GIBSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Cedric D. Gibson (“Gibson”) appeals, following a jury trial, his conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine.¹ Gibson argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding that there was sufficient evidence, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there was sufficient evidence supporting Gibson's conviction.

Facts

[3] On May 3, 2024, Evansville Police Department Detective Jailyn Blair (“Detective Blair”) and Detective Mitchell Mansfield (“Detective Mansfield”) responded to a dispatch related to Gibson, who had an active warrant for his arrest. When Detective Mansfield arrived on the scene, he saw Gibson walking along the sidewalk. When Detective Blair and his K-9 partner arrived on the scene in his police car, Gibson fled. Detective Blair activated his siren, drove his car next to Gibson, identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Gibson to stop and get on the ground. Gibson continued to run and ignored Detective Blair's commands. Gibson “looked back over his shoulder” at Detective Blair before running down an alley. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 35).

[4] Detective Blair “deployed [his] K9 partner to apprehend” Gibson. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 30). The K-9 partner apprehended Gibson next to a parked car. Detective Blair and Detective Mansfield arrested Gibson. The detectives searched Gibson and found $1,891 in “various types of denominations[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 53). The detectives also found on Gibson's person a pipe and a cellphone. Officers, including Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Office Detective Skye Terhune (“Detective Terhune”), began searching the surrounding area for any items that Gibson may have abandoned while fleeing from law enforcement.

[5] The officers collected items from Gibson and placed them on the parked car where Gibson had been apprehended. At some point during this process, the owner of the car arrived, the officers removed the items from her car, and the car owner drove her car away. Thereafter, officers discovered a brown sock on the ground, just beneath the front bumper of where the car had previously been parked and a few feet away from where Gibson had been apprehended by the K-9 partner. In the sock, Detective Terhune found “six clear plastic bags” of methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 92).

[6] After collecting the evidence, Detective Mansfield placed Gibson in his police car and drove Gibson to the hospital. While driving, Detective Mansfield asked Gibson if the drugs found in the sock were “meth or fentanyl[,]” and Gibson responded, “meth.” (State's Ex. 6). Detective Mansfield then asked Gibson how much meth he had, and Gibson replied, “give or take ․ about sixteen grams.” (State's Ex. 6).

[7] The State charged Gibson with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine.² While in jail and awaiting trial, Gibson placed multiple phone calls from the jail phone. In a May 7, 2024 call (“the first jail call”), Gibson told a woman on the phone that “the money I had on me, they took it cause I had dope on me.” (State's Ex. 7). Gibson also made a jail phone call on May 11, 2024 (“the second jail call”) during which he stated, “I ain't no big time drug dealer. Nah, you like big time drug dealers. I'm a small, small time.” (State's Ex. 8) (grammatical errors in the original).

[8] In August 2024, the trial court held a two-day jury trial. The State moved to admit both the first jail call and the second jail call, which were ultimately admitted into evidence over Gibson's objection.

[9] During Detective Blair's testimony, he explained that his K-9 partner was trained in apprehension and in narcotics alerting. Detective Blair testified that if he let his K-9 partner out of the left car door, the K-9 partner was trained to apprehend a target. Detective Blair further testified that if he let his K-9 partner out of the right car door, the K-9 partner was trained to alert for narcotics. Detective Blair also testified that, when he had sent his K-9 partner to apprehend Gibson, he had released his K-9 partner from the left car door, resulting in the K-9 partner being instructed to apprehend a target and not to alert for narcotics.

[10] Detective Terhune testified that he had collected from the sock found at the scene of Gibson's arrest a total of six plastic bags containing methamphetamine. Detective Terhune also testified that one bag had a larger amount of methamphetamine, and the other five bags each had about a gram of methamphetamine. A forensic scientist from the Indiana State Police Laboratory testified that the drugs collected from the sock tested positive for methamphetamine. The forensic scientist further testified that the methamphetamine collected from the larger plastic bag weighed approximately 10.96 grams and that the smaller plastic bags, weighed together with the bags, weighed approximately 4.70 grams. In total, the methamphetamine weighed nearly sixteen grams.

