ALEXANDER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bruce Alexander, Jr., appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for murder, a felony.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Alexander raises the following two restated issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence regarding a prior shooting.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his proposed jury instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 31, 2021, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Cristen Crouch went to visit her friend, Charlie Moore, at Moore's mother's home at the Spring Gardens Apartment Complex. When Crouch arrived, Jeremy Dumas was walking outside. Dumas approached Moore's mother's apartment, and Dumas and Moore had a “tense” conversation about Moore's brother that turned “argumentative.” Tr. v. 3 at 17-18. Moore went into the bathroom of her mother's apartment and contacted Alexander with her friend's cell phone. Moore asked Alexander to come help her “handle” the situation, and Alexander told her he was on his way. Id. at 21. Moore told Alexander that she felt threatened by Dumas and that he was “bothering her.” Id.

[4] The same night, Willie James left a friend's home at around 10:00 p.m. and started to drive to his sister's home. James was driving a silver Chevrolet Malibu. While James was driving, Alexander called him and asked for a ride to Spring Gardens Apartments to see his girlfriend, Moore. James agreed and picked up Alexander, who got into the front passenger seat of James’ car. James then drove to Spring Gardens Apartments. James missed the turn to enter the apartment complex, so he made a U-turn near the front entrance. Alexander told James to stop in the right lane instead of entering the apartment complex, and James did so.

[5] While the two men were sitting in the car in the right lane, Alexander spoke with someone on the phone, but James did not hear their conversation. After he ended his phone conversation, Alexander told James they could leave. James then noticed a person later identified as Dumas coming out of the Spring Gardens entrance on a bicycle. Dumas turned onto the sidewalk on Teal Road, and James drove away from the Spring Gardens entrance. Alexander then rolled down the passenger-side window of James’ vehicle and shot at Dumas multiple times, hitting him in the arm and abdomen. James then asked Alexander, “Did you shoot at somebody?” and Alexander responded that he “didn't know.” Tr. v. 2 at 196. James drove to his sister's home, and Alexander walked home.

[6] While still at Moore's mother's house, Crouch heard gunshots about “5 to 10 minutes” after Moore had ended her phone conversation with Alexander. Tr. v. 3 at 23. At some point that night, Moore told Crouch that Alexander had shot Dumas. Moore told Crouch and her other friends to delete their phone messages and to claim they “didn't know anything” if asked about the shooting. Id. at 27. Moore “threaten[ed]” that “she was going to do something” if her friends told the police anything about the shooting. Id.

[7] At approximately 10:40 p.m., officers were dispatched to the location of the shooting. They found Dumas lying on the sidewalk, and “he appeared to be in agony.” Tr. v. 2 at 164. Dumas had multiple gunshot wounds, including one to the chest, and had “an extremely hard time speaking” but stated that he could not breathe. Id. He was in a “very bad state” and was “not very responsive.” Id. at 164, 170. An officer applied chest seals to prevent air from entering Dumas's chest cavity, and medical personnel eventually took over, but Dumas died from his injuries.

[8] The next day, James called Alexander and told him to watch the news because it was reporting a death by Spring Gardens Apartments. Alexander responded that he had already seen it and told James to “be cool.” Id. at 203. On September 1, 2021, Alexander sent a Snapchat message to Moore instructing her to “make sure that car is cleared out.” Ex. 85AR, Ex. v. 5 at 184. Moore informed him that a friend had moved the car. On September 3, 2021, Moore sent Alexander a message that said, “THE FUCKING POLICE IS [sic] HERE[,]” and Alexander responded, “I love yu [sic.]” Id. at 192 (emphasis in original). Alexander asked Moore if she could get away, and, when Moore responded that she was under the sink, Alexander told her to “stay quiet” and contact him when the officers left. Id. at 193. He told Moore that “this is important,” and Moore stated, “they really tryna [sic] get us.” Id. at 193-94. Alexander subsequently left Indiana.

