Rodolfo S. Reyes, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Rodolfo S. Reyes repeatedly abused a child who lived in his house. He appeals his convictions of: (1) one count of Level 1 felony child molesting; (2) two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting; (3) two counts of Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years of age; and (4) one count of Level 6 felony intimidation. Reyes also appeals his sentence of seventy-eight and a half years. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, and that Reyes has failed to establish that his sentence should be revised, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Reyes raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions.

II. Whether Reyes’ sentence should be revised in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In July 2018, Brandy Seager ¹ and her four children moved into Reyes’ house after she ended her relationship with her then-husband, who was the father of her youngest child. Seager and Reyes began a romantic relationship after she moved into his house.

[4] The house had two bedrooms and one bathroom. Seager shared a bedroom with Reyes, and her three daughters slept in the other bedroom. Seager turned a sunroom into a bedroom for her son.

[5] Seager's oldest child, a daughter who the record identifies as Victim 1 (“V1”), was ten years old when they moved into Reyes’ home. Reyes wanted V1 to call him “Dad,” but she refused. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 178. Her biological father had committed suicide two years before, which caused her to attend therapy, but she kept him in her memories. Reyes became angry when any of the children disobeyed him. On several occasions, he locked one of V1's sisters in the girls’ bedroom by herself, with the lights off.

[6] Seager and her children lived in Reyes’ house until February 2019, when she obtained other housing. In 2021, when V1 was thirteen, Seager arranged for her to return to therapy because she showed signs of anxiety, anger, and depression. V1 also had recurring nightmares that would cause her to wake up screaming, and she had problems in school.

[7] On January 25, 2022, V1, still age thirteen, attempted suicide by overdosing on over-the-counter medication. She was taken to the hospital, and when she regained consciousness, she asked, “why it didn't work[?]” Id. at 245. After V1's medical team treated her for the overdose, they placed her in an inpatient mental health care unit. During her hospitalization, she disclosed that Reyes had repeatedly molested her.

[8] Almost a month after V1 was released from inpatient treatment, she participated in a forensic interview at a child interview center. She again disclosed that she had been sexually abused.

[9] V1 continued to regularly attend outpatient therapy for several years after attempting suicide, including during trial court proceedings in this case. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. V1 developed an eating disorder and showed symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Her therapist's diagnostic tools indicated she was dealing with severe trauma and her presentation during sessions was consistent with sexual abuse trauma.

[10] V1 disclosed that when she was ten years old and her family was living with Reyes, he called her a “whore” when she wore leggings or a crop top in the house. Id. at 209. He also “smack[ed] [her] around.” Id.

[11] Reyes molested V1 for the first time in October 2018. She was in her bedroom, and her mother and siblings were asleep in other rooms. Reyes entered V1's room, wearing only his underwear. He sat on her bed and showed her his penis, saying “[t]his is what a man has.” Id. at 195. Reyes made V1 touch his penis and stroke it until he ejaculated. When she resisted, he told her to “stop being a whore.” Id. at 196. Next, Reyes forced V1 to lay flat, and he pulled down her pants and underwear. He got on top of her and attempted to put his penis in her vagina, but she struggled against him. Reyes struck V1 on her face with an open hand. After she stopped struggling, he put three fingers in her vagina. Reyes removed his fingers when V1 threatened to tell others what he was doing. In response, he said that if she told anyone, “he would kill [V1's] mother and make [her] an orphan.” Id. at 199. V1 was scared and stayed silent.

[12] On another day, V1 was taking a shower while her mother and siblings were outside the house. Reyes entered the bathroom, slid open the shower door, and told her he would be waiting for her in her bedroom. A few minutes later, he loudly knocked on the door, frightening her. V1 stayed in the shower until the hot water ran out, and then she entered her bedroom wearing a towel. Reyes was in the room, alone. V1 thought Reyes was “just gonna apologize for the other night[,]” when he had assaulted her. Id. at 204. When she asked for an apology, he responded, “That's not what we do.” Id. at 206. Next, Reyes pushed V1 onto one of the beds and inserted three fingers into her vagina. He said she “was being a good whore.” Id. at 209. V1 told Reyes to stop and that what he was doing was wrong, but he said, “You're still gonna do what I say. Your mother's life's at risk.” Id. at 210. Reyes stopped assaulting V1 when Saeger entered the house.

