II v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] James Travis Rogers Johnson II slapped, dragged, and bit his ex-girlfriend, K.T., while a no-contact order was in place to prohibit Johnson from contacting her. Johnson appeals his resulting domestic battery conviction, arguing the trial court erred by admitting an unredacted copy of the no-contact order into evidence. The order listed charges that were pending against Johnson for a separate battery of K.T., and Johnson contends this evidence was inadmissible as a prior bad act under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). The charges, however, were relevant to show Johnson's motive for the domestic battery and to prove an essential element of another charged offense—stalking. The court also limited the discussion of the charges. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Facts

[2] After knowing each other for twenty years, Johnson and K.T. began a romantic relationship. But after living together in Marion County for approximately one year, they separated.

[3] A few weeks later, in late September 2023, the two saw each other at a concert in Hamilton County. While the details of their encounter are unclear, Johnson was ultimately arrested and charged with strangulation, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and battery resulting in bodily injury against K.T. As a result, the Hamilton County court issued a no-contact order in October 2023, prohibiting Johnson from contacting K.T. during the pendency of the criminal case. That case remains pending.

[4] Despite the no-contact order, Johnson persistently communicated with K.T. He sent numerous emails apologizing to K.T., telling her that he missed her, and asking to see her and her children. When K.T. asked Johnson to leave her alone, Johnson's emails became increasingly troubling. The messages included statements like, “[y]ou won't never be with no one else I promise you that,” Exh. Vol. II, p. 13, and “you're getting me to the point where I just don't give a f*** about jail death or anything right now,” id. at 11.

[5] Then, in late November 2023, Johnson went to K.T.’s home to fix a water spigot that K.T. had mentioned was broken. After the repair was complete, Johnson and K.T. sat together inside. When K.T. received a phone call, Johnson grabbed her phone and discovered that she had changed her phone password. He became enraged and grabbed K.T.’s hair, “smacked” her face, “smashed his face up against [hers],” and bit her finger and lip. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 111-12. K.T. tried to leave, but Johnson pulled her by the hair into the bathroom where he continued to hit her.

[6] K.T. finally convinced Johson to leave by promising that they would talk the next day. K.T. then called the police, who took her statement and photographed her injuries: a bloodied lip, facial redness, and bite marks on her finger.¹ Fearing Johnson would return, K.T. spent the night at a friend's house.

[7] Over the following months, Johnson continued his pattern of harassment. During January and February of 2024, Johnson sent K.T. numerous emails and called her 65 times, including 22 calls in a single day. One day in February, K.T. noticed Johson's truck parked across the street from her home and later found a gold rose on her car's windshield. Johnson later emailed K.T. about the rose, writing “I know you got that,” “you can't miss it,” “it was on your windshield,” and “please don't throw that Rose away.” Exhs. Vol. II, pp. 21, 23.

[8] Based on this pattern of conduct, the State charged Johnson in Marion County with five offenses:

• Count 1 Stalking (as a Level 5 felony because of the pre-existing no-contact order)

• Count 2 Invasion of Privacy (as a Class A misdemeanor)

• Count 3 Criminal Confinement (as a Level 6 felony)

• Count 4 Kidnapping (as a Level 6 felony)

• Count 5 Domestic Battery (as a Class A misdemeanor, but enhanced to a Level 6 felony based on Johnson's prior unrelated battery convictions)

[9] Before Johnson's trial, the State notified Johnson that it sought to introduce evidence of Johnson's prior violent acts against K.T. This evidence included the Hamilton County no-contact order, which contained a list of Johnson's pending charges—strangulation, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and battery resulting in bodily injury—stemming from the September 2023 concert incident. Johnson objected.

[10] After argument, the trial court admitted the no-contact order in full. The court found the order was necessary to prove the invasion of privacy offense and the evidence of the pending charges within that order was relevant to establish both Johnson's motive and K.T.’s reasonable fear resulting from Johnson's contact—an element of the stalking offense. However, the court limited discussion of the incident, stating:

[W]hat the State can present is the fact that [Johnson] was arrested in Hamilton County on September 29, 2023, regarding that cause number, [K.T.] is the alleged victim, the case is pending, and what the specific charges are, period.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 27.

[11] At trial, K.T. testified to Johnson's persistent communication despite the no-contact order and the fear she experienced as a result. She also recounted the events of the November incident at her home. The officer who responded to her 911 call that night testified that he arrived to find K.T. with visible injuries and took her statement. The State then introduced photographs of those injuries. When the State introduced the no-contact order, it referenced only the existence of the pending charges and acknowledged Johnson's presumption of innocence. The trial court also admonished the jury as to the same presumption.

[12] The jury found Johnson guilty of invasion of privacy and domestic battery. Johnson separately admitted to having prior battery convictions, which elevated the domestic battery offense to a Level 6 felony. The jury deadlocked on the other charges of stalking, criminal confinement, and kidnapping. Johnson later pled guilty to confinement and kidnapping in exchange for the State's dismissal of the stalking charge. The trial court accepted this plea agreement and sentenced Johnson to a two-year aggregate sentence to be executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. This sentence encompassed his convictions arising out of both the jury verdicts and his guilty plea.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Johnson appeals his conviction for domestic battery, arguing that it was based on inadmissible evidence of his pending criminal charges in Hamilton County.² He specifically claims that the list of those charges should have been redacted from the no-contact order, which he acknowledges was otherwise admissible to prove the invasion of privacy charge against him. We review a trial court's admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 567-68 (Ind. 2019).

[14] Here, the trial court admitted evidence of Johnson's pending charges under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). This rule generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a “crime, wrong, or other act” solely to prove the defendant's character “in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). This prevents the jury from “indulging in the forbidden inference that a criminal defendant's prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 568 (internal quotations omitted).