[9] Officers found eight 9-millimeter Spear cartridge cases on Teal Road near where Dumas had been shot and collected surveillance footage from businesses in the area. Officers identified a silver Chevrolet Malibu in the surveillance footage. On September 3, 2021, Captain Adam Mellady with the Lafayette Police Department located the silver Malibu. Officers learned that the owner of the vehicle was James. They found an empty handgun holster near the vehicle's center console. Officers performed an extraction of the phone that Moore used to call Alexander and discovered the calls made to Alexander. Officers also obtained Snapchat records of the September 3, 2021, conversation between Alexander and Moore in which they discussed hiding from the police.

[10] On August 20, 2021, eleven days before the shooting of Dumas, Detective Adam Ransom with the Lafayette Police Department was dispatched to a scene of an alleged shooting at 24th and Central Streets. At that location, police found five cartridge cases from a Spear Luger 9-millimeter at the scene. A firearm toolmark examiner with the Indiana State Police Laboratory determined that the cartridge cases found at the scene were Spear Luger cartridges fired from the same unidentified firearm as the cartridge cases found at the scene of Dumas's murder. Surveillance footage of the August 20 shooting showed a “white colored passenger vehicle” driving by while the sounds of “gunfire” could be heard. Tr. v. 3 at 88. Officers learned that the white passenger vehicle in the footage was “consistent with” the white Chevrolet Cruze that Moore had used in the past and in which a subpoena for Moore had been found. Id. at 89. Police also found an empty Spear Lawman 9-millimeter ammunition box in the Chevrolet Cruze.

[11] On May 20, 2022, the State charged Alexander with Dumas's murder; perjury, as a Level 6 felony;² a firearm enhancement;³ and thirteen other offenses. Alexander filed a motion in limine to exclude “[a]ny reference to [the] ‘same gun’ recovered firearm [sic] vs. [the] firearm alleged to have been used ․ without proper foundation.” App. v. 2 at 126. The trial court granted the motion to the extent that the State would be required to establish a proper foundation before offering such evidence.

[12] During Alexander's subsequent jury trial, Detective Ransom testified to his investigation of the August 20 shooting, over Alexander's objections. State's exhibits 57 through 73, photographs of the August 20 crime scene and the cartridge casings found there, were admitted into evidence over Alexander's objection. The court also admitted the testimony of the firearm toolmark examiner and evidence of a white Chevy Cruze “consistent with” the vehicle seen in the surveillance footage and the ammunition box found in the white Chevy Cruze. Tr. v. 3 at 89. Alexander objected to evidence related to the August 20 shooting on the grounds that the evidence was unduly prejudicial and that the incidents were eleven days apart and involved separate parties.⁴ The trial court admitted this evidence over Alexander's objection.

[13] Alexander requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. However, the trial court denied that request because it found that “the evidence presented to the jury did not support a finding of sudden heat.” App. v. 2 at 87. Alexander was found guilty of all counts but, due to double jeopardy concerns, was ultimately convicted only of murder with a firearm enhancement and perjury. The trial court sentenced Alexander to consecutive sentences of fifty-eight years with a fifteen-year firearm sentencing enhancement for murder and two years for perjury, for an aggregate sentence of seventy-five years. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Admission of Evidence

[14] Alexander asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the shooting that took place on August 20, 2021: specifically, (1) surveillance footage of the August 20 shooting suggesting that it was a drive-by shooting and that a white Chevy Cruze driven by Moore was involved, (2) evidence that an empty Spear Lawman 9-millimeter ammunition box was subsequently found in the white Chevy Cruze, and (3) evidence that the shell casings collected from the scene of the August 20 shooting were fired from the same firearm as the shell casings found at the scene of Dumas’ murder.⁵ Alexander contends that such evidence is “evidence of prior misconduct” whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, citing Indiana Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b).

[15] We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 176 (Ind. 2017); see also, e.g., Wallace v. State, 79 N.E.3d 992, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“The weighing of the probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court.”). Thus, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. See Wallace, 79 N.E.3d at 997; see also Wilcoxson v. State, 132 N.E.3d 27, 31-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting trial courts are given wide latitude in weighing the probative value of evidence against the prejudice caused by its admission), trans. denied. And we may affirm a trial court's judgment on any theory supported by the evidence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted).