[13] On a third occasion, V1 was trying to sleep very early one morning when Reyes entered her bedroom and approached her. She tried to fight him, but he said she “was still being a whore.” Id. at 214. Reyes grabbed V1 by the throat with both hands, lifted her up, and pushed her against a wall. She could not touch the ground. He squeezed her neck, causing her to feel severe pain and to fear for her life. Reyes told V1 that she needed to start listening, she needed to “start being a whore,” and she had “a mother and father who cares [sic] about me.” Id. at 215. Reyes stopped only when his alarm clock went off, and he returned to his bedroom. As V1 got ready for school, she saw bruises forming around her neck. She tried to cover them with makeup because she did not want to get into more trouble.

[14] On a fourth occasion, V1 was watching television in the sunroom during the day. Her mother was smoking on the front porch, and none of her siblings were at home. Reyes entered the room and told V1 that she needed to do her homework. V1 responded that she would not listen to him. He then threatened to do the “same thing” to her again. Id. at 226. V1 understood him to mean that he would sexually assault her again, but she decided she “was done with him telling [her] what to do.” Id. Reyes approached V1 where she was sitting, grabbed her by the neck with one hand, and pulled down her leggings. He put three fingers in her vagina, pushing in and out. V1 experienced great pain and tried to get up, but he held her down by her neck. He also groped her breasts. Reyes stopped when he heard the garage door open.

[15] On one other occasion, V1 was in her room, hanging up clothes in her closet, when Reyes entered the room and said he wanted to engage in sexual conduct with her and one of her sisters. V1 said she would tell the police if he involved her sister. Reyes put his hand on her rear, and she could tell he wanted to sexually assault her again. At that point, V1's sister entered the room and asked her to watch a movie. The girls left the room together.

[16] When V1 asked Reyes why he molested her, he said “it was [her] fault” and she “was asking for it.” Id. at 241. V1 attempted suicide after watching a video that reminded her of the things Reyes had said to her. She felt “alone” as she watched the video. Id. at 243.

[17] The State charged Reyes with the six felonies listed above. A jury determined Reyes was guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to seventy-eight and one-half years, with two and a half years suspended to probation. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Incredible Dubiosity

[18] Reyes claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, but he is not challenging the specific evidence that supports each of his convictions. Instead, Reyes argues that all of his convictions are supported exclusively by V1's testimony, and the Court should question the validity of her testimony because it is “inconsistent [and] uncorroborated.” Appellant's Br. p. 11.

[19] “When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is well established that our court does not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.” Smith v. State, 163 N.E.3d 925, 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). We will affirm a conviction “unless ‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)). “It is therefore not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Id. at 147 (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[20] “In general, the uncorroborated testimony of one victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This principle is often applied in criminal cases involving child abuse because those cases raise “distinctive evidentiary problems[,]” including that such abuse typically occurs in private. Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. 1995).

[21] Here, the particular kind of sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim Reyes raises is the doctrine of incredible dubiosity. Under this doctrine, an appellate court may impinge upon a jury's responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses only when confronted with testimony at trial that was so “ ‘unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.’ ” Carter v. State, 44 N.E.3d 47, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015)). “Incredible dubiosity is a difficult standard to meet, requiring ambiguous, inconsistent testimony that ‘runs counter to human experience.’ ” Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)). The incredible dubiosity rule has three requirements: “(1) a sole testifying witness; (2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and (3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id.

[22] Reyes argues that V1's testimony was uncorroborated, but he does not explain how her testimony was contradictory, equivocal, or coerced. V1 was sixteen when she testified at trial. Her testimony about the incidents described above was consistent and unequivocal on the key points: Reyes inserted his fingers in her vagina three separate times, groped her breasts, made her touch his penis, strangled her, slapped her, and repeatedly threated to kill her mother if she told anyone. V1 remembered the time frame for Reyes’ abusive acts, the rooms where they took place, and her age. There is no evidence that V1 was coerced to testify. We conclude that V1's testimony was not incredibly dubious and that the evidence against Reyes is sufficient as to each conviction. See Hobbs v. State, 160 N.E.3d 543, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (victims’ testimony in child molesting case not incredibly dubious; despite some contradictions in victims’ statements, their descriptions of key events were unequivocal), trans. denied.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[23] Reyes argues his sentence is an outlier that the Court should revise downward by an unstated amount. He further argues the trial court effectively imposed “a life sentence” upon him. Appellant's Br. p. 22.

