WALTON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Ricky Walton considers himself to be a “citizen journalist.” In that vain, Walton showed up to a scene where someone was having a medical emergency and began to film. The friends and family members of that person did not appreciate Walton filming the scene. A confrontation between Walton and others became loud and angry. During the hour-long episode, Walton yelled continuously, cursed, and insulted those present. Law enforcement attempted unsuccessfully to get Walton to stop yelling. Walton was arrested and later found guilty of disorderly conduct. Walton appeals and presents a single issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 21, 2023, there was a medical emergency at Melissa Katrine's home located in Henry County, Indiana. After EMTs arrived, Katrine heard yelling outside in front of her house. There, she discovered her sister, Jackie Ledbetter, having a “heated discussion” with Walton. Tr. Vol. II at 28. Walton had been recording the EMTs and Ledbetter's family members who were in the front yard. Walton considers himself a journalist and livestreams “hours and hours of footage of Henry County government activity” on Facebook. Id. at 54. Initially, Walton started recording the incident on his cell phone but switched to “different camera equipment.” Id. at 38. Ledbetter asked Walton to stop filming, but “he wouldn't stop and told [her] that it was his right to.” Id. Katrine convinced Ledbetter to come inside the house, and, as they were walking away, Walton called Ledbetter a “c[*]nt,” id. at 31, and “continued to say words,” id. at 39.

[4] Once they were inside, Katrine called law enforcement because she felt “[the police] could deal with [Walton].” Tr. Vol. II at 32. Officer Ellis Evans arrived at Katrine's house, and, as he was walking up to the house, he could hear “Walton yelling in different various capacities.” Id. at 61. Officer Evans asked Walton to stop yelling and warned him of disorderly conduct; Walton responded that “it was against his rights,” id. at 41, law enforcement “wouldn't silence him, and he had the right to record and speak ․ freely,” id. at 62. In order to avoid Walton's distractions, Officer Evans then asked Katrine and Ledbetter if they could all go inside the house to avoid the noise. At this point, Walton's yelling had caused neighbors to start looking out their windows to see what was going on.

[5] Once they went inside, Officer Evans could still hear Walton yelling “profanity and other different statements” outside, Tr. Vol. II at 63, including calling Ledbetter a “b[*]tch” and making comments about her genitals, id. at 66. Lieutenant Hedges also arrived on scene and came inside the house to investigate the situation. Officer Evans and Lieutenant Hedges separately exited the house while questioning Katrine and Ledbetter to ask Walton to stop yelling. Officer Evans told Walton that this was “twice in a row” that he had told Walton to stop yelling. Id. at 63. Walton replied, “You can't f[*]cking count. It's been three times.” Id. at 64. In sum, law enforcement officers were on the scene for “over an hour,” and Walton “[c]ontinuously” yelled that entire time. Id. at 65. The State charged Walton with disorderly conduct as a Class B misdemeanor. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Walton guilty as charged and sentenced him to 180 days in jail with 60 days suspended. Walton now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Walton's Conviction

[6] Walton argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for disorderly conduct as a Class B misdemeanor. Our Supreme Court has explained our standard of review for such a claim as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025).

[7] In order to convict Walton of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct under Indiana Code section 35-45-1-3(a)(2), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Walton “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally [made] unreasonable noise and continue[d] to do so after being asked to stop.” Walton argues only that the disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was engaged in speech that was protected by the Indiana Constitution.¹ We cannot agree.

[8] Initially, the State argues that Walton has waived this argument for appellate review by failing to raise the constitutional claim at the trial court. “Generally, the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising the Constitutional challenge waives the issue on appeal.” Payne v. State, 484 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. 1985) (citing Newton v. State, 456 N.E.2d 736, 739 (1983)). However, both our Supreme Court and this court have “considered constitutional challenges even when the defendant has failed to file such a motion.” McBride v. State, 94 N.E.3d 703, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Burke v. State, 943 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Payne, 484 N.E.2d at 18). We choose to consider the merits of Walton's claim.

[9] Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits the legislature from “passing any law ‘restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever.’ However, this clause is not absolute, and provides that: ‘but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.’ ” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 442 (Ind. 2022) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Ind. Const. art. 1, § 9). “Under this freedom-and-responsibility standard, the legislature's ‘sole authority over expression is to sanction individuals who commit abuse.’ ” Id. (quoting Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind. 1993)).

[10] Our Supreme Court has explained our analysis for as applied challenges to our disorderly conduct statute:

We employ a two-step inquiry in reviewing the constitutionality of an application of the disorderly conduct statute: we (1) “determine whether state action has restricted a claimant's expressive activity” and (2) “decide whether the restricted activity constituted an ‘abuse’ of the right to speak.” Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996). The first prong may be satisfied based solely on the police restricting a claimant's loud speaking during a police investigation. Id. at 1370. The second prong hinges on whether the restricted expression constituted political speech. Id. at 1369–70.

Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind. 2011). Here, the record shows that law enforcement officers restricted Walton's speech while they were investigating the call, so we move to step two. See id.