[11] The jury found Gibson guilty of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court sentenced Gibson to fifteen (15) years for his Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine conviction and one (1) year for his Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction. The trial court ordered Gibson's sentences to be served concurrently at the Indiana Department of Correction.

[12] Gibson now appeals.

Decision

[13] Gibson argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting his Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine conviction. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). “In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id.

[14] Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2) provides that a person who “possesses, with intent to ․ deliver ․ methamphetamine, pure or adulterated ․ commits dealing in methamphetamine[.]” The statute further provides that the offense is a Level 2 felony if “the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) grams[.]” I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(e).

[15] Gibson challenges the possession element and argues that there was insufficient evidence that he had constructively possessed the methamphetamine. He specifically challenges the intent element of constructive possession.

[16] Proof of possession of contraband may rest upon proof of either actual or constructive possession. Houston v. State, 997 N.E.2d 407, 409-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over an item.” Cruz v. State, 218 N.E.3d 632, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (cleaned up), trans. denied. Constructive possession requires a showing that the defendant had “both the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the contraband.” Bradshaw v. State, 818 N.E.2d 59, 62-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The intent element of constructive possession is shown if the State demonstrates the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). “The capability element of constructive possession is met when the State shows that the defendant is able to reduce the contraband to the defendant's personal possession.” Canfield v. State, 128 N.E.3d 563, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. A defendant's knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the contraband, or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of contraband. Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6. These additional circumstances may include: “(1) a defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ind. 2011). The State is not required to prove all additional circumstances when showing that a defendant had the intent to maintain dominion and control over contraband. See Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. 2004). These listed circumstances are not exhaustive. Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[17] Our review of the record reveals that Gibson, when he saw multiple police cars approaching him while he was walking along a public sidewalk, fled from the officers by running down an alley. Gibson was apprehended by a K-9 partner, and the officers arrested him next to a parked car. After that parked car was moved by its owner, officers found a brown sock on the ground where the car's front bumper had been. In other words, the sock was found in close proximity to where Gibson had been apprehended and arrested. Further, Gibson made incriminating statements. For example, after being arrested and placed in a police car, Gibson told Detective Mansfield that the drugs in the sock were methamphetamine and that the methamphetamine weighed about sixteen grams. Additionally, while making phone calls from the jail, Gibson told an unidentified party that he had dope on him at the time of his arrest. This ample evidence supports the intent element of constructive possession.

[18] Based on our review of the evidence presented at the jury trial, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found Gibson guilty of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.³

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1.

2.   The State also charged Gibson with Level 2 felony dealing in a schedule one controlled substance and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The State dismissed the Level 2 felony dealing in a controlled substance charge before trial. The jury also found Gibson guilty of the Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement charge, but Gibson does not challenge this conviction on appeal.

3.   Gibson attempts to distinguish the facts of his case from cases where a defendant had been found to constructively possess contraband in a place where he had no possessory interest. Gibson notes that in Canfield and Shorter v. State, 151 N.E.3d 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, officers “had observed the defendant[s] looking at the drugs,” and here, the officers had not seen Gibson do the same. (Gibson's Br. 9). Gibson also asserts that in Canfield, the defendant had made furtive movements and Gibson had not. However, as we stated above, the list of additional circumstances is not exhaustive, and the State is not required to prove every factor. See Cannon, 99 N.E.3d at 280; Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 344. Gibson also argues that the sock was “far enough from the defendant that it went undetected” during the officer's initial search and was “not sniffed out by the [K-9 partner].” (Gibson's Br. 10). However, the record is clear that the sock was partially underneath a parked car. Additionally, Detective Blair testified that his K-9 partner had been sent to apprehend Gibson and had not been instructed to alert for narcotics. Gibson's other arguments are requests to reweigh evidence and assess witness credibility, which we will not do. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.