IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.E. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.E. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her daughter, N.E. Mother raises one issue for our review: was the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to N.E. clearly erroneous? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and S.E. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of N.E., born in January 2021.¹ In October 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) alleged N.E. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). In its petition, DCS claimed Parents “were involved in an argument and/or domestic violence incident during which time child was in arms of Mother.” Ex. Vol. 3 at 221. Because of the argument, Parents traveled to the hospital to seek care for Mother's mental health breakdown and left N.E. with a neighbor. After a stranger came to the neighbor's house claiming to be N.E.’s aunt, the neighbor called law enforcement. In addition to the incident, DCS noted the inadequacy of the family home—no functioning toilets, electricity, or water, and extreme clutter. DCS could not locate or contact Parents and took N.E. into custody.

[3] In December 2021, the trial court adjudicated N.E. a CHINS. Parents appealed. While the appeal was pending, Parents did not comply with court-ordered services and rarely attended supervised visits with N.E. In May 2022, Mother petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Father, claiming Father would slap and choke her, among other things. Mother was granted a protection order. A few weeks later, Mother was charged with battery, domestic battery, and residential entry after she entered Father's residence and battered Father and two others. About a month later, Mother requested her dissolution petition and the protection order be dismissed. The trial court granted Mother's request.

[4] In October 2022, a divided panel of this Court reversed the CHINS adjudication, concluding DCS failed to present evidence that N.E. was harmed or endangered by Mother's mental health or the home's inadequacy and determined the conditions leading to removal had been voluntarily remedied without court coercion. See In re N.E., 198 N.E.3d 384, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[5] A few months later, DCS again alleged N.E. was a CHINS. This second CHINS petition alleged, in part, that the following occurred after N.E. had first been adjudicated a CHINS: (1) Parents failed to participate in visitations with N.E. for eight months; (2) when participating in visitations, Parents often arrived late, failed to follow visitation rules, argued with and threatened visitation supervisors, and appeared under the influence of substances; (3) Mother was charged with domestic battery, battery resulting in bodily injury, and battery; (4) Parents failed to consistently comply with court orders in the CHINS cases of their other children; and (5) N.E. was exposed to domestic violence between Parents. Mother unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition, and the trial court adjudicated N.E. a CHINS in February 2023.² Soon after, the trial court entered a dispositional decree ordering Parents to, among other things: (1) maintain weekly contact with DCS; (2) notify the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) of any changes in address; (3) complete all programs, assessments, or other services recommended by DCS; (4) maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; (5) secure a legal and stable source of income; (6) avoid using illegal substances; (7) complete substance use assessments and follow all treatments and recommendations; (8) submit to random drug screens; (9) not commit any act of domestic violence; (10) attend all scheduled visitations; and (11) participate in home-based casework. See Ex. Vol. 3 at 102–05.

[6] In the following months, Mother did not complete a substance use assessment and tested positive for methamphetamine multiple times. At one point, the trial court held Mother in contempt for failing to complete drug screens. Mother participated in supervised visits with N.E., but her attendance was inconsistent. By August 2023, Mother's visits had been suspended based on her lack of attendance. As of November 2023, Parents were not participating in any services.

[7] In February 2024, Mother contacted DCS to restart visitation; Mother had not seen N.E. in about five months. During her supervised visits with N.E., Mother did not bring supplies and often failed to interact with N.E., spending significant time on her phone instead. After N.E. began exhibiting negative behaviors during the visits, the trial court suspended Mother's visitation. Around this time, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and had not yet completed a substance use assessment or a domestic violence assessment. N.E.’s permanency plan was reunification with a concurrent plan for termination and adoption.

[8] In May 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate the parental relationship between N.E. and Parents. Shortly after, Mother completed substance use and domestic violence assessments. Following Mother's assessments, weekly therapy sessions and a psychiatric evaluation were recommended. Mother did not complete the recommendations. In May, June, and July, Mother participated in home-based casework. In July, Father petitioned to dissolve his marriage to Mother. And in August, Mother stopped participating in home-based casework and missed several drug screens.

[9] During a fact-finding hearing on the termination petition, Mother shared she stayed at multiple sober living facilities in July and August 2024. Mother further stated she had intentionally tested positive for illegal substances around the same time to qualify for a drug rehabilitation program at an addiction treatment center. Mother had not informed DCS of her whereabouts and did not provide documentation concerning her stays at the recovery center or sober living facilities until part-way through the fact-finding hearing. Mother briefly moved back in with Father. But after the house was condemned, Mother stayed at a local mission. Like before, Mother did not update DCS on her living situation. At the time of the hearing, Mother was not employed.

[10] Both FCMs testified at the hearing. FCM Makaylah Kersey—FCM between January 2023 and May 2024—recalled Mother missing multiple substance use assessments and Mother's “hit and miss” participation in court-ordered drug screens. Tr. Vol. 2 at 83. Concerning Mother's supervised visits with N.E., FCM Kersey explained visitation was stayed for a period of time because N.E. “was exhibiting negative behaviors ․ directly correlating with visitation and parents were also making no progress ․ with services.” Id. at 80. Although Mother made “the most progress” with her services in February 2024, FCM Kersey described it as “very minimal.” Id. at 91.

[11] FCM Tiffany Clark was assigned to the case in May 2024. According to FCM Clark, the conditions that led to N.E.’s removal had not been resolved and continuing N.E.’s parental relationship with Parents posed a threat to N.E.’s well-being. FCM Clark explained Parents had not substantially complied with the trial court's dispositional order and N.E. was “doing really well” in her placement. Id. at 107. In FCM Clark's opinion, terminating the parental relationship was in N.E.’s best interests.