[11] If the defendant demonstrates by an objective standard that the impaired expression was political speech, “the impairment is unconstitutional unless the State demonstrates that the magnitude of the impairment is slight or that the speech amounted to a public nuisance such that it inflict[ed] particularized harm analogous to tortious injury on readily identifiable private interests.” Barnes, 946 N.E.2d at 577 (quoting Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1369–70) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, if the expression is ambiguous in context, the speech is not political. Id. “Where expression is not political, we must apply rationality review in determining whether the state could reasonably have concluded that the defendant's expressive activity, because of its volume, was an ‘abuse’ of the right to speak or was, in other words, a threat to peace, safety, and well-being.” Jordan v. State, 37 N.E.3d 525, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1371).

[12] “Expressive activity is political, for the purposes of the responsibility clause, if its point is to comment on government action and includes criticizing the conduct of an official acting under color of law.” Jordan, 37 N.E.3d at 531 (citing Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370). The expression is not political when it “focuses on the conduct of a private party—including the speaker himself or herself.” Id. (quoting Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370). Here, Walton claims that his speech was political because “the overall focus of his statements and actions was to criticize the police.” Appellant's Br. at 12. We cannot agree.

[13] Walton's expression principally was speech directed at private parties—Ledbetter and Katrine. Before law enforcement even arrived, Walton had been yelling and cursing at Ledbetter. Walton's loud and obnoxious behavior caused other family members to come out of the house to observe what was happening. All this, of course, was occurring while the family was in the middle of a medical emergency for a guest at the home. When law enforcement officers began telling Walton to stop talking, he stated that it “was against his rights,” Tr. Vol. II at 41, and told officers that they “wouldn't silence him, and he had the right to record and speak,” id. at 62. Walton also made antagonizing statements, such as telling Officer Evans that he “can't f[*]cking count,” id. at 64, and calling Ledbetter a “b[*]tch” while making comments about her genitals, id. at 66.

[14] We look at two decisions from this court to determine whether the overall focus of Walton's comments were political in nature. In Blackman v. State, while law enforcement was conducting a narcotics investigation on her brother, Blackman became “loud” and “belligerent.” 868 N.E.2d 579, 582–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. When law enforcement officers conducted a pat-down search, Blackman commented “this [is] unconstitutional,” and we determined that this speech was political “because she was criticizing the conduct of the officers.” Id. at 585–86 (alteration in original). After the search yielded no evidence, a law enforcement officer asked Blackman to leave but she refused, shouting that “she had every right to be there [and] that she did not have to leave the scene.” Id. at 583. We determined that this statement “constituted expression focused on the conduct of a private party, Blackman herself.” Id. at 586. Ultimately we concluded that Blackman's speech started as political but did not end as such due to the “dual nature of Blackman's outbursts, ․ her unreasonable noise levels, her refusal to comply with the officers’ instructions, and the resulting disruption of the police investigation.” Id. Thus, we determined that Blackman's expression was ambiguous as to whether it was commenting on government action or the conduct of a private party and, in turn, found the expression was not political. Id.

[15] Walton argues that his situation is more analogous to our decision in Jordan v. State. There, a law enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop on Jordan and she became “belligerent” when the officer asked her if she had a weapon in the car. 37 N.E.3d at 528. She responded by yelling at the officer, stating that he “was just asking because she was Black” and asking “[w]hy would [I] have a weapon, so on and so forth.” Id. After multiple officers asked her to stop yelling, she continued to tell the officers that they “just stopped her because she was Black, ․ needed religion,” and “couldn't handle a Black woman.” Id. We concluded “that Jordan's overall complaint and the aim or focus of her statements was to criticize the actions of the police, and thus her speech was political.” Id. at 533.

[16] The present case is more akin to that in Blackman. Walton did claim that the police conduct was against his rights, but the remaining statements are comments directed at private parties. The statements Walton made concerning his right to be there and that he was not doing anything wrong are comments focused on the conduct of a private party (himself), see Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 586, and his antagonizing comments to Ledbetter and Officer Evans were not criticisms of government action. At most, Walton's statement telling Officer Evans that he could not count is ambiguous as to whether the expression is political. Thus, we conclude that the overall focus of Walton's speech was not political, and his speech is subject to rationality review. See id.; Jordan, 37 N.E.3d at 531.

[17] “Rationality inquiry under § 9 has historically centered on whether the impingement created by the statute is outweighed by the public health, welfare, and safety served.” McBride, 94 N.E.3d at 712 (citing Price, 622 N.E.2d at 960 n.7). Under this review, we determine “whether the State could reasonably have concluded that [the defendant's] expressive activity was an abuse of the right to speak.” Id. at 711 (citing Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1371). Here, Walton continued to yell, including profanities at both law enforcement and Ledbetter, for “over an hour” at a volume that law enforcement officers could hear across the street, describing it to be as loud as someone yelling at a sporting event. Tr. Vol. II at 65, 69. Walton's yelling was so disruptive that neighbors started looking out their windows to see what was going on. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Walton's conduct was an abuse of the right to speak. See McBride, 94 N.E.3d at 711–12. Accordingly, we conclude that the State provided sufficient evidence to support Walton's conviction, and we affirm the trial court's decision.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Walton does not raise a federal constitutional claim pursuant to the First Amendment.

Felix, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.