[16] Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a material fact more or less probable. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Evid. R. 402. Pursuant to Rule of Evidence 403:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

Rule of Evidence 404(b) further provides, in relevant part:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

[17] All relevant evidence is necessarily prejudicial in a criminal prosecution. Bowman v. State, 73 N.E.3d 731, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. In evaluating whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded, we look for the dangers (1) that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or (2) that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury. Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation and citation omitted). “The effect of Rule 404(b) is that evidence is excluded only when it is introduced to prove the ‘forbidden inference’ of demonstrating the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime.” Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[18] The State asserts that the evidence regarding the firearm used in the August 20 shooting at which Moore and Alexander were present was not evidence of a prior “bad act” but rather evidence merely tending to show that Alexander “had access to the murder weapon through his connection with Moore.” Appellee's Br. at 13. “Evidence that a defendant had access to a weapon of the type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.” Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Thompson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. Such is the case here; the evidence that Alexander had access to the weapon used in the August 20 shooting and that that weapon was the same one used to kill Dumas was relevant to and probative of Alexander's opportunity to murder Dumas.⁶

[19] The State further notes that possessing a firearm is not, alone, an illegal “bad” act. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 175 (Ind. 1997) (noting “[i]t is by no means clear that weapons possession, evidence of gun sales, and the like, are necessarily prior ‘bad acts’ for 404(b) purposes.”). Moreover, “evidence that creates a mere inference of prior bad conduct does not fall within the parameters of Rule 404(b).” Rogers, 897 N.E.2d at 960 n.3 (citing Williams, 690 N.E.2d at 175) (holding that, to the extent possession of a knife implied misconduct, it was a mere inference of misconduct that did not fall under the purview of Rule 404(b)). Thus, while the evidence here may have created an inference that Alexander illegally shot at someone on August 20, such an inference does not fall within the parameters of Rule 404(b). See id.

[20] However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court erred in admitting the challenged evidence, any such error was harmless as there was substantial independent evidence to support Alexander's murder conviction. An error is harmless where “its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Appellate Rule 66(A); see also, e.g., Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012) (observing error is harmless “if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.”). Here, the State presented substantial independent evidence that Alexander murdered Dumas, including: testimony by multiple witnesses implicating him in the crime charged;⁷ surveillance video evidence connecting him to the crime; evidence of Snapchat messages in which Alexander asked Moore about moving the car used in the August 20 shooting and instructed her to hide from the police; and evidence that Alexander fled the State soon thereafter. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (holding that evidence of flight or additional attempts to evade arrest may be considered circumstantial evidence of guilt). Given that substantial evidence, we are satisfied that any error in admitting the challenged evidence likely did not contribute to the conviction.

Jury Instructions

[21] Alexander appeals the trial court's denial of his request for a jury instruction regarding manslaughter. Our standard of review upon claims of instructional error is well-settled:

The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. In reviewing a trial court's decision to give [or refuse] a tendered jury instruction, we consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law, (2) is supported by the evidence in the record, and (3) is not covered in substance by other instructions. The trial court has discretion in instructing the jury, and we will reverse only when the instructions amount to an abuse of discretion. To constitute an abuse of discretion, the instructions given must be erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.

Phillips v. State, 22 N.E.3d 749, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Munford v. State, 923 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)), trans. denied. We will not reverse on the basis of instructional error unless the defendant shows that the probable impact of the error upon a reasonable, average jury affected the defendant's substantial rights and, thus, undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding in light of all the evidence in the case. See, e.g., Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 66).

[22] Alexander's proposed jury instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter was as follows:

The crime of voluntary manslaughter is defined by law as follows: A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another [human being] [a fetus that has attained viability] while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2 felony. [The offense is a Level 1 felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.]

The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder to voluntary manslaughter. In addition to the elements below, which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, for the defendant to be found guilty the killing must have also been committed under sudden heat. Evidence of sudden heat may be found in either the State's evidence or the Defendant's. But to convict for voluntary manslaughter, there must be some evidence of sudden heat.

Before you may convict the Defendant of manslaughter [as] a Level 2 felony, the State must [have] proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) The Defendant

(2) Knowingly or intentionally

(3) Killed

(4) Jeremy Dumas

(5) Via a deadly weapon

If the State did prove each of elements 1 through 4 beyond a reasonable doubt but failed to prove element 5 beyond a reasonable doubt, you may find the Defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2 felony, a lesser included offense of Count 1.

