Nicholas Edward Walsh, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In December of 2022, A.B. was living with Nicholas Walsh in his South Bend house; the pair had a relationship that revolved around drugs. On December 5, 2022, Walsh fought with A.B. about their relationship. When A.B. contacted the authorities, Walsh caused the responding officer to leave by falsely telling him that nothing was wrong. After the officer left, Walsh strangled and had sexual intercourse with A.B. The State charged Walsh with Level 3 felony rape, Level 6 felony strangulation, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime.

[2] While Walsh was incarcerated awaiting trial and subject to a no-contact order, he sent several letters to A.B. and, when he was released on his own recognizance in August of 2023, continued to send her text messages and emails. The communications generally expressed feelings of continued love and/or hatred for A.B., anger, and betrayal. Walsh also sent several text messages to a stranger he believed to be connected to A.B. Walsh unsuccessfully sought to exclude evidence of his communications to A.B. and the stranger, and, after his trial, a jury convicted him of strangulation, domestic battery, and interference with the reporting of a crime. Walsh contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his post-release communications to A.B. and the stranger and, in the alternative, that the trial court abused its discretion in preventing him from providing context to his post-release communications. Because we disagree with both contentions, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] A.B. and Walsh met in 2022, developed a relationship based on drugs, and eventually cohabitated in Walsh's South Bend house. On the evening of December 4, 2022, Walsh and A.B. argued because Walsh wanted to be more than friends but A.B. did not. The next evening, Walsh and A.B. fought, with Walsh telling A.B. that he was entitled to have sex with her because of everything he had done for her. Walsh threatened to kill A.B.’s dog and told her it would be “10 times worse” if she called the police. Tr. Vol. II p. 106. A.B. nonetheless called 911 and screamed, “he's going to kill me!” State's Ex. 1B. Walsh took the telephone from A.B.’s hand, and, when a police officer arrived, A.B. was not visible and Walsh was able to convince the officer to leave by claiming that nothing was wrong and that nobody had placed a call from the house. After the officer left, Walsh squeezed A.B.’s neck until she was lightheaded and unable to breathe normally, pinned her down, overpowered her, and had intercourse with her.

[4] On December 12, 2022, the State charged Walsh with Level 3 felony rape, Level 6 felony strangulation, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime. While in jail, Walsh sent A.B. many letters in violation of a no-contact order. The letters were “all the same” in indicating Walsh's love and/or hate for A.B. and his feelings of anger and betrayal, with at least one referring to A.B. by her first name and his surname. Tr. Vol. II p. 118. In August of 2023, A.B. went into a drug rehabilitation program (“rehab”), and the trial court granted the State's motion to continue Walsh's trial for that reason and released him on his own recognizance. Walsh continued to attempt to communicate with A.B. via email and text messages, “saying the same thing pretty much that all of the other letters say” and seeming even “more obsessed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 121. Walsh also called and texted Frank Stinnett, a stranger, because he thought that Stinnett's number was somehow connected to A.B.

[5] On March 8, 2024, the State moved for the admission of Walsh's communications to A.B. and Stinnett pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). On March 13, 2024, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to Walsh's allegation that A.B. had entered rehab to delay the jury trial. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled that Walsh's statements to A.B. and Stinnett were “preliminarily” admissible and that it would rule on whether the statements were unduly prejudicial pursuant to Evidence Rule 403 when the statements were offered at trial. Tr. Vol. II p. 13. The trial court also preliminarily granted the State's motion in limine regarding A.B.’s motive for having entered rehab, pending A.B.’s deposition.

[6] Prior to the start of Walsh's trial on March 20, 2024, the State informed the trial court that A.B.’s deposition indicated that she had gone into rehab in August of 2023. Walsh sought to admit evidence about the rehab issue to show that he had communicated with A.B. after his release from jail only because he had wanted his trial to occur in August and had been upset that it had been continued. Barring that, Walsh argued for the exclusion of the post-release communications as unduly prejudicial. The trial court ruled that either (1) all of the communications would be admitted and Walsh could provide context or (2) the post-release communications would be excluded and the motion in limine regarding A.B.’s motive would remain intact. The trial court ordered the parties to avoid the rehab issue until A.B. testified and that, if the subject of rehab came up in her direct testimony, Walsh was allowed to cross-examine her on her rehabilitation, the continuance, and the subsequent communications.

[7] During A.B.’s testimony, Walsh did not object to the admission of his pre-release communications with her. Walsh, however, did object to the admission of his post-release communications, which objection the trial court overruled. On cross-examination, A.B. testified that she had gone into rehab on August 11, 2023. On re-direct, A.B. discussed the facilities she had entered. On recross, Walsh did not ask A.B. about her time spent in rehab. Finally, Walsh objected to the admission of his text communications to Stinnett, which objection the trial court overruled.

