IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of S.R. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Sh.R. (“Father”) appeals an order involuntarily terminating his parental rights over Sk.R. (“Child”), born May 12, 2016, upon the petition of the Delaware County Department of Child Services (“DCS”).¹ The sole, restated issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred when it terminated Father's parent-child relationship with Child.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November 2020, Child was in Father's physical custody, and Father was unaware of Mother's whereabouts. Father was arrested on two charges of auto theft and was incarcerated. Father left Child in his home in the care of Child's paternal grandmother, J.R. On November 22, while Father was still incarcerated, police responded to his home concerning a physical altercation involving J.R. and her roommate that took place in Child's presence. J.R., who appeared impaired, admitted to using methamphetamine while caring for Child, and a “meth pipe” was located in the bedroom where Child slept. Appealed Order at 2. DCS filed a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) petition, removed Child from Father's care, located Mother, and placed Child in Mother's care. The CHINS petition was ultimately dismissed the following month after Mother obtained custody of Child.

[4] DCS next became involved with Child in late April 2022 when it investigated an allegation of “educational neglect and delinquent dental care and oral hygiene” regarding Child. Id. Child had multiple teeth that were substantially decayed, his dental health was “very poor,” and he required surgery. Tr. at 54. Child also had “bruises and scratches throughout his body” and behavioral problems at school. Ex. v. I at 44. DCS was not “able to locate [ ] Father” at that time. Id. After DCS substantiated the above allegations but Mother failed to take the necessary steps to obtain the help Child needed, DCS filed another CHINS petition regarding Child in June 2022. However, DCS did not remove Child from Mother's care at that time. At the July 11 initial hearing at which both parents appeared, the court ordered Child to remain in Mother's home but admonished Mother regarding “the seriousness of the medical and educational condition of the child.” Id. at 48. The court further ordered that DCS had “discretion to offer supervised visits” to Father and to progress Father's visits to a less restrictive setting. Id. at 49.

[5] The following month, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS after Mother and Father executed a stipulation as to the facts contained in the June 2022 CHINS petition. The court then entered its dispositional decree in October, ordering Mother into reunification services and ordering Father to remain in contact with DCS, complete a parenting assessment, submit to random drug screens, participate in Fatherhood Engagement, and exercise supervised visitation with Child. Child remained in Mother's care.

[6] At a review hearing held in November 2022 at which Father did not appear, the court found that Father had not complied with the case plan, stayed in contact with DCS, engaged in services, or visited Child. At the next review hearing held in February 2023, the court found that Father had partially complied with the case plan by recently becoming engaged with DCS and was entitled to supervised visitation. The court gave discretion to DCS to “progress [Father's] visits to overnight and weekend visitation.” Id. at 90. The court ordered Child to remain in Mother's care. However, in May 2023, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, and services “were then incorporated to address Mother's substance abuse issues.” Appealed Order at 3.

[7] On June 5, 2023, the court held a permanency hearing which Father did not attend. The court found that Father had not complied with Child's case plan, had not maintained contact with DCS, and had attended only one fifteen-minute virtual visit with Child. The court further found that “[m]atters in the home were deteriorating due to Mother's substance abuse and inability to supervise.” Id. Mother “had begun locking [Child] in his room which was a safety hazard in the event of fire,” and she “lacked insight into the seriousness of this matter [as] expressed to her by” the DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”), the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”), and the family preservation service provider. Id. Mother had also tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. While the court ordered Child to remain in Mother's care, it also noted that another positive test result could prompt DCS to request Child's removal from Mother's care.

[8] The following month, the CASA requested that the court remove Child from Mother's care because he “continue[d] to be in danger of physical and emotional neglect.” Ex. v. 2 at 167. At the August review hearing, the court found that Father had not cooperated with DCS and had not visited Child since the one virtual visit in June. The court ordered Child to remain in Mother's care but ordered Mother into additional services.

[9] In September 2023, the CASA and family preservation service provider filed a motion to have Child and his sibling, J.B., removed from Mother's care due to her continued noncompliance with services and potential eviction from housing. The court granted that motion and placed Child and his sibling in the care of sibling's paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). At the subsequent November review hearing, the court found that neither parent was compliant with Child's case plan. The court found that Father had not engaged in services and had visited Child only once.