Case: Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566 (Ind. 2018)

App. v. 2 at 91-92.

[23] Although the first paragraph and first sentence of the second paragraph of Alexander's proposed jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter were correct statements of the law as provided in Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-3, the remainder of the instruction was incorrect and would have misled and confused a jury. Specifically, the remainder of the instruction suggests that Alexander could be convicted of manslaughter even if there was no evidence of sudden heat; that is an incorrect statement of the law, as voluntary manslaughter is proven only when a person knowingly or intentionally kills another person “while acting under sudden heat.” I.C. § 35-42-1-3. The instruction also incorrectly states that use of a deadly weapon is an element of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Alexander's proposed instruction because it was an incorrect statement of the law.

[24] The trial court also acted within its discretion to the extent it rejected Alexander's proposed voluntary manslaughter instruction because it was not supported by evidence in the record.

To obtain a conviction for murder, the State is not required to negate the presence of sudden heat because “[t]here is no implied element of the absence of sudden heat in the crime of murder.” Earl v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 1999). However, once a defendant places sudden heat into issue, the State then bears the burden of negating the presence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt. McBroom v. State, 530 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ind. 1988).

Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (Ind. 2000). “[I]f there is no serious evidentiary dispute over sudden heat, it is error for a trial court to instruct a jury on voluntary manslaughter in addition to murder.” Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 2008).

[25] Evidence of sudden heat is evidence of

anger, rage, resentment, or terror sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, preventing deliberation and premeditation, excluding malice, and rendering a person incapable of cool reflection. Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind. 2001). Anger alone is not sufficient to support an instruction on sudden heat. Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 474 (Ind. 1998). Nor will words alone “constitute sufficient provocation to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter,” and this is “especially true” when the words at issue are not intentionally designed to provoke the defendant, such as fighting words. Allen v. State, 716 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ind. 1999).

Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; see also Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 462 (Ind. 2023) (citation omitted) (“Indiana law ․ provides a clear and discernible bright-line rule: anger alone cannot provoke sudden heat.”).

[26] Alexander points to no evidence of sudden heat in the record that would support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. He notes that Moore had called him over half an hour before he shot Dumas to tell him that she and Dumas had been engaged in a verbal altercation earlier in the evening that left Moore feeling “threatened” and “bothered” by Dumas. Tr. v. 3 at 20-21. However, there was no evidence that Dumas did anything to Moore other than verbally argue with her. Further, the evidence shows that Dumas had already walked away from the verbal argument with Moore by the time Moore called Alexander, and that he was riding away from her location when Alexander shot him. Those facts would not provoke so much rage, resentment, or terror that it would obscure the reasoning of an ordinary person and lead him to shoot a man actively moving away from the scene of a verbal argument with a third person. The trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent it determined that there was no evidence to support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the August 20, 2021, shooting and rejected Alexander's proposed jury instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-2-1(a).

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-11.

4.   Alexander did not object to the admission of an interview with Detective Kevin Miller in which Alexander appeared to admit that he and Moore were “involved” in the August 20 shooting. Ex. 86 at 47:53.

5.   In one sentence of his brief, Alexander also references his statement to police in which he indicates that he was involved in the August 20 shooting. However, because Alexander did not object to the admission of that evidence at trial and has not claimed fundamental error on appeal, he has waived any challenge to that evidence. See, e.g., Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1239 (Ind. 2012).

6.   Alexander stresses that the August 20 shooting happened eleven days before Dumas’ murder and was not shown to involve Dumas. However, those facts do not undermine the relevance of the August 20 shooting to Alexander's access to and opportunity to obtain the murder weapon.

7.   Alexander asserts that the direct evidence of James’ testimony that Alexander was the person who shot Dumas was not credible because James testified under a grant of immunity and had a motive for saying that someone other than himself shot Dumas. However, the issue of James’ credibility is one for the jury, and we will not judge credibility of witnesses on appeal. See, e.g., Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 698 (Ind. 2005) (“[I]t is the jury's role to weigh the evidence and assess a witness's credibility.”).

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.