reasons for Child's continued placement outside Parents’ care will likely not be remedied, coupled with the testimony of the FCM and CASA, supports the court's determination that the termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interests.

Guardianship

[38] Still, throughout their brief, Parents contend that the court erred when it terminated their parental rights because a “remedy exists that is less extreme than termination.” Appellants’ Br. at 42. In particular, they contend that they can coparent Child “under the restrictions of a guardianship” and that “[f]orestalling adoption to allow a guardianship proceeding is not an unreasonable proposal.” Id. at 42-43.

[39] While the parties agreed during the underlying proceedings that a guardianship should be established and that Nicholson would serve as Child's guardian, Nicholson contacted both FCM Day and the CASA and informed them that “her plan was to take the guardianship on paper and give [Child] back immediately to his parents.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 200. As a result, the guardianship plan “fell apart[.]” Id. at 202. DCS then asked Parents for the names of individuals who could serve as a guardian instead of Nicholson, but “they could not give [FCM Day] any names for anyone.” Id. at 219. Because Nicholson indicated that she would give Child back to Parents if she became the guardian, because Parents could not give DCS the name of anyone else who could serve as Child's guardian, and because Child needs permanency, the court did not err when it terminated Parents’ parental rights instead of pursuing a guardianship option.

Conclusion

[40] The evidence supports the challenged findings, and the findings support the trial court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reason for Child's removal and continued placement outside Parents’ home will not be remedied and that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interest. And the court did not clearly err when it declined to pursue a guardianship. The court therefore did not clearly err when it terminated Parents’ parental rights. We affirm the trial court's order.

[41] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The dispositional order contains identical language for Mother and Father.

2.   Mother purports to challenge the court's findings number 40, 52, and 63. But her only argument on those three findings is that finding number 17 “does not support the conclusion [that] a ‘reasonable probability’ exists that [she] will not remedy the unstable housing problem that is the basis for findings 40, 52, and 63” and that finding number 17 “is a low point of unstable housing from which she has raised herself[,] rebutting findings 40 and 63.” Appellants’ Br. at 31. Mother had not made cogent argument challenging those three findings of fact and has therefore waived any argument regarding them. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8).

3.   Parents also challenge findings of fact number 74, 79, and 80, which are related to finding number 32. However, while framed as a finding of fact, those findings are actually conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons that led to Child's removal from Parents’ care or continued placement outside their home will not be remedied. See, e.g., Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 28 (Finding 74, which provides: “The evidence presented in this case shows that even if given more time, both Mother and Father would not be likely to succeed in achieving the stability, sobriety, skills, and education needed to achieve reunification.”) We address Parents’ challenge to that conclusion in Issue Two below.

4.   Parents also challenge the court's conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child and certain of the court's findings related to that conclusion. However, because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, we need not address those arguments.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.