[10] In March 2024, the court found that Father had still failed to comply with Child's case plan, contact DCS, or engage in visitation or any other services. The court changed Child's permanency plan to adoption by Grandmother.

[11] On June 20, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate parental rights as to Child, with adoption by Grandmother as the permanency plan. Following the September 12, 2024, termination hearing, the court found that Father had “repeatedly been arrested during [Child's] childhood, and, in fact, was arrested and taken into custody at the conclusion of the [t]ermination ․ hearing for an outstanding warrant.” Appealed Order at 6. Father had taken one drug test and had tested positive for methamphetamine; Father did not take any other drug tests while the CHINS case was pending. The court further found that Father was referred to Fatherhood Engagement through Firefly but “engaged in only one supervised visit” with Child over a four-year period and “never again visited his son.” Id. And Father “lacked insight into how [his failure to visit Child] detrimentally affected” Child. Id. The court found that Grandmother was “able to provide a loving and stable home” for Child and his sibling. Id. at 7. Moreover, since Child's placement with Grandmother, Child had proper medical and dental care and was behaving appropriately in school and maintaining his academic performance. Both the CASA and FCM supported termination of Father's parental rights and opined that adoption was in Child's best interests.

[12] On October 24, 2024, the court entered its termination order, in which it concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by Mother or Father and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. The court also found that termination is in Child's best interests. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[13] We begin our review by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[14] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(5) (2024). In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C.§ 31-37-14-2).

[15] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied.

[16] Here, in terminating Father's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[17] The trial court's findings of fact include that Father: has been incarcerated repeatedly throughout Child's life; has failed to participate in and/or complete services; and has visited with Child only once in four years, and then only for fifteen minutes in a virtual visit. On appeal, Father does not challenge any of the factual findings made by the trial court. When findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

Conditions that Resulted in Removal/Continued Placement

[18] Father challenges the court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, and that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parental relationship poses a threat to Child. Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, we need only address whether the trial court erred in concluding that there exists a reasonable probability that Father will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside the home.

[19] When we consider the likelihood of remediation of conditions, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[20] However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted); see also In re M.S., 898 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the “trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development are permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship”). In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013). And DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Moore, 894 N.E.2d at 226.

[21] Here, the uncontested findings show that Child remained out of Father's care because Father failed to comply with the case plan, failed to participate in services, failed to participate in drug tests or tested positive for illegal drugs, failed to visit Child more than one brief time in a four-year period, and was repeatedly arrested and incarcerated due to criminal activity. Although Father testified that he had completed a substance abuse treatment program in December 2023, he failed to present any confirmation of the participation and completion to DCS or the court. In addition, at the time of the termination hearing, Father was unemployed and had not paid any child support for Child. And, although Father testified that he had stable housing, he provided no evidence of that other than his own testimony, and he was arrested at the end of the termination hearing on an outstanding warrant.

[22] The evidence most favorable to the judgment supports the trial court's conclusion that Father likely would not remedy the reasons Child remained out of his care since November 2020. Father's contentions to the contrary are simply requests that we reweigh the evidence and/or judge witness credibility, which we may not do. See, e.g., In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.

Best Interests of the Child

[23] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Such evidence, “in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[24] The evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that, throughout the CHINS and Termination of Parental Rights proceedings and even at the time of the termination hearing, Father was unable to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision for Child. Father visited Child only once in four years, failed and/or refused drug screens, was unemployed, and could not provide stable housing as shown by the facts of his repeated incarcerations and his arrest at the conclusion of the termination hearing. Moreover, the FCM and CASA testified that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests and that Child needs permanency which can be provided by Grandmother, who intended to adopt Child. Given that testimony, in addition to evidence that Child needs permanency and stability that Father cannot and/or will not provide and that the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement outside Father's home will not likely be remedied, we hold that the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that termination is in Child's best interests. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.

Conclusion

[25] The trial court's uncontested findings of fact support its judgment terminating Father's parental rights. The trial court did not clearly err.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's mother, B.I., (“Mother”) does not participate in this appeal but has filed a separate appeal under Case No. 24A-JT-2761.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.