[15] But Rule 404(b) is not a total ban. See id. Evidence of other bad acts “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). However, even when evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b)(2), “[t]he court may exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403.

[16] Based on these rules, we engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing evidence admitted under Rule 404(b). First, we determine whether, consistent with Rule 404(b)(2), the challenged evidence is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime. Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 568. If this hurdle is cleared, we then consider, consistent with Rule 403, whether “the evidence's probative value is not ‘substantially outweighed’ by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (quoting Rule 403).

[17] We find no error in the trial court's determination that the evidence of Johnson's pending charges was admissible.

I. Evidence was Relevant

[18] Johnson first argues that the evidence of his pending charges—for strangulation, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and battery resulting in bodily injury—was inadmissible under Rule 404(b)(1) because it showed only his propensity for violence. But the record demonstrates that the charges were relevant to two permissible purposes under Rule 404(b)(2): Johnson's motive for committing the instant offenses against K.T.; and K.T.’s reasonable fear of Johnson, an element of the stalking charge.

[19] “Evidence of a defendant's motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime.” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1057 (Ind. 2011). Here, the pending charges demonstrate hostility in the relationship between Johnson and K.T., and “[h]ostility is a paradigmatic motive for committing a crime.” Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation omitted) (finding evidence of defendant's subsequent domestic violence against victim was relevant to show motive for earlier violent offenses against same victim); see also Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding evidence of defendant's pending charges for prior assault against same victim was relevant to show motive and relationship between parties).

[20] Using Johnson's pending charges to set a backdrop of the couple's tumultuous relationship also enabled the State to prove a critical element of the stalking charge: that Johnson's contact reasonably and actually caused K.T. to be fearful.³ Their hostile relationship is relevant to the State's argument that Johnson's acts of repeatedly calling and messaging K.T. and leaving a rose on her windshield—which in other contexts may appear to be merely annoying or even thoughtful—was terrifying for K.T. For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the evidence of Johnson's pending charges was relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b)(2).

II. Balancing Probative Value and Danger of Unfair Prejudice

[21] Johnson also argues that the evidence of his pending charges is inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. But we find no error in the trial court's determination that the evidence of Johnson's pending charges was highly probative and limitations on its use reduced the risk of unfair prejudice.

[22] The September incident underlying Johnson's pending charges occurred less than a month before the alleged stalking began and less than two months before the November incident. The close proximity in time and the similarity in nature of the incidents (both of which relate to alleged domestic batteries) made the pending charges highly probative of Johnson's motive and the reasonableness of K.T.’s fear. See Iqbal, 805 N.E.2d at 409 (noting that courts consider “similarity and proximity in time of the prior act” in determining probative value and ultimately finding evidence of domestic violence four months before instant offense sufficiently probative).

[23] We therefore disagree with Johnson's argument to the contrary—that because the pending charges predated the alleged period of stalking and the November incident, they were irrelevant. This timing supports the State's use of the pending charges to explain motive and reason for fear, as cause logically predates effect.

[24] Additionally, the trial court reduced the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence by limiting the scope of its use at trial. The State was permitted to discuss merely the existence of the pending charges, without providing further detail of the September incident. Immediately after the evidence was admitted, the State noted that Johnson was presumed to be innocent of the pending charges. The court reiterated this presumption when it instructed the jury at the end of the proceedings, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. See Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 989 (Ind. 2018). In fact, the jury demonstrated its ability to parse the evidence and come to independent conclusions, as it reached a split verdict: finding Johnson guilty of some charges while deadlocking on others.

[25] We therefore find no error in the trial court's determination that the probative value of the pending charges was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, thus making the evidence admissible under Rule 403.

III. Harmless Error

[26] Even assuming error in the admission of the evidence, reversal of Johnson's domestic battery conviction would not be warranted. An error in a trial court's ruling is deemed harmless, and therefore does not require reversal, “where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A)). In other words, “the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id. at 492.

[27] Here, Johnson argues that admitting evidence of his pending charges was not harmless because it permitted the jury to assess his guilt as to the domestic battery charge on the basis of an apparent propensity for violence. But beyond the pending charges evidence, K.T. testified to the events of the November assault, recounting that Johnson grabbed her by the hair, slapped her face, smashed her face into his, and bit her lip and finger. This testimony alone could support Johnson's conviction. See Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim.”). Even so, K.T.’s testimony was corroborated by photographs of her injuries and the testimony of the responding officer.

[28] Therefore, the probable impact of admitting evidence of Johnson's pending charges—in light of all the evidence in this case—was “sufficiently minor” and our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. Accordingly, any error in the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless.

Conclusion

[29] Finding no abuse of discretion in the admission of the challenged evidence and concluding any error would have been harmless, we affirm Johnson's domestic battery conviction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Though K.T. completed an incident report, charges were not filed against Johnson until four months later, in March 2024. According to the probable cause affidavit, K.T. had spoken with a detective shortly after the November incident who made her feel “defeated,” “intimidated,” and “discouraged from pursuing prosecution.” App. Vol. II, p. 23.

2.   In his appellate brief, Johnson explicitly challenges “his conviction of Count V, Domestic Battery,” and consistently requests reversal of only this conviction. Appellant's Br., p. 4. Though he mentions once, in passing, that he “appeals his convictions for Counts II and V”—referencing both the invasion of privacy and domestic battery convictions, id. at 5, Johnson later concedes that the no-contact order “was permissible to establish commission of the Invasion of Privacy Charge,” id. at 6 n.1. He also focuses his entire argument exclusively on how the evidence of his pending charges affected his domestic battery conviction. Therefore, we understand Johnson to appeal only his domestic battery conviction.

3.   The chapter of the criminal code on stalking defines “stalk,” in relevant part, to mean “a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.