[8] Walsh testified that he had been upset that he had lost nine months of his life and “everything else” and explained that his communication with A.B. after his release from jail had been intended to ensure that she appeared for the reset trial because she had not appeared in August of 2023. Tr. Vol. III p. 36. Walsh testified that A.B. had “stalled and didn't show up because she [said] that she was somewhere that she wasn't.” Tr. Vol. III p. 37. The State objected to Walsh's testimony that A.B. had “said that she was checking into a rehab facility that she never checked into” because Walsh had not asked A.B. about it. Tr. Vol. III p. 37. When Walsh responded that he had not received documentation relating to A.B.’s rehab, the trial court pointed out that he had taken no measures through the trial court to enforce the already-issued subpoenas for such documentation. The trial court sustained the State's objection and struck Walsh's statement, noting that he had not been restricted in his cross-examination of A.B., the only evidence in the record was that A.B. had gone to rehab, and Walsh could have asked for the trial court's assistance to acquire any documentation that might exist but had not.

[9] The jury found Walsh guilty of Level 6 felony intimidation, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime and not guilty of Level 3 felony rape. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 524 days for Level 6 felony intimidation, 365 days for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and 365 days for Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime.

Discussion and Decision

[10] “In reviewing the admission or exclusion of evidence, we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. We will reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 561 (Ind. 2018) (citation omitted). Walsh contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his post-release communications pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 403 and, in the alternative, that the trial court abused its discretion in preventing him from providing evidence that put them in a proper context.

[11] Evidence Rule 403 permits the trial court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” A trial court's evidentiary rulings are presumptively correct, and the “defendant bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that the court erred in weighing prejudice and probative value under Evid. R. 403.” Anderson v. State, 681 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ind. 1997). The determination of whether there is a risk of unfair prejudice depends on “the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis.” D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[A]ll relevant evidence is ‘inherently prejudicial’ in a criminal prosecution, so the inquiry boils down to a balance of probative value against the likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the jury.” Richmond v. State, 685 N.E.2d 54, 55–56 (Ind. 1997) (citation omitted).

[12] Walsh contends that evidence of his post-release communications “shed no light” on whether he had committed the crimes and only served to “paint” him in a “bad light” and “unfairly prejudice” the jury against him. Appellant's Br. p. 8. We are unconvinced. This evidence was probative of Walsh's obsession with and desire to control A.B., his mindset regarding what he felt he deserved from her, his belief that he had only done right by her, and his belief that she had lied and acted like she loved him. Walsh's communications, then, were relevant to shed light on his motive and intent at the time he had committed his offenses. See Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that evidence of motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime and that hostility is a paradigmatic motive) (citations omitted), trans. denied. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Walsh's post-release communications to A.B. and Stinnett.

[13] In any event, any error the trial court may have made in the admission of Walsh's post-release communications can only be considered harmless as cumulative of his similar pre-release communications, the admission of which Walsh does not challenge on appeal. A fair characterization of both the pre-and post-release communications is that they all, in varying degrees, express Walsh's love and/or hate for A.B. and his feelings of anger and betrayal. Errors in the admission of evidence “are to be disregarded as harmless unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.” Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An error in the admission of evidence may be harmless when the evidence is merely cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence. Id. Because the post-release communications convey the same anger, obsession, and claims of betrayal as the pre-release communications, any error the trial court may have made in their admission was harmless.

[14] Walsh also contends that the trial court prevented him from providing context to his post-release communications, which presumably would have mitigated their allegedly unfair prejudicial effect. Contrary to Walsh's claim on appeal, however, he was not prevented from providing context to evidence of his post-release communications to A.B. Walsh testified on direct examination that he had been upset that he had lost nine months of his life and “everything else” and explained that his communication with A.B. after his release from jail had been intended to make sure she showed up for trial because she had not shown up in August. Tr. Vol. III p. 36. Walsh was also allowed to testify to his alleged belief that A.B. had “stalled and didn't show up because she [said] that she was somewhere that she wasn't[,]” Tr. Vol. III p. 37, which, along with the evidence from A.B. that she had, in fact, checked into rehab in August of 2023, effectively conveyed his contention that A.B. had falsely claimed to be in rehab. The trial court did not prevent Walsh from providing the context to his post-release communications that he now claims he was prevented from doing.¹ Walsh has failed to establish that any of the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence amounted to error, much less reversible error.

[15] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   None of Walsh's post-release communications even mention the continuance of his trial, much less blame A.B. for having arranged it intentionally. Moreover, even if we were to assume that Walsh's post-release anger was genuinely based on his desire to get his trial over with and belief that A.B. was deliberately stalling, we are at something of a loss to see how any of this could be considered exculpatory. In the end, we largely agree with the trial court's statement on the record that “I don't see how the trial being vacated at that time for whatever reason it was vacated is relevant to whether or not -- I don't know how it makes a fact of whether or not this offense occurred more or less probable.” Tr. Vol. II p. 38.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.