[24] Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes the Court to review sentences. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) implements this authority, stating the Court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[25] Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is deferential to the trial court's decision, and “we avoid merely substituting our judgment” for that of the trial court. Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Instead, the main purpose of review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers.” Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018). “[W]e may look to any factors appearing in the record” in our review. Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[26] Reyes bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. “[W]e reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019).

[27] “When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. At the time Reyes committed his offenses, the advisory sentence for Level 1 felony child molesting was thirty years, with a maximum of fifty years and a minimum of twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(c) (2014). The advisory sentence for a Level 4 felony was six years, with a maximum of twelve years and a minimum of two years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). For a Level 5 felony, the advisory sentence was three years, with a maximum of six years and a minimum of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). And the advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony was one year, with a maximum of two and a half years and a minimum of six months. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019).

[28] The trial court sentenced Reyes as follows: (1) forty years for the Level 1 felony; (2) twelve years for both of the Level 4 felonies; (3) six years for both of the Level 5 felonies; (4) and two and a half years for the Level 6 felony, suspended to probation. The court ordered Reyes to serve all of his sentences consecutively. As a result, Reyes’ total executed sentence is seventy-six years, plus two and a half years on probation. Reyes’ executed sentence is far less than the maximum of eighty-eight and a half years.

[29] “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990. Reyes’ course of conduct can only be described as heinous. He repeatedly sexually abused V1 and subjected her to other physical violence and emotional abuse over a span of almost five months, from October 2018 until February 2019. He had many opportunities to reconsider his brutal acts against V1, but he chose to continue. Reyes argues that his offenses “occurred over a relatively contained timeframe,” Appellant's Br. p. 19, but he stopped only because Seager and her children moved out of his home, not because he chose to end his abusive conduct.

[30] Reyes was in a position of care, custody or control over V1 as her host, as Seager's romantic partner, and as someone who attempted to assume a fatherly role over Seager's children. He used his position to facilitate his abusive conduct. Indeed, Reyes's acts of sexual abuse against V1 were closely intertwined with his assertions of parental authority, such as when he sexually abused her after she refused his directive to do her homework.

[31] Reyes caused great pain to V1 when he penetrated her vagina with his fingers on three separate occasions. She explained that he was even more forceful when he was mad at her. Reyes slapped V1 on her face when she resisted touching his penis, further demonstrating that he freely used force to overcome her attempts at resisting molestation. In addition, Reyes’ act of strangling V1, which caused her to feel severe pain and terror for her life, was particularly dangerous. As Nancy Grant, who is both a sexual assault nurse examiner and an emergency room nurse, testified, strangulation can damage delicate but vital structures in a person's neck, cause brain damage, or cause a stroke.

[32] We also note that Reyes intimidated V1 by threatening Seager's life. That particular threat was especially frightening to V1, who had already lost her father and feared being an orphan if her mother died.

[33] Finally, the psychological harm that Reyes inflicted on V1 was far beyond what was necessary to commit the offenses. V1 has been diagnosed with major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Her symptoms include flashbacks, disordered sleep patterns, severe nightmares, and obsessive behaviors. Most tragically, V1 attempted suicide by overdose. After the State filed charges against Reyes, V1's stress and negative behaviors increased to the point that she committed an act of self-harm in the week before Reyes’ counsel took her deposition. At sentencing, V1 said that Reyes “took something from me I'll never get back, and that's something I have to live with for the rest of my life.” Tr. Vol. V, pp. 121-22. She added that when she goes to work, “all I see is him in everyone, and I still have to cope with that.” Id. at 123.

[34] Turning to the character of the offender, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990-91. Reyes was fifty-four years old at sentencing. He has an extensive criminal history, consisting of three felonies and eleven misdemeanors. One of his prior felony convictions is for attempted sexual assault. And Reyes accrued two of his misdemeanor convictions and one felony conviction after the State filed the current case. He has not been deterred from criminal conduct by his many contacts with the criminal justice system.

[35] Reyes argues that he had a troubled childhood marred by his father's alcoholism. But evidence of “a difficult childhood carries little mitigating weight[.]” Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ind. 2000). That standard applies with particular force here, where Reyes had many opportunities after reaching adulthood to lead a law-abiding life and refrain from abusing others, but he chose instead to repeatedly assault, intimidate, and humiliate V1. He has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his lengthy sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[36] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At that time, Seager had a different last name, but we will use the last name she provided at trial.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Judges May and Felix concur. May, J., and Felix, J., concur.