[12] N.E.’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) made similar points, testifying Parents showed a general “lack of interest in [N.E.’s] li[f]e.” Id. at 125. The CASA also shared N.E. was “thriving” and “doing phenomenal” in her placement. Id. at 118. Due to the “incredible stability” provided by her placement, N.E. was attending pre-school, was involved in extracurricular activities, was bonded to her foster siblings, and made “great improvements in therapy.” Id. The CASA recommended terminating the parental relationship between N.E. and Parents, believing it was in N.E.’s best interests to do so.

[13] In September 2024, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to N.E. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court concluded DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in N.E.’s best interests. The trial court specifically noted the stability provided to N.E. through her current placement and recognized the “grave impact” domestic violence can have on young children. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 106. The trial court also found that “continu[ing] with [N.E.’s] current placement until the adoption goes through” was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of N.E. Id. at 107.

Standard of Review

[14] In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the trial court must enter findings of fact that support its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c). “We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly support the judgment.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). Trial court findings not challenged on appeal must be accepted as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

[15] Out of deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will affirm the termination of parental rights unless the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. A termination decision is clearly erroneous “when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision.” Id. We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. And we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

Terminating Mother's parental rights to N.E. was not clearly erroneous.

[16] Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children. Id. This right, however, is not absolute and may be terminated when parents are unwilling or unable to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. at 45–46. “The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” In re I.B., 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992)). But because parental rights are “an important interest warranting deference and protection, and a termination of that interest is a ‘unique kind of deprivation,’ ” Indiana law sets a high bar to sever the parent-child relationship. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916–17 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). To do so, DCS must prove four elements by clear and convincing evidence. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019);³ I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds DCS has met its burden, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8.

[17] Mother does not dispute DCS proved the first and second statutory elements.⁴ Rather, Mother focuses her claim on elements three and four, each of which we address in turn.

A. Termination was in N.E.’s best interests.

[18] Mother first argues DCS failed to prove termination was in N.E.’s best interests. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C). When deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. The child's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013)).

[19] To start, FCM Clark and the CASA both recommended Mother's parental rights to N.E. be terminated. A “recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Going further, Mother made little progress throughout this case and displayed a general lack of engagement with the services provided to her. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 91 (describing Mother's progress as “very minimal”). For example, Mother continued to test positive for illicit substances, missed several drug screens, and did not follow through with recommendations after eventually completing substance use and domestic violence assessments. Moreover, Mother infrequently attended supervised visits with N.E., thereby demonstrating a “lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve [the] parent-child relationship.”⁵ Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied. Mother's attempts to emphasize her recent recovery efforts or shift blame to others for not engaging in provided services is a request to reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45.

[20] Ultimately, N.E. need not wait indefinitely for Mother to create a stable home environment free of drug use and domestic violence. As the trial court put it, Mother's efforts came “too little ․ too late.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 104. The trial court's determination that termination was in N.E.’s best interests was not clearly erroneous.

B. There was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of N.E.

[21] Mother next contends DCS failed to prove there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of N.E.⁶ See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). To be satisfactory, a plan “need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.” A.J. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 881 N.E.2d 706, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Adoption can be a “satisfactory plan” under the termination of parental rights statute. In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). For a DCS plan of adoption to be satisfactory, “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[22] The plan for N.E.’s care and treatment is adoption. By the time of the termination hearing, N.E. had lived with the same foster family for nearly two years. By several accounts, N.E. was doing well in her foster placement and benefitted from the stability it provided for her. And the CASA testified N.E. is “incredibly bonded” to her foster siblings. Tr. Vol. 2 at 118. DCS’ plan for N.E. was satisfactory because it provides a general sense of N.E.’s post-termination direction. See A.J., 881 N.E.2d at 719 (concluding adoption was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of children doing well in their respective pre-adoptive foster homes).

Conclusion

[23] The trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights to N.E. was not clearly erroneous.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother has two other biological children, and Father has four other biological children. Several of these other children have been the subject of CHINS petitions and/or petitions to terminate parental rights. This case involves only the termination of Parents’ parental rights to N.E. That said, Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   A panel of this Court affirmed this CHINS finding. See In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

3.   The legislature amended this statute with an effective date of March 11, 2024. We use the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS filed the petition to terminate.

4.   More specifically, Mother does not dispute that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that (1) N.E. had been removed from Parents’ home for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in N.E.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Parents’ home will not be remedied. See I.C. §§ 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii) & (b)(2)(B)(i).

5.   The trial court made the following finding of fact: “Between October of 2021 and May of 2022, for nearly eight (8) months, the parents did not participate in any visits with N.E.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 94. Mother claims this finding is clearly erroneous because Parents “attended one or two visits with N.E. between October of 2021 and December of 2021.” Appellant's Br. at 15. Assuming Mother is correct, and the finding is clearly erroneous, such a conclusion has no bearing on the ultimate outcome we reach today. The unchallenged findings support the trial court's judgment.

6.   From Mother's point of view, the plan is not satisfactory because it “does not provide for N.E. to maintain her relationship with her six siblings.” Appellant's Br. at 15. Sibling relationships are important considerations when deciding whether to terminate parental rights. At the hearing, Mother testified it was in N.E.’s best interests to maintain her relationships with her half-siblings. Yet even after hearing Mother's concerns, FCM Clark and the CASA both believed terminating Mother's parental rights to N.E. was in N.E.’s best interests. In doing so, the CASA detailed N.E.’s strong bond to her foster siblings and noted N.E. had been removed from Parents’ home for the thirty-five months prior to the hearing. Indeed, N.E. had not been under Parents’ care since she was removed prior to her first birthday. Based on this record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in determining the plan of adoption was satisfactory for the care and treatment of N.E.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.