IN RE: M.J.A.G. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Jefferson Circuit Court adjudicated M.J.A.G. (“Child”) to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). M.G., Child's father (“Father”),¹ appeals that adjudication and raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] C.M. is Child's mother (“Mother”) and she has a long-history of child-related proceedings in Michigan, where she used to live. Although she was married to another man at the time, Mother has two children with Father, including Child. Mother and Father's other child is currently in foster care in Michigan. Father is a member of the Sault Ste Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and both of his children with Mother are Indian Children under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.

[4] Mother moved to Jefferson County in April 2024 to give birth to Child. DCS learned that Mother was in Indiana and also learned that, if she were to give birth to Child in Michigan, Michigan officials were prepared to remove Child from Mother's care “upon delivery” based upon “a history of a previous fatality ․ with one of [Mother's] children” and “concerns for [Father's] volatile temperament.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 19-20. Michigan officials were further concerned with repeated allegations of abuse and neglect by Mother toward her children and Father's repeated disregard of those concerns.

[5] When Mother arrived at the hospital in late April to give birth to Child, Father called the hospital and stated that Mother “was trying to ‘sign over’ guardianship” of the child to Mother's mother, whose home he described as having animal feces “everywhere.” Id. at 78-79. Mother informed hospital staff that “there were ‘issues’ with Father and that he had been asked to leave their home.” Id. at 79. She further asked that, if Father arrived at the hospital, security accompany him into her room.

[6] Father did arrive at the hospital for Child's birth, and he was “confrontational and argumentative” with others, including hospital social worker Jill Turner and Mother's mother. Id. A DCS family case manager at the hospital also had difficulty communicating with Father, describing him as “erratic” with “difficulty focusing” and having a demeanor that “changed minute by minute.” Id. at 80.

[7] DCS filed a petition for emergency custody over Child, which the trial court granted, and later filed its petition alleging Child to be a CHINS. During an ensuing meeting with DCS in June, Father “threatened to kill DCS [s]taff.” Id. He also stated that he had “threatened an animal control officer with his gun.” Id. And Father “displayed little awareness of the Child's needs as to feeding, getting formula, and properly holding the Child.” Id. Meanwhile, Mother told DCS that “Father followed her to Indiana and that they were moving in together, although she did not want this.” Id.

[8] At an assessment for Father's parenting strengths and needs, he refused to be candid with the assessor. Father was “dismissive about attachment” and “push[ed] away from memories of past challenging experiences.” Id. Father was “defensive,” “incoherent[,] and difficult to follow.” Id. at 81. Father was “intimidating” and it was not clear at times if he was “talking about the past or present.” Id. He was also “volatile,” “could not regulate his emotions,” and he refused to directly answer a question regarding whether he was armed. Id.

[9] Later in June, the State charged Father with Level 5 felony obstruction of justice; Level 5 felony intimidation; and three counts of Level 6 felony intimidation. Those charges arose out of Father's interactions with DCS officials and staff. For example, the Level 5 felony intimidation charge alleged that Father had stated: “if you take away my kid you're going to die”; “I will kill people to protect my family and to keep my kid”; “you people are going to pay for this”; and “people are going to die.” Id. at 81-82 (cleaned up).

[10] In August, the court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition. Father appeared for that hearing, although the State's criminal charges remained pending, and in addition to receiving witness testimony the trial court took judicial notice of the records of the Michigan proceedings involving Mother's other children. After the hearing, the court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS.

[11] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[12] Father argues that the trial court's order adjudicating Child to be a CHINS is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). Our standard of review is well settled:

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up). Further, “when findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true.” Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[13] Not every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287-88 (Ind. 2014). Rather, a CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, as alleged here, requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. Id. In full, the statute provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so;

and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 (2023).

[14] The law does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene on behalf of a child. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parents but to protect the child. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[15] Father's arguments on appeal are focused on the following three paragraphs of the trial court's order adjudicating Child to be a CHINS:

67. Father has also demonstrated significant mental health issues. The Court finds it compelling that Father's threats and violent tendencies were discussed by the Michigan Court of Appeals in its opinion affirming the termination of Mother's parental rights over [M.] and [J.]. Father threatened to forcibly remove [E.] from the hospital when she was born. His conduct was “volatile[,” and] he was angry and irrational. When security was called to [E.’s] room, Father engaged them and was removed from the hospital.

* * *

69. The Court concludes by clear and convincing evidence that Father's unchecked volatility and history of threats with firearms would put the Child at risk of serious and/or physical damage if the Child were to be placed in his care.

70. Father's refusal to participate in services in [E.’s] case, and his continued threats and intimidating behaviors in this case[,] are further evidence that the Child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving[ ] and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 85-86 (citations omitted).

[16] According to Father, paragraph 67 is erroneous for two reasons. First, Father asserts that “[t]here was no evidence presented ․ that Father conclusively suffered from mental health issues ․” Appellant's Br. at 16. Second, and relatedly, Father challenges paragraph 67's reliance on his behavior in the hospital near the time of Child's birth to support his apparent mental health issues. In particular, Father asserts that there was neither a “medical diagnosis” of a mental health issue nor a plan of care for him based on any such diagnosis. Id. He also asserts that he had made some progress in his Michigan case with respect to parenting time with his daughter there and related psychological evaluations.

[17] But paragraph 67 is a reasonable conclusion from the unchallenged findings of Father's behavior throughout Child's life and before it. Father does not challenge the Court's findings that he followed Mother to Indiana; compelled her to accept his presence in her home; threatened DCS officials and others; and often engaged in erratic and volatile behavior. Paragraph 67 merely relies on those unchallenged findings to conclude that Father's behavior might be indicative of underlying, treatable issues for which he has not obtained useful treatment, and, until he does so, his behavior is a clear and convincing risk to Child. We agree with the trial court's assessment and conclude that Father's challenge to paragraph 67 merely seeks to have this Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[18] Father challenges paragraph 69 on the theory that it is premised on his having “merely iterated his constitutional right to carry a firearm” and having simply been “frustrated and angry” that he was unable to leave the hospital with Child. Appellant's Br. at 17-18. We read paragraph 69 to supplement paragraph 67 and Father's history of anger issues and behavioral volatility. And his threats—express or implied—with the firearms extended beyond the day of Child's birth at the hospital. Father's challenge to paragraph 69 is merely a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[19] Finally, Father challenges paragraph 70 as “misguided” because Father had made progress in his Michigan case. Id. at 18. But it is Father's argument that is misguided. Paragraph 70, like paragraph 69, is supported by paragraph 67 and the underlying, unchallenged facts that support paragraph 67. Accordingly, there is no error or basis for reversal in paragraph 70.

[20] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's mother does not participate in this